Facts:

The State Government, in exercise of powers under Section 15 and Section 23-C of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, issued a resolution prohibiting the export of ordinary sand excavated within the state. Subsequently, the state amended the Gujarat Minor Mineral Rules by inserting Rule 44-BB, further restricting the movement of sand beyond the state.

Issues:

Whether the power of the State Government under Section 15 includes control over minor minerals post-excavation.

The constitutional validity of the rules and resolution in light of Part XIII of the Constitution.

Held:

The power of the State Government under Section 15 does not extend to control over minor minerals post-excavation. Section 23-C, introduced to prevent illegal mining, pertains to the transportation and storage of illegally mined minerals, not legally excavated ones.

The impugned rules violate Part XIII of the Constitution by restricting the freedom of trade, commerce, and intercourse under Article 301. The Constitution envisions differentiation between states only under specific circumstances in the public interest, as outlined in Articles 302 and 303. The State Government, under a statute aimed at regulating mines and mineral development, cannot impose such a prohibition on trade and commerce.

Decision: The appeals are dismissed. The Court emphasizes that restrictions on state legislatures, as outlined in Article 303, prevent the imposition of such prohibitions under statutes focused on mines and minerals, not trade and commerce.

Facts:

The case, involving M/S. Vijay Industries and the Commissioner of Income Tax, centers around the deduction claimed under section 80HH. The dispute arises from the conflicting interpretations of whether the deduction should be based on gross profits and gains or after factoring in depreciation and other elements.

Issues:

Whether the deduction under section 80HH is to be calculated on gross profits and gains, or if it should consider factors such as depreciation and unabsorbed depreciation. Additionally, the application of section 80AB is in question.

Held:

Assessment Years 1979-1980 and 1980-1981 are under consideration. Section 80HH explicitly specifies a deduction of 20% of 'profits and gains,' indicating it applies to gross profits and gains before computation under Sections 30 to 43D of the Act. Section 80AB, having a prospective effect from April 1, 1981, does not apply to the mentioned assessment years.

The court delves into the scheme of the Income Tax Act, highlighting the distinction between 'income' and 'profits and gains' under Chapter IV. It emphasizes the computation of income under the head 'profits and gains' from business or profession, as outlined in Sections 28 to 43D.( Paragraph 18)

Exploring Chapter VI-A of the Act, the court notes that certain deductions are provided as incentives. Section 80A specifies deductions from gross total income, with Sections 80C to 80U containing different subject matters and specific percentages for deductions.( Paragraph 19)

Facts:

The case involved a challenge to the selection of two Lieutenant Generals as Army Commanders. The appellants contested that the appointments were solely based on seniority, without a comparative evaluation of officers fulfilling the eligibility criteria.

Issues:

Whether the appointments of the third and fourth respondents as Army Commanders were based exclusively on seniority, in violation of the norms governing selection posts.

Held:

The judgment emphasizes that while seniority is a relevant consideration, the post of Army Commander remains a selection post. The appointing authority is not restricted to considering seniority alone but can take into account a range of relevant factors.

The submission that the appointments were based solely on seniority is refuted. The rejection of the statutory complaint does not imply a disregard for merit or a comparative evaluation.

The Chief of Army Staff (COAS) considered the service profile of seven officers and recommended the appointments, adhering to the prescribed criteria. The Defence Minister was informed of officers fulfilling eligibility conditions.

The appointments were duly approved by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC), and there was no violation of norms governing selection posts.

No breach of the Government of India (Transaction of Business) Rules, 1961, occurred. The ACC was apprised of material facts before approval.

The policy decision of 1992, indicating the suggestion of two senior eligible officers for each Army Commander vacancy, was deemed directory and did not prejudice the appellant.

The appellant and the third and fourth respondents have retired, rendering the appeal moot. The grievance is addressed on merits with no substance found.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, affirming the validity of the appointments of the third and fourth respondents as Army Commanders.

Facts:

The Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) were dismissed in limine without reasons. The issue at hand revolves around the maintainability of the review petitions filed subsequently. There was a perceived conflict in the views expressed in Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm case and Kunhayammed case, prompting a referral to a larger bench.

Issues:

The conflicting views in Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm case and Kunhayammed case.

The maintainability of review petitions after the dismissal of SLPs without reasons.

Held:

The Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm case was explained in the judgment in Kunhayammed case, and there is no conflict between the two. Kunhayammed case lays down the correct law and does not necessitate a reference to a larger bench. (Para 25)

The conclusions in Kunhayammed case are affirmed and reiterated, clarifying that an order refusing special leave to appeal does not attract the doctrine of merger. It does not substitute the order under challenge, and findings in the order bind the parties and subsequent proceedings by way of judicial discipline. (Para 27)

Following Kunhayammed case, the timing of filing a review petition (before or after the dismissal of SLP) does not affect its maintainability. (Para 27)

Civil Appeal No. 2432 of 2019, dismissed without reasons, should have had the review petition decided on merits. The order of November 12, 2008, is set aside, and the matter is remanded back to the High Court. (Para 28)

Civil Appeal No. 2433 of 2019, dismissed without a speaking order, allows the review petition filed after the dismissal of SLP. The matter is referred to the regular Board to decide on the merits. (Para 28)

FACTS:

The father of the respondent, employed in the Union Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, died on 25 May 1996.

The widow's representation for compassionate appointment was rejected on 3 January 1997.

A series of representations followed, with rejections and reconsiderations, leading to legal proceedings initiated in 2007.

The High Court, in its judgment dated 9 August 2016, directed the appellants to grant appointment on a compassionate basis to the respondent within three months.

ISSUES:

Delay in moving the Tribunal for compassionate appointment, with the first recourse in 2007, almost eleven years after the employee's death.

The successive orders of the Tribunal for reconsideration of the representation and the impact on the initial delay.

The interpretation of the purpose and timing of compassionate appointments.

HELD:

Compassionate appointments are intended to address the immediate financial crisis resulting from the death of an employee.

The delay of over a decade in seeking redress through the Tribunal invalidated the claim for compassionate appointment.

The Tribunal's successive orders for reconsideration do not negate the impact of the initial delay.

Quoting Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana, the Court emphasized that compassionate employment cannot be granted after a lapse of a reasonable period specified in the rules.

The judgment of the High Court was deemed unsustainable, and the appeal was allowed, affirming the Tribunal's dismissal of the Original Application.

DECISION: The appeal is allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and affirming the Tribunal's decision to dismiss the Original Application. No order as to costs.

REFERRED CASES:

Umesh Kumar Nagpal Vs. State of Haryana, (1994) 4 SCC 138

Facts:

The appellant, as the Director of Siddharth Garments Pvt. Ltd., filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 25,00,000/-.

The trial court declined an application to amend the plaint, citing an attempt to convert the suit from an individual to a Private Limited Company.

The High Court upheld the trial court's decision.

Issues:

Whether the amendment sought was a legitimate correction of an inadvertent mistake in the memo of parties.

Whether the trial court's refusal to allow the amendment was justified in law.

Held:

The court held that the memo of parties contained a clear inadvertent mistake made by the counsel in describing the plaintiff. Such mistakes should not be refused correction, as the Rules of Procedure are meant to serve justice and not defeat substantive rights. Amendment in pleadings cannot be denied merely due to mistakes, negligence, or procedural infractions. The power to grant amendments is intended to serve the ends of justice.

The court referred to various cases, including Charan Das vs. Amir Khan, Clarapede & Co. vs. Commercial Union Assn, Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal, State of Maharashtra vs. Hindustan Construction Company Limited, and Uday Shankar Triyar v. Ram Kale war Prasad Singh and Another, to emphasize the principle that procedural defects and irregularities should not be allowed to defeat substantive rights or cause injustice. The court concluded that it was an inadvertent mistake in the plaint, and the trial court should have allowed the correction to permit the Private Limited Company to sue as the Plaintiff. Therefore, the orders of the High Court and the trial court were set aside, and the application to amend the plaint was allowed with no order as to costs.

FACTS:

The case involves a dispute governed by the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, wherein the Adjudicating Officer is tasked with determining the quantum of penalty. The provisions in question are found in s.15-J, Cl. (a), (b), and (c), alongside other related sections (ss.15-A to 15-HA).

ISSUES:

Whether conditions stipulated in Clauses (a), (b), and (c) of s.15-J are exhaustive or illustrative.

Whether the conditions in Clauses (a) to (c) of s.15-J are mandatory for imposing penalties under ss.15-A to 15-HA.

HELD:

The court holds that the provisions of Clauses (a), (b), and (c) of s.15-J are illustrative and must be considered whenever relevant. However, the Adjudicating Officer is not precluded from considering other circumstances beyond those enumerated in Clauses (a), (b), and (c) while determining the penalty.

The court clarifies that the conditions in Clauses (a), (b), and (c) of s.15-J are not exhaustive. There may be circumstances beyond these clauses that the Adjudicating Officer can consider while deciding the quantum of penalty, especially in cases not covered by certain provisions like s.15-A, 15-B, or 15-C.

The court further explains that Clause (c) of s.15-J, which mentions the "repetitive nature of default," refers specifically to a recurring or successive default. However, this does not exclude the consideration of a continuing default as a relevant factor, as Clauses (a) to (c) are illustrative and not exhaustive.

The court addresses the argument that the power and discretion vested by s.15-J are eclipsed by penalty provisions in ss.15-A to 15-HA. It emphasizes that these sections must be read harmoniously to avoid inconsistency. The Explanation to s.15-J, added by Amendment Act No.7 of 2017, reinforces the Adjudicating Officer's discretion in determining penalties.

The court delves into the applicability of s.15-J in the context of s.15A(a) between 29th October 2002 and 7th September 2014. It highlights that the legislative intent, clarified by the Explanation to s.15-J, was not to curtail the Adjudicating Officer's discretion during that period.

REFERRED CASES:

Securities and Exchange Board of India through its Chairman vs. Roofit Industries Limited, (2016) 12 SCC 125

Securities and Exchange Board of India vs. Kishore R. Ajmera, (2016) 6 SCC 368

Securities and Exchange Board of India vs. Rakhi Trading (P) Ltd, (2018) 13 SCC 753

Siddharth Chaturvedi vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India, (2016) 12 SCC 119.

State of Bihar vs. Deokaran Nenshi & Ors., (1972) 2 SCC 890

Union of India & Anr. Vs. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648

Facts:

The appellants, lecturers/professors in engineering disciplines, challenged the order treating their appointments as temporary. The University contended that its statutes did not apply to teachers in Self Financing Institutions. The Single Judge allowed the petition, but the Division Bench held in favor of the University, asserting that appellants were not University teachers.

Issues:

Whether the appointments were temporary or against substantive posts.

The applicability of University statutes to teachers in Self Financing Institutions.

Entitlement of lecturers to pay revision benefits.

Held:

The appointment orders did not indicate temporary or part-time positions, governed by University statutes, indicating permanency through regular selection.

The benefits extension discrepancy was based on the erroneous claim of temporary appointments. The facts established the substantive nature of appellants' posts, justifying benefit extension.

AICTE's Progress Profile affirmed appellants as permanent faculty, disputing the University's claim of temporary status.

Despite initial rulings against appellants, subsequent contradictory decisions highlighted the inconsistency in the University's stance.

Decision: The appeals were allowed, and Special Leave Petitions were segregated based on the clarity in the appointment order.

Facts:

The appellant, Mrs. Neeraj Dutta, was convicted under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

The complainant received a demand for a bribe from the appellant for the installation of an electricity meter. The complainant reported the incident to the Anti-Corruption Bureau, leading to a pre-raid operation and the appellant's conviction.

Issues:

The absence of direct evidence of demand due to the complainant's death, leading to the appellant's contention that the conviction cannot stand solely on proof of receipt of money.

Held:

The court noted that direct proof of illegal gratification may not be available in all instances.

The court considered the evidence of the panch witness, acceptance of money proved by the Phenolphthalein Test, and the permissibility of drawing inference to prove demand.

The appellant argued that the Satyanarayana case emphasized the necessity of direct evidence of demand, while the respondent contended that inference can be drawn from other evidence.

The court expressed reservations about the observations in Satyanarayana and referred the question to a larger bench: whether, in the absence of direct evidence of demand, inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant is permissible based on other prosecution evidence.

Decision: The matter was directed to be placed before the Chief Justice for appropriate orders.

REFERRED CASES:

Hazari Lal v. State (Delhi Administration) (1980) 2 SCC 390

KishanChand Mangal v. State of Rajasthan (1982) 3 SCC 466

M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P. (2001) 1 SCC 691

P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police, State of Andhra Pradesh and another (2015) 10 SCC 152