Facts:

The appellant convicted for murdering Smt. Ruby by acid attack.

Additional convictions under IPC sections for injuring other family members.

Appeal against the death sentence confirmed by the High Court.

Issues:

Validity of the death sentence in light of the circumstances.

Consideration of special reasons for the imposition of the death penalty.

Connection between the present crime and a prior murder conviction.

Held:

The appellant rightly convicted for causing the death of Smt. Ruby. Dying declaration of the victim and consistent witness accounts establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.( Para 5)

The evidence of the appellant fleeing the crime scene, fingerprints matching on the acid container, and the Dying Declaration hold strong probative value. The conviction is well-founded.( Para 6)

Consideration of the imposition of the death sentence. Special reasons required. Appellant committed the crime while on bail for a prior murder conviction. However, the earlier case is unrelated to the present incident.( Para 8)

Appellant's disappointment in his relationship with the deceased led to the attack. The choice of acid suggests an intention to injure or disfigure rather than premeditated murder.( Para 9)

No special reasons found to warrant a death sentence. Reference to Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684 and Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470 for sentencing guidelines.( Para 10)

The death sentence imposed by the High Court is set aside. Appellant to undergo imprisonment for life.( Para 12)

Facts:

The respondent's father, a Peon in the Revenue Department, passed away in service in 1997.

The respondent, a minor at the time of his father's death, applied for compassionate appointment upon reaching majority in 2002.

The application was rejected in 2008, citing the employment of the respondent's brother with the Himachal Pradesh Electricity Board.

The respondent filed a Writ Petition seeking the setting aside of the rejection letter and his appointment as a Peon.

Issues:

• Whether the rejection based on the brother's employment was valid under the policy.

• Whether the High Court could direct the State to consider applications not meeting the policy's terms.

• Whether the delay in filing the Writ Petition affected the case.

Held:

The High Court overstepped its authority by directing the State to consider applications not meeting the policy terms.

Compassionate appointment is not a right but governed by the State's policy.

The High Court's direction breaches the policy framed by the State and is impermissible.

The Writ Petition was filed two years and six months after the rejection, with insufficient factual averments.

The delay, coupled with the High Court's unwarranted direction, renders its judgment unsustainable.

The appeal is allowed, and the High Court's directions are set aside, resulting in the rejection of the Writ Petition. No costs are awarded.

Facts:

The petitioner, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan University, faced repeated lapses in meeting the minimum standards for MBBS student admissions. The respondents canceled admissions for the academic year 2017-18 due to concerns about the college's compliance. The college, in its defense, claimed unnecessary harassment by the authorities despite complying with standards.

Issues:

Whether the college had engaged in fraudulent practices by presenting false information to the court, particularly in relation to the authenticity of patients in the hospital.

Held:

The Committee's findings revealed that the college made a false statement based on a fabricated document. The assertion regarding the genuineness of patients was proven false, with only 21 patients identified, eight of whom were affiliated with the college. The college was found guilty of large-scale malpractices in showing compliance with minimum standards.( Para 13)

The court held the Dean of the College liable for prosecution under Section 193 of the IPC, given the blatant reliance on manipulated records to mislead the court.( Para 14)

In light of the deceitful methods employed by the college, a penalty of Rs. Five Crores was imposed for committing perjury. The amount was directed to be paid to the account of the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.( Para 15)

The court rejected the apology offered by the college, condemning its habitual indulgence in foul play, as evidenced by events in 2015.( Para 16)

While students admitted in the academic year 2017-18 were directed to other colleges for 2018-19, they were entitled to a refund of the fee paid for admission to the college.( Para 17)

The final order summarized the actions:( Para 18)

Dean of the college to be prosecuted.College barred from admissions for the next two years.A penalty of Rs. Five Crores imposed on the college.Students entitled to a fee refund and additional compensation.

Facts:

Provide a concise summary of the background and events leading to the legal dispute.

Issues:

Enumerate the key legal questions and disputes raised in the case.

Held:

The constitutional validity of Section 2(8)(i) is challenged on the ground of vagueness. However, the court rejects this plea, citing alignment with the definition of obscenity in Section 292 of the IPC.[Para 79-81, 84, 89]

Section 6(4), forbidding the grant of licenses for both dance bars and discotheques or orchestras at the same place, is deemed arbitrary and irrational, lacking a nexus with the intended purpose. Hence, it is struck down as unconstitutional.[Para 90]

Section 8(2) is upheld, considering the distinction between offenses under Section 8(1) and Section 8(2) of the Act.[Para 91, 92]

Section 8(4) is justified in banning the showering of money on stage but is set aside concerning the method of tipping, allowing flexibility between performers and visitors.[Para 93]

Rule 3(3)(i) is found vague, prompting its quashing, with liberty granted to refine the provisions.[Para 95]

Conditions regarding the size of the stage are upheld, but the imposition of a non-transparent partition is struck down for lacking rationality.[Para 96, 97]

Condition No.11 prescribing a 1 km distance from educational and religious institutions is deemed arbitrary and unreasonable, leading to its quashing.[Para 98]

Condition No.2 of Part B, mandating monthly employment contracts, infringes on the freedom of workers, and is set aside. The requirement for written contracts and remuneration in bank accounts is deemed appropriate.[Para 99]

Condition No. 9 limiting dance performance timings to 6 pm to 11:30 pm is considered reasonable and upheld.[Para 100]

Condition No. 12 prohibiting alcohol in bar rooms where dances are staged is found disproportionate and arbitrary, leading to its quashing.[Para 101]

Condition No. 20 mandating the installation of CCTV cameras is deemed an invasion of privacy and is struck down.[Para 102]

Facts:

The appellant, Himanshu, was accused of dishonouring a cheque.

The appellant argued that since the cheque was issued by him as a director on behalf of a company, the company should be named as an accused.

The appellant filed a petition under Section 482 of CrPC before the High Court, which was rejected.

Issues:

Whether the complaint against the appellant is maintainable without naming the company as an accused.

Whether the High Court erred in rejecting the petition under Section 482 of CrPC.

Held:

The court cited the decision in Aneeta Hada vs. Godfather Travels and Tours Private Limited, (2012) 5 SCC 661, stating that for maintaining a prosecution under Section 138, arraigning a company as an accused is imperative. The court held that without the company being arraigned, the complaint against the appellant was not maintainable.

The court found merit in the submission that the proviso to Section 138 contains pre-conditions that must be fulfilled before an offence is made out. The court emphasized the importance of complying with the conditions, including the issuance of a notice of demand. In the absence of compliance, the direction of the High Court to arraign the company as an accused was deemed erroneous.

The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and quashing the complaint under Section 482 of CrPC.

The court directed the amount deposited by the appellant to be paid to the respondent-complainant, as per the earlier order.

Facts:

The case involves the death of an employee in the Horticulture Department in 2005. The respondent, the deceased employee's dependant, applied for compassionate appointment in 2007. The State policy, formulated on 18.01.1990, is central to the case, emphasizing immediate assistance to families left in indigent circumstances due to the untimely death of a government servant. The policy considers family pension and other terminal benefits in assessing financial need.

Issues:

Whether the State can consider family pension and other terminal benefits in determining compassionate appointments.

Validity and interpretation of the income slab prescribed by the Finance Department.

The impact of delay in seeking compassionate appointment.

Held:

Compassionate appointment is an exception to the general rule of appointment based on constitutional principles. Dependents of a deceased state employee are eligible by virtue of the compassionate appointment policy. There is no inherent right to compassionate appointment; eligibility is subject to fulfillment of terms in the policy.( Para 20)

The policy, formulated on 18 January 1990, aims to provide employment assistance to dependents left in indigent circumstances. Family pension and death gratuity are considered in assessing financial need. The receipt of family pension is a relevant factor but not a preclusion for consideration. The policy emphasizes the immediacy of financial need.( Para 21)

The fixation of an income slab reduces arbitrariness, bringing objectivity and uniformity to decision-making. Circulars by the Finance Department are clarificatory, not amendments. The State is directed to periodically revise income limits, considering inflation and cost of living.( Para 39)

The respondent's delay of over seven years in seeking compassionate appointment diminishes the sense of immediacy, as highlighted in Umesh Kumar Nagpal case. The respondent is barred from seeking compassionate appointment due to the delay and the lapse of time.( Para 40 and 42)

Facts:

The respondents, appointed between 1982 and 1989 as Rifleman in Assam Rifles, were working as Havildars.

Changes in the structure of Assam Rifles in 2011 introduced an intermediate rank of Warrant Officer.

Recruitment Rules of 2012 specified promotion from Havildar to Warrant Officer, contrary to the earlier avenue to Naib Subedar.

Writ proceedings were initiated, challenging the promotion to the lower rank of Warrant Officer.

Issues:

Whether the changes in the structure and Recruitment Rules affected the rights accrued to Havildars for promotion to Naib Subedar.

The constitutional validity of promoting Havildars to the rank of Warrant Officer.

Held:

The High Court erred in stating that vacancies occurring before the amendment must be governed by the old Rules. No universal rule dictates filling vacancies based on the law at the time of their occurrence.

There is no vested right to promotion; the right is to be considered for promotion in accordance with the existing Rules during the promotion process.

Creation of an intermediate post (Warrant Officer) does not infringe on vested rights, as clarified in previous judgments.

The appeal is allowed, setting aside the High Court's order. No costs are imposed.

Facts:

The case involved three accused facing charges under relevant sections of the Penal Code, Madhya Pradesh Dakaiti and Vyapharan Prabhavit Kshetra Adhiniyam, Arms Act, and others. The prosecution's case relied on circumstantial evidence, last seen witnesses, and the recovery of incriminating articles based on confessional statements.

Issues:

The central issues included the reliability of last seen witnesses, the voluntary nature of confessions, the legality of fingerprint samples, and the overall strength of the prosecution's case.

Held:

In a case where the High Court acquitted the accused, a double presumption in favor of the accused arises. The Supreme Court should only interfere if there are compelling reasons, substantial errors, or a palpable miscarriage of justice. (Para 17)

Last seen witnesses (PW12 and PW20) lacked credibility due to discrepancies and a delay in recording statements. Their evidence was deemed an afterthought. (Para 18)

The delay in the arrest of accused persons, despite clear knowledge of their whereabouts, cast doubt on the prosecution's case. (Para 20)

Confessions leading to recovery were found to be involuntary, violating Article 20(3) of the Constitution, undermining the evidentiary value. (Para 22)

Issues with the identification procedure, non-examination of important witnesses, and doubts regarding recovery of stolen items raised suspicion over the prosecution's case. (Para 23-26)

The absence of a magisterial order for fingerprint samples raised doubts on their credibility, indicating a possibility of tampering. (Para 27)

The inference drawn by a high-ranking police officer impeded the investigation, creating prejudice against the accused. (Para 28)

The High Court's acquittal was well-reasoned, and the appellants failed to prove any error. The Court confirmed the acquittal based on the reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused. (Para 29)

FACTS:

In 2002, 1500 acres of land were acquired from different villages for the public purpose of developing an Industrial Township in Manesar, Gurgaon.

Compensation was awarded to landowners based on different types of lands.

Two sets of villages were given differential treatment.

The Reference Court initially relied on the decision in Pran Sukh's case to enhance compensation.

The High Court, in subsequent applications, further increased compensation based on a cumulative enhancement at rates of 12% and 15% over the base rate.

ISSUES:

The differential treatment of two sets of villages in compensation calculation and the validity of the enhancement of compensation rates.

HELD:

The sale deeds (P1, P2, P3) for lands in Bas Kusla and Dhana postdated the acquisition initiation in Pran Sukh's case. The High Court rightly ruled out one transaction (PY) due to construction and CLU. (Para 21, 22)

For lands in Naharpur Kasan and Kasan, three methods were applied. The appropriate value in 2002 was determined to be Rs. 39,54,666/- per acre, and all statutory benefits were deemed payable. (Para 23, 25, 26, 30)

Lands in Bas Kusla, Bas Haria, and Dhana showed no substantial increase. Using a rough method, their market value in 2002 was assessed at Rs. 29,77,333/- per acre, with statutory benefits payable. (Para 27, 30)

Lands in Manesar, abutting National Highway No.8, justified a 50% rise over the market value of Naharpur Kasan and Kasan. Market value in 2002 was fixed at Rs. 59,31,999/- per acre, with statutory benefits. (Para 28, 30)

No severance charges were awarded to M/s. K Private Limited as the High Court was not justified in granting additional compensation on this account. (Para 29)

REFERRED CASES:

General Manager, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited. v. Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel and Another, (2008) 14 SCC 745

Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation v. Pran Sukh & Ors, (2010) 11 SCC 175

Lal Chand vs. Union of India and another, (2009) 15 SCC 769

Land Acquisition Officer and Revenue Divisional Officer v. Ramanjulu (2005) 9 SCC 594

Ranjit Singh (1992) 4 SCC 659 related to acquisition for development of Sector 41 of Chandigarh. Ramanjulu (2005) 9 SCC 594

Ranjit Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh (1992) 4 SCC 659

Satish Kumar Gupta and others v. State of Haryana and others, (2017) 4 SCC 760

Surender Singh v. State of Haryana and others, (2018) 3 SCC 278