Facts:

The first respondent was appointed as an Ayurvedic Medical Officer in the State of Bihar in 1989.

Bihar was reorganized in 2000, resulting in the creation of the State of Jharkhand.

The first respondent opted for Bihar but was later allocated to Jharkhand in 2007.

In 2010, the first respondent sought re-allocation to Bihar, which was granted.

The respondent continued to work in Jharkhand until retirement in 2017.

The first respondent filed a Writ Petition claiming non-relief from Jharkhand to join Bihar.

Issues:

Whether the non-relief by Jharkhand was a valid ground for seeking relief from the court.

Whether the first respondent, having retired, could be absorbed by the State of Bihar.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the first respondent did not pursue legal remedies when aggrieved by Jharkhand's decision not to relieve him. It deemed inappropriate to direct his absorption by Bihar after retirement. The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment. The judgment further stated that there shall be no order as to costs.

Facts:

The dispute arose from a construction project where M/S Treaty Construction & another (appellants) undertook to build a structure with flats and shops. The purchasers formed a co-operative housing society (M/S Ruby Tower Co-op. HSG. Society Ltd.). The society alleged that the appellants failed to complete interior works, obtain necessary certificates, and borrowed money on false pretenses.

Issues:

The completion of construction, allegations of illegal alterations, and financial transactions between the parties.

Held:

The National Commission's direction to pay Rs.25,00,000/- by the appellants to the respondent was upheld. The appellants had agreed to this amount in meetings, and the National Commission rightly enforced this commitment.( Para 10)

The part of the order requiring the appellants to pay compensation of Rs.3,00,000/- was set aside. The court found no evidence on record to establish the appellants' liability for compensation, and there was a lack of material proving loss suffered by the respondent-society.( Para 11)

The direction for the appellants to pay Rs.1,000/- per day after 60 days until obtaining full Occupancy Certificate was also set aside. The court considered the Municipal Corporation's objections and the ongoing dispute over alleged illegal constructions by the respondent-society.( Para 12)

In summary, the court partly allowed the appeal, directing the appellants to pay Rs.25,00,000/- to the respondent. The compensation and daily penalties were set aside. Both parties were instructed to fulfill their respective obligations within specified time frames. The court left open the option for the parties to seek appropriate remedies for future grievances.( Para 14)

Facts:

The appellant initiated a public interest litigation.

High Court directed the State to make an administrative decision on Tripura Medical College.

State reconstituted the Society managing the college.

Issues:

Appellant challenged admission procedure and fees, seeking parity with other government medical colleges.

The writ petition was dismissed, leading to the present appeal.

Held:

Court's Jurisdiction and Policy Decision: The court highlighted that the appellant raised a policy issue, and it was inappropriate for the High Court to direct the government to run the college as a government institution. The chosen hybrid model with a society was upheld. (Para 8)

Grievance on Fees The appellant's grievance about student fees was advised to be considered by the regulatory committee in the state. (Para 9):

Appropriateness of Judicial Review: The court found it inappropriate to determine the correctness of a policy decision made by the State government. (Para 10)

Final Decision: The court found no merit in the appeal and dismissed it. No costs were imposed. (Para 11)

Facts:

The Union of India contended that the respondents were involved in smuggling a large volume of gold from the UAE to India, weighing over 3300 kgs. The respondents were arrested under Section 135 of the Customs Act, and detention orders were issued under Section 3 of COFEPOSA on May 17, 2019. The detention orders were served on the respondents on May 18, 2019, while the compilation of documents was served on May 21, 2019, and May 22, 2019.

Issues:

The High Court quashed the detention orders, citing a procedural violation concerning the non-simultaneous service of relied-upon documents with the detention orders. Additionally, the detaining authority's satisfaction regarding the respondents' likelihood of release on bail was questioned.

Held:

Section 3(3) of COFEPOSA allows a leeway of five days for the grounds of detention and documents to be served. The High Court erred in quashing the orders based on the timing of document service, as the statutory requirement was met within the stipulated timeframe.( Paragraph 19)

The relied-upon documents were served within the statutory period, and the time-consuming nature of compiling voluminous documents justified the delay in serving the compilation.( Paragraph 21)

The term "pari passu" must be read in conjunction with Section 3(3) of COFEPOSA, meaning that the grounds and documents must be served within five days. The High Court's decision to quash the orders on this ground was deemed incorrect.( Paragraph 24)

The "Hand Book on Compilation of Instructions on COFEPOSA matters" guidelines were fully complied with, but executive instructions cannot override statutory provisions.( Paragraph 26)

Detention orders can be validly passed against a person in custody, provided the grounds show awareness and the likelihood of release on bail leading to further prejudicial activities.( Paragraph 30)

The detaining authority's awareness of the respondents' custody was evident, even though it was not explicitly stated in the orders.( Paragraph 35)

The satisfaction of the detaining authority regarding the likelihood of release on bail was based on materials, and the High Court erred in quashing the orders solely on this ground.( Paragraph 37)

Decision: The appeals of the Union of India were allowed, and the appeals of the detenues were dismissed. The High Court's decision to quash the detention orders was set aside.

Facts:

The respondents sought compassionate appointment after the death of their parents who were teachers.

Appointments were made under Rule 10 of the Bihar Municipal Body Elementary Teachers (Employment and Service Conditions) Rules, 2006.

An instruction dated 17 October 2008 by the Government of Bihar affected the jurisdiction of the District Compassionate Committee.

Issues:

Validity of appointments under Rule 10.

Impact of the Government instruction dated 17 October 2008 on the appointments.

Held:

The High Court's direction to appoint the respondents in the regular service of the Government was deemed erroneous. The respondents were appointed in accordance with Rule 10 of the 2006 Rules. No executive instruction could supersede the rules. The respondents were granted the liberty to approach the State Government for suitable relief.

Facts:

Specific performance suit filed by the plaintiff against family members.

Only Defendant No. 5 (Respondent No. 1) filed a written statement but did not lead evidence.

Interim injunction in a partition suit related to the property.

Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between plaintiff and defendants.

High Court initially decreed specific performance but later recalled the judgment on a review petition.

Issues:

Validity of service on Respondent No. 1.

Absence of a written Vakalatnama for the advocate representing Respondent No. 1.

Family dispute and the effect of an interim injunction.

Held:

The court, after considering the facts and arguments, held that service on Respondent No. 1 was properly conducted through multiple attempts. The absence of a written Vakalatnama was deemed an irregularity, and the court rejected the argument that it could be a ground for review. The court found that the result of the appeal would have been the same even if Respondent No. 1 had not appeared. Consequently, the impugned judgment was set aside, and the appeal was allowed.

Facts:

Land owned by the petitioner acquired for Metro railway construction under the 1978 Act.

Petitioner filed for compensation under the 2013 Act, seeking an amendment.

Appellate Authority awarded compensation, including 12% per annum and 100% solatium.

High Court partially allowed revision, stating solatium calculated only on market value and assets.

Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether solatium under Section 30(1) should include the additional 12% per annum on market value.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after analyzing relevant sections, held that solatium under Section 30(1) should be calculated only on the market value plus the value of assets attached to the land. The total compensation amount determined under Sections 26, 27, and 28 should not include the additional 12% per annum on the market value specified in Section 30(3). The final award comprises three components: compensation amount, solatium, and the amount calculated at 12% per annum on the market value. The Court rejected the argument that Section 69 supports including the 12% per annum amount in the solatium, stating that Section 69 pertains to the determination of the final award, which includes separate components. The Special Leave Petitions were dismissed.

Facts:

The State of Maharashtra initiated land acquisition for the construction of Mukane Dam in 1994.

Landowners (appellants) challenged the compensation offered by the Land Acquisition Officer (LAO).

Civil Court partly enhanced the compensation rates for Jirayat, Bagayat, and Pot Kharab lands in 2006.

State appealed to the Bombay High Court against the Civil Court's award.

High Court partly allowed the State's appeals, reducing the compensation rates for Jirayat and Bagayat lands.

Issues:

Whether the rates determined by the Civil Court for Jirayat and Bagayat lands were justified.

The validity of the High Court's decision to reduce the compensation rates.

Held:

The High Court's reasoning and conclusion in reducing the compensation rates are just and proper. The reduction is based on the appreciation of evidence, including six sale deeds presented by both the State and the landowners.( Para 20)

The High Court correctly considered three sale deeds presented by the State and three by the landowners to determine the market value of the acquired land. The rates determined by the Civil Court were deemed on the higher side, justifying the reduction by the High Court.( Para 21)

The sale deed dated 14.02.1994 (Ex-141) was considered relevant for determining the market value, being close to the date of acquisition and involving a larger chunk of land.( Para 24)

Exclusive reliance on a single sale deed (Ex-P-42) from 1989 for a small piece of land was deemed unsafe. The High Court's consideration of multiple sale deeds was justified.( Para 26)

The marginal reduction in rates for Jirayat and Bagayat lands, based on the High Court's cogent reasoning, cannot be faulted with.( Para 29)

The appeals are accordingly dismissed. ( Para 30)

Facts:

Original plaintiffs filed a suit for specific performance against the original defendant.

Despite an injunction, the defendant executed a sale deed in favor of the appellant during the suit's pendency.

The appellant applied for impleadment as a defendant, claiming a direct interest in the suit property.

Trial court allowed impleadment, but the High Court set aside this order, stating the appellant was not a necessary party.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, not a party to the original agreement, can be impleaded in a specific performance suit.

Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the trial court's order allowing impleadment.

Held:

The Supreme Court, relying on the principles in Kasturi vs. Iyyamperumal, held that the plaintiff is the dominus litis and cannot be compelled to implead a person against whom no relief has been claimed. The Court emphasized that a third party or a stranger cannot be added to a suit for specific performance merely to find out who is in possession or to avoid multiplicity of suits.

The Court agreed with the High Court's view that the appellant cannot be impleaded as a defendant in the specific performance suit against the wish of the plaintiffs. The appeals were dismissed.