Facts:

The establishments, covered under the Act, contested the inclusion of special allowances in the "basic wages," arguing that these allowances were not universally applicable and were linked to specific conditions.

Issues:

Whether the special allowances had a direct nexus with extra output, making them eligible for exclusion from "basic wages."

Whether the allowances were universally, necessarily, and ordinarily paid to all employees.

Held:

The court, relying on Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd. vs. Union of India, held that allowances not payable by all concerns or not earned by all employees of a concern should be excluded from basic wages. Dearness allowance, an exception in the definition, was included for contribution under Section 6. The court emphasized that the Act is a social welfare legislation meant to protect workmen and should be interpreted accordingly.

The court considered the definition of "basic wages" and the exceptions under Section 2(b)(ii), emphasizing that exclusions were based on universality. Dearness allowance was considered an exception but was included for contribution under Section 6.( Para 8)

Citing Muir Mills Co. Ltd., Kanpur vs. Its Workmen, the court held that variable earnings dependent on efficiency and diligence would be excluded from "basic wages."( Para 10)

Referring to Kichha Sugar Company Limited vs. Tarai Chini Mill Majdoor Union, the court considered the dictionary meaning of "basic wages" and reiterated that universally, necessarily, and ordinarily paid wages are considered basic.( Para 12)

The establishments failed to demonstrate that the allowances were variable or linked to specific incentives for extra work. The court upheld the factual conclusions of the authorities that the allowances were essentially part of the basic wage, dismissing the appeals by the establishments.( Para 14)

Facts:

The case involves a petition filed under Article 226 challenging a communication by the appellant regarding the superannuation of an employee working in the hospital run by the appellant.

Issues:

The maintainability of the petition under Article 226, with a preliminary objection raised regarding whether the appellant or the hospital falls within the definition of the State under Article 12.

Held:

The hospital, being a branch of Ramakrishna Mission, is subject to its control, and the activities undertaken by the Mission are voluntary, charitable, and non-profit making. These activities are not closely related to those performed by the State in its sovereign capacity.[Para 19]

The Governing Body of the Mission manages the organization without any governmental control. The conditions of service for hospital employees are governed by service rules framed by the Mission without governmental intervention.[Para 20]

The hospital, even if performing public functions, does not involve a public law element in enforcing private contracts of service. The nature of the work rendered by the Mission, including hospital activities, is purely voluntary.[Para 30]

Before an organization can be considered to discharge a public function, it must be closely related to functions performed by the State in its sovereign capacity. The hospital, in the absence of State control, does not fall within the ambit of a public authority.[Para 31]

Contracts of a purely private nature are not subject to writ jurisdiction unless governed or regulated by a statutory provision.[Paras 32, 33]

The Clinical Establishments (Registration and Regulation) Act 2010 does not govern contracts of service entered into by the hospital with its employees, preserving the distinction between private contracts and those subject to writ jurisdiction.[Paras 32, 34]

The Division Bench of the High Court erred in concluding that the appellants are amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226, as neither Ramakrishna Mission nor the hospital constitutes an authority within the meaning of the Article.[Paras 35, 36]

Facts:

The appellant, Mrs. Neeraj Dutta, was convicted under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

The complainant received a demand for a bribe from the appellant for the installation of an electricity meter. The complainant reported the incident to the Anti-Corruption Bureau, leading to a pre-raid operation and the appellant's conviction.

Issues:

The absence of direct evidence of demand due to the complainant's death, leading to the appellant's contention that the conviction cannot stand solely on proof of receipt of money.

Held:

The court noted that direct proof of illegal gratification may not be available in all instances.

The court considered the evidence of the panch witness, acceptance of money proved by the Phenolphthalein Test, and the permissibility of drawing inference to prove demand.

The appellant argued that the Satyanarayana case emphasized the necessity of direct evidence of demand, while the respondent contended that inference can be drawn from other evidence.

The court expressed reservations about the observations in Satyanarayana and referred the question to a larger bench: whether, in the absence of direct evidence of demand, inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant is permissible based on other prosecution evidence.

Decision: The matter was directed to be placed before the Chief Justice for appropriate orders.

REFERRED CASES:

Hazari Lal v. State (Delhi Administration) (1980) 2 SCC 390

KishanChand Mangal v. State of Rajasthan (1982) 3 SCC 466

M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P. (2001) 1 SCC 691

P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police, State of Andhra Pradesh and another (2015) 10 SCC 152

Facts:

The Appellants, traders in cotton fabrics and made-ups, supplied raw materials to over 70 job workers. The total clearances amounted to more than Rs. 1.45 crore. Only one job worker exceeded the limit of Rs. 25 lakhs, while the individual clearances of the rest were below this threshold.

Issues:

Whether the Appellants' liability extended to the entire aggregate value of clearances or only to the clearance value of the job worker exceeding Rs. 25 lakhs.

Held:

The Court held that Rule 12B treated the person as an assessee if conditions were met, and the Exemption Notification focused on the aggregate value of clearances. The Circular clarified that once any job worker crossed the exemption limit, duty applied to the aggregate value. The second illustration in the Circular emphasized that the entire clearance value became dutiable when it exceeded the limit. The Court affirmed that it was not the individual clearance of one job worker alone but the aggregate of all clearances by the Appellant that was liable to duty. The appeals were dismissed.

FACTS:

The case involves a dispute governed by the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, wherein the Adjudicating Officer is tasked with determining the quantum of penalty. The provisions in question are found in s.15-J, Cl. (a), (b), and (c), alongside other related sections (ss.15-A to 15-HA).

ISSUES:

Whether conditions stipulated in Clauses (a), (b), and (c) of s.15-J are exhaustive or illustrative.

Whether the conditions in Clauses (a) to (c) of s.15-J are mandatory for imposing penalties under ss.15-A to 15-HA.

HELD:

The court holds that the provisions of Clauses (a), (b), and (c) of s.15-J are illustrative and must be considered whenever relevant. However, the Adjudicating Officer is not precluded from considering other circumstances beyond those enumerated in Clauses (a), (b), and (c) while determining the penalty.

The court clarifies that the conditions in Clauses (a), (b), and (c) of s.15-J are not exhaustive. There may be circumstances beyond these clauses that the Adjudicating Officer can consider while deciding the quantum of penalty, especially in cases not covered by certain provisions like s.15-A, 15-B, or 15-C.

The court further explains that Clause (c) of s.15-J, which mentions the "repetitive nature of default," refers specifically to a recurring or successive default. However, this does not exclude the consideration of a continuing default as a relevant factor, as Clauses (a) to (c) are illustrative and not exhaustive.

The court addresses the argument that the power and discretion vested by s.15-J are eclipsed by penalty provisions in ss.15-A to 15-HA. It emphasizes that these sections must be read harmoniously to avoid inconsistency. The Explanation to s.15-J, added by Amendment Act No.7 of 2017, reinforces the Adjudicating Officer's discretion in determining penalties.

The court delves into the applicability of s.15-J in the context of s.15A(a) between 29th October 2002 and 7th September 2014. It highlights that the legislative intent, clarified by the Explanation to s.15-J, was not to curtail the Adjudicating Officer's discretion during that period.

REFERRED CASES:

Securities and Exchange Board of India through its Chairman vs. Roofit Industries Limited, (2016) 12 SCC 125

Securities and Exchange Board of India vs. Kishore R. Ajmera, (2016) 6 SCC 368

Securities and Exchange Board of India vs. Rakhi Trading (P) Ltd, (2018) 13 SCC 753

Siddharth Chaturvedi vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India, (2016) 12 SCC 119.

State of Bihar vs. Deokaran Nenshi & Ors., (1972) 2 SCC 890

Union of India & Anr. Vs. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648

Facts:

The appellants, lecturers/professors in engineering disciplines, challenged the order treating their appointments as temporary. The University contended that its statutes did not apply to teachers in Self Financing Institutions. The Single Judge allowed the petition, but the Division Bench held in favor of the University, asserting that appellants were not University teachers.

Issues:

Whether the appointments were temporary or against substantive posts.

The applicability of University statutes to teachers in Self Financing Institutions.

Entitlement of lecturers to pay revision benefits.

Held:

The appointment orders did not indicate temporary or part-time positions, governed by University statutes, indicating permanency through regular selection.

The benefits extension discrepancy was based on the erroneous claim of temporary appointments. The facts established the substantive nature of appellants' posts, justifying benefit extension.

AICTE's Progress Profile affirmed appellants as permanent faculty, disputing the University's claim of temporary status.

Despite initial rulings against appellants, subsequent contradictory decisions highlighted the inconsistency in the University's stance.

Decision: The appeals were allowed, and Special Leave Petitions were segregated based on the clarity in the appointment order.

Facts:

Civil Suit No. RBT 1251/95/92 filed by the first respondent-plaintiff for a declaration as a joint owner of a specific share in the suit scheduled land.

Allegation that a fictitious gift deed was executed by the appellant, playing fraud on Smt. Vidya Devi, the original owner.

Contention by the appellant that the gift deed was valid, executed with free will and consent, and not in violation of Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act.

Trial Court dismissed the suit, holding that the evidence did not support the fraud allegation and the gift deed was valid.

First Appellate Court concurred with the Trial Court's findings.

High Court reversed the judgments, primarily based on the consideration mentioned in the gift deed.

Issues:

Validity of a registered gift deed.

Interpretation of the consideration mentioned in the gift deed.

Whether the High Court exceeded its authority in re-evaluating evidence.

Held:

The appellant argued that the Rs. 5,000 mentioned in the gift deed was for valuation purposes and not consideration for the gift, a point accepted by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court.

High Court misconstrued the document, wrongly holding that the gift was evidenced by a consideration of Rs. 5,000.

The judgment of the High Court set aside, emphasizing that the mentioning of Rs. 5,000 was for valuation, not consideration for the gift.

Lack of evidence to substantiate the claim that the gift deed was not executed with free will and consent.

High Court erred in re-evaluating evidence, and findings of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court upheld.

Facts:

The case involved a prosecution under sections 132 and 135(1)(a) of the Customs Act concerning the export of antiquities. The appellant, Sharad Gandhi, challenged the prosecution, invoking the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972.

Issues:

The compatibility of the Customs Act with the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, especially regarding the prohibition on the export of antiquities. The interpretation of Section 30 of the Antiquities Act and the applicability of the Customs Act were central to the case.

Held:

The principles of ejusdem generis were applied to interpret the relationship between the Customs Act and the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act. The court emphasized the need to consider legislative intent and purposive interpretation to understand the coexistence of both laws (Para 17).

Section 30 of the Antiquities Act was analyzed, and the court concluded that the words "any other law for the time being in force" should be construed ejusdem generis with the specific laws mentioned in the section (Paras 27, 28).

Legislative intent behind Section 30 was to allow the application of other laws dealing with antiquities to continue after the passing of the Antiquities Act, but the Customs Act was not included in the scope (Para 38).

Section 4 of the Antiquities Act already provided for the applicability of the Customs Act with certain qualifications, ensuring its application except where inconsistent with the Antiquities Act (Para 40).

The court examined whether prosecution under Sections 132 and 135(1)(a) of the Customs Act was permitted under Section 4 of the Antiquities Act. It clarified that such prosecution was permissible as long as the ingredients of the offenses were satisfied (Para 42).

The court addressed the distinction between the offenses under Section 25 of the Antiquities Act and Section 132 of the Customs Act. It emphasized that the ingredients of these offenses were distinct and different (Para 42).

The court rejected the argument that prosecution under Section 132 would violate Section 25 or Section 26 of the Antiquities Act, highlighting the different elements of the offenses (Para 67).

The prosecution's case involved the interception of a wooden box declared as 'Stone Figure Handicrafts,' later identified as an antiquity. The charges under Section 135(1)(a) were based on fraudulent evasion of export prohibition (Paras 69, 71).

Section 135(1)(a) was analyzed in the context of the Antiquities Act and the Foreign Trade (Development & Regulation) Act 1992. The court clarified the distinct elements of this offense compared to Section 25 of the Antiquities Act (Para 76).

The court considered the mandate of Section 4 of the Antiquities Act and its impact on the prosecution under Section 135(1)(a). It concluded that such prosecution was consistent with Section 25 read with Section 26 of the Antiquities Act (Para 77).

Section 24 of the Antiquities Act, dealing with the power to decide the status of an article as an antiquity, was highlighted. The court emphasized the role of the Director General of Archaeological Survey of India in making such determinations (Para 78).

The concept of 'inconsistency' as found in Article 254 of the Constitution was briefly discussed, though acknowledging its limited applicability to the case (Para 80).

The court recognized the Antiquities Act as a comprehensive law but highlighted its non-exhaustive nature. It emphasized the legislative intention allowing multiple offenses arising from the same set of facts (Para 83).

The court concluded that full play was given to the Customs Act, ensuring its application where not inconsistent with the Antiquities Act (Paras 84, 85).

Facts:

The dispute arising from the interpretation of Section 24(1)(b) and Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, relating to compensation and lapsing of land acquisition, respectively.

Issues:

Whether the proviso in Section 24 applies to Section 24(1)(b) or Section 24(2).

Held:

The court establishes that Section 24(1) deals with compensation, while Section 24(2) deals with the lapsing of land acquisition. The proviso, accordingly, pertains to Section 24(1)(b) and not Section 24(2) [Para 9].

The court highlights the scheme of Section 24(1), emphasizing enhanced compensation even in cases under the repealed Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The proviso acts as an exception to Section 24(1)(b) in cases where compensation for a majority of land holdings has not been deposited, allowing the application of more favorable provisions of the 2013 Act [Para 10].

Reading the proviso as applicable to Section 24(2) would lead to anomalies, arbitrary results, and potential violation of Article 14 of the Constitution [Paras 11, 12, 13].

The language of the proviso makes it clear that it does not refer to the award under Section 24(2). Reading it as a proviso to Section 24(1)(b) ensures compatibility with awards made under Section 11, irrespective of the timeline [Para 14].

Emphasizing the beneficial nature of the 2013 Act, the court advocates a construction that furthers its purpose. The preferred view is the one aligned with the legislation's objectives [Para 15].

Due to the referral of the Indore Development Authority case to a Bench of five Judges, the present judgment is also referred to the same Bench for further consideration [Para 17].