Facts:

The Complainant, an industrial unit, suffered a fire incident and claimed Rs. 54,93,865 under a fire insurance policy.

Three surveyors were appointed successively, with varying assessments of the claim.

The Insurance Company repudiated the claim based on the third surveyor's report, alleging fraud and manipulation.

Issues:

Validity of successive appointments of surveyors.

Acceptance of the first surveyor's report and subsequent repudiation based on the third surveyor's findings.

Held:

The Court scrutinized whether the Insurance Company had valid reasons or identified inherent defects in the first surveyor's report. It emphasized that the right to appoint another surveyor should be exercised for valid reasons or if the report was found to be arbitrary.( Paragraph 20)

The Court observed that there was no valid reason for the Insurance Company to reject the first surveyor's report and no proof of arbitrariness. Successive appointments of surveyors were deemed unjustified, and their purpose appeared to be repudiating the claim.( Paragraph 24)

While dismissing the Insurance Company's appeal, the Court noted that the Commission failed to grant interest on the amount due to the Complainant. Accordingly, interest at 6% per annum was allowed from the date of filing the petition till the payment of the amount.( Paragraph 27)

Facts:

Respondent No. 1 filed a public interest litigation raising issues of transparency in the AAI. The High Court passed orders for the appointment of an Administrator and amendments to the AAI Constitution. The present appeals challenge the decision of the High Court and subsequent actions of the Administrator.

Issues:

Validity of the amendments made by the Administrator beyond the approved ones.

Legitimacy of the elections conducted by the Administrator based on the amended Constitution.

Compliance with the National Sports Code.

Held:

The court declared the Constitution of AAI amended only to the extent of four amendments approved by the court, treating it as amended by the court's order. The additional amendments by the Administrator were declared null and void. The elections conducted on the basis of the Administrator's Constitution were also declared null and void. The court directed reversion to the position after the four approved amendments and ordered fresh elections to be conducted by a Committee appointed by the court.

The appeals are allowed in the aforementioned terms. All the applications are disposed of.

Facts:

The respondent, serving as Deputy Commissioner, faced allegations of corruption related to a land acquisition matter. The complainant filed a case with the Lokayukta Police, leading to a series of events, including a spy camera recording of a meeting between the complainant and the respondent.

Issues:

Admissibility of electronic evidence without a certificate under Section 65B.

Validity of preliminary inquiry before lodging an FIR.

Whether the prosecution had enough evidence beyond electronic records.

Compliance with the principles of Section 239 regarding the discharge of the accused.

Held:

The failure to produce a certificate under Section 65B at the charge sheet stage is a curable defect. The necessity for the certificate arises when electronic records are presented as evidence during the trial.

The preliminary inquiry conducted before lodging an FIR was consistent with the decision in Lalita Kumari, as it aimed to ascertain whether the information disclosed a cognizable offence.

The High Court erred in concluding that the absence of a Section 65B certificate was fatal to the prosecution, overlooking other material on which the prosecution relied.

The trial court should proceed on the assumption that the material brought by the prosecution is true while evaluating whether the facts disclose the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. A mini-trial is not permitted at the discharge stage.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment. The order of the trial judge dismissing the discharge application is maintained.

Facts:

The appellant, Shree Shree Ram Janki Ji Asthan Tapovan Mandir, sought to transfer land belonging to the Deity as permitted by statutory provisions. However, the High Court of Jharkhand, in response to a Public Interest Litigation filed by Respondent No. 8, directed the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to investigate allegations against the government and the board governing the trust, claiming illegality in the transfer of Deity's property. The High Court cast doubt on the permission granted by state authorities, asserting fraudulent practices.

Issues:

Whether the Deity has the legal right to transfer its land.

Whether the High Court was justified in directing a CBI investigation based on allegations against the government and trust board.

Whether the High Court erred in disregarding statutory provisions permitting the transfer of trust property.

Held:

The Division Bench found the High Court's conclusion that the Deity could not transfer its land untenable. It emphasized the reliance on statutory provisions supporting the land transfer and criticized sweeping remarks against the government. The Court asserted that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering a CBI investigation into a civil dispute involving property transfer within the religious trust.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's order, and the writ petition was dismissed.

Facts:

The case pertains to the participation of an MP in a Panchayat Samiti's special meeting for a 'No Confidence Motion' against the Pramukh. The dispute arose regarding the interpretation of relevant sections, rules, and articles governing the composition and functioning of the Panchayat Samiti.

Issues:

Whether the MP, being an ex-officio member of the Panchayat Samiti, is entitled to participate and vote in the special meeting for a 'No Confidence Motion' against the Pramukh.

Held:

Constitutional Framework: The judgment begins by elucidating the constitutional framework regarding the composition of Panchayats, emphasizing the freedom of the State legislature to make laws in accordance with Article 243C. (Para 12-15)

Election of Chairperson: It clarifies that the chairperson of the Panchayat Samiti is elected by the elected members, distinguishing them from other persons mentioned in Article 243C(3). (Para 18)

Composition of Panchayat Samiti: Section 107(3) explicitly includes the MP as a member with the right to vote in the Panchayat Samiti meetings. (Para 16)

Regulation and Rules: The judgment delves into the Regulation and Rules, outlining the specific provisions for moving and carrying forward a 'No Confidence Motion.'(Para 21-23)

Quorum Requirement: The court emphasizes the quorum requirement of not less than two-thirds of the "total membership," including ex-officio members. (Para 24-25)

Who Can Vote on 'No Confidence Motion': It dismisses the notion that only directly elected members can vote, asserting that the law allows all members to participate in the process. (Para 26)

Inclusive Nature of Regulation: The judgment defends the inclusivity of the Regulation, expressly permitting all members, including those from Section 107(3), to participate and vote. (Para 28)

Conclusion: The court concludes by reiterating the statutory right of elected representatives, including the MP, to participate in and vote on a 'No Confidence Motion.'(Para 32)

Facts:

The case involved appeals filed against the High Court of Karnataka's order dated February 26, 2016, where a series of appeals were disposed of concerning the appellant (assessee) and the Commissioner of Income Tax (Revenue) under Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Issues:

The court was the failure of the High Court to frame specific questions of law as required by Section 260-A(3) of the Act.

Held:

The court, referring to a similar case (Civil Appeal No. 3968 of 2019), emphasized the distinction between questions proposed by the appellant for admission and questions framed by the court. It highlighted that the appeal is heard on merits only on the questions framed by the High Court. The court observed that if the High Court considered the appeal devoid of substantial questions of law, it should have explicitly recorded such findings. In the absence of this, the court concluded that the High Court did not adhere to the mandatory procedure prescribed in Section 260-A of the Act. The court allowed the appeals.

Facts:

The prosecution alleged that ten accused persons, armed with various weapons, attacked the complainant's son and the victim-deceased. After initial investigations, a report against only four accused was submitted, stating that the appellants were not present at the scene. Subsequent investigations also cleared the appellants. The Magistrate directed the release of the appellants, and the trial proceeded against the remaining accused. Later, the complainant filed an application under Section 319, asserting that the appellants were present during the incident.

Issues:

Whether the Magistrate was justified in summoning the appellants under Section 319 based on the complainant's application during the trial.

The impact of earlier discharge orders by the Magistrate on the subsequent summoning under Section 319.

Held:

During the trial, depositions of PW-1 and PW-2 were recorded. Their specific statements against the appellants, attributing a role to them in the incident, constituted evidence. The Magistrate, on application under Section 319, found a prima facie case and summoned the appellants. The High Court confirmed this decision.( Para 6.1)

The orders dated 01.09.2016 and 28.10.2016, regarding the discharge of appellants by the Magistrate, were not orders of discharge in stricto sensu. They pertained to discharging the appellants from custody. Therefore, the Magistrate retained the power to summon the appellants under Section 319, despite earlier discharge orders.( Para 7.10)

Before accepting a closure report, the Magistrate must issue notice to the complainant, allowing an opportunity to submit a protest application. This procedure ensures fairness and gives the complainant a chance to contest the closure report.( Para 8)

The statements of PW-1 and PW-2 during the trial constituted evidence. Even if the complainant was not given an opportunity to protest the non-filing of a charge sheet against the appellants, the trial court could summon them based on emerging evidence during the trial.( Para 9)

Facts:

The case involved a challenge to the amended Recruitment Rules equating the post of Principal, Grade ‘A’ (Senior Scale) with that of JCIF.

Issues:

The dissimilarity in the nature of duties, responsibilities, and powers exercised by officers holding the posts.

Held:

The High Court, relying on previous decisions, dismissed the writ petition, upholding the tribunal's decision to quash the amended rules.

The tribunal and the High Court failed to consider relevant factors that led to the amendment, including the concurrence of the UPSC and government deliberations.

The UPSC's conscious decision, considering pros and cons, amounted to a policy decision, rendering the tribunal's decision unjustified.

Duties of JCIF and Principal, Grade ‘A’ (Senior Scale) were found to be identical or similar, further justifying the amendment.

The impugned judgment of the High Court was quashed, and the order of the tribunal was set aside.

Facts:

The case involves a suit for title and permanent injunction based on a sale deed. The defendants claimed that the suit property had been part of a partition and fell into the share of the husband of defendant no.1 and father of defendant no.2 and 3. The trial court dismissed the suit, asserting collusion in executing a sham document. The first appellate authority upheld this decision.

Issues:

The admissibility of the partition deed and the authenticity of the sale deed. The trial court and the first appellate court found the sale deed to be nominal, while the High Court, in appeal, held that the partition deed required registration and, therefore, was inadmissible.

Held:

The jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 100 of the CPC, post the 1976 amendment, is confined to second appeals involving a substantial question of law. The substantial question framed by the High Court was not substantial at all. Both lower courts had given reasoned decisions based on evidence, and the High Court erred in re-appreciating evidence, which was impermissible under Section 100 of the CPC.

The father of defendants was not a signatory to the sale deed, making it not binding on him or his heirs. The sale deed was not acted upon, and even if it were registered, a defendant could challenge its validity. The High Court's interference with the findings of the lower courts on this matter was unwarranted.

The partition deed relied upon by the defendants was deemed a family arrangement and did not require registration. The execution of this document was established and proved by witnesses, including the plaintiff's admission of the oral partition. The High Court's finding on its inadmissibility was not justified.

The sale deed executed in favor of the plaintiff had discrepancies in the stated consideration, and both lower courts had found it to be sham. The High Court should not have interfered with these findings.