Facts:

Haffkine Bio-Pharmaceutical Corporation Ltd., a Government of Maharashtra undertaking, issued a tender for the supply of bulk drugs, including Monovalent Bulk of Poliomyelitis Type 1 (Oral) Sabin Strain and Monovalent Bulk of Poliomyelitis Type 3 (Oral) Sabin Strain.

Nirlac Chemicals, a registered partnership firm, protested against the issuance of the tender but participated in it.

During the tender opening process, the bid of one of the parties, Bionet, was not opened in the presence of the representatives of Nirlac, contrary to CVC guidelines.

The High Court quashed the tender and directed the government to float a fresh tender. However, it allowed Haffkine to procure the bulk drug from Bionet until a fresh tender was finalized.

Issues:

Whether the tender process complied with CVC guidelines.

Whether Nirlac was qualified to be awarded the tender.

Interpretation of tender conditions, specifically condition 'j'.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the tender process violated CVC guidelines as the bid of Bionet was not opened in the presence of Nirlac's representatives (Para 10).

It found that Nirlac was aware of the rejection of their bid on the same day as the bid opening and failed to follow up on the matter, thus disqualifying them from being awarded the tender (Para 11).

Regarding the interpretation of tender conditions, the Court interpreted condition 'j' to require the bidder to generate business for the Corporation by selling a specified quantity of the finished product, a condition that Nirlac did not meet (Para 14).

The Court set aside the tender awarded to Bionet and directed Haffkine to place orders with Nirlac for the supply of bulk drugs required for the manufacture of 120 million doses of oral polio vaccine, based on the price quoted by Nirlac. Haffkine was restrained from purchasing further bulk drugs from Bionet. Additionally, Haffkine was directed to supply and Bionet to purchase 66 million doses of oral vaccine as per a confirmed order (Para 19).

The Court permitted Haffkine to float a fresh tender for the supply of bulk drugs, mandating that the tender process should be conducted as an e-tender to ensure transparency and avoid allegations of impropriety. The appeals are disposed of (Para 21-22).

Facts:

The Customs Department, at the behest of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), detained goods belonging to importers.

Mumbai Port Trust and the Shipping Line demanded demurrage and detention charges from the importers.

The importers challenged these demands, alleging mala fide actions by DRI officials.

The High Court ruled in favor of the importers, directing the Port Trust to waive demurrage charges and holding the Customs authorities liable for detention charges.

Issues:

Whether Mumbai Port Trust has the authority to levy demurrage charges despite actions by the Customs Department.

Who is liable for demurrage and detention charges - the importers or the Customs authorities?

Whether the importers can claim exemption or reimbursement for the charges.

Whether the High Court had the jurisdiction to direct the Customs authorities to pay detention charges to the Shipping Line.

Held:

The Mumbai Port Trust has the statutory power to levy rates, including demurrage, as per Section 47A of the Major Port Trusts Act, unaffected by the Customs Act or the 2009 Regulations (Para 30-31).

Importers are primarily liable for demurrage charges, even if not at fault, while detention charges are part of a private contract between the importer and the carrier. Importers may claim reimbursement from Customs authorities only if their actions are proven mala fide or a gross abuse of power, which was not established in this case (Para 34).

Importers had the option to take advantage of provisional assessment offers to reduce charges, which they did not utilize (Para 44).

Both delays by Customs authorities and importers contributed to the situation, and importers cannot evade liability for charges. Importers are free to seek remission or exemption from charges under Section 53 of the Act, and the Board may consider their case sympathetically (Para 46).

The High Court did not have jurisdiction to direct the Customs authorities to pay detention charges to the Shipping Line (Para 47).

Decision: The appeals were allowed, affirming Mumbai Port Trust's authority to levy demurrage charges and upholding the importer's liability for both demurrage and detention charges. Importers were advised to approach the Port Trust for exemption or remission under Section 53. The High Court's direction regarding payment of detention charges by Customs authorities to the Shipping Line was set aside.

Facts:

Naresh Kumar was apprehended by the police at Majhotli with two kilograms of Charas allegedly recovered from a bag in his possession. The prosecution relied on witness testimonies, including that of an independent witness, Sita Ram (PW-2). Defense witnesses were also examined. The Special Judge acquitted Naresh Kumar due to doubts regarding the prosecution's version.

Issues:

The reliability of witness testimonies and the prosecution's ability to establish the case beyond a reasonable doubt, especially considering the discrepancies in timing and distance.

Held:

The Supreme Court analyzed the timing discrepancy and found the claim of Naresh Kumar's apprehension at 6:15 A.M. highly doubtful due to the bus ticket issuance time and distance. The testimony of the independent witness, PW-2, was crucial, as he denied witnessing the apprehension or recovery of narcotics from Naresh Kumar.

The Court emphasized the prosecution's obligation to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt, especially in NDPS Act cases with presumptions against the accused. Citing legal precedent, the Court held that the High Court's decision was speculative and contrary to the weight of evidence on record. Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, restoring Naresh Kumar's acquittal.

Facts:

The case stemmed from a complaint filed by the wife against her husband and his family members under Section 498A alleging dowry harassment and cruelty. The husband and his family contested the allegations, arguing against the summoning of all family members.

Issues:

The misuse of Section 498A and the need for safeguards to prevent arbitrary arrests and harassment of innocent family members.

Held:

The Court acknowledged the misuse of Section 498A and expressed concern over the high number of arrests and low conviction rates. It emphasized the need to protect innocent family members from harassment. (Para 14-15)

Decision: The Court issued several directives to address the misuse of Section 498A, including the constitution of Family Welfare Committees, designation of specific investigating officers, facilitation of settlements, and restrictions on passport impounding. Bail applications should be decided promptly, and personal appearances of family members may be exempted. These directives aim to strike a balance between protecting married women from genuine harassment while preventing the misuse of the law. (Para 19-20)

Facts:

The State of Assam enacted the Assam Parliamentary Secretaries Act, 2004, allowing members of the Assembly to be appointed as Parliamentary Secretaries with the rank and status of a Minister of State. A PIL challenging the constitutional validity of the Act was filed before the High Court, which transferred the petition to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the State Legislature of Assam had the competence to enact the Assam Parliamentary Secretaries Act, 2004.

Whether it was in line with the constitutional provisions governing legislative powers and privileges.

Held:

The principle of the "rule of widest construction" in interpreting the Constitution is rooted in the belief that the Constitution provides a continuing framework adaptable to new social, political, and historical realities (Para 18).

While analyzing legislative authority, the Court noted that the Constitution of India structures not only the authority of the federal government but also that of the States and local bodies. It emphasized the importance of adapting relevant principles from the analysis of legislative authority adopted by the US Supreme Court (Para 22).

Article 246 of the Constitution delineates the legislative authority of Parliament and State Legislatures. The Court explained that the existence of dedicated articles authorizing legislation on specific topics eliminates legislative authority implied by Article 246 and related entries in the Seventh Schedule (Para 23-25).

The entries in the Seventh Schedule are indicative of legislative fields, not sources of legislative power. The Court stressed the need to interpret these entries while considering the scheme of the Constitution (Para 26-28).

The Court reiterated that while a broad and liberal spirit should inspire interpretation, caution must be exercised, especially concerning the amplitude of legislative entries (Para 30).

The creation of new offices by legislation would be irrational and beyond the scope of Article 194(3) and Entry 39 of List II. Such authority is limited to the powers, privileges, and immunities of legislators qua legislators (Para 31).

The elaborate constitutional arrangement regarding legislative offices and matters incidental to them precludes the legislature from creating new offices by legislation (Para 32).

Decision: The Supreme Court held that the Assam Parliamentary Secretaries Act, 2004, was beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature. Therefore, the Act was declared invalid (Para 44-45).

Facts:

The Bank granted a cash credit facility to a company, of which Shri Dhillon P. Shah, the owner of the disputed flat, was a director.

After the company failed to repay the dues, the Bank initiated recovery proceedings, resulting in an attachment order for the flat.

Nagraj Ganeshmal Jain, the respondent, claimed ownership of the flat through an alleged unregistered agreement to sell by Shah.

Doubts arose regarding the authenticity and timing of Jain's claim, as well as the validity of the agreement to sell.

Issues:

Whether an unregistered agreement to sell confers any right, title, or interest in immovable property.

Whether Jain's claim of ownership based on the alleged agreement to sell is valid.

Whether Jain is entitled to membership in the housing cooperative society based on his ownership claim.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that immoveable property can only be transferred by a registered deed of conveyance, not by an unregistered agreement to sell (paragraph 15).

Doubts regarding the authenticity of the agreement to sell, timing of Jain's claim, and lack of disclosure by Shah and his wife during legal proceedings raised questions about the validity of Jain's claim (paragraphs 17-18).

Jain failed to establish his right, title, or interest in the flat, and thus, he cannot claim membership in the housing cooperative society (paragraph 19).

Decision: The appeals were allowed, and the orders of the High Court and the revisional/appellate authority accepting Jain's claim were set aside. Jain's claim of ownership was rejected, affirming that he has no right, title, or interest in the flat. Consequently, Jain cannot claim membership in the New Shrinath Kunj Housing Co-operative Society (paragraph 19).

Facts:

The appellant, Rajiv Dawar, appealed against his conviction and sentence under section 2(c) read with Section 10 & 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act and under Article 215 of the Constitution of India.

The conviction was based on allegations by the de facto complainant without giving the appellant a fair opportunity to present evidence or cross-examine the complainant.

The complainant accused Dawar of charging exorbitant fees without providing active assistance and subsequently withdrawing from the case. However, Dawar asserted that the fees were justified for the professional services rendered.

Issues:

Whether procedural formalities were followed in the contempt proceedings.

Whether the appellant was given a fair opportunity to defend himself.

Whether the allegations against the appellant were proven according to law.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that procedural safeguards were not followed, and the appellant was not granted a fair opportunity to defend himself. The court emphasized the importance of allowing the accused to establish their innocence in contempt proceedings and noted that the appellant was not given adequate opportunities to do so. Additionally, the Bar Council of Delhi had absolved the appellant of misconduct, further indicating that the conviction was not justified. Therefore, the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant were set aside, and the appeal was allowed.

Facts:

The appellants challenged the validity of a notification issued by the NCTE, dated 29th July 2011, making it mandatory for teachers in schools to have 50% marks in graduation. The appellants, possessing post-graduation and B.Ed. qualifications, argued that this requirement was not mandatory for those with 50% marks in post-graduation at the time of their B.Ed. admission.

Issues:

Whether candidates with post-graduation and B.Ed. qualifications, covered by the notification dated 23rd August 2010, could be excluded based solely on the graduation marks requirement introduced in the notification dated 29th July 2011.

Held:

The Supreme Court, in consideration of judgments from the Rajasthan and Uttarakhand High Courts, held that the requirement of a minimum percentage of marks in graduation was not going to be enforced by the NCTE. The Court declared this condition as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The appellants were directed to be treated similarly to those covered by the High Courts' judgments. The NCTE was instructed to issue a clarification within one month. The appellants and others similarly placed were given the liberty to claim further relief in accordance with the judgments of the Rajasthan and Uttarakhand High Courts.

Facts:

Parminder Singh, the appellant, and Gurpreet Singh, the respondent, are real brothers.

An agreement was made on 02.07.1995, wherein Parminder Singh agreed to sell his share of land to Gurpreet Singh.

Parminder Singh did not execute the sale deed as per the agreement, leading Gurpreet Singh to file a civil suit seeking specific performance.

Parminder Singh denied the validity of the agreement, alleging forgery and claiming he had only signed blank paper.

Issues:

Whether the agreement was genuine and enforceable.

Whether the lower courts erred in their decisions.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts. The findings of fact by all three courts were deemed concurrent and based on evidence. Parminder Singh's arguments had been previously considered and rejected by the lower courts. The discretion of the courts in granting specific performance, as per Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, was respected. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.