Facts:

The prosecution alleged that the appellant was responsible for the death of his wife and five daughters. Witnesses reported hearing shouting from the appellant's house on the night of the incident. The appellant's mother claimed to have seen him attacking his family with a sharp object. The appellant was found unconscious at the scene, and the prosecution presented various pieces of evidence to establish his guilt.

Issues:

Admissibility of evidence under Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act.

Circumstances surrounding the appellant's unconsciousness and the seizure of his clothes.

Possibility of third-party involvement in the crime.

Consideration of motive and non-disclosure by the appellant.

Held:

The statements attributed to PW-6 by other prosecution witnesses did not meet the requirements of Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act, as the spontaneity and immediacy of the statement were lost.

The prosecution failed to provide sufficient evidence regarding the circumstances of the appellant's unconsciousness and the seizure of his clothes, leading to doubts about his guilt.

The layout of the house and the absence of conclusive evidence, such as fingerprints on the murder weapon, suggested the possibility of third-party involvement.

The appellant's motive, as expressed dissatisfaction with having daughters and past quarrels with his wife, coupled with his failure to explain the circumstances of the crime, raised suspicions against him.

Decision: The Supreme Court acquitted the appellant due to the lack of conclusive evidence and reasonable doubt regarding his guilt. The dissenting opinion suggested a life sentence instead of the death penalty, considering the appellant's background and lack of criminal history.

Facts:

The case involved a motor accident resulting in the death of an employee who was covered under the Haryana Compassionate Assistance to the Dependants of the Deceased Government Employees Rules, 2006.

Issues:

The main issue was whether the compensation granted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, should be adjusted for the amount received by the claimants under the 2006 Rules.

Held:

The term "compensation" under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, refers to recompense for the loss suffered due to the death of a family member in a motor accident .

Two cardinal principles guide the determination of compensation: it must be just and adequate, and no double benefit should be passed on to the claimants .

Loss of income, including "pay and wages," is a significant component of compensation under the Act. However, if the dependents are compensated by the employer under the 2006 Rules, they cannot claim the same amount under the Act .

Rule 5 of the 2006 Rules compensates for loss of pay and other allowances, and this amount cannot be claimed again under the Motor Vehicles Act .

A harmonious approach is advocated to determine just compensation, excluding the amount received under the 2006 Rules for loss of pay and wages .

Other benefits not covered under the 2006 Rules, such as future escalation of income and benefits under sub-rules of Rule 5, remain unaffected and cannot be deducted.

The appellants should succeed only to the extent of the amount receivable by the dependents under Rule 5(1) of the 2006 Rules for loss of pay and wages.

Decision: The court partially allowed the appeals, affirming that compensation should be adjusted for the amount received under the 2006 Rules for loss of pay and wages.

Facts:

In the instant case, the appellant-accused, a senior police officer of the State, was charged with molesting a minor girl. The prosecution's key witness, PW-13, testified that she witnessed the appellant-accused holding the victim's hand and waist while attempting to embrace her. The victim's reluctance to disclose the incident promptly was attributed to societal pressures and embarrassment. The complaint was presented after a delay of six days, which the court deemed reasonable given the circumstances.

Issues:

Whether the appellant-accused's actions constituted an offence under Section 354 IPC, considering the delay in presenting the complaint and the reliability of the prosecution's evidence.

Held:

The court reaffirmed the essential ingredients of Section 354 IPC, emphasizing that the knowledge of likely outrage to a woman's modesty suffices for conviction, which can be inferred from the circumstances. In this case, the sequence of events indicated the appellant-accused's culpable intention .

The delay in presenting the complaint was deemed reasonable given societal pressures and the victim's reluctance to disclose the incident promptly. Once assurance of justice was received, the formal complaint was lodged, justifying the delay .

The evidentiary value of handwriting expert testimony was discussed, with the court emphasizing its weak nature and the need for corroboration with other evidence. The court also noted that adverse inference against the prosecution could only be drawn if it withholds certain evidence, which was not the case here .

The testimony of a sole eyewitness was deemed sufficient for conviction, provided it was truthful, consistent, and inspiring confidence. In this case, PW-13's testimony was found reliable and corroborative with other prosecution witnesses .

Mitigating factors were considered for the appellant-accused's sentence, including his old age, health ailments, familial responsibilities, past service, and the prolonged trial. As a special case, the court reduced the sentence to the period already undergone by the appellant-accused .

Decision: The court upheld the conviction of the appellant-accused under Section 354 IPC for outraging the modesty of a woman while reducing the sentence based on mitigating factors.

Facts:

Dispute arose between the Electricity Department and Suryachakra Power Corporation Limited regarding project cost and completed cost.

Various expert committees were set up to determine project cost, resulting in different figures.

A five-member committee ultimately arrived at a final project cost, which was accepted by the Administration.

The respondent contested certain deductions from the project cost, which were not considered by the expert committees.

Issues:

Whether the expert committee's report accepted by the Administration should be upheld.

Whether additional costs claimed by the respondent for delays in project execution should be allowed.

Held:

The Division Bench held that the expert committee's report accepted by the Administration should be upheld. The deductions contested by the respondent were not included in any of the expert committee reports.

The Bench allowed the appeal to the extent that it set aside the judgment of the Appellate Tribunal regarding additional costs claimed by the respondent for delays in project execution. The Bench found that these costs were not part of the original appeal and were not supported by sufficient evidence.

Facts:

The appellant, Suryachakra Power Corpn. Ltd., filed an appeal under Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003, with an application for condonation of 161 days' delay.

The delay was attributed to the time taken by the appellant in prosecuting a review petition before the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity.

Issues:

Whether the delay in filing the appeal can be condoned beyond the 60-day limit prescribed under Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003?

Whether the principles under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, can be applied in this case?

Held:

The Court held that:

The Supreme Court cannot condone the delay beyond 60 days as prescribed under Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003.

The principles under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, can be applied only if both due diligence and good faith are established.

In this case, the appellant failed to demonstrate due diligence and good faith in prosecuting the appeal.

Consequently, the application for condonation of delay was dismissed, and the appeal was dismissed on the ground of delay.

Facts:

The case involved allegations of copyright infringement concerning lyrics and musical works. The dispute arose between the International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers (CISAC) and Aditya Pandey & Ors.

Issues:

The primary issues before the court included the interpretation of relevant provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957, regarding the rights of authors and producers, the distinction between assignment and license of copyright, and the scope of interim injunctions.

Held:

The court upheld the interim injunction issued by the Single Judge, which was affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court .

It clarified the distinction between the assignment and license of copyright, emphasizing that ownership of copyright is transferred in an assignment, while a license permits the use of the work by another party .

The court affirmed the rights of authors and producers under copyright law, highlighting that the rights of the author of a literary work do not negate the rights of the producer of a sound recording .

It noted the amendment to the Copyright Act in 2012 and clarified that the law in effect at the time of filing the suit in 2006 should be applied for the relevant period .

Emphasizing the need for judicial restraint, particularly in interim orders, the court highlighted the importance of refraining from expressing opinions that could prejudice either party in the suit.

The court stressed the objective of finding a reasonable solution to govern the parties during the pendency of the suit, endorsing the interim order as a workable solution.

Expressing concern over the prolonged pendency of the suits and the failure of the plaintiffs to make substantial progress, the court urged timely resolution of legal proceedings.

Facts:

Ragini Narayan, the plaintiff, filed a suit claiming to be the Donor Trustee of the B.M. Sreenivasaiah Educational Trust, Bangalore, following the death of her husband, B.S. Narayan, the original Donor Trustee.

The dispute centered around the interpretation of the Trust Deed and subsequent amendments regarding the succession of the Donor Trustee position.

The plaintiff asserted that she was validly nominated as the Donor Trustee through a registered document dated 30.01.1995, while the government appointed another individual, M.R. Sreenivasa Murthy, as the Donor Trustee.

Issues:

Whether the State Government had approved certain amendments to the Trust Deed, including the one allowing for the nomination of the Donor Trustee's wife as a successor.

The validity of Ragini Narayan's nomination as the Donor Trustee.

Held:

The Supreme Court examined the relevant provisions of the Trust Deed and the amendments made over time. It noted that the State Government had indeed approved the disputed amendment dated 10.12.1994, which allowed for the nomination of the Donor Trustee's wife as a successor. Therefore, Ragini Narayan's nomination as the Donor Trustee was deemed valid.

The Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts and dismissed the appeal. However, it clarified that while nominees appointed by the State Government could function as ordinary trustees, they would not automatically assume the role of the Donor Trustee unless the succession, as outlined in the Trust Deed, failed.

This ruling underscores the importance of understanding and interpreting legal documents accurately, particularly in matters concerning trusts and succession rights. It also highlights the significance of governmental approval in such matters.

Facts:

The appellant, a company manufacturing insecticide products, had applied for provisional registration for their product, DURANET®, with the Central Insecticide Board (CIB).

The Registration Committee of CIB provisionally approved the registration subject to certain conditions, including obtaining permission for commercialization from the Department of Agriculture & Co-operation (DAC).

The appellant participated in a tender floated by the respondent for the procurement of Long Lasting Insecticide Nets (LLIN) but failed to submit the registration certificate along with the bid as required by the amended clause in the Instructions to Bidders.

The appellant challenged the rejection of their bid, arguing that their product was duly registered by the CIB and thus, the rejection was unjustified.

Issues:

Whether the rejection of the appellant's bid was justified due to non-compliance with the requirement of submitting a registration certificate?

Whether the decision of the Registration Committee of CIB amounted to the grant of a registration certificate?

Held:

The Supreme Court held as follows:

The decision of the Registration Committee of CIB to provisionally approve the registration did not constitute the grant of a registration certificate itself. Therefore, the appellant's bid did not meet the essential condition of the tender, which required the submission of the registration certificate along with the bid. Even if the clause in the Instructions to Bidders had not been amended, the rejection would have been justified due to the non-submission of the registration certificate. The amendment to the clause was seen as a clarification rather than an arbitrary act by the respondent (Para. 21).

The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to tender conditions and ensuring fairness in procurement processes. It highlighted that public interest must prevail over private interests in such matters (Para. 26).

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as devoid of merit, and the rejection of the appellant's bid was upheld (Para. 27).