FACTS:

The shares in question, acquired by the appellants, have always been in the custody of Appellant No.1.

The acquisition of shares was from the funds of Appellant No.1, and the complainant failed to provide material supporting his claim.

Appellants asserted that shares could be sold in the market, and the proceeds divided between Appellant No.2 and Respondent No.2.

Appellant No.1 disowned Respondent No.2 and initiated civil proceedings against them.

ISSUES:

Whether the shares were acquired from the funds of Appellant No.1 or the complainant.

Whether the criminal complaint is a genuine case or an attempt to seek vengeance against the appellants.

Whether the application under Section 245(2) CrPC justifies the quashing of the criminal complaint.

HELD:

The material on record establishes that the acquisition of shares was from the funds of Appellant No.1.

The criminal complaint appears to be an abuse of the process of the court, motivated by personal vendetta.

The Court invoked its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the criminal proceedings, preventing abuse of the court's process.

DECISION: The appeal is allowed, the orders of the Courts below are set aside, and the application for discharge under Section 245(2) CrPC is allowed. Respondent No.2 is directed to pay costs of Rs.25,000/- to each appellant for initiating frivolous litigation within two months.

REFERRED CASES:

Rajiv Thapar and Others v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330

Facts:

The case pertains to alterations made to a vehicle and the subsequent legal implications. The appellants, Regional Transport Officer and others, challenged the High Court's judgment, asserting that the court unduly emphasized rules over Section 52(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 52(1) post-amendment in 2000. The appellants contended that the High Court failed to acknowledge the prohibition of alterations beyond the manufacturer's original specifications.

Held:

The amendment to Section 52(1) explicitly prohibits alterations beyond the manufacturer's specifications, including changes to tires of higher capacity.

The provisos to Section 52(1) allow for modifications to the engine under certain conditions, and the Central Government possesses the authority to prescribe specifications for such alterations.

Section 52(2) grants State Governments the power to permit alterations under specific circumstances.

Alterations made without the approval of the Registering Authority, as permissible under Section 52(3), require reporting within 14 days.

Rule 92(1) of the Central Motor Vehicle Rules must be subservient to Section 52 of the Act, ensuring no alterations contrary to the original specifications.

Rule 126 focuses on vehicle fitness tests, emphasizing compliance with AIS: 017-2000.

Rules in Chapter V act as additional safeguards, prohibiting alterations as per Section 52(1).

The High Court erred by prioritizing rules over Section 52(1), and Circular No. 7/2006 should be interpreted in alignment with this perspective.

Decision: The appeals were allowed, with the Court holding that the High Court's decision did not correctly interpret the law. The Rules should be subservient to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, particularly Section 52(1).

Facts:

The appellant, Hansraj, and his brother Bansraj were Bhumidhars of Plot No.677.

Consolidation proceedings were initiated, and the Assistant Consolidation Officer proposed chaks to both the appellant and respondents on Plot No.677.

Dispute arose over the allocation on the pitch road, leading to objections from respondents.

The Consolidation Officer allowed objections, allocating chaks on the northern side to respondents and placing the appellant on the southern side away from the pitch road.

Issues:

The equitable distribution of land during consolidation, especially concerning the appellant's claim for a portion on the pitch road.

The respondents argued for chaks according to their possession, leading to objections to the initial proposal.

Held:

The appellant, being the original tenure holder, had a right to claim allocation on a part of the plot on the pitch road.

The Assistant Consolidation Officer initially proposed chaks on the pitch road for all parties.

The Consolidation Officer's decision to allocate chaks in favor of the respondents was reversed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation and Deputy Director, Consolidation.

Lack of partition under Section 176 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950 indicated that all co-sharers had rights to the plot.

The High Court erred in setting aside the orders of the Settlement Officer Consolidation and Deputy Director, Consolidation, as their decisions were based on spot inspection and resulted in an equitable distribution on the pitch road.

The High Court's justification, citing the location of the house of one petitioner and the appellant's pumping set, was disregarded as the Settlement Officer had already addressed this by allocating chaks accordingly.

The orders of the High Court were unsustainable, and the appeals were allowed. The writ petition filed by the respondents was dismissed.

Facts:

On 07.01.2019, the Court delivered a judgment in favor of the appellant, setting aside the High Court's order. However, a crucial point was overlooked during the initial hearing – the amendment to the definition of "employee" under Section 2(E) of the Payment of Gratuity Act by Amending Act No.47 of 2009.

Issues:

The Court realized that the judgment's reliance on Ahmedabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association vs. Administrative Officer (2004) 1 SCC 755 was based on a definition that had been retrospectively amended in 2009, with effect from 03.04.1997.

The oversight raises concerns about the correctness of the initial judgment.

Held:

The Court, sua sponte, took up the matter for reconsideration due to the overlooked amendment.

The amendment in the definition of Section 2(E) was not brought to the Bench's attention during the original appeal, leading to a prima facie finding of error in the judgment.

Pending a rehearing, the Court stayed the operation of its judgment dated 07.01.2019.

The Registry was directed to list the matter for rehearing before the appropriate Bench, comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre and Hon'ble Ms. Justice Indu Malhotra.

Decision: The judgment dated 07.01.2019 shall not be given effect to until the matter is reheard finally by the appropriate Bench.

Facts:

The case involves a complaint of medical negligence resulting in the death of the complainant's wife. The Medical Council found the treatment untimely, holding the hospital guilty of professional misconduct.

Issues:

The determination of medical negligence, adequacy of compensation, and the liability of the hospital and its director.

Held:

1. Standards of Medical Care: The standard of care expected of a medical professional is that of a reasonably competent practitioner. The Bolam test, although criticized, must evolve with advances in medical science. The Court emphasized the need for a patient-centric approach and adherence to evolving standards.

2. Unreasonableness in Professional Conduct: While varying approaches to treatment exist, a medical professional must ensure that the course adopted is not unreasonable. The threshold to prove unreasonableness considers the risks associated with medical treatment and the conditions under which professionals operate.

3. Violation of Guidelines: The hospital failed to provide medical treatment in accordance with WHO Guidelines and the guidelines prescribed by the Directorate of National Vector Borne Diseases Control Programme. This failure established medical negligence as per the Bolam case.

4. Director's Liability: The Director of the hospital, not being the treating or referring doctor, is not personally liable for medical negligence. However, the hospital itself is held accountable.

5. Compensation for Non-Working Spouse: The SCDRC erred in quantifying compensation based on the educational and employment status of the complainant's children. The economic contribution of a non-working spouse must be recognized, and compensation is enhanced to Rs. 15 lakhs.

6. Interest on Compensation: Compensation awarded carries interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of the complaint's institution before the SCDRC.

Facts:

Group 'D' workers engaged on a casual basis at the Regional Training Institute, Allahabad sought regularization since 1986.

The Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) issued directions for the preparation of a seniority list and exploring the possibility of regularization.

The High Court observed that there was no positive direction for regularization but directed to consider the possibility. It upheld the accommodation of the first 20 casual laborers based on seniority.

In 2008, new recruitment rules came into force. Despite directions, juniors were regularized, leading to a new application before CAT.

Issues:

Breach of seniority in regularization as per CAT directions.

Alleged discrimination and arbitrary action in favoring juniors.

Held:

CAT held Union of India breached directions by regularizing juniors and not adhering to seniority.

Union of India's defense rejected; Tribunal directed equivalent regularization benefits to applicants as given to their juniors from the same date.

Regularization to be in available vacancies based on category, no back wages, but notional pay fixation allowed.

High Court affirmed CAT's decision, stating Union of India frustrated earlier orders by regularizing juniors, directing consideration even in other establishments if posts not available at the Institute.

Facts:

M/s. Lohiya Agencies, a merchant dealing in 'gypsum board,' was assessed for the years 2006-07 and 2007-08. The Tax Department alleged tax evasion, claiming that 'gypsum board' should be taxed at 12.5% instead of the declared 4%. The dispute arose from the interpretation of Entry 56 of Schedule IV of the RVAT.

Issues:

Whether 'gypsum board' falls within the amended Entry 56, taxed at 4%, or in the residuary Entry 1 of Schedule V, taxed at 12.5%.

Held:

The Additional Commissioner initially held that 'gypsum board' falls under the residuary Entry, subject to 12.5% taxation.

The High Court reversed the decision, relying on the expanded definition of 'gypsum in all its forms' in Entry 56.

The manufacturing process of 'gypsum board' involves dehydration, mixing with additives, and forming a composite material.

The court considered the term 'in all its forms,' interpreting it broadly to include 'gypsum board' within Entry 56.

The court emphasized that the legislature's conscious decision to create a separate Entry for 'gypsum board' in 2014 supported the interpretation that it was distinct from the residuary Entry.

The court dismissed the appeals, allowing each party to bear its own costs.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute over the parity of pay scales between Head Clerks and Internal Auditors in the Punjab State Power Corporation Limited. The Internal Auditors claimed historical parity, arguing that a revision in the pay scale of Head Clerks disrupted the long-standing equality between the two positions.

Issues:

The entitlement of Internal Auditors to claim pay scale parity with Head Clerks, irrespective of differences in recruitment, qualifications, and job responsibilities.

The Internal Auditors contended that the revised pay scale for Head Clerks disturbed the established parity.

Held:

Equation of Posts and Revision of Pay Scale: The court held that the equation of posts and the revision of pay scales fall within the government's domain. The matter should be left to the discretion and expertise of the Pay Committee and the Government, considering the nature of duties and responsibilities. Judicial review is not applicable to the conclusion reached by expert bodies like the Pay Anomaly Committee.

Burden of Proof for Parity: The burden of proof in establishing parity in pay scales and the nature of duties and responsibilities lies with the person claiming such right. The court emphasized that the claimant must produce material to prove the similarity in the nature of work performed.

Differences in Duties and Responsibilities: The duties and nature of work of Head Clerks and Internal Auditors were deemed entirely different. Head Clerks held more administrative responsibilities, disbursing salaries, and overseeing the entire establishment, while Internal Auditors audited billing in the Revenue Department of the Sub-division Office.

Conscious Exercise of Option: The court highlighted that the exercise of option for promotion as Internal Auditor was a conscious decision by employees, considering the promotional avenues and higher pay scales available in the Internal Auditor position.

Time-Bound Promotional Scales: Internal Auditors were granted time-bound promotional scales on completion of service, which was not available to Head Clerks. This was considered a relevant factor in justifying the differences in pay scales.

Identity for Parity: The court emphasized that a mere difference in service conditions does not constitute discrimination. Complete identity between the two posts is necessary for claiming parity in pay scale.

FACTS:

The appellant filed a Criminal Writ Petition in 2002, seeking registration of a criminal complaint regarding the wrongful killing of his son by the police.

Delhi High Court directed CBI to register a complaint and investigate.

CBI filed a Closure Report in 2008, which was not accepted by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate.

Cognizance was taken against thirteen police officers, and the matter was committed to the Court of Sessions.

Accused filed Revision Petition, leading to petitions before the Delhi High Court.

High Court directed the Magistrate to reconsider cognizance, leading to multiple rounds of petitions and orders.

The High Court eventually dismissed the Appellant's petition in 2014, with the liberty to approach the Sessions Judge.

ISSUES:

The appropriate forum for revisionary jurisdiction under Section 397 of Cr.P.C.

The delay in the legal proceedings.

HELD:

The Court acknowledged the prolonged nature of the case, emphasizing the need for speedy justice.

The Court refrained from deciding on the question of law regarding concurrent revisionary jurisdiction.

The order of the High Court was set aside, and the case was restored before the High Court with a request for expeditious consideration.

The Court clarified that it did not express any opinion on the merits of the case.

Liberty was granted to approach the Supreme Court again if any party was aggrieved by the High Court's order.