Facts:

The petitioners were appointed as Presiding Officers prior to the substitution of Section 6 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993. The original provision mandated a term of office until attaining the age of 62 or completing five years, whichever was earlier. The provision was substituted by Act 44 of 2016, effective from September 1, 2016, extending the term of office until the age of 65 or completing five years. At the time of the substitution, the petitioners had not completed five years but were attaining the age of 62.

Issues:

The applicability of the amended provision of Section 6 to the petitioners, considering their appointment prior to the substitution of the provision.

Held:

The Court held that the amended provision of Section 6 applies to the petitioners as well. Thus, they are entitled to continue working as Presiding Officers until they attain the age of 65 or complete five years' term before reaching the age of 65.

The Court interpreted the term "substitution" in legislative terms, noting that it effectively replaces the old provision with the new one. This means that the new provision operates as if it had been in place from the beginning, unless there is a clear intention otherwise.

Legislative intent was crucial in determining the applicability of the amended provision. The purpose behind amending Section 6 was to reduce the burden of pending cases by increasing the age limit of judges. Thus, a purposive interpretation of the statute was necessary to achieve the legislative objective.

The Court emphasized that the benefit of the amended provision extends to all Presiding Officers serving on the date when the amendment took effect. Consequently, those incumbents are governed by the substituted provision as if it were the only provision in force.

Decision: The Court allowed the matters and held that the amended provision of Section 6 applies to the petitioners, allowing them to continue their tenure as Presiding Officers until the age of 65 or completion of five years' term, whichever is earlier.

Facts:

The petitioners, personnel of the Army Service Corps (ASC), challenged their posting orders to operational units/areas issued by the Respondents.

The petitioners contended that their postings violated their Fundamental Rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

The Respondents argued that the postings were within the discretion of the competent authority and were in line with organizational effectiveness and operational requirements.

Issues:

Whether the Writ Petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution are maintainable?

Whether the posting orders of the petitioners to operational areas/units are valid in view of previous judicial decisions?

Whether the postings of the petitioners violate any statutory rules, executive policies, or instructions?

Held:

The Writ Petitions were not maintainable under Article 32 as there was no violation of Fundamental Rights. The petitioners had an alternate statutory remedy available through the Armed Forces Tribunals.

The previous judicial decision, Lt. Col. P.K. Choudhary's Case, regarding promotions did not apply to posting orders. Different streams of the Army, including the ASC, have distinct roles, and the ASC is considered operational. Therefore, the posting orders were valid.

The petitioners failed to demonstrate any violation of statutory rules, executive policies, or instructions regarding their postings.

The oath administered to all personnel binds them to serve wherever ordered, regardless of their arm or service.

Consequently, the Court dismissed the Writ Petitions with no order as to costs.

Facts:The appellant was intercepted by a raiding party while walking on the road. A search revealed the possession of 1.5 kgs of charas and Rs. 2,400/- cash. The appellant challenged his conviction, alleging non-compliance with sections 42 and 50 of the Act.

Issues:

Whether the provisions of section 42 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 were applicable to the circumstances of the case.

Whether there was compliance with the requirements of section 50(1) regarding the search of the appellant.

Held:

The court held that section 42, including recording of information received by the empowered officer, is not mandatory when the offence under the Act was not committed in a building, conveyance, or an enclosed place. In this case, the interception occurred in a public place, rendering section 42 inapplicable.

Section 43 applies to situations where the seizure and arrest take place in a public place, including places accessible to the public. The court found that the location of the interception fell within the definition of a "public place" under section 43.

Compliance with section 50(1) regarding search of a person by the empowered officer is mandatory. Since the search conducted by PW-2 involved the appellant's person, section 50 applied. Both PW-2 and PW-4 informed the appellant of his right to be searched in the presence of a gazetted officer or a magistrate.

The option given to the appellant to search PW-2 before conducting his own search did not vitiate the process. The search was conducted in the presence of PW-4, a gazetted officer, in compliance with section 50(1).

Decision: The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the conviction of the appellant. It held that there was strict compliance with the legal requirements regarding search and seizure under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

Facts:

The appellant, R.S. Sehrawat, a Junior Engineer in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD), was implicated in a writ petition alleging unauthorized construction and subsequent demolition.

The High Court initiated contempt proceedings against him based on allegations of filing a false affidavit.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's finding of guilt against the appellant for filing a false affidavit was justified.

Whether the appellant was given fair opportunity and whether charges were properly framed against him.

Held:

The Supreme Court found that the High Court failed to properly consider the appellant's defense, which was supported by contemporaneous official records.

The burden of proof in contempt proceedings is high and must be established beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court did not meet this standard.

The Court criticized the High Court for not framing formal charges against the appellant and proceeding unjustly.

Consequently, the Supreme Court quashed the High Court's judgment and orders, and dropped the show cause notices issued to the appellant.

Facts:

The petitioner sought a writ to ban the novel 'Meesha', alleging that it insulted and derogated temple-going women and had the potential to disturb public order and decency.

Issues:

Whether the novel 'Meesha' should be banned on the grounds alleged by the petitioner.

The extent to which freedom of speech and expression should be curtailed.

Held:

The court emphasized the importance of freedom of expression in literature and the dangers of stifling creativity. Literature represents the freedom to express oneself, and creativity should not be choked or smothered.

Intellectual freedom is crucial for the flourishing of literary freedom, and any obstruction to free speech and expression leads to intellectual repression.

While the freedom enjoyed by an author is not absolute, the court's duty is to ensure that any restriction imposed falls within the reasonable parameters of Article 19(2).

Readers should approach creative works with maturity and tolerance, appreciating them for their manifestation of imagination.

Courts should refrain from interfering with creative works unless they violate the law. Imposing restrictions based on subjective perceptions would amount to censorship.

Decision: The court dismissed the writ petition, upholding the freedom of speech and expression and emphasizing the importance of safeguarding creativity in literature.

Facts:

The appellant, a teacher at Rani Chennamma School, Hospet, assaulted a second standard student (PW-2) with a wooden stick for not wearing uniform shoes, resulting in injury to the student's left eye.

The Trial Court initially acquitted the appellant, citing contradictions in the evidence of eyewitnesses and alleging that the injured child witness (PW-2) was tutored before his testimony.

The High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellant under Section 326 IPC, sentencing him to two years of imprisonment.

Issues:

Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellant.

Whether the conviction under Section 326 IPC was appropriate or if it should be modified.

Held:

The Supreme Court examined the evidence presented in the case.

Regarding the tutoring allegation of the child witness (PW-2), the Court found that being a child witness, PW-2 needed guidance to understand court proceedings and testify truthfully.

Contradictions in the testimony of eyewitnesses (PW-3 and PW-4) were deemed immaterial, especially as their evidence was supported by PW-5 and medical evidence.

The Court modified the conviction from Section 326 IPC to Section 325 IPC (voluntarily causing grievous hurt), as there was no evidence to show that the stick used by the appellant was a dangerous weapon.

The sentence of imprisonment was reduced to one year, with an additional fine of Rs.50,000. In default of payment, the appellant would undergo three months of imprisonment.

The fine amount was ordered to be paid as compensation to the injured student (PW-2).

The appellant was given four weeks to surrender, failing which he would be taken into custody to serve the remaining sentence. The appeal is partly allowed.

Facts:

The appellant was injured in a tractor accident due to rash and negligent driving.

He filed a claim petition seeking compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Evidence was presented regarding the circumstances of the accident and the extent of the appellant's injuries.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's travel in the tractor breached policy terms.

Determination of just and proper compensation for the appellant's injuries.

Held:

The High Court found that the appellant traveled in the tractor in breach of policy conditions.

The insurance company was directed to pay compensation to the appellant but with the liberty to recover it from the tractor owner.

The compensation amount determined by the tribunal and upheld by the High Court was deemed just and proper.

The tribunal's assessment of permanent disability at 60% was upheld as reasonable.

The appellant's claim for enhancement of compensation was rejected.

The appeals were partly allowed, directing the insurance company to pay the compensation amount to the appellant with the liberty to recover it from the tractor owner.

Facts:

A writ petition was filed before the Bombay High Court by Tasneem Rizwan Siddiquee, seeking a writ of habeas corpus for the production of her husband who was allegedly unlawfully detained by the police.

The husband was in police custody pursuant to a remand order passed by the jurisdictional Magistrate in connection with FIR No. I-31/2018.

The High Court allowed the writ petition, directing the release of Siddiquee's husband and making strong remarks against the police officials involved.

Aggrieved by the High Court's decision, the appellants appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether a writ of habeas corpus could be maintained when a person is in police custody under a valid remand order?

Whether the scathing remarks made by the High Court against the police officials were justified?

Held:

A writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued when a person is in judicial custody under a valid remand order. This principle is established by precedents, including the cases of Saurabh Kumar through his father v. Jailor, Koneila Jail and Anr., (2014) 13 SCC 436, and Manubhai Ratilal Patel v. State of Gujarat and Ors., (2013) 1 SCC 314.

The scathing remarks made by the High Court against the police officials were unwarranted. The High Court should not have made such remarks without giving the officials an opportunity to explain their actions. Therefore, the remarks were expunged.

The appeal was allowed, and the impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside. Since Tasneem Rizwan Siddiquee's husband had already been released, the Investigating Officer could proceed against him strictly in accordance with the law.

Facts:

The appellant, Smt. Kavita, challenged a no-confidence motion notice issued against her under Section 15 of The U.P. Kshettra Panchayats and Zila Panchayats Adhiniyam, 1961 ("the Act").

The notice was issued by the Collector/District Magistrate, Bulandshahar, U.P., based on a requisition by 32 members out of 59 members of the Kshettra Panchayat, expressing no confidence against her, who was the Block Pramukh of Kshettra Panchayat, Lakhawati at the relevant time.

The appellant raised two grounds: first, that the Collector failed to hold an inquiry into the validity of signatures of 10 members who alleged their signatures were obtained by fraud, and second, that there was no clear 15-day notice as required under Section 15(3) of the Act.

Issues:

Whether the notice fulfilled the essential requirements of a valid notice under Section 15 of the Act.

Whether the Collector was required to hold an inquiry into the validity of signatures of 10 members who alleged fraud.

Held:

The Court upheld the decision of the High Court, dismissing the appeal. It emphasized that the Collector's jurisdiction under Section 15(3) of the Act is limited to determining whether the notice fulfills the essential requirements of a valid notice and cannot extend to detailed inquiries into the validity of signatures. The Court cited previous judgments to support this interpretation.

In the case of Kiran Pal Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., the Court expounded on the purport of Section 15(2) of the Act, emphasizing the limited role of the Collector in determining the validity of the notice.

Therefore, the appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.