FACTS:

Appellants sought a permanent injunction against the respondents from using their patented technology and trademark.

A sub-licence agreement was terminated due to disputes over licence fees/trait values.

Defendants claimed protection under the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers' Rights Act, 2001 (PPVFR Act).

The learned Single Judge issued an injunction, but the Division Bench delved into patent validity and excluded certain claims under Section 3(j) of the Patents Act.

ISSUES:

Validity of the patent and the grant of injunction.

Applicability of the PPVFR Act and its relation to the Patents Act.

Summary adjudication on complicated patent issues.

HELD:

Complicated issues cannot be subjected to summary adjudication.

The Division Bench's examination of the counter claim on patent validity was beyond its jurisdiction.

The suit involves complex questions requiring technological and expert evidence, which should be considered at the final hearing.

The injunctive relief granted by the Single Judge was deemed in order and merits no interference during the suit's pendency.

The order of the Division Bench was set aside, restoring the Single Judge's order, and the suit was remanded for disposal in accordance with the law.

REFERRED CASES:

Alka Gupta vs. Narender Kumar Gupta, (2010) 10 SCC 141

Facts:

The appellant, Ex. LAC Yogesh Pathania, challenged the findings and sentence awarded by the District Court Martial (DCM) under the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007. The charges include using insubordinate language, using criminal force, and acts prejudicial to good order and Air Force discipline.

Issues:

The appellant's alleged violations of Air Force discipline, specifically charges 3, 5, and 7, relating to insubordination, criminal force, and prejudicial acts during an incident on the night of May 22-23, 2009.

Held:

The Tribunal found direct evidence supporting charge no. 3, with witnesses confirming the appellant's misconduct regarding insubordinate language towards a superior officer. The Tribunal also noted the appellant's admission of consuming alcohol on the day in question.( Para 7)

The claim that the appellant was slapped by WO Agar Singh was not substantiated by the evidence on record. The Tribunal reexamined the statements of witnesses and upheld the charges of insubordination, criminal force, and acts prejudicial to discipline.( Para 11)

The Supreme Court, in reviewing the evidence and Tribunal's findings, concluded that the view taken by the Tribunal was plausible. The Court, under Sections 30 and 31 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, found no ground for interference in the appeal.( Para 12)

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, and the application for permission to file the appeal was also rejected, as the Court did not find any point of law of general public importance warranting leave.

Facts:

The appellants, Babu Lal and Devi Lal, were convicted under Section 302 and 120B IPC for murder and conspiracy.

The case was based on circumstantial evidence, with an extra-judicial confession by co-accused Babu Lal.

The circumstances included a missing person report, suspicious activities of the accused, and alleged conflicts over money transactions.

Issues:

Reliability of circumstantial evidence.

Admissibility and evidentiary value of an extra-judicial confession.

Whether the circumstances collectively lead to a conclusive hypothesis of guilt.

Held:

The Court emphasized the need for circumstantial evidence to be conclusive, consistent only with the guilt of the accused.

Extra-judicial confession, being weak evidence, requires corroboration and caution in reliance.

If two views are possible based on circumstantial evidence, the accused is entitled to the benefit of the one favorable to them.

The circumstances in this case, though raising suspicion, did not form a complete and coherent chain to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The prosecution failed to elevate the case from "may be true" to "must be true."

The appellants were entitled to the benefit of doubt, and their convictions were set aside.

FACTS:

The appellant filed a Criminal Writ Petition in 2002, seeking registration of a criminal complaint regarding the wrongful killing of his son by the police.

Delhi High Court directed CBI to register a complaint and investigate.

CBI filed a Closure Report in 2008, which was not accepted by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate.

Cognizance was taken against thirteen police officers, and the matter was committed to the Court of Sessions.

Accused filed Revision Petition, leading to petitions before the Delhi High Court.

High Court directed the Magistrate to reconsider cognizance, leading to multiple rounds of petitions and orders.

The High Court eventually dismissed the Appellant's petition in 2014, with the liberty to approach the Sessions Judge.

ISSUES:

The appropriate forum for revisionary jurisdiction under Section 397 of Cr.P.C.

The delay in the legal proceedings.

HELD:

The Court acknowledged the prolonged nature of the case, emphasizing the need for speedy justice.

The Court refrained from deciding on the question of law regarding concurrent revisionary jurisdiction.

The order of the High Court was set aside, and the case was restored before the High Court with a request for expeditious consideration.

The Court clarified that it did not express any opinion on the merits of the case.

Liberty was granted to approach the Supreme Court again if any party was aggrieved by the High Court's order.

Facts:

The case involved the divestment of the Director, CBI, Alok Kumar Verma, of his powers, functions, duties, and supervisory role by the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) and the Government of India.

Issues:

The authority of the CVC and the Government to take such actions without obtaining prior consent from the Committee under s.4A(1) of the Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act.

Held:

The legislative intent behind the CVC Act, 2003, and the amendments to the DSPE Act was to ensure the independence of the Director, CBI. Parliament followed the directions of the court in Vineet Narain and further amended the DSPE Act through the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013, emphasizing the need for a High Power Selection Committee for the Director's appointment.( Para 32)

Sections 4A and 4B of the DSPE Act aim to completely insulate the Director, CBI, from extraneous influences, upholding the integrity of the CBI. The requirement of "previous consent of the Committee" in Section 4B(2) is crucial to prevent arbitrary interference with the Director's functioning.( Para 34)

Orders divesting powers from the Director, CBI, were set aside. The Committee under Section 4A(1) of the DSPE Act will reconsider the matter. Until then, the Director is directed to refrain from major policy decisions, limiting activities to routine functions.( Para 39-41)

Facts:

The appellant was accused of dowry death under Sections 498(A) and 302 of IPC.

The Sessions Judge acquitted the appellant, finding insufficient evidence of dowry demand.

The High Court reversed the acquittal, convicting the appellant based on prosecution evidence.

The deceased's family alleged ill-treatment, dowry demands, and accused the appellant of setting her on fire.

Issues:

Whether the evidence supported charges under Sections 498(A) and 302 IPC.

Whether the High Court correctly reversed the Sessions Judge's acquittal.

Held:

The High Court rightly convicted the appellant under Sections 498(A) and 302 IPC.

The evidence, including testimonies of the deceased's family, established dowry demands, ill-treatment, and the appellant's culpability.

The appellant's actions leading to the death were deemed homicidal, not accidental.

The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's judgment.

Facts:

Appellant (Kamal Kumar) filed a civil suit for specific performance against the respondents (Premlata Joshi and Others) regarding the suit land.

Trial Court dismissed the suit, and the High Court affirmed the decision in the first appeal.

Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court under Article 136.

Issues:

Whether a valid and concluded contract existed between the parties.

Whether the appellant was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.

Whether the appellant was entitled to specific performance or any alternative relief.

Held:

The grant of specific performance is discretionary and equitable.

The two Courts below held that the appellant failed to prove readiness and willingness, a crucial factor for specific performance.

Concurring findings of facts by the lower Courts are binding, and no perversity or illegality was identified.

The material questions for specific performance, as per Sections 16(c), 20, 21, 22, and 23 of the Specific Relief Act, were duly considered by the lower Courts.

The appellant did not establish readiness and willingness, leading to the dismissal of the appeal.

Facts:

The appellant was granted permission under Rule 11C of the Cable Television Network (Amendment) Rules, 2012, to operate as an MSO in the DAS notified areas.

The permission was revoked on 03.09.2014, citing denial of "security clearance" by the Ministry of Home Affairs.

The appellant challenged the cancellation through a writ petition, which was dismissed by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the cancellation of permission was justified based on the denial of "security clearance"?

Whether the principles of natural justice were violated by not providing prior notice before the cancellation?

Held:

The cancellation order was passed in conformity with Rule 11C of the Rules, as security clearance was a mandatory requirement for permission.

The principles of natural justice were not violated, and the appellant was not entitled to claim prior notice before the cancellation.

The appeal was found devoid of merit and dismissed. The appellant was given the liberty to apply for fresh permission in accordance with the law.

Facts:

The respondent worked as a daily wager in the R & B Department of the State for approximately 18 years.

The State terminated the respondent's services without following the due procedure prescribed in law.

The respondent raised a dispute almost 15 years after his alleged termination before the Labour Court.

Issues:

Whether the termination of the daily-wage worker was illegal, and if so, what relief is appropriate, considering the nature of the employment and the circumstances surrounding the termination.

Held:

After hearing counsels, the court is inclined to allow the appeal in part and modify the impugned order.( Paragraph 8)

The court determines that the case falls within the parameters set by previous decisions in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited vs Bhurumal and District Development Officer vs. Satish Kantilal Amerelia.( Paragraph 9)

The court quotes the rationale from Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, emphasizing that automatic reinstatement with back wages is not applicable when the termination is due to procedural defects, such as the violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act.( Paragraph 10)

Highlights reasons for the decision: respondent worked as a daily wager for a few years, had no right to claim regularization, no right to continue as a daily wager, and raised the dispute after a significant gap.( Paragraph 11)

Concludes that lump sum monetary compensation is just, proper, and reasonable in full and final satisfaction of the claim of reinstatement and other consequential benefits under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act.( Paragraph 13)

Specifies the amount of compensation as Rs. 1,00,000/- to be paid by the appellant (State) to the respondent within three months.( Paragraph 14)

The appeal succeeds, and the impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The Labour Court's Award is modified accordingly.( Paragraph 15)