Facts:

The appellants, village assistants, were charged with demanding illegal gratification for facilitating the transfer of an electric connection.

P.W.2 filed a complaint against the village administrative officer for demanding Rs. 600 for signing necessary papers.

The money was allegedly handed over to one of the appellants on the village administrative officer's instruction.

Issues:

Whether the appellants were involved in the demand for illegal gratification.

Validity of the defense's claim that money was received in the belief it was payment for land tax arrears.

Held:

Sufficient evidence established a prima facie case against the appellants.

The appellants were in league with the village administrative officer.

The defense's claim of receiving money for land tax arrears was belied by canceled taxation for the relevant period.

Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act creates a presumption, and the acquittal under Section 7 is inconsequential.

The appeals were dismissed, and the appellants were directed to surrender for serving the remaining sentence.

Facts:

The Goa, Daman and Diu Cooperative Fisheries Federation Limited (the Society) was registered under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960.

The Society advanced loans to its members during the period from 1974 to 1980.

Serious irregularities in loan disbursement by the Society led to a misfeasance case and ultimately, the winding-up proceedings.

The Registrar of Cooperative Societies appointed multiple liquidators to recover loans from defaulting members.

Issues:

Whether, under Section 109, proceedings for recovery of dues against members should be closed after the expiry of the liquidation period.

Held:

The concept of restitution is a common law principle serving as a remedy against unjust enrichment. Members obtaining stay in appeal or on recovery proceedings cannot benefit from the expiry of the Liquidator's period.( Para 23)

Upon the liquidation of the Society or the expiration of the liquidation period, the liability of members for the loans does not automatically cease. The disbursement of loans in an arbitrary manner and failure to recover were key reasons for the Society's winding up.( Para 24)

The decision of the High Court, which held that winding-up proceedings must be closed after the lapse of a specific period, is set aside. The bank, being the prime lender and liquidator, can continue recovery proceedings.( Para 25)

Facts:

The respondent, Dilip Mulani, was accused of offenses related to bribery and corruption, particularly involving SAD refund claim cheques and illegal gratification. The Trial Court had rejected Mulani's discharge application, finding a prima facie case against him. However, the High Court set aside this decision, stating there was no prima facie evidence of criminal conspiracy and insufficient proof against Mulani.

Issues:

The sufficiency of evidence for criminal conspiracy, illegal gratification, and bribery charges. The Trial Court found a prima facie case, while the High Court held that the evidence presented was insufficient.

Held:

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, deeming it unacceptable. It emphasized that the High Court failed to properly analyze the factual aspects and merely concluded that there was no evidence against Dilip Mulani. The case was remanded to the High Court for reconsideration on its merits, and the Supreme Court clarified that it did not express an opinion on the discharge application's merits.

The Supreme Court found the High Court's approach unacceptable and not meeting the standards of judicial scrutiny.( Paragraph No. 10)

The case was remanded to the High Court for reconsideration of the Criminal Revision Application on its own merits in accordance with the law.( Paragraph No. 11)

Facts:

The appellants defaulted on a loan from the respondent bank.

The bank exercised its power under section 13(4) of the 2002 Act, taking constructive possession of the mortgaged property.

DRT applications filed by appellants were dismissed for non-prosecution.

The bank proceeded with the sale of the property, and a third party emerged as the highest bidder.

Appellants attempted payments to redeem the property, but the bank rejected them, citing invalid tenders.

Sale was confirmed in favor of respondent no. 3, who complied with all conditions, transferring the property to a third party.

Applications for restoration of proceedings before the DRT were dismissed.

A writ petition was filed before the High Court seeking to quash the auction.

Issues:

Validity of the appellants' attempts to redeem the property.

The impact of the registration of the sale certificate and the subsequent transfer of the property to a third party on the rights of the parties.

Compliance with the amended Section 13(8) of the 2002 Act.

Held:

The court held that the appellants failed to make a valid tender to redeem the mortgage before the issuance of the sale certificate, and, therefore, had no subsisting right of redemption. (Para 28)

The registration of the sale certificate and the transfer of the property significantly altered the rights of the parties. (Para 25)

The appellants did not take appropriate steps to pay the outstanding dues or seek permission to deposit the required amount during legal proceedings. (Para 26)

Based on the amended Section 13(8) of the 2002 Act, the appellants' right of redemption had been extinguished before the institution of the writ petitions. (Para 29)

The court dismissed the appeals, upholding the actions taken by the respondent bank, as the appellants failed to make a valid and legal tender before the registration of the sale certificate. (Para 30)

Facts:

A FIR was registered for offenses under Sections 60 and 72 of the United Provinces Excise Act, 1910, and Sections 420, 467, 468, and 471 of the IPC. The charges were related to the seizure of 154 cartons of illicit liquor and a firearm from a truck by a joint team of Excise Department and police officials.

Issues:

The jurisdiction of the Collector to order the confiscation of the seized vehicle. Mustafa contended that only the Magistrate conducting the trial had the authority to release the vehicle, and the Collector lacked jurisdiction to pass an order of confiscation.

Held:

The court affirmed that the power of the Collector to order confiscation is independent of whether a prosecution for the offense has been instituted. Section 72(2) of the Act empowers the Collector to order confiscation, and the proviso allows the owner an option to pay a fine in lieu of confiscation.( Para 1-5)

The court established that the Collector has exclusive jurisdiction to order confiscation, emphasizing that the criminal court does not possess the authority to release seized items. The matter was remitted back to the High Court for a judicial review of the confiscation order passed by the Collector.( Para 6-10)

The judgment emphasized the applicability of the procedure of confiscation under the United Provinces Excise Act, 1910, as opposed to Chapter XXXIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 5 of the Code was cited, saving special or local laws.( Para 11-15)

The court delved into the specifics of the Act, affirming that the Collector has exclusive jurisdiction to confiscate vehicles. Sub-sections (3), (4), and (8) of Section 72 were analyzed, clarifying the powers of the Collector regarding the sale of seized items and distribution of sale proceeds.( Para 16-30)

The judgment concluded by highlighting the distinction between punishment resulting from prosecution and the order of confiscation passed by the Collector.( Para 31-33)

Facts:

The case involves a family settlement between three brothers regarding the sale of a property. Allegedly, the first defendant sold the property to the second defendant without obtaining the plaintiff's written concurrence, leading to a suit for specific performance.

Issues:

Whether there was a family settlement.

Whether the family settlement was vague.

Whether the High Court was correct in holding that the courts would not exercise discretion under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

The impact of the absence of written concurrence by brothers for sale.

The effect of the prohibition against fragmentation of the property under the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952.

Held:

Family Settlement and Vagueness of Clause (5) (Para 17-32): No material was presented to establish that the alleged family settlement is forged. The court proceeds on the assumption that there is a family settlement. The clause in question, requiring the concurrence of three brothers in writing, is found not to be vague. The court emphasizes the preferential offer as a condition precedent to selling to a stranger.

Specific Performance and Right of Pre-emption (Para 37-53): The appellate court's decree for specific performance is found flawed due to errors in directions and assumptions about the terms of the family settlement. The court examines the appellant's right to pre-emption and estoppel in invoking the clause. The appellant's actions and correspondence estop him from claiming the absence of written consent.

Impact of Prohibition Against Fragmentation (Para 54-66): The court analyzes the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952, and rules prohibiting fragmentation. The appellant fails to convince the court that the assignment to the second defendant is vulnerable on the grounds of fragmentation.

Facts:

The case involves a challenge against notifications issued by State Governments requiring candidates to execute bonds for compulsory service upon admission to medical courses. The notifications aim to address the scarcity of specialized healthcare professionals and ensure the provision of medical assistance, particularly in government hospitals.

Issues:

The jurisdiction of State Governments to issue such notifications, the alleged violation of fundamental rights (Article 14, 19, and 21), the reasonableness of compulsory service conditions, and the impact on the right to live with dignity.

Held:

The judgment establishes that Entry 66 of List I and Entry 25 of List III of the Constitution provide the State Legislature the power to legislate on medical education. The Medical Council of India Act does not cover the subject of compulsory bonds, allowing States to legislate on the matter. State Governments, through executive orders under Article 162, have the competence to issue such notifications.( Para 17)

The court deems the notifications reasonable, considering the need for infrastructure in medical colleges, meagre fees, and the duty of government hospitals. It directs State Governments to consider a reasonable compulsory service period of two years, with a default clause requiring doctors to compensate the government with Rs. 20 Lakhs in case of non-compliance.( Para 18-19)

The judgment clarifies that conditions imposed at the time of admission do not violate the right to carry on the medical profession directly. The right to practice arises after course completion. Admissions and bond execution without protest negate claims of violation under Article 19(1)(g).( Para 20)

Article 21 obligates the State to safeguard the right to life, emphasizing the importance of government hospitals in providing medical assistance. Article 47 underscores the constitutional duty to improve public health.( Para 21-22, 25)

The right to life under Article 21 encompasses the right to live with human dignity, extending beyond physical survival. The State has an obligation to take action to protect and facilitate human dignity.( Para 26-28)

The court rejects the argument that Article 21 rights are violated, emphasizing the laudable objective of State Governments to protect the fundamental rights of the deprived sections through compulsory service bonds.( Para 32-33)

The judgment dismisses claims of forced labor under Article 23(1), noting that the service rendered is not forced labor, especially considering the benefits received by the appellants.( Para 35-36)

Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act prohibits the enforcement of contracts of personal service. The court highlights that none of the State Governments attempted to enforce the contracts through service bonds.( Para 39-40)

The judgment calls for suitable steps to establish a uniform policy regarding compulsory service for doctors trained in government institutions, considering variations in conditions imposed by different states.( Para 41)

Facts:

The appellant, Tarun Jit Tejpal, was facing trial for offenses under various sections of the Indian Penal Code, as indicated in the charge sheet filed by the Investigating Officer. The Sessions Judge had ordered charges to be framed against the appellant. Subsequently, the appellant filed a revision application before the High Court seeking discharge from the charged offenses.

Issues:

The appellant sought discharge on the grounds that the informant and the Investigating Officer were the same, alleging that this aspect vitiated the entire criminal proceedings. Reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab (2018) 17 SCC 627.

Held:

The Court noted that the decision in Mohan Lal was not applicable to the present case as the criminal prosecution had been initiated before the Mohan Lal decision. Therefore, the appellant could not be discharged solely on the ground of the same person serving as both the informant and the Investigating Officer (Para 8.2).

The Court distinguished the case of Bhagwan Singh, relied upon by the appellant's counsel, stating that it was relevant after the trial and not at the stage of framing of charges. The Court emphasized that considerations regarding the conduct of the victim/prosecutrix and other merits should be addressed during the course of the trial (Para 9.5).

The submissions made on behalf of the appellant on merits and the conduct of the victim/prosecutrix were deemed to be matters requiring consideration at an appropriate stage during the trial. The Court affirmed that there was more than a prima facie case against the accused, and the trial court had rightly framed the charges, a decision properly confirmed by the High Court (Para 9.5).

FACTS:

Saleem Ahmed, the appellant, owned a house in New Delhi, rented to respondent No. 3.

BSES officials found discrepancies in the electricity meter at the house.

BSES sent a theft bill of Rs. 97,786, leading to a case against the appellant.

Permanent Lok Adalat settled the case at Rs. 83,120 against full payment.

ISSUES:

Legality of filing an FIR after settlement through Lok Adalat.

HELD:

The dispute was settled amicably through Lok Adalat, resulting in an award fully satisfying the entire claim. Filing an FIR post-settlement had no legal basis.( Paragraph 14)

Emphasized that the remedy for the parties, if aggrieved by the award, should have been to challenge it in an appropriate forum. This, however, was not the case here.( Paragraph 15)

The passing of the award concluded the dispute in full and final satisfaction of the demand. The dispute came to an end, leaving only the recovery of the awarded amount.( Paragraph 16)

The appellant paid the awarded amount, which was accepted without protest by BSES, fully satisfying the award.( Paragraph 17)

The award did not grant BSES the liberty to file an FIR post-settlement. Conditions in the award confirmed full and final settlement without reserving the right to file an FIR.( Paragraph 18)

Filing an FIR after the Lok Adalat's award was deemed wholly unjust and illegal, lacking legal sustainability.( Paragraph 20)

REFERRED CASES:

Firm Seth Radha Kishan vs. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Ludhiana, AIR 1963 SC 1547

Firm of Illuri Subbaya Chetty and Sons v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 322

Dhulabhai and Ors. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr, (1968) 3 SCR 662

Kamala Mills Ltd v. State of Bombay (1966) 1 SCR 64

NDMC vs. Satish Chand, (2003) 10 SCC 38

Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava (Dead) By LRs v. Union of India (1988) 1 SCC 681

Ram Swarup and Ors. vs. Shikar Chand, AIR 1966 SC 893

Secretary of State vs. Mask, AIR 1940 PC 105

Shiv Kumar Chadha Etc. Etc vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1993) 3 SCC 161

Srikant K. Jituri vs. Corporation of the City of Belgaum, (1994) 6 SCC 572

Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. vs. Hawkesford, [1859] 6 C. B. (NS) 336