Facts:

The private respondents, operating under the names Mitra Prakashan Ltd. and Maya Press Ltd., faced financial difficulties and owed significant dues to their workers.

The property of the private respondents was attached and put up for auction, with the appellant, Pravesh Kumar Sachdeva, emerging as the highest bidder.

One of the private respondents, Alok Mitra, initially raised objections to the auction sale, which were later withdrawn.

Subsequent actions were taken by other private respondents seeking payment of the difference between the auction sale price and the outstanding dues, which was granted to them.

Legal proceedings ensued, resulting in the setting aside of the auction sale by the Competent Authority and the dismissal of the appellant's writ petition by the Allahabad High Court.

Issues:

Whether the objections raised to the auction sale were valid, and if the Allahabad High Court was correct in setting aside the confirmed auction sale.

Held:

The Supreme Court examined the facts and found that objections were raised only by Alok Mitra and were subsequently withdrawn. The Court noted that the other private respondents did not authorize Alok Mitra to file objections on their behalf. Additionally, the conduct of the private respondents indicated acceptance of the auction sale proceeds.

Based on the legal principles of waiver and estoppel, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the judgment of the Allahabad High Court, thereby reinstating the auction sale in favor of Pravesh Kumar Sachdeva.

Facts:

The case revolves around the attempt by the State Government of Kerala to regularize admissions to MBBS courses in certain colleges following the quashing of admissions by the Admission Supervisory Committee (ASC) and subsequent affirmation of this decision by the High Court and the Supreme Court. The State Government sought to achieve this regularization through the Kerala Professional Colleges (Regularization of Admission in Medical Colleges) Ordinance, 2017.

Issues:

Whether the Ordinance enacted by the State Government to regularize admissions infringed upon the principles of separation of powers and judicial review.

Whether the Ordinance was in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers as enshrined in Article 50 of the Constitution.

Whether the Ordinance sought to nullify court judgments and thus interfere with the judicial process.

Whether the judgments of the Supreme Court have binding effect, and the extent of the Court's powers under Article 142 of the Constitution.

Held:

The impugned Ordinance clearly encroaches upon the field of judicial review.

It seeks to nullify court judgments, which is impermissible and beyond the legislative competence of the State.

Such legislative action violates the doctrine of separation of powers.

The independence of the judiciary is fundamental to the rule of law. Legislation that interferes with the judicial process can be invalidated, as it negates equality under Article 14 of the Constitution.

The attempt to regularize admissions that were deemed irregular by the courts constitutes an impermissible interference with the judicial process. The Ordinance had the effect of perpetuating illegality and arbitrariness committed by the colleges.

Judgments of the Supreme Court have a binding effect on all parties and authorities. Orders refusing leave to appeal, if they contain reasons, constitute a declaration of law under Article 141. The Court's power under Article 142 cannot be exercised to nullify its own judgments or perpetuate illegality.

Decision: The Court held the impugned Ordinance to be ultra vires and an encroachment upon the judicial domain. It declared the Ordinance invalid and affirmed the binding nature of court judgments, while emphasizing the limitations of the Court's powers under Article 142.

Facts:

A grocery shop named "Ambika Stores" was inspected by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer along with the accused, during which the accounts book was seized.

The prosecution alleged that one of the accused demanded a bribe from the owner of the shop for the return of the seized accounts book.

The owner of the shop lodged a complaint with the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Wing, based on which a trap was arranged.

The accused were caught receiving the bribe during the trap.

Issues:

Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused under the relevant sections of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Whether the lower courts' findings of guilt and subsequent conviction were justified.

Held:

The Division Bench, comprising R. Banumathi and Indira Banerjee, JJ., held that the appeals were to be dismissed and the conviction upheld. The Bench noted the following:

The evidence provided by PW-2 was corroborated by the testimony of PW-3 and PW-6.

PW-3, in his Chief Examination, stated that he witnessed the accused directing the payment of the bribe.

The office assistant, PW-6, corroborated PW-2's version of events.

The Trial Court and the High Court had found the accused guilty based on this evidence and the test conducted with sodium carbonate solution.

The Bench found no grounds to take a different view from the concurrent findings of the lower courts.

Therefore, the appeals were dismissed, and the appellants were directed to surrender to custody within eight weeks to serve the remaining sentence.

Facts:

The plaintiffs filed a civil suit seeking a declaration and permanent injunction regarding a piece of land, claiming ownership based on documents and alleged possession.

The defendants contested the suit, asserting their ownership of the same land, claiming purchase from previous owners.

The Trial Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, which was upheld by the Appellate Court.

Dissatisfied, the defendants filed a second appeal in the High Court, which framed a substantial question of law.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's jurisdiction in deciding second appeals is limited to substantial questions of law framed by it under Section 100 of the CPC.

Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in examining the ownership issue without framing appropriate questions.

Held:

The High Court's jurisdiction in second appeals is confined to substantial questions of law framed by it under Section 100 of the CPC. The High Court cannot exceed this jurisdiction unless it assigns reasons for doing so at the time of the appeal hearing.

The High Court improperly examined the ownership issue without framing substantial questions of law related to it. This was a procedural error.

Decision: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case back to the High Court for reconsideration. The High Court was instructed to properly frame substantial questions of law related to the ownership of the land and decide the appeal afresh within a specified timeframe.

Facts:

The applicant-company undertook construction activities under an exemption granted by Section 23 of the Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975.

A notification dated 18.08.1992, issued under the Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900, prohibited construction activities on certain notified lands, including those of the applicant.

The Town and Country Planning Department of the State of Haryana supported the illegal activities of the applicant despite resistance from the Forest Department.

Issues:

Whether the construction activities carried out by the applicant violated environmental regulations and statutory notifications.

The role of the Town and Country Planning Department in supporting illegal construction activities.

Held:

The notified land under the Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900, must be treated as forest land, and construction activities on such lands are prohibited.

The actions of the Town and Country Planning Department were criticized for disregarding environmental concerns and statutory notifications.

The court emphasized the application of the "Polluter Pays" principle, directing the applicant to pay for rehabilitation of damaged areas.

Construction carried out prior to the notification date (18.08.1992) was saved, but illegal constructions made afterward were ordered to be demolished.

The applicant was directed to refund investments made by individuals who purchased land from them after the notification date.

Compensation was ordered to be paid for the cost of construction to those affected by the demolition, to be shared by the applicant company and the Town and Country Planning Department.

Decision: The court's ruling focused on enforcing environmental regulations, holding the applicant accountable for the damage caused by its illegal activities, and compensating affected parties.

Facts:

The Respondent No. 1 issued a Request for Qualification (RFQ) for a container terminal project, divided into eligibility and Request for Proposal (RFP) stages. The Appellant and Respondent No. 2 formed a consortium that qualified in the eligibility stage. A Letter of Award was issued to the consortium, but Respondent No. 2 withdrew from the bid process. Consequently, Respondent No. 1 issued a show-cause notice, and upon failure to perform, revoked the Letter of Award. An arbitration notice was sent by Respondent No. 1, claiming disputes under an arbitration clause.

Issues:

Whether there existed a concluded contract between the parties.

The applicability of the arbitration clause to the disputes.

Held:

The Court observed that the bid process, as per the Request for Proposal (RFP) clauses, did not result in a concluded contract between the parties. The process was ongoing, and several steps were required before a contract could be enforceable.

Section 7 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 requires acceptance to be absolute and unqualified. In this case, there was no such absolute acceptance by the Letter of Award. Therefore, there was no enforceable contract.

The Court relied on precedents such as Dresser Rand S.A. and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited to emphasize that certain steps are necessary for a contract to materialize. It reiterated that everything before the fulfillment of these steps is merely a prelude and not a binding contract.

Even if there were an arbitration clause, it would not be suitable for the current dispute. The clause only covered disputes between a Special Purpose Vehicle and Respondent No. 1, excluding the Appellant and Respondent No. 2.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment. The Court affirmed that there was no concluded contract between the parties, and the arbitration clause referred to by Respondent No. 1 was not applicable to the dispute at hand.

Facts:

The case involves a challenge to the seniority granted to promotee officers over direct recruits within the Indian Railways Establishment, specifically concerning the Indian Railway Service of Signal Engineers.

The dispute arose when a direct recruit contested the seniority granted to promotee officers, who were placed en bloc senior to all direct recruits. The direct recruit argued that seniority should be fixed from the date of sending the requisition for vacancies relating to the year 2009. The Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) rejected the plea, stating that the IREM provisions determining seniority based on the 'date of increment in the time scale (DITS)' were flawed and arbitrary.

The High Court upheld this decision, asserting that DoPT circulars were binding on the Railways, and IREM was not statutory but merely a set of guidelines.

Issues:

The determination of seniority within the Indian Railways Establishment, specifically concerning the Indian Railway Service of Signal Engineers.

The key contention is whether the seniority of direct recruits should be fixed from the date of sending the requisition for vacancies relating to the year 2009, as argued by the appellants.

Held:

The Court examined the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961, framed under Article 77 of the Constitution, which explicitly exclude the Railways from the ambit of the Department of Personnel and Training's (DoPT) jurisdiction. Consequently, DoPT circulars are not inherently binding on the Railways unless specifically accepted or made applicable.

It was clarified that both the Indian Railways Establishment Code (IREC) and IREM have statutory force, being issued under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. Therefore, the Railways have the authority to govern their employees' service conditions through these rules.

Referring to the N.R. Parmar case, the Court established that seniority could be determined based on the year of requisition only if it aligns with the vacancy year. However, this principle applies solely when the recruitment year matches the vacancy year. Since the vacancies related to the year 2009, direct recruits were not entitled to seniority from 2007 when the requisition was sent.

The Court found that the Railways' amendment to the IREM rules, aligning them with the CAT's judgment, did not violate the CAT's order. The CAT had only ordered the removal of arbitrariness associated with 'DITS' and adoption of the 'year of allotment.' Therefore, the Railways' action was in line with the CAT's directive.

Decision: The Court upheld the Railways' authority to govern its employees' service conditions, including seniority determination, through the IREC and IREM. It also affirmed the validity of the Railways' amendment to IREM rules, finding it consistent with the CAT's directive to remove arbitrariness in seniority determination. We dispose of the appeal.

Facts:

Mysore Urban Development Authority (MUDA) initiated acquisition proceedings under the Karnataka Urban Development Authorities Act, 1987, and the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

The High Court of Karnataka quashed the acquisition proceedings, citing delay in possession of the acquired land.

MUDA filed appeals before the Division Bench, which were dismissed as not pressed, based on a resolution purportedly dropping the lands from acquisition proceedings.

MUDA appealed to the Supreme Court challenging the dismissal of appeals and arguing for their right to be heard on merits.

Issues:

Whether the Division Bench erred in dismissing MUDA's appeals as not pressed.

Whether subsequent actions by the parties should influence the decision on the appeals.

Whether MUDA had the authority to withdraw from the acquisition proceedings without the sanction of the State Government.

Held:

The Court held that the Division Bench erred in dismissing MUDA's appeals as not pressed. The court emphasized the importance of the right of appeal and the need for strict compliance with legal provisions. Subsequent actions by the parties were deemed irrelevant to the decision on the appeals. MUDA was found to lack the authority to unilaterally withdraw from the acquisition proceedings without the State Government's sanction. Therefore, the appeals were allowed, and the High Court was instructed to decide the appeals on their merits.

Facts:

The case involved an appellant, Maqbool, challenging the framing of charges against him under Section 326A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) in relation to an acid attack. The appellant argued that the injury caused was simple, not grievous, and thus, Section 326A should not apply.

Issues:

Whether an offense under Section 326A of the IPC is attracted if the injury caused in an acid attack is simple.

Whether charge can be framed under Section 326B if the injury caused is only simple.

Held:

The court held that the nature of the injury, whether simple or grievous, does not affect the application of Section 326A in cases of acid attacks. Additionally, the court clarified the distinction between Sections 326A and 326B, emphasizing that Section 326A applies when the injury falls under specified types due to an acid attack, regardless of its severity.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the framing of charges under Section 326A.