Facts:

The Ministry of Women and Child Development was in the process of preparing an SOP for children who are victims of violence. An interim advisory had been issued, and reports from the NCPCR were being shared with some states. Additionally, progress on the Child Protection Policy and the establishment of a National Institution for the benefit of Children was discussed. Status reports regarding Child Welfare Committees and Juvenile Justice Boards were also examined.

Issues:

The Court identified six key issues that required consideration, including the implementation of protocols for child victims, the sharing of reports by the NCPCR.

The development of a Child Protection Policy, strengthening of the National Institution for the benefit of Children, status reports on Child Welfare Committees and Juvenile Justice Boards, and the review of reports furnished by the States.

Held and Decision:

Regarding SOPs for child victims, an interim advisory had been issued by the Ministry of Women and Child Development. The Court directed the learned Amicus to review the advisory.

The NCPCR had submitted an interim report, but it was unclear if all states had received it. The Court instructed State Governments to complete registration of child care institutions and provide necessary information to the NCPCR within two weeks.

The first draft of the Child Protection Policy was expected by December 2018, and the Court emphasized wide circulation and inviting suggestions.

The matter of the National Institution for the benefit of Children was referred to the Department of Expenditure.

The status report provided on Child Welfare Committees and Juvenile Justice Boards was deemed incomplete, and the Court directed the ASG to provide a comprehensive report and address the issue with State Governments.

The Court noted that reports furnished by some States were incomplete and urged the Ministry of Women and Child Development to address this with the States.

Facts:

Kamala (PW-1), the mother of the deceased Sankar, witnessed the brutal murder of her son. On August 19, 1996, while visiting her elder son's newborn baby in Harikesavanallur, Kamala and Sankar were attacked by a group of individuals armed with weapons. The attackers, including the appellant, inflicted fatal injuries on Sankar, leading to his death.

Issues:

The primary issue revolved around the credibility of Kamala's testimony as the sole eyewitness to the murder.

The defense challenged her account, citing various factors such as the location and circumstances of the attack.

Additionally, concerns were raised regarding the delay in lodging the complaint and registering the FIR, as well as alleged discrepancies between the oral and medical evidence.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Kamala's testimony was credible and consistent, supported by medical evidence and other corroborative evidence. Despite attempts by the defense to discredit her account, the severity of the victim's injuries lent weight to her testimony. The court also found the delay in lodging the complaint and registering the FIR reasonable given the circumstances of the incident.

Furthermore, the court emphasized that motive, while relevant, was not essential in cases where eyewitness testimony was strong and supported by other evidence. The defense's arguments regarding discrepancies between the oral and medical evidence were deemed insignificant, as such variances did not undermine the prosecution's case.

Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant's conviction and sentence were upheld. The appellant was directed to surrender within two weeks to serve the remainder of his sentence if he had not already done so.

Facts:

Gagandeep Singh, the appellant, was third on the select list for appointment to the post of District Programme Officer.

A vacancy arose when the person appointed against the reserved vacancy resigned from the post.

The appellant contended that the vacancy should be filled from the same community, and as he was next in line after the resignation, he should be appointed.

The Department rejected the appellant's claim, stating that once an appointment is made, the reserved point is consumed, and thus, the appellant cannot be considered.

The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court, which was dismissed.

Issues:

Whether a vacancy created by a candidate from the reserved category, and subsequently vacated, should be filled from the candidates available in the select list.

Whether the purpose of preparing a select list would be frustrated if vacancies were not filled from the list when they arose.

Held:

The purpose of preparing a select list would be frustrated if vacancies were not filled from the list when they arose.

Referring to the guidelines issued by the welfare department, the Court emphasized that a vacancy created by a candidate from the reserved category, and subsequently vacated, should be filled from the candidates available in the select list.

The Court directed the respondents to make the appointment from the merit list published on 20.06.2012, within a period of two months.

It was clarified that the appointed candidate would get seniority only from the date of appointment.

Facts:

The complainants had booked residential flats in a project named "White Spring Building" in Mumbai.

The possession of the flats was delayed beyond the agreed date.

The agreement between the parties contained Clause 17 specifying various contingencies that would extend the possession date.

The original allottees transferred their allotment within the family to the present respondents.

The appellant cited delays due to mandatory requirements such as resubmission of plans and obtaining fresh NOC for fire safety permission.

The appellant also claimed a reduction in the availability of sand due to restrictions on sand mining activities.

Issues:

Whether the complaints filed by subsequent transferees within the family were maintainable.

Whether the appellant was entitled to an extension of the possession period due to mandatory requirements and reduced availability of sand.

Held:

The court held that the complaints filed by subsequent transferees within the family were maintainable, distinguishing the case from instances where transfers were made to strangers (referring to Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Raje Ram, (2008) 17 SCC 407).

The court accepted the appellant's argument regarding delays due to mandatory requirements, granting a six-month extension for the period from 21.12.2012 to 07.05.2013.

While acknowledging the appellant's claim regarding the reduced availability of sand, the court did not fully accept the argument.

The court modified the directions issued by the Commission, ordering a lump sum compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs to each respondent in respect of each case, in addition to other directions regarding payment and interest. With these directions civil appeals stand disposed of. No costs.

Facts:

The appellant, Bangalore International Airport Area Planning Authority, demanded betterment charges, building construction charges, etc., from the respondents, including Birla Super Bulk Terminal (now a unit of UltraTech Cement Ltd.), for land allotted by the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (KIADB) for the construction of a Bulk Cement Terminal. The respondents challenged this demand through a writ petition, arguing that as the land was allotted by the KIADB, they were not liable to pay development charges under the Karnataka Town and Country Planning (KTCP) Act, 1961.

Issues:

Whether the Planning Authority under the KTCP Act has jurisdiction to levy betterment charges on development activities within industrial areas governed by the KIAD Act.

Whether there is any conflict between the provisions of the KIAD Act and the KTCP Act regarding the authority to regulate land use and development.

Held:

The Court examined the objects and scope of both the KIAD Act and the KTCP Act and found that they operate in different fields. The KIAD Act is focused on securing the establishment of industrial areas and promoting orderly development of industries, while the KTCP Act regulates planned growth of land use and development, including town planning schemes.

The levy of prescribed fees under Section 18 of the KTCP Act encompasses both changing land use and development of land or building.

The Planning Authority constituted under the KTCP Act is empowered to grant approval for development on land within its jurisdiction, including land acquired and allotted by the KIADB under the KIAD Act.

Both the KIAD Act and the KTCP Act must be harmoniously construed to give effect to their respective provisions, and there is no inconsistency or overlapping between them.

The High Court's findings regarding the applicability of the KTCP Act to industrial areas governed by the KIAD Act were contradictory, and the Planning Authority has the authority to levy betterment charges as per the law.

Decision: The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside, and the respondents are directed to pay the demanded charges to the appellant authority with interest at the rate of 6% from the date of the demand, within the stipulated period.

Facts:

The case involves the selection process for Sub-Inspectors (Civil Police) and Platoon Commanders (Provincial Armed Constabulary or PAC) in Uttar Pradesh, with a total of 4010 posts advertised. Challenges were raised regarding the selection of certain candidates who used whitener or blade during the main examination. The final results were revised multiple times due to legal challenges.

Issues:

The eligibility of candidates who used whitener or blade during the main examination, the filling of vacant posts, and the adherence to selection criteria such as obtaining 50% or more marks in the written examination.

Held:

The court, considering various interventions and the presence of 607 vacant posts, directed that these posts be filled in the present selection itself as a one-time exception.

Additionally, it affirmed the correctness of the High Court's decision in Special Appeal No.416 of 2016.

Candidates must have obtained 50% or more marks in the main written examination to be eligible for selection, as per the court's directive.

Despite the discrepancy between the number of candidates called for group discussion (14256) and the notified vacancies (12030), the court found it inappropriate to eliminate the excess candidates from consideration. It directed the filling of the remaining 607 vacancies.

The court emphasized that the vacancies for candidates excluded due to the use of whitener or blade should be in addition to the total number of posts advertised (4010), resulting in a total selection of 4010+1022 candidates.

The court directed the State Government to make available 833 posts (607 + 226) in the present selection, strictly in order of merit and subject to fulfilling eligibility criteria.

The direction to fill up the 833 posts was specified as an addition to any previous directions issued.

Matters unrelated to the present selection, such as promotions for Head Constables or Constables to the post of Sub-Inspectors, were segregated for separate consideration.

Facts:

The respondent, Abhijit Singh Pawar, participated in the selection process for police posts in Madhya Pradesh in 2012.

He disclosed a pending criminal case against him involving charges under Sections 323, 325, 506, and 34 of the IPC.

A compromise was reached between the parties, and the charges were compounded under Section 320(2) of the CrPC.

Despite disclosure and the compromise, the respondent's candidature was rejected due to the importance of high moral conduct for police positions.

The respondent challenged the rejection in the High Court, which ruled in his favor, allowing his appointment based on merit but without back wages.

The State appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the rejection of the respondent's candidature was justified despite the disclosure and subsequent compromise of the criminal case.

Whether the employer has the discretion to consider the suitability of candidates with criminal antecedents for police positions.

Held:

The Court upheld the rejection of the respondent's candidature, emphasizing the importance of maintaining integrity in the police force. It affirmed the employer's discretion to consider the suitability of candidates with criminal antecedents, even after disclosure and compromise of the case.

The decision was based on established principles outlined in relevant precedents such as Commissioner of Police, New Delhi v. Mehar Singh, Avtar Singh v. Union of India, and others. These precedents affirmed the employer's right to reject candidates with criminal antecedents if it is deemed necessary to maintain the integrity and credibility of the police force.

In conclusion, the appeal was allowed, and the decisions of the Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court were set aside. The respondent's writ petition was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.

Facts:

The plaintiffs, residents of Dubai, filed a suit in the High Court of Madras as a derivative action on behalf of defendant No. 2, a Dubai-based company, regarding the ownership of shares in an Indian company held by defendant Nos. 3-7.

The plaintiffs claimed beneficial interest in the shares held by defendant No. 2, while defendant Nos. 3-7 contested this claim. The dispute primarily concerned affairs of the Dubai-based company, and the cause of action did not arise in India.

Issues:

Whether the High Court of Madras had jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the plaintiffs.

Whether the dispute between the parties warranted litigation in India or Dubai.

Whether the principles governing derivative actions and beneficial interests were applicable to the case.

Held:

The High Court rightly held that the mere existence of the registered office of an Indian company does not confer jurisdiction on Indian courts when the dispute primarily involves entities from other jurisdictions.

The dispute between the parties pertained to the affairs of the Dubai-based company, and the cause of action did not arise in India. Therefore, the High Court of Madras lacked jurisdiction.

The High Court correctly observed that the relief sought against the Indian company was consequential, and the main dispute needed resolution first, which would be more appropriately handled by a court in Dubai.

The court highlighted the principles governing derivative actions, emphasizing that they must have legal sanction and are not obliged to foreign entities. In this case, defendant No. 2 was not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court.

The definition of "Beneficial interest" under the Trust Act, 1882 was discussed, indicating that the ownership vests with the registered owner but the beneficial owner may include a person acting as a trustee, legal representative, or agent.

The court reiterated that the issue of territorial jurisdiction over a suit initiated to protect beneficial interests could only be decided if such interests were amenable to such jurisdiction. Defendant No. 2 was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court.

Facts:

The appeals arose from a judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Madras dated 6.2.2015, which dismissed writ appeals filed by the State of Tamil Nadu against the judgment of a learned Single Judge.

Employees M. Mangayarkarasi and M. Jayalakshmi were accused of admitting and sanctioning bills without proper verification, leading to misappropriation in the District Treasury at Salem.

The State Government issued orders of removal from service against them, challenged before the learned Single Judge.

The Single Judge substituted the punishment of removal with stoppage of increments for two years without cumulative effect.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's application of the principle of parity was justified in the disciplinary proceedings.

Whether the gravity of misconduct by the appellants was distinct and more serious compared to other employees.

Held:

The court establish that the Supreme Court found fault with the High Court's decision for several reasons:

The gravity of misconduct by the appellants was distinct and more serious compared to other employees, as evidenced by the amount involved and the extent of lack of verification.

The Division Bench erred in applying the principle of parity without recognizing the material distinction in the misconduct alleged against the appellants.

Judicial review in disciplinary matters should only interfere with the employer's discretion if the penalty is shockingly disproportionate to the charges proved. In this case, the High Court substituted the penalty without proper justification.