FACTS:

The dispute revolves around a Purchase Order dated 01.10.2008, where Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited (MTNL) was to provide last mile connectivity within two months. The Appellant failed to provide the required connectivity by the stipulated time, leading to the termination of the contract by the Respondent.

ISSUES:

Did the Appellant have justified reasons for not providing last-mile connectivity?

What compensation is the Respondent entitled to for the breach of contract?

HELD:

The petitioner (Appellant) failed to provide last-mile connectivity within the stipulated time. The defense of lack of access and permission was deemed weak. The Tribunal found the petitioner's case unacceptable and ruled in favor of the Respondent.( Para 25)

Considering the delay and failure on the part of the petitioner, the Tribunal explored the possibility of reducing the claimed amount based on the actual cost of providing last-mile connectivity. However, lacking reliable materials for cost assessment, the Tribunal invoked clause 16.2(b) of the Agreement, limiting liquidated damages to a maximum of 12%.( Para 26)

The Tribunal allowed the claim in part. The principal amount to be refunded or paid back to the petitioner was determined as Rs. 84,74,087/-. Interest at the rate of 9% from the due date until the judgment date was also directed.( Para 28)

REFERRED CASES:

Alopi Parshad and Sons Ltd. v. Union of India, (1960) 2 SCR 793

Kailash Nath Associates v. DDA, (2015) 4 SCC 136

Kanhayalal Bisandayal Bhiwapurkar (Dr.) v. Indarchandji Hamirmalji Sisodia, AIR 1947 Nag 84

Moselle Solomon v. Martin & Co., ILR (1935) 62 Cal 612

Mulamchand v. State of M.P., (1968) 3 SCR 214

Orissa Industrial Infrastructure Development Corpn. v. Mesco Kalinga Steel Ltd., (2017) 5 SCC 86

Facts:

Civil Suit No. RBT 1251/95/92 filed by the first respondent-plaintiff for a declaration as a joint owner of a specific share in the suit scheduled land.

Allegation that a fictitious gift deed was executed by the appellant, playing fraud on Smt. Vidya Devi, the original owner.

Contention by the appellant that the gift deed was valid, executed with free will and consent, and not in violation of Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act.

Trial Court dismissed the suit, holding that the evidence did not support the fraud allegation and the gift deed was valid.

First Appellate Court concurred with the Trial Court's findings.

High Court reversed the judgments, primarily based on the consideration mentioned in the gift deed.

Issues:

Validity of a registered gift deed.

Interpretation of the consideration mentioned in the gift deed.

Whether the High Court exceeded its authority in re-evaluating evidence.

Held:

The appellant argued that the Rs. 5,000 mentioned in the gift deed was for valuation purposes and not consideration for the gift, a point accepted by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court.

High Court misconstrued the document, wrongly holding that the gift was evidenced by a consideration of Rs. 5,000.

The judgment of the High Court set aside, emphasizing that the mentioning of Rs. 5,000 was for valuation, not consideration for the gift.

Lack of evidence to substantiate the claim that the gift deed was not executed with free will and consent.

High Court erred in re-evaluating evidence, and findings of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court upheld.

Facts:

The case involved a prosecution under sections 132 and 135(1)(a) of the Customs Act concerning the export of antiquities. The appellant, Sharad Gandhi, challenged the prosecution, invoking the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972.

Issues:

The compatibility of the Customs Act with the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, especially regarding the prohibition on the export of antiquities. The interpretation of Section 30 of the Antiquities Act and the applicability of the Customs Act were central to the case.

Held:

The principles of ejusdem generis were applied to interpret the relationship between the Customs Act and the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act. The court emphasized the need to consider legislative intent and purposive interpretation to understand the coexistence of both laws (Para 17).

Section 30 of the Antiquities Act was analyzed, and the court concluded that the words "any other law for the time being in force" should be construed ejusdem generis with the specific laws mentioned in the section (Paras 27, 28).

Legislative intent behind Section 30 was to allow the application of other laws dealing with antiquities to continue after the passing of the Antiquities Act, but the Customs Act was not included in the scope (Para 38).

Section 4 of the Antiquities Act already provided for the applicability of the Customs Act with certain qualifications, ensuring its application except where inconsistent with the Antiquities Act (Para 40).

The court examined whether prosecution under Sections 132 and 135(1)(a) of the Customs Act was permitted under Section 4 of the Antiquities Act. It clarified that such prosecution was permissible as long as the ingredients of the offenses were satisfied (Para 42).

The court addressed the distinction between the offenses under Section 25 of the Antiquities Act and Section 132 of the Customs Act. It emphasized that the ingredients of these offenses were distinct and different (Para 42).

The court rejected the argument that prosecution under Section 132 would violate Section 25 or Section 26 of the Antiquities Act, highlighting the different elements of the offenses (Para 67).

The prosecution's case involved the interception of a wooden box declared as 'Stone Figure Handicrafts,' later identified as an antiquity. The charges under Section 135(1)(a) were based on fraudulent evasion of export prohibition (Paras 69, 71).

Section 135(1)(a) was analyzed in the context of the Antiquities Act and the Foreign Trade (Development & Regulation) Act 1992. The court clarified the distinct elements of this offense compared to Section 25 of the Antiquities Act (Para 76).

The court considered the mandate of Section 4 of the Antiquities Act and its impact on the prosecution under Section 135(1)(a). It concluded that such prosecution was consistent with Section 25 read with Section 26 of the Antiquities Act (Para 77).

Section 24 of the Antiquities Act, dealing with the power to decide the status of an article as an antiquity, was highlighted. The court emphasized the role of the Director General of Archaeological Survey of India in making such determinations (Para 78).

The concept of 'inconsistency' as found in Article 254 of the Constitution was briefly discussed, though acknowledging its limited applicability to the case (Para 80).

The court recognized the Antiquities Act as a comprehensive law but highlighted its non-exhaustive nature. It emphasized the legislative intention allowing multiple offenses arising from the same set of facts (Para 83).

The court concluded that full play was given to the Customs Act, ensuring its application where not inconsistent with the Antiquities Act (Paras 84, 85).

Facts:

The dispute arising from the interpretation of Section 24(1)(b) and Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, relating to compensation and lapsing of land acquisition, respectively.

Issues:

Whether the proviso in Section 24 applies to Section 24(1)(b) or Section 24(2).

Held:

The court establishes that Section 24(1) deals with compensation, while Section 24(2) deals with the lapsing of land acquisition. The proviso, accordingly, pertains to Section 24(1)(b) and not Section 24(2) [Para 9].

The court highlights the scheme of Section 24(1), emphasizing enhanced compensation even in cases under the repealed Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The proviso acts as an exception to Section 24(1)(b) in cases where compensation for a majority of land holdings has not been deposited, allowing the application of more favorable provisions of the 2013 Act [Para 10].

Reading the proviso as applicable to Section 24(2) would lead to anomalies, arbitrary results, and potential violation of Article 14 of the Constitution [Paras 11, 12, 13].

The language of the proviso makes it clear that it does not refer to the award under Section 24(2). Reading it as a proviso to Section 24(1)(b) ensures compatibility with awards made under Section 11, irrespective of the timeline [Para 14].

Emphasizing the beneficial nature of the 2013 Act, the court advocates a construction that furthers its purpose. The preferred view is the one aligned with the legislation's objectives [Para 15].

Due to the referral of the Indore Development Authority case to a Bench of five Judges, the present judgment is also referred to the same Bench for further consideration [Para 17].

Facts:

The appeal arises from income tax proceedings initiated after a search operation.

The Tribunal favored the respondent, leading to the Revenue's appeal to the High Court.

Issues:

High Court's failure to frame substantial questions of law.

Lack of discussion on why the ITAT's order is not illegal.

Held:

After hearing both parties, the court allows the appeal, remanding the case to the High Court for a fresh decision.( Para 7)

High Court failed to discuss and assign reasons for dismissing the appeal.( Para 8)

High Court erred in not framing substantial questions of law despite hearing both parties.( Para 11)

Emphasizes the need for the High Court to frame questions and provide reasons under Section 260A(4) and (5) of the Act.( Para 16)

The court sets aside the impugned order and remands the case to the High Court for a fresh decision, emphasizing that the court hasn't expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.( Para 20)

FACTS:

Gorden Wapshare died intestate on 18.01.1991.

Appellant obtained a Succession Certificate in O.P. No. 17 of 2005.

Respondent, claiming to be the daughter of Beatrice, applied to revoke the Succession Certificate under Section 383.

Respondent's lineage questioned; she was not a lineal descendant of Gorden Wapshare.

ISSUES:

Validity of the revocation application under Section 383.

Lineal descent and entitlement to Gorden Wapshare's estate.

HELD:

Succession Certificate can only be revoked under Section 383 for specific grounds (a to e), none of which applied in this case.Respondent was not a lineal descendant; had no familial connection with the Wapshare family.( Para 9)

Respondent's application described her as the daughter of Beatrice, omitting Edward Wapshare, establishing no lineal connection.Gorden Wapshare dying intestate meant his property passes to widow and lineal descendants under Section 33(a).Appellant being the only living lineal descendant, the respondent had no legal standing. ( Para 10)

The High Court erred in not considering all grounds; set aside the judgment and restored the Sub-Judge's decision.( Para 11)

Facts:

The complainants booked apartments in a project titled "DLF Valley, Panchkula." The developer failed to hand over possession within the agreed-upon time, leading to various complaints.

Issues:

Compensation for delayed possession, and the entitlement of heirs in the case of a deceased original allottee.

Held:

The entitlement of heirs in the case of a deceased original allottee cannot be determined at this stage and must be left to a competent court. However, 3/4 of the sum is directed to be made over to the widow for herself and on behalf of two children, while the remaining 1/4 shall be made over to the mother.

In all refund cases, interest at the rate of 9% is awarded from the day of deposit till the date of refund. In cases of possession sought, the compensation period is after the expiry of three years from the date of the agreement, with interest at the rate of 9%.

Facts:

Respondents were governed by the Employees Contributory Provident Fund Scheme.

Pension Scheme introduced before VRS, but not implemented until 1995.

VRS eligibility required 10 years of service or completion of 40 years of age.

Pension scheme applied retrospectively from 3.8.1981, implemented by the appellant-Corporation in 1995.

Dispute arose regarding the exclusion of the period of unauthorized absence from qualifying service for pension.

Issues:

Whether the period of unauthorized absence without pay should be counted towards qualifying service for pension under the Pension Rules.

Interpretation of Rules 21, 27, and 28 in the context of leave availed of during service.

Held:

The respondents were not governed by the Pension Rules initially but by the Employees Contributory Provident Fund Scheme.

The introduction of the Pension Scheme occurred just before VRS, and its implementation was delayed until 1995.

The period of unauthorized absence without pay should be excluded from qualifying service for pension, as per the clear language of Pension Rules.

Rule 21 explicitly states that only leave periods with payable leave salary should count as qualifying service for pension.

Rules 27 and 28, dealing with interruption in service, are deemed inapplicable as there is no forfeiture of past service.

The Government decision of 28.2.1976 emphasizes the need for prompt entry into service records for extraordinary leave to be considered qualifying for pension.

The respondents failed to qualify for pension benefits under the Pension Rules due to the period of unpaid leave.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, setting aside the impugned order, with each party bearing its own costs. However, no refund is claimed for any payments already made to the respondents.

Facts:

The land in question underwent ceiling proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, subsequently being allotted to a hospital on a 30-year lease. Challenges to the notification issued under Section 10(3) of the Act were raised by the respondents. The High Court upheld the notification, but the Supreme Court suggested the availability of alternative remedies.

Issues:

The maintainability of a civil suit seeking a declaration that the proceedings under the Act were null and void, and the respondents be declared owners of the land.

Held:

The judgment establishes that the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, is a self-contained code, providing a comprehensive framework for dealing with landowners' rights exceeding prescribed ceiling limits. The Act gives finality to appellate orders under Section 33, and bars civil suits under Sections 30(5) and 40.

The jurisdiction of civil courts is held to be excluded implicitly due to the finality provided by Section 33(3), availability of remedies through appeals, and the Act's completeness. The Act expressly excludes civil court jurisdiction under Sections 30(5) and 40.

The civil court lacks jurisdiction to grant reliefs sought in the suit, as it is impliedly barred under the Act.

The respondents had multiple legal remedies available, including filing a civil suit, submitting a statement to the Competent Authority under Section 6, and raising objections under Section 10(1). Failure to pursue these remedies led to the implied bar on filing a civil suit.

Dismissal of a writ petition and SLP affirmed the conformity of proceedings under the Act. The suit property vested in the state, precluding the filing of a civil suit.

Any remedy for the respondents was under the Act, and filing a civil suit was impliedly barred.

The Act's intention to exclude civil court jurisdiction is evident from various sections.

The civil court lacks jurisdiction over land subject to ceiling proceedings under the Act.

Respondents' belated challenge to ceiling proceedings is meritless, and the situation is irreversible after the state's acquisition and lease to hospitals.

The Division Bench of the High Court erred in allowing the appeal, contrary to the trial court's dismissal, which was justified.