Facts:

The respondents filed a civil suit seeking partition of certain properties.

The Trial Court dismissed the suit, but the first Appellate Court allowed the appeal filed by the respondents and decreed the suit.

The appellants then filed a second appeal before the High Court, which summarily dismissed the appeal under Order 41 Rule 11 of the CPC.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's summary dismissal of the appeal under Order 41 Rule 11 of the CPC was justified.

Whether the High Court's judgment lacked reasoning and compliance with legal requirements.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's summary dismissal of the appeal without providing reasons and without addressing the submissions made by the appellants was not justified. The Court emphasized the importance of providing reasoned judgments, as mandated by legal provisions such as Section 100 and Order 41 Rule 31 of the CPC.

The Court further highlighted the necessity of addressing substantial questions of law in appellate proceedings. Therefore, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order, and remanded the case to the High Court for a fresh hearing in accordance with the law.

Facts:

The case concerns the fixation of seniority under the Madhya Pradesh Class III (Non-Ministerial) Forest Service Recruitment Rules, 1967.

The issue arose from the promotion of Foresters to the positions of Deputy Rangers and Forest Rangers, with concerns raised about postings in different circles affecting seniority.

Issues:

The promotion process to the post of Deputy Ranger and how postings in various circles influence seniority within the service.

There is also ambiguity regarding the rules governing selection and seniority fixation.

Held:

The Supreme Court emphasized that members of the same service should not gain accelerated promotions solely due to fortuitous postings, as this would unfairly disadvantage their seniors in higher positions within the same service.

However, due to the lack of clarity regarding the rules and the absence of assistance from the parties, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remitted the matter back to the High Court for reconsideration. The High Court was urged to expedite the proceedings and dispose of the matter within six months. The appeals were disposed of without imposing any costs.

Facts:

The appellant (Buyer) and respondent no. 2 (Seller) entered into an agreement of sale in 1986 for a property.

The agreement stipulated a sale consideration, a time period for completion of sale, and conditions regarding survey and boundaries.

The buyer filed a suit for specific performance after the seller failed to fulfill obligations under the agreement.

Issues:

Whether the High Court exceeded its appellate jurisdiction in reversing findings of fact?

Whether time was of the essence in the contract?

Whether the buyer adequately proved readiness and willingness for specific performance?

Whether granting specific performance would be inequitable?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by interfering with factual findings of the lower courts in the second appeal. (Para 9, 13, 16)

It was established that time was not the essence of the contract, and the buyer was ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. (Para 18, 20)

The Court emphasized the importance of proving readiness and willingness for specific performance, which was adequately done in this case. (Para 21)

The Court rejected the seller's contention that granting specific performance would be inequitable due to price escalation, stating that escalation of prices cannot be a ground for denying relief. (Para 23)

Facts:

The case revolves around the telecasting and broadcasting of live feed signals of cricket matches or other sporting events of national importance. The respondent no.3 and 4 shared these signals with Prasar Bharati, which raised questions regarding the retransmission of these signals by cable operators.

Issues:

Whether the live feed signals shared by the respondents with Prasar Bharati could be retransmitted by cable operators, considering the provisions of the relevant legislation.

Held:

The court interpreted Section 12(3)(c) of the Prasar Bharati Act, 1990, which enables Prasar Bharati to negotiate for the acquisition of programs and rights for broadcasting, and found that it pertains to broadcasting on its own terrestrial and DTH networks.

Regarding the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995, the court discussed its enactment to regulate cable television networks and ensure the dissemination of national issues through channels like Doordarshan.

Analyzing the Sports Broadcasting Signals (Mandatory Sharing with Prasar Bharati) Act, 2007, the court emphasized its objective to provide free-to-air access to sporting events of national importance and the obligation to share broadcasting signals with Prasar Bharati.

The court clarified that the obligation under the Sports Act, 2007, is limited to transmission on Prasar Bharati's terrestrial and DTH networks, excluding cable operators.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, affirming that the live feed signals shared with Prasar Bharati were not meant for retransmission by cable operators but for Prasar Bharati's own networks.

Facts:

The appellant, a public Trust, leased out two shops to the respondents.

Disputes arose regarding non-payment of rent and termination of tenancy.

Appellant filed suits for eviction and recovery of rent against the respondents.

The Trial Court decreed the suits in favor of the appellant, but the Appellate Court dismissed them due to the appellant Trust not being registered under the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959.

The issue revolved around the interpretation and applicability of Section 29 of the Act, which prohibits unregistered trusts from filing suits to enforce their rights.

Issues:

Whether the suits filed by the unregistered public Trust were competent under Section 29 of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959.

The jurisdiction of the Trial Court and the validity of its decree in light of the Trust's registration during the pendency of the appeal.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the suits filed by the unregistered public Trust were not competent under Section 29 of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959.

Once the Trust obtained registration during the pendency of the appeal, the bar under Section 29 no longer applied, and the Trial Court had jurisdiction to hear and decide the suits on merits.

The judgments of the lower courts were set aside, and the suits were remanded to the Trial Court for hearing and deciding them on merits.

The parties were given the liberty to amend their pleadings and submit additional documents, including the certificate of registration of the Trust.

The Trial Court was directed to decide the suits within six months, and the parties were instructed to appear before the Trial Court on a specified date.

Facts:

The case involved the interpretation of amendments made to the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Act, 1992, particularly the changes in the forum for the trial of offenses under the Act introduced by the SEBI (Amendment) Act, 2002, and the SEBI (Amendment) Act, 2014.

Issues:

Whether the changes in the forum for the trial of offenses under the SEBI Act introduced by the 2002 and 2014 amendments apply retrospectively to pending proceedings.

Whether the amendments affected the substantive rights of the accused, particularly regarding the right of revision.

The applicability of provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) to trials under the SEBI Act.

Held:

The change in the forum for trial introduced by the amendments to the SEBI Act in 2002 and 2014 operates retrospectively, affecting pending proceedings.

The amendments are procedural in nature and do not affect substantive rights, such as the right of revision.

The amendments explicitly specify the new forums for trial, and pending matters must be transferred accordingly, irrespective of when the offense occurred or when trial proceedings commenced.

The provisions of the CrPC regarding trial forums do not uniformly apply to trials under the SEBI Act.

Decision: The court affirmed that offenses under the SEBI Act, regardless of when they were committed or when trial proceedings commenced, would be tried in accordance with the amended provisions, either by a Court of Session or a Special Court, as specified in the relevant amendments.

Facts:

The respondent filed a Civil Suit (CS (Comm) No. 330 of 2016) against the appellant, seeking certain reliefs.

The defendants filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC, stating that the plaint disclosed no cause of action.

The impugned judgment held that while the plaint discloses no cause of action against certain directors, the suit is to continue against the company, and the defendant was barred from filing a written statement due to delay.

Issues:

Whether the plaint as a whole discloses a cause of action.

Whether the defendants should be allowed to file a written statement despite the delay.

Held:

The Supreme Court clarified the application of Order 7 Rule 11 and directed the continuation of the suit with specific instructions regarding the filing of the written statement. The key points of the decision are as follows:

Interpretation of Order 7 Rule 11: The Court emphasized that Order 7 Rule 11 applies to the plaint as a whole, and partial rejection of the plaint is not permitted under this rule.

Distinction from Order 6 Rule 16: The Court clarified that if only a portion of the plaint needs to be struck out, Order 6 Rule 16 applies, not Order 7 Rule 11. However, in this case, there were no grounds to apply Order 6 Rule 16.

Discretion under Order 14 Rule 2: The Court explained that under Order 14 Rule 2, the Court has discretion to deal with an issue of law as a preliminary issue, but this provision applies after issues are framed, not before.

Decision: The impugned judgment was set aside, and the defendants were granted eight weeks to file their written statement. The suit would then proceed to trial.

Facts:

On 19.11.2002, the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) intercepted Ms. Pushpa Lekhumal Tolani at the IGI Airport, suspecting her of carrying undeclared valuable goods.

Jewellery worth Rs. 1.27 crores was found, leading to a show-cause notice and confiscation order.

The respondent challenged these through a writ petition, arguing that the jewellery was personal effects under Baggage Rules 1998.

The High Court quashed the notice and order, deeming the jewellery as personal effects.

Issues:

Whether the show-cause notice and order were rightly quashed by the High Court.

Held:

No violation of Section 77 of the Customs Act as necessary declarations were made implicitly.

The jewellery was considered personal effects under Baggage Rules, as it was for personal use and intended to be taken out of India.

The proximity of the purchase date and intended use supported the respondent's claim.

No deliberate concealment was found; the respondent's travel to London for personal reasons was noted.

Legal restrictions on bringing back VAT-reclaimed items were absent.

The Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the respondent followed legal procedures and didn't violate customs laws. The appeal was dismissed. The Court also expunged any remarks against DRI from the High Court's judgment.

Facts:

Advertisements were issued in 2010 inviting applications for the selection of Constables and Sub-Inspectors of Police.

During the recruitment process, the State Government issued a circular on 11.05.2011, stipulating that candidates of SC/ST/BC, regardless of any concessions including age relaxation, would be migrated against general category vacancies if they scored higher than the last candidate of the general category.

General category candidates challenged the circular through writ petitions, contending that candidates availing age relaxation in reserved categories should not be migrated to unreserved vacancies.

Issues:

Whether the circular issued by the State Government on 11.05.2011 could be applied retroactively to the ongoing recruitment process.

Whether candidates availing age relaxation in reserved categories are eligible for migration to unreserved vacancies.

Held:

The circular of 11.05.2011 was issued during the recruitment process but could not be applied retroactively as the recruitment process had commenced prior to its issuance. The circular dated 24.06.2008, in force during the initial stages of recruitment, stipulated that reserved category candidates availing age relaxation were not eligible for migration to unreserved vacancies. Thus, the circular of 11.05.2011 could not be applied in the ongoing recruitment process. (Para 30, 39)

The subsequent circular dated 26.07.2017 reiterated the position provided by the circular dated 24.06.2008, affirming that candidates belonging to SC/ST/BC who availed age relaxation were not eligible for migration to unreserved vacancies. This circular reaffirmed the established position that such candidates are not entitled to be migrated. (Para 39)

Rule 7(1) of The Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1989 expressly provides for reservation of vacancies for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in accordance with government orders in force at the time of recruitment. As the recruitment commenced when the circular dated 24.06.2008 was in force, the subsequent circular dated 11.05.2011 cannot be applied to the ongoing recruitment process. (Para 46)

Candidates belonging to SC/ST/BC who availed age relaxation were not entitled to be migrated to unreserved vacancies. However, the State of Rajasthan unlawfully migrated such candidates, resulting in the displacement of candidates entitled to be selected against unreserved vacancies. The affected unreserved category candidates are entitled to appointment based on merit. (Para 48)

Decision:

The Court directed that unreserved candidates entitled to appointment against unreserved vacancies should be appointed based on merit within three months. If vacancies are unavailable, supernumerary posts may be created for the affected candidates, which may be terminated when vacancies arise. (Para 49)