Facts:

On 15 June 2004, MoEF issued guidelines regulating the diversion of forest land for non-forest purposes.

On 7 March 2008, the Government of Tamil Nadu approved the diversion of forest land for the construction of an intake well for drinking water purposes.

The National Green Tribunal received a complaint alleging the misuse of water for industrial purposes instead of the approved drinking water purposes.

Issues:

Whether the diversion of forest land for drinking water purposes was misused for industrial purposes.

Compliance with Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, and MoEF guidelines.

Held:

The Tribunal directed the TWAD Board to prohibit the use of water for industrial purposes and clarified the prohibition was only for industrial units.

The Court restored the position as per the interim order of the Tribunal, allowing the supply of water for industrial purposes, subject to fully meeting drinking water requirements.

The Collector was directed to monitor the decision to release water for industrial purposes, ensuring no compromise on drinking water and irrigation needs.

A joint meeting of the State Government and TWAD Board was ordered to resolve the proposal under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980.

The appeals were disposed of accordingly.

FACTS:

The petitioners, representing PTOs/HGOs, challenged certain eligibility conditions and provisions in the Haj Policy 2019-2023.

The Government of India, following a detailed process and consultation, formulated the Haj Policy, taking into account suggestions from stakeholders.

ISSUES:

Dispute over eligibility conditions and provisions in the Haj Policy.

Grievances raised by PTOs/HGOs regarding the financial criteria, documentation requirements, and other aspects of the Policy.

HELD:

The judgment emphasized the significance of the Haj pilgrimage for the Muslim community, highlighting the regulatory measures implemented by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the bilateral agreement between India and Saudi Arabia.

The Court acknowledged the grievances of PTOs/HGOs and detailed the modifications made in the Haj Policy, including the removal of certain eligibility conditions and simplification of documentation.

The judgment highlighted the exhaustive process of formulating the Policy, including invitations for suggestions, comments, and a mid-term review provision after two years.

The Court rejected the challenge to the eligibility criteria for HGO categories, emphasizing the importance of both experience and financial strength for PTOs, particularly given the responsibility of arranging various aspects of the pilgrimage.

The judgment underscored the limited scope of judicial review in policy matters, citing precedents that established the court's reluctance to interfere with policy decisions unless they are against the law or manifestly arbitrary.

REFERRED CASES:

Benett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, (1972) 2 SCC 788.

Maharashtra State Board of Secondary & Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27

State of Madhya Pradesh v. Nandlan Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566.

Union of India and Others v. Rafique Shaikh Bhikan and Another, (2013) 4 SCC 699.

Facts:

G. Ratna Raj, the original appellant (now represented by legal representatives), filed a civil suit for redemption of mortgage and permanent injunction against Sri Muthukumarasamy Permanent Fund Ltd. (Respondent No.1) and others.

Defendants appeared initially, issues were framed, and plaintiff's evidence was recorded.

Defendants did not appear later, and the court proceeded ex parte against them, leading to the passing of a preliminary decree.

Issues:

Whether the Division Bench was justified in setting aside the preliminary decree, treating it as an ex-parte decree under Order 9, Rule 13 of CPC?

Held:

The Trial Court proceeded ex parte under Order 17, Rule 2 and Order 9, Rule 6 (a) as the defendants were absent despite summons.

The Division Bench rightly set aside the preliminary decree, treating it as an ex-parte decree under Order 9, Rule 13.

The Court clarified that an ex-parte decree under Order 9, Rule 6 (a) can be set aside under Order 9, Rule 13 on establishing sufficient grounds by the defendants.

Decision: Appeals dismissed. The Trial Court directed to decide the Original Suit No. 131/1999 on merits within one year. The legal representatives permitted to amend the cause title and prosecute the suit.

Facts:

The appellant (Asharfi Devi) was the owner of certain lands subjected to ceiling proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976.

Ceilings proceedings declared some lands in excess of ceiling limits as surplus, and the State claimed to have taken possession in 1982.

The appellant filed a writ petition in 2002, claiming that the Ceiling Act's repeal in 1999 rendered the proceedings lapsed.

The writ petition was dismissed in 2008, and a review application was filed, which was also dismissed in 2008.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was right in dismissing the review application under Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC.

Whether the main order contained any error/mistake apparent on the face of the record.

Held:

The original appellant did not challenge the legality of the main order dated 14.03.2008 separately.

The Court refused to invoke Article 142 of the Constitution to permit challenging the main order, citing lack of reasons and legal impediment.

The appeal was confined to examining the legality of the review order and not the main order.

The High Court's finding that the main order did not contain any error/mistake under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code was upheld.

The Court concluded that the review order was passed in conformity with the requirements of Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC.

The finding in the writ petition that the appellant failed to prove possession on the date of repeal was not subject to denovo examination in the review jurisdiction.

The appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The Chairman of the Tribunal, acting singly, stayed proceedings before a two-member Bench and rendered interim orders passed by that Bench inoperative, utilizing powers under Sections 5, 24, and 25 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

Issues:

Whether the Chairman, sitting singly, possesses the authority to nullify orders passed by a larger Bench?

What is the relevance of the Preamble of the Administrative Tribunals Act in the context of the Chairman's actions?

What are the powers and limitations of the Chairman under Sections 5, 24, and 25 of the Act?

Held:

The Chairman, sitting singly, cannot nullify orders passed by a larger Bench. The order staying proceedings before the two-member Bench was without jurisdiction and unsustainable in law.( Para 40)

The reference to the Preamble of the Act is irrelevant. The Preamble does not support the contention that the Chairman, sitting singly, could stay proceedings before a Division Bench.( Para 47)

Section 5 establishes the composition of the Tribunal, distinguishing the Chairman's administrative powers from those of the Tribunal. The Chairman's powers include discharging functions of members and transferring members between Benches.( Paras 49, 50)

The proviso to Section 5(c) allows the Chairman, during the hearing, to transfer the case to a Bench consisting of two Members if deemed necessary.( Para 53)

Section 24 limits the power to pass interim orders to the Tribunal, not the Chairman. Section 25 grants the Chairman administrative power to transfer cases between Benches but doesn't confer the power to pass interim stays.( Para 58, 59, 60)

The Chairman, while exercising power under Section 25, does not function as a Tribunal and lacks the authority to pass interim stay orders.( Para 61)

The Chairman can exercise financial and administrative powers over Benches but cannot interfere with their functioning or tinker with orders through interim orders in a transfer petition.( Para 64)

Judicial decorum demands that a judicial order be vacated, varied, or reviewed by a Bench of equal or larger strength, not a smaller Bench.( Para 65)

Interim orders do not operate as precedents, but norms of judicial decorum apply to them. Principles of higher strength Benches take precedence.( Para 67)

The Division Bench rightly allowed the writ petition, asserting that the Chairman's order of stay was without jurisdiction. The Chairman, acting judicially, is equal to any other Member.( Para 68)

The Chairman's order is declared without jurisdiction, and the appellant is directed to deposit costs of Rs. 25,000 with the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.( Paras 73, 74)

Facts:

A complaint was lodged on 01.09.1998, stating an attack on the complainant on 29.08.1998 by the respondents and others.

The complainant alleged injuries and hospitalization, leading to the filing of FIR No. 1165/1998.

After the trial, all accused were acquitted on 06.09.2005.

Issues:

The State of Maharashtra sought leave to appeal under Section 378(3) of CrPC, which was rejected by the High Court on 13.06.2008.

Held:

The appellant argued based on the judgment in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar (2008) 9 SCC 475, emphasizing the scope of Section 378(3), CrPC.

The High Court's rejection was based on the alleged absence of injuries as per medical evidence, contrary to the record.

The Court found the rejection flawed and prima facie established a case for the State to appeal.

Considering a cross-complaint and pending appeal in another case related to the incident, the Court granted leave.

The impugned order dated 13.06.2008 was set aside, allowing the State's appeal.

Facts:

The dispute originated in the Court of Superintendent of land records and subsequently progressed through appellate stages, culminating in a writ petition before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay.

Issues:

The primary issue revolves around the entries made in the revenue records concerning the disputed land.

Held:

The Supreme Court reiterated the settled legal position that mutation of land in revenue records does not affect the title of the land; it merely facilitates the payment of land revenue by the person in whose favor the mutation is ordered. This principle is consistent with previous judgments, including Sawarni(Smt.) vs. Inder Kaur, (1996) 6 SCC 223, Balwant Singh & Anr. Vs. Daulat Singh(dead) by L.Rs. & Ors., (1997) 7 SCC 137, and Narasamma & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors., (2009) 5 SCC 591.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, upholding the order of the High Court. The Court found no merit in the argument that mutation entries could impact the title of the parties involved, emphasizing that civil suits related to the land were still pending.

Facts:

The appellant filed a civil suit against the respondents for specific performance of the contract based on an agreement dated 08.08.1984. The Trial Court decreed the suit, but the first Appellate Court overturned the decision. The High Court dismissed the second appeal, stating it lacked substantial questions of law.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the plaintiff's second appeal on the ground that it does not involve any substantial question(s) of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not right in holding that the appeal does not involve any substantial question of law. It emphasized that the appeal did involve a substantial question of law, and such questions should have been framed at the time of admission of the second appeal as provided under Section 100 (4) of the Code for its final hearing. The Court decided to remand the case to the High Court for deciding the second appeal on merits in accordance with law after framing appropriate substantial question(s) of law arising in the case.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the impugned order is set aside. The case is remanded to the High Court with a request to admit the appeal and frame appropriate substantial question(s) of law in terms of Section 100 (4) of the Code. The High Court is directed to decide the second appeal on merits by answering the question(s) framed as per Section 100 (5) of the Code in accordance with the law without being influenced by any of the Supreme Court's observations on merits.

Facts:

The appellant, N. Sankaranarayanan, and respondent No. 2 are members of a family with disputes over family properties.

An earlier memorandum of understanding in 1998 aimed to resolve disputes, but conflicts persisted.

The appellant filed a writ petition under Article 226, challenging the activities of respondent No. 2 on family land.

Issues:

Whether a writ petition under Article 226 is the appropriate recourse for private property disputes among family members.

Jurisdiction of State authorities in addressing alleged illegal activities on the disputed land.

Held:

The Division Bench dismissed the writ petition, citing that private property disputes among family members should be resolved in civil courts, not under Article 226 jurisdiction.( Para 15)

Emphasized that the dispute was essentially a private matter within the family and not a matter for writ jurisdiction.( Para 17)

Reiterated the settled law that writ petitions cannot address private property disputes and that remedies lie in civil courts.( Para 18)

Acknowledged pending proceedings before the Company Law Board and directed parties to pursue remedies available in those proceedings.( Para 21)