FACTS:

The ITBP requested about 75 acres of land for establishing a Battalion Headquarters in Kanpur Nagar.

Notifications under Section 4 and Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act were issued for urgent acquisition of the land.

Legal challenges were raised by the landowners, leading to multiple writ petitions before the High Court.

The High Court quashed the notifications, holding that the urgency clause was improperly invoked, and there was no immediate urgency justifying the use of Section 17 and dispensing with Section 5A procedure.

ISSUES:

Whether the invocation of the urgency clause and dispensing with the Section 5A procedure were justified?

Compliance with Section 17(4) regarding the deposit of compensation.

HELD:

The High Court erred in finding no justification for invoking the urgency clause. The time gap of three months between notifications indicated a real urgency.

The purpose of land acquisition for establishing an ITBP Battalion Headquarters justified the invocation of Section 17 and dispensing with the Section 5A procedure.

The High Court's finding of non-compliance with Section 17(4) regarding compensation was unfounded, as the ITBP had deposited the estimated amount in 2009/2010.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashed the High Court's judgment, and dismissed the writ petition.

Facts:

The appellant, Tarun Jit Tejpal, was facing trial for offenses under various sections of the Indian Penal Code, as indicated in the charge sheet filed by the Investigating Officer. The Sessions Judge had ordered charges to be framed against the appellant. Subsequently, the appellant filed a revision application before the High Court seeking discharge from the charged offenses.

Issues:

The appellant sought discharge on the grounds that the informant and the Investigating Officer were the same, alleging that this aspect vitiated the entire criminal proceedings. Reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab (2018) 17 SCC 627.

Held:

The Court noted that the decision in Mohan Lal was not applicable to the present case as the criminal prosecution had been initiated before the Mohan Lal decision. Therefore, the appellant could not be discharged solely on the ground of the same person serving as both the informant and the Investigating Officer (Para 8.2).

The Court distinguished the case of Bhagwan Singh, relied upon by the appellant's counsel, stating that it was relevant after the trial and not at the stage of framing of charges. The Court emphasized that considerations regarding the conduct of the victim/prosecutrix and other merits should be addressed during the course of the trial (Para 9.5).

The submissions made on behalf of the appellant on merits and the conduct of the victim/prosecutrix were deemed to be matters requiring consideration at an appropriate stage during the trial. The Court affirmed that there was more than a prima facie case against the accused, and the trial court had rightly framed the charges, a decision properly confirmed by the High Court (Para 9.5).

Facts:

The appellant, a judicial officer, accepted an objection raised by one of the lawyers regarding the authorization of a compromise petition in a claims case. The High Court set aside this order, making adverse remarks against the appellant, questioning his integrity, and accusing him of favoritism. The appellant challenged this decision in the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's remarks against the appellant were justified.

The appropriateness of the order regarding the authorization of lawyers in the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal matter.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after considering the arguments and previous cases, held that remarks against judicial officers should not be passed lightly. The court expunged all adverse remarks against the appellant and directed the deletion of a specific paragraph from the judgment. The order imposing costs on the appellant was set aside. The court emphasized that costs are not normally imposed on the presiding officer of the court.

"We, accordingly, expunge all such remarks and direct deletion of para 15 of the judgment."( Para 11)

"We also set aside the order in so far as the imposition of costs of Rs.10,000/- on the appellant is concerned."( Para 12)

"The civil appeal is accordingly allowed, and we direct expunging of all remarks made against the appellant and further direct that para 15 of the impugned judgment shall stand deleted for all intents and purposes."( Para 14)

Facts:

The deceased, Pradeep Tokas, a 21-year-old trained swimmer, died in a motor accident.

The accident involved a collision between a two-wheeler (with the deceased as a pillion rider) and a stationary truck.

The claimants (parents of the deceased) filed a compensation claim before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT).

MACT awarded compensation, but the High Court modified the amount based on the age of the mother of the deceased.

Issues:

Applicability of the multiplier for compensation calculation based on the age of the deceased or dependents.

Determination of notional income and inclusion of future prospects in compensation.

Held:

The Division Bench, comprising Justices Indu Malhotra and Sanjiv Khanna, held that the multiplier for compensation should be based on the age of the deceased, not the dependents. The court referred to various precedents, including Sarla Verma, Reshma Kumari, Pranay Sethi, and others, to establish this principle. Even in the case of a bachelor, the age of the deceased should be considered, aligning with settled legal norms.

The court noted errors in the High Court's decision regarding the notional income of the deceased and the failure to award future prospects. The notional income was adjusted to Rs. 12,000/- per month, and future prospects were calculated at 40% of the income.

Facts:

Corporation engaged in stocking goods, with loading and unloading work carried out by workers.

Dispute arises on whether these workers are entitled to benefits under the Provident Fund Act.

Corporation contests the claim, asserting no employer-employee relationship.

Issues:

Whether the workers are eligible for benefits under the Provident Fund Act.

Whether the Corporation is liable to pay statutory contributions for these workers.

Held:

The High Court's reliance on the Industrial Disputes Act findings was criticized.

Definition of "employee" under the Provident Fund Act differs from that in the Industrial Disputes Act, and their objectives are distinct.

Findings under the Industrial Disputes Act are irrelevant to the Provident Fund Act issue.

The High Court's order is set aside, and the case is remanded for reconsideration on merits, considering the definition of "employee" under Section 2(f) of the Provident Fund Act.

The High Court is urged to decide the writ petition expeditiously.

FACTS:

The appellant had been obtaining individual Mediclaim Policies for family members since 2007-2008.

Dispute involves a medical claim for the year 2014-15 for the son of the appellant, Master Jasnoor Singh.

Son incurred medical expenses exceeding Rs. 8,00,000 during hospitalization in 2014.

Insurance Company initially repudiated the claim but later paid Rs. 27,550.

ISSUES:

Determination of the extent of liability of the Insurance Company under the "Parivar - Mediclaim for Family Policy."

The validity of the claim based on the pre-existing disease argument.

HELD:

The individual Mediclaim Policy for Master Jasnoor Singh was continuously held from 2007-2008 to 2014-2015.No pre-existing disease at the initiation of the policy in 2007-2008.The insurance company cannot claim pre-existing disease.The Family Mediclaim Policy had a 50% limit on the sum insured for individual claims.The maximum payable claim is 50% of the sum insured under the Family Mediclaim Policy for the medical treatment of Master Jasnoor Singh, i.e., Rs. 2,50,000.( Para 10)

Repudiation of the claim by the Insurance Company was not justified.The Insurance Company allowed the claim initially by paying Rs. 27,550, indicating that the pre-existing disease was not considered material.( Para 12)

The appellant is entitled to Rs. 2,50,000 minus the amount already paid by the Insurance Company.Additional compensation awarded for mental agony, harassment, and litigation costs.Interest at 7.5% p.a. is applicable on the balance amount payable.( Para 13)

The appeal is allowed with the above directions.( Para 14)

Facts:

The Gram Panchayat, Namhol requested the appellants (State) for the construction of a road from Namhol to Bahadurpur.

Possession of the land for road construction was taken in 1988.

Respondents, whose land was utilized for the road, filed a writ petition complaining of improper land acquisition.

Land acquisition proceedings initiated after court directions, and notification under Section 4(1) issued in 2005.

Land Acquisition Officer passed an award, categorizing land and fixing market value.

Respondents sought reference under Section 18, leading to the Reference Court fixing compensation at a uniform rate of Rs.7.00 lakhs per bigha.

State appealed against the fixation, claiming errors in relying on a specific sale deed (Ex.PW-1/A).

Issues:

Whether the Reference Court and the High Court erred in accepting Ex.PW-1/A as a comparable sale.

Allegation that another comparable sale (Ex.'RA' dated 04.05.2001) was not considered without valid reasons.

Appropriateness of fixing compensation at Rs.7.00 lakhs per bigha for the total acquired land of 18-15 bighas.

Held:

The Court set aside the fixation of compensation at Rs.7.00 lakhs per bigha, finding errors in relying on the specific sale deed (Ex.PW-1/A) for a small portion of land. The Court emphasized that in the absence of comparable sales in the same village, the Reference Court should consider sales in adjoining villages or use alternative methods for fixing compensation. The matter was remitted back to the District Court for fresh consideration. The Court also directed the Reference Court to dispose of the references within six months and allowed both parties to present additional evidence. The additional interest awarded at 15% per annum was set aside, leaving it open to the Reference Court to consider the claim for additional interest independently.

Facts:

Appellant, Kum C. Yamini, appointed as an ad hoc District Judge for a Fast Track Court in 2003.

Notification for regular appointments to the posts of District & Sessions Judges in the A.P. Higher Judicial Service issued in 2004.

Writ petition challenging the notification and seeking absorption in regular vacancies was dismissed.

Appellants applied and were appointed to regular District Judge posts in 2013, following a 2012 notification.

Issues:

Appellants claimed seniority from the date of their initial appointment as ad hoc District Judges.

Challenge to paragraphs 5 and 6 of G.O.MS. No. 68 dated 02.07.2013, questioning their seniority.

Held:

The court rejected the claim for seniority, emphasizing the distinction between appointments for Fast Track Courts and regular appointments.

Appellants' rejection of the claim for absorption and challenge to the 2004 notification were cited as a basis for denying seniority.

The court directed that appellants and similarly placed individuals be given the benefit of counting their service as Fast Track Judges for pensionary and other retiral benefits.

Facts:

The appellants, representing the State of Rajasthan, challenged the dismissal of second appeals by the High Court in a case related to mining operations. The respondent, Shiv Dayal, claimed to be the mining lessee and sought a permanent injunction against the State and its authorities.

Issues:

The dismissal of the State's second appeals by the High Court, contending that no substantial question of law was present. The Court identified five crucial questions related to forest laws, revenue laws, MMRD Act, and the status of the suit land.

Held:

The Court sets aside the High Court's order and remands the case for fresh consideration on merits.( Paragraph 12)

Rejects the High Court's reasoning that a concurrent finding by lower courts makes it unassailable in second appeal.( Paragraph 14)

Establishes that if a finding is based on misreading, against provisions of law, or without jurisdiction, it can be challenged in a second appeal.( Paragraph 21)

Enumerates five questions arising for consideration, constituting substantial questions of law.( Paragraph 23)

Allows the appeals, directing the High Court to frame appropriate substantial questions of law and decide the case afresh on merits.( Paragraph 32)

Acknowledges the death of Shiv Dayal during the appeals but asserts that appeals against him have not abated.( Paragraph 36)