Facts:

The complainants booked apartments in a project titled "DLF Valley, Panchkula." The developer failed to hand over possession within the agreed-upon time, leading to various complaints.

Issues:

Compensation for delayed possession, and the entitlement of heirs in the case of a deceased original allottee.

Held:

The entitlement of heirs in the case of a deceased original allottee cannot be determined at this stage and must be left to a competent court. However, 3/4 of the sum is directed to be made over to the widow for herself and on behalf of two children, while the remaining 1/4 shall be made over to the mother.

In all refund cases, interest at the rate of 9% is awarded from the day of deposit till the date of refund. In cases of possession sought, the compensation period is after the expiry of three years from the date of the agreement, with interest at the rate of 9%.

Facts:

Respondents were governed by the Employees Contributory Provident Fund Scheme.

Pension Scheme introduced before VRS, but not implemented until 1995.

VRS eligibility required 10 years of service or completion of 40 years of age.

Pension scheme applied retrospectively from 3.8.1981, implemented by the appellant-Corporation in 1995.

Dispute arose regarding the exclusion of the period of unauthorized absence from qualifying service for pension.

Issues:

Whether the period of unauthorized absence without pay should be counted towards qualifying service for pension under the Pension Rules.

Interpretation of Rules 21, 27, and 28 in the context of leave availed of during service.

Held:

The respondents were not governed by the Pension Rules initially but by the Employees Contributory Provident Fund Scheme.

The introduction of the Pension Scheme occurred just before VRS, and its implementation was delayed until 1995.

The period of unauthorized absence without pay should be excluded from qualifying service for pension, as per the clear language of Pension Rules.

Rule 21 explicitly states that only leave periods with payable leave salary should count as qualifying service for pension.

Rules 27 and 28, dealing with interruption in service, are deemed inapplicable as there is no forfeiture of past service.

The Government decision of 28.2.1976 emphasizes the need for prompt entry into service records for extraordinary leave to be considered qualifying for pension.

The respondents failed to qualify for pension benefits under the Pension Rules due to the period of unpaid leave.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, setting aside the impugned order, with each party bearing its own costs. However, no refund is claimed for any payments already made to the respondents.

Facts:

The land in question underwent ceiling proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, subsequently being allotted to a hospital on a 30-year lease. Challenges to the notification issued under Section 10(3) of the Act were raised by the respondents. The High Court upheld the notification, but the Supreme Court suggested the availability of alternative remedies.

Issues:

The maintainability of a civil suit seeking a declaration that the proceedings under the Act were null and void, and the respondents be declared owners of the land.

Held:

The judgment establishes that the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, is a self-contained code, providing a comprehensive framework for dealing with landowners' rights exceeding prescribed ceiling limits. The Act gives finality to appellate orders under Section 33, and bars civil suits under Sections 30(5) and 40.

The jurisdiction of civil courts is held to be excluded implicitly due to the finality provided by Section 33(3), availability of remedies through appeals, and the Act's completeness. The Act expressly excludes civil court jurisdiction under Sections 30(5) and 40.

The civil court lacks jurisdiction to grant reliefs sought in the suit, as it is impliedly barred under the Act.

The respondents had multiple legal remedies available, including filing a civil suit, submitting a statement to the Competent Authority under Section 6, and raising objections under Section 10(1). Failure to pursue these remedies led to the implied bar on filing a civil suit.

Dismissal of a writ petition and SLP affirmed the conformity of proceedings under the Act. The suit property vested in the state, precluding the filing of a civil suit.

Any remedy for the respondents was under the Act, and filing a civil suit was impliedly barred.

The Act's intention to exclude civil court jurisdiction is evident from various sections.

The civil court lacks jurisdiction over land subject to ceiling proceedings under the Act.

Respondents' belated challenge to ceiling proceedings is meritless, and the situation is irreversible after the state's acquisition and lease to hospitals.

The Division Bench of the High Court erred in allowing the appeal, contrary to the trial court's dismissal, which was justified.

Facts:

The case originated from matrimonial proceedings where certain averments were made in anticipatory bail applications. Allegations of perjury were raised against the appellant for deliberate false statements.

Issues:

Whether the statements in the anticipatory bail application were deliberately and consciously false?

Whether there is sufficient unimpeachable evidence to support perjury charges?

Whether the High Court's grounds were substantial for initiating prosecution under Section 340?

Held:

The High Court felt a prima facie case for perjury existed and ordered prosecution. The statements in anticipatory bail applications were contested, and the Sessions Court held that initiation of proceedings under Section 340 was premature.

The same statements were made in the High Court's anticipatory bail application, leading to the High Court's order. The appellant argued that the investigation report was preliminary and inconclusive. The High Court's order was primarily based on different grounds for granting anticipatory bail.

The law on initiating proceedings under Section 340 was discussed, emphasizing the need for deliberate and conscious false statements. It was noted that evidence had not been led, and the investigation report couldn't be considered unimpeachable. The High Court's grounds were deemed insufficient for prosecution.

Counsel for the respondent cited judgments supporting the initiation of proceedings by the High Court. The Court distinguished these cases as not applicable to the present situation, emphasizing the lack of fabricated documents or a detailed independent inquiry.

The Court rejected the argument that the High Court failed to satisfy itself on the expediency of justice. The appellant's claim of suppression of the Sessions Court order was dismissed.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's order was set aside.

Facts:

Mrs. Sudha Jain, the wife of the appellant, suffered from various diseases.

Admitted to S. Antokba Durlabhji Memorial Hospital and treated by Dr. Anurag Govil for chills and fever.

Discharged from the hospital, but her health deteriorated, leading to subsequent admissions and, ultimately, her demise on 31.10.2011.

Appellant alleged medical negligence, initiating legal proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the medical treatment administered to Mrs. Sudha Jain amounted to medical negligence.

The appellant's claim of inappropriate and ineffective medication, premature discharge, and oral administration of antibiotics.

Held:

The court cited the Consumer Protection Act, emphasizing that a doctor cannot be negligent if acting in accordance with accepted medical practices.

Reiterated the principle that a doctor need not possess the highest expert skill but should exercise ordinary skill as per the profession's standards.

Acknowledged the possibility of genuine differences of opinion in medical diagnosis and treatment.

Upheld the NCDRC's view that, at most, it was a case of wrong diagnosis and not medical negligence.

Dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that sympathy for the appellant cannot translate into a legal remedy.

FACTS:

Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. and Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. (Appellants) vs. Adani Power Ltd. (Respondent).

Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) dated 07.08.2008 and 02.02.2007 between the parties.

Change in law due to withdrawal of exemptions by notifications dated 06.04.2015 and 16.02.2016.

Adani Power filed a petition before the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) seeking compensation for change in law.

ISSUES:

Interpretation of Article 13 of the PPAs regarding compensation for change in law.

Applicability of restitutionary principles in determining compensation.

Claim for carrying costs under Article 13.

HELD:

Article 13.2 establishes a restitutionary principle, compensating the affected party to restore them economically.Two periods defined for compensation: Construction Period and Operation Period, each governed by specific criteria.( Para 7)

Compensation during the Construction Period is subject to proof of increase/decrease in Capital Cost, resolved through dispute resolution mechanism.( Para 8)

Compensation during the Operation Period is determined by the Appropriate Commission, subject to a threshold limit.Monthly tariff adjustment effective from the date of the change in law under Article 13.4.1(i).( Para 10)

Carrying cost claimed by Adani Power falls within the restitutionary principle of Article 13.2 and is specifically provided in the PPAs.The claim is not based on general principles of equity but is governed by the terms of the PPA.( Para 11)

The judgment dismisses the appeals, affirming the Appellate Tribunal's decision in favor of Adani Power.( Para 16)

REFERRED CASES:

All India Power Engineer Federation and Ors. v. Sasan Power Ltd. and Ors., (2017) 1 SCC 487

Energy Watchdog v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and Ors., (2017) 14 SCC 80

Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India and Ors., (2011) 8 SCC 161

South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors., (2003) 8 SCC 648

Facts:

Respondent No. 1 migrated to the USA after completing studies in India.

Respondent No. 1 and 2, an Indian couple, returned to India in 2016 after a decade in the USA.

Respondent No. 2 became a US citizen during their stay in the USA.

The couple, unable to conceive, planned to adopt an Indian child upon returning to India.

They submitted an application on 19.07.2016 for in-country adoption as Indian prospective adoptive parents.

While waiting for a referral, Respondent No. 1 was granted US citizenship on 06.12.2016.

A second application was submitted on 05.11.2017 for inter-country adoption after acquiring US citizenship.

Issues:

Whether the acquisition of US citizenship by Respondent No. 1 affects their eligibility for in-country adoption?

Should the offer of the child for adoption to Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 be based on their first application or the subsequent application after acquiring US citizenship?

Held:

The High Court upheld the decision to consider the application based on the first registration dated 19.07.2016.

The Court set aside the judgments directing consideration on the basis of the first application and upheld the decision communicated on 15.03.2018.

The competent authority was directed to notify the child for adoption within one week.

If the child is not adopted by Indian prospective adoptive parents within sixty days, adoption to Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in inter-country adoption was allowed.

Facts:

The suit property originally belonged to 'PG,' who executed a will in 1971, bequeathing life interest to his sons 'K' and 'B,' and subsequently to the male heirs of his sons. 'B,' on behalf of himself and his minor son 'P,' sold a portion of the property to the defendants-respondents in 1981-82.

Issues:

The plaintiffs filed a suit in 1992, challenging the authority of 'B' to execute sale deeds on behalf of his minor son 'P,' contending that the deeds were void. The defendants raised the defense of limitation, arguing that the suit should have been filed within three years from the death of 'P' in 1986.

Held:

The judgment clarifies that Article 60(b)(ii) of the Limitation Act is applicable in cases where a ward dies before attaining majority, and the limitation to avoid an instrument made by the guardian of the ward is three years from the ward's death.

The period of limitation under Article 65 is relevant when seeking possession of immovable property based on title. However, since the sale deeds were voidable and not void, Article 60 governs the limitation for the suit, and it was rightly held as time-barred.

Sale deeds executed without the court's permission, in violation of Section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority & Guardianship Act, 1956, are voidable. The suit, lacking a prayer for setting aside these deeds, was improperly framed and couldn't be decreed.

The release deed executed in 1986 does not repudiate the sale deeds by 'B' on behalf of the minor, and Section 8(3) of the 1956 Act allows the minor or their legal heirs to avoid such alienations.

Decision: Dismissing the appeal, the court affirmed that the sale deeds executed by 'B' were not repudiated or avoided within the prescribed limitation period, rendering the suit time-barred.

Facts:

Five individuals were tried for the murder of Kaushalya Devi in 1992.

Kanhai Prasad Chourasia was convicted under Section 302 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act, sentenced to life imprisonment.

The other four were acquitted of murder but convicted under Section 27 of the Arms Act.

Appeals were filed by Kanhai Prasad Chourasia (Criminal Appeal No. 112/1994) and the other four collectively (Criminal Appeal No. 77/1994).

The High Court, under a misconception, treated all accused as convicted under Section 302/149 IPC, leading to a common judgment convicting all five.

Issues:

Misinterpretation by the High Court regarding the nature of convictions.

Imposition of Section 302/149 IPC without appeal by the State or notice of enhancement.

Failure to consider the acquittal under Section 149 IPC by the trial court.

Absence of sentencing for those convicted under Section 302/149 IPC.

Held:

The Division Bench found fundamental errors in the High Court's judgment.

The misconception of all accused being convicted under Section 302/149 IPC was identified as a primary error.

The High Court failed to consider the acquittal under Section 149 IPC and imposed Section 302/149 IPC without any appeal by the State.

The Bench, invoking Article 136, decided to set aside the entire impugned order against all accused.

Emphasized that an order based on wrong factual premises cannot be perpetuated against non-appealing accused.

Remanded the case to the High Court for re-hearing, directing separate consideration for each accused.

Noted that the appellant, Deep Narayan Chourasia, had already served a significant portion of the sentence and granted bail pending the High Court's decision.