Facts:The case involved two sets of suits: the appellants filed suits for eviction and damages, while the respondents filed suits for adverse possession, injunctions, and against the Municipality.

Issues:

Whether the questions formulated by the High Court satisfied the test of being 'substantial questions of law' under Section 100 of the CPC.

Whether the findings of the lower courts were binding on the High Court.

Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to remand the case for a de novo trial.

Whether any party raised the ground for remand, and whether there was justification for remanding the case.

Whether the High Court's decision was based on substantial questions of law or not.

Held:

The questions formulated by the High Court did not satisfy the test of being 'substantial questions of law' under Section 100 of the CPC. The second appeal did not involve any substantial questions of law .

The findings of the lower courts were binding on the High Court, as they were concurrent in nature .

The High Court lacked jurisdiction to remand the case for a de novo trial. It also failed to formulate substantial questions of law regarding the remand .

No party raised the ground for remand, and there was no justification for remanding the case .

The High Court's decision lacked justification and failed to consider whether the questions framed were substantial questions of law.

Decision:The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, finding no error in the judgments of the trial court and the first appellate court. It held that the High Court's decision to remand the case was unjustified.

Facts:

The case involves the sentencing of the appellants in a criminal appeal. The trial court had imposed life sentences on the accused, while the High Court declined to enhance the sentence to death but instead imposed fixed term sentences.

The appellants were convicted under sections 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and the trial court could have imposed the death sentence.

Issues:

The permissibility of imposing a fixed term sentence.

The competence of the appellate court to impose a sentence beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court.

Determining whether the fixed term sentences should run concurrently or consecutively.

Consideration of the circumstances surrounding the crime, particularly whether it constitutes an 'honour killing'.

The scope of judicial review regarding the exercise of executive powers under Article 71 and Article 161 of the Constitution.

Held:

The court held that the imposition of a fixed term sentence is within the judiciary's domain and is not unauthorized in law .

The court also established that the appellate court cannot impose a sentence beyond the competence of the trial court.

Regarding the concurrent or consecutive running of sentences, the court held that the High Court did not direct the sequence of serving sentences, so it is inappropriate to do so on appeal. Thus, the sentences imposed for different offences shall run concurrently.

The court considered the crime as an 'honour killing' and noted the brutality and lack of respect for human life displayed by the accused. Consequently, the imposition of fixed term sentences was deemed appropriate.

The scope of judicial review regarding executive powers was discussed, emphasizing that while amenable to review, the courts cannot exercise such powers.

Facts:

The case concerned the demand for regularization of workmen employed at Balihari Colliery under Bharat Coking Coal Limited (BCCL).

An Industrial Tribunal initially awarded regularization without back wages, which was later modified by the High Court to give preference to the workmen whenever regular employment opportunities arose.

Issues:

Whether the modification of the Industrial Tribunal's award by the High Court adequately addressed the concerns of the workmen.

Whether the workmen, after significant passage of time and facing practical difficulties, were entitled to further relief.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the modification of the Industrial Tribunal's award by the High Court did not fully address the predicament of the workmen, who were left without practical relief. Given the prolonged duration since their engagement and nearing retirement age for many, the Court deemed it appropriate to order compensation in final settlement of all claims, dues, and outstandings payable to the remaining 14 workmen. This compensation, amounting to Rs. Two lakhs each, was to be deposited by BCCL with the Central Government Tribunal at Dhanbad. Upon verification of identity, the amount would be disbursed to the respective workmen, marking the satisfaction of the Industrial Tribunal's award. The Civil Appeal was allowed, with no costs awarded.

Facts:

An international arbitration award was passed against the appellant, making them jointly and severally liable to pay USD 6,948,100.

The award was challenged in the High Court, where a single judge held it enforceable only against one respondent, not the appellant.

A Division Bench of the High Court upheld the maintainability of an appeal despite the abolition of Letters Patent Appeal.

Issues:

Whether an appeal against the judgment of a Single Judge in an international arbitration matter is maintainable.

Whether the intra-court appeal would lie because of the Letters Patent.

Held:

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the High Court, holding that a Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable before the Division Bench. It construed Sections 5 and 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and Section 50(1)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to conclude that the appeal was permissible. The Court considered the judgment in P.S. Sathappan v. Andhra Bank Ltd. and others, (2004) 11 SCC 672, and Fuerst Day Lawson Limited v. Jindal Exports Limited, (2011) 8 SCC 333, among others, to establish that the Arbitration Act, 1996, is a self-contained code and that an appeal under Section 50(1)(b) is maintainable. The decision was affirmed for different reasons, dismissing the appeals without costs.

Facts:The appellants, employees of Nagarjuna Cooperative Sugars Limited, filed a petition challenging the denial of lay-off compensation. The State of Andhra Pradesh introduced a Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) that did not cover lay-off compensation. The employees, having accepted benefits under the VRS, sought lay-off compensation, leading to a legal dispute.

Issues:

Whether the Labour Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim for lay-off compensation under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, despite the employees accepting benefits under the VRS which did not cover lay-off compensation.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim for lay-off compensation under Section 33C(2) of the Act, even though it was not covered by the VRS. The Court clarified that if a claim like lay-off compensation is not covered by a VRS, affected employees can approach the Labour Court for adjudication. The judgment allowed the appeal, set aside the judgments of the High Court and Labour Court, and remitted the matter to the Labour Court for adjudication within three months.

Facts:

The case involved the validity of a sanction granted by the Minister-in-charge of the concerned department for initiating disciplinary proceedings against a retired government employee under Regulation 351-A of the Civil Services Regulations, 1975.

Issues:

Whether the sanction granted by the Minister-in-charge of the department was valid under Regulation 351-A.

Whether delegation of power from the Governor to the Minister was necessary for such sanctions.

Held:

T.S. Thakur, CJI's Opinion: The power to direct disciplinary proceedings against a government employee, whether in-service or retired, is an executive function of the State Government. This power can be exercised by the Governor or delegated to Ministers through rules framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution (Para 16). The sanction granted by the Minister-in-charge of the concerned department was valid under Regulation 351-A as it was deemed an action taken by the Governor.

V. Gopala Gowda, J.'s Dissenting Opinion: The power under Regulation 351-A is framed under Article 309 of the Constitution, which pertains to legislative power, not executive power. Therefore, the rules framed under Article 166 cannot justify actions under Article 309 (Para 13). Without evidence of specific delegation of power by the Governor to the Minister under Regulation 351-A, the sanction granted by the Minister was invalid.

Facts:

The controversy arose from amendments made by the State of Bihar to introduce reservation in judicial services, which were challenged in a batch of writ petitions before the High Court of Judicature at Patna.

The amendments were not preceded by appropriate consultation with the High Court as required by Articles 233 and 234 of the Constitution.

Issues:

Whether the State of Bihar has the authority to provide reservation in favor of various backward classes in the judicial services.

Whether the amendments made by the State of Bihar for reservation in judicial services were preceded by appropriate consultation with the High Court.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that while the State of Bihar is entitled to initiate the process of consultation for providing reservation in judicial services, such consultation must meet the requisite standards. If there is a consensus between the State and the High Court, the State would be at liberty to make appropriate rules providing for reservation. However, if there is a difference of opinion, the Government must record reasons for its inability to accept the conclusions communicated by the High Court and proceed to amend the Rules in accordance with law. Additionally, the Court directed expeditious action to fill vacancies in the judicial services. The special leave petition stands disposed of.

Facts:

Gujarat Maritime Board (GMB) issued a Letter of Intent (LoI) to L&T Infrastructure Development Projects Ltd. for the development of Sutrapada Port.

Conditions of the LoI included the submission of a detailed project report and obtaining necessary clearances within specified timelines.

Due to certain difficulties, L&T requested a change of location to Kachchigarh, which was approved by GMB, and a bank guarantee was furnished.

L&T later expressed inability to proceed with the project at Kachchigarh, leading GMB to cancel the LoI and invoke the bank guarantee.

L&T challenged these actions before the High Court through a writ petition.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in exercising its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 to restrain GMB from invoking an unconditional bank guarantee.

Whether the cancellation of the LoI and invocation of the bank guarantee were legally justified.

Held:

Scope of Jurisdiction under Article 226: The High Court erred in analyzing the facts and law related to the cancellation of the LoI and invocation of the bank guarantee. The Court clarified that the jurisdiction under Article 226 should not be exercised unless exceptional circumstances exist.

Independence of Bank Guarantee Contract: The bank guarantee is an independent contract between the bank and GMB. The decision of GMB regarding breach of conditions is binding on the bank. Thus, the cancellation of the LoI and invocation of the bank guarantee were valid.

Injunction against Bank Guarantee Invocation: An injunction against the invocation of an unconditional bank guarantee can only be granted in cases of egregious fraud or irretrievable injury to one of the parties. Such circumstances did not exist in this case.

Facts:

Khalil Ahmed filed a civil suit against Nagar Palika Thakurdwara regarding the municipality's levy of taxes on his properties.

The suit sought a permanent injunction and a declaration stating that the properties were outside the municipal limits and thus not liable for taxation.

The trial court dismissed Khalil Ahmed's suit, but he succeeded on appeal to the Additional District Judge.

Nagar Palika Thakurdwara then appealed to the High Court, which dismissed the appeal citing Section 102 of the CPC due to the claim being less than Rs. 25,000.

Issues:

Whether Section 102 of the CPC applies when the suit involves not only the recovery of money but also a declaration and permanent injunction regarding municipal taxation.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Section 102 of the CPC should not have been applied to dismiss the appeal solely based on the monetary value of the claim. The suit encompassed broader issues beyond mere recovery of money, including questions of jurisdiction and taxation. Therefore, the provision was not applicable, and the High Court's dismissal was erroneous. The Court remanded the case for fresh consideration, directing the High Court to hear the parties and decide the appeal promptly, preferably within six months.