Facts:

On April 28, 2008, the appellant-State invited recommendations for the promotion to the OAS Class-II cadre. The recruitment process was governed by the 1978 Rules and Regulations. The State decided to put the 2008 recruitment on hold until the completion of the recruitment process for 2001-2005. The restructuring of the Orissa Administrative Service took place in February 2009, abolishing the existing OAS Class-II posts and creating the Orissa Revenue Service Group 'B' cadre.

Issues:

Whether the contesting Respondents have a vested right for selection or promotion to OAS Class-II posts based on their forwarded names?

Did the contesting Respondents challenge the abolition of OAS Class-II posts and the creation of corresponding Orissa Revenue Service Group 'B' posts?

Can the contesting Respondents claim lien over the abolished OAS Class-II posts?

Held:

Contesting Respondents cannot claim a vested right for selection or promotion to OAS Class-II posts merely based on their forwarded names. The recruitment process did not proceed in accordance with the relevant regulations. The dismissal of the Special Leave Petition (S.L.P.) in limine does not imply a declaration of law or a binding precedent.

The contesting Respondents did not challenge the abolition of OAS Class-II posts or the creation of corresponding Orissa Revenue Service Group 'B' posts. Some participated in the proceedings for recruitment to the newly created cadre. Their appointments to Orissa Revenue Service Group 'B' posts were made prior to the repeal of the old rules and regulations.

Dismissal of the S.L.P. in limine does not constitute a declaration of law. The Division Bench's direction to appoint the contesting Respondents in the abolished cadre contradicts the law and is set aside.

Facts:

The respondent was appointed as a conductor on a contractual basis by the appellant. The contractual appointment allowed termination at any time without notice. The services were terminated on 21 March 2007. The respondent challenged the termination, citing a breach of natural justice.

Issues:

Whether the termination of the respondent's contractual appointment was in accordance with the terms of the agreement.

Whether there was a breach of the principle of natural justice.

Held:

The Court found that the nature of the appointment was purely contractual and allowed termination without notice. The terms of the agreement explicitly granted the appellant the right to terminate at any time. The Court distinguished the present case from Hari Ram Maurya v Union of India, where the removal was based on a charge of bribery. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and the writ petition was dismissed. No costs were awarded.

Facts:

Appellants challenged the High Court's orders allowing candidates with research and development experience in drugs to be considered for the post.

Dispute arose over the interpretation of essential and desirable qualifications mentioned in the advertisements dated 04.01.2012 and 31.03.2015.

Issues:

Whether candidates with research and development experience can be considered eligible for the post of Assistant Commissioner (Drugs) and Drug Inspectors.

The interpretation of essential and desirable qualifications as per the advertisements.

Held:

The essential qualifications for the post are at the discretion of the employer, and the court cannot reinterpret them.

Desirable qualifications do not automatically confer eligibility; they are preferences.

Research experience in a research and development laboratory does not equate to essential eligibility for the post.

The experience of testing in a research and development laboratory is different from the testing carried out in the manufacturing process.

The preference clause means additional weightage for candidates with research experience, not automatic eligibility.

The Court set aside the High Court's orders and allowed the appeals.

Facts:

The appellant, Ganesan, was declared entitled to Ambalam right in his village by the Joint Commissioner of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Board. The third respondent filed an appeal under Section 69 of the Act, accompanied by a delay condonation application for a delay of 266 days. The Commissioner condoned the delay. The appellant challenged the order condoning the delay through a writ petition.

Issues:

The applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in appeal proceedings before the Commissioner, and whether the Commissioner could be considered a court under the statutory scheme of the Act, 1959.

Held:

The court held that the Commissioner, while hearing an appeal under Section 69 of the Act, is not a court as defined in Section 6(7). The Commissioner is an appointed authority entrusted with various functions, including hearing appeals.( Paragraph 15)

Section 70 of the Act further provides that any party aggrieved by the Commissioner's order under Section 69 can file a suit in the court. The Commissioner is not considered a court under the statutory scheme.( Paragraph 16-17)

The judgment clarifies that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act applies only to suits, appeals, and applications to be filed in a court and not before statutory authorities like the Commissioner.( Paragraph 54)

The court decided that Section 29(2) cannot be invoked concerning filing suits, appeals, and applications before statutory authorities. Consequently, the Commissioner cannot condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.( Paragraph 55)

The court emphasized that a special or local law can determine the applicability of any provision of the Limitation Act, including Section 5. The Act, 1959, does not indicate an intention to apply Section 5.( Paragraph 56)

Section 115 of the Act, dealing with limitation, only provides for the computation of limitation, excluding the time for obtaining a certified copy. The judgment concluded that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable as per the scheme of the Act, 1959.( Paragraph 63)

Facts:

The petitioner, Federation of Obstetrics and Gynecological Societies of India (FOGSI), challenged the constitutional validity of Section 23(2) of the Act, contending that it presumes guilt before conviction and violates the fundamental right under Article 21. Additionally, the petitioner sought relief regarding paperwork anomalies, asserting violations of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and 21.

Issues:

Constitutional validity of Section 23(2) of the Act.

Decriminalization of paperwork anomalies under the Act.

Held:

The court underscored that Section 23(2) is not an isolated provision but operates in conjunction with other Act provisions. Dilution of this section, which penalizes medical practitioners violating the Act, would compromise the Act's fundamental purpose of curbing female foeticide. The court emphasized that the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 is not a mere formality and must be actively safeguarded through stringent provisions.( Para 1-23)

In scrutinizing Form 'F,' the court highlighted its significance in ensuring compliance with the Act. The court dismissed the petitioner's assertion that Form 'F' is merely clerical, emphasizing that it is a vital tool for overseeing the usage of ultrasound machines and regulating the Act's objectives. Incomplete Form 'F' not only raises doubts about the medical practitioner's conduct but also poses a severe threat to the Act's effectiveness in preventing gender-based prenatal practices.( Para 24-58)

The court rejected the petitioner's plea to read down Section 4(3), emphasizing the mandatory nature of maintaining records. The court reiterated that non-maintenance is not a trivial clerical lapse but a violation of the Act's core provisions. Section 4(3) and its proviso reflect the pivotal role records play in preventing sex-determination, with any deficiency amounting to a contravention of other Act sections.( Para 59-77)

Upholding the validity of Section 23(1) and Section 23(2), the court justified these provisions as reasonable restrictions. The court highlighted that the suspension of registration under Section 23(2) serves as a deterrent against potential violators. In emphasizing the gravity of female foeticide and its impact on the overall sex ratio, the court found these provisions necessary and not violative of the right to equality or the right to practice any profession.( Para 78-94)

The court concluded that any dilution of the Act's provisions, particularly Section 23, would defeat its fundamental purpose of preventing female foeticide. Such dilution would relegate the right to life of the girl child, enshrined under Article 21, to a mere formality. The court reaffirmed the Act's status as a social welfare legislation designed to rectify the skewed sex ratio in India.( Para 95)

Facts:

The case revolves around an incident on 23.11.1997, where accused persons, involved in a land dispute, allegedly fired shots at the complainant party during a confrontation, resulting in death and injuries.

Issues:

Identification discrepancies and contradictions in witness statements, along with doubts about the recovered weapons, raised questions about the prosecution's case.

The High Court specifically questioned the identity of accused No.2-Kalusinh.

Held:

The trial court convicted accused No.1-Ashok Singh and accused No.2-Kalu Singh, but the High Court acquitted accused No.2, citing doubts about his identity.

Contradictions in witness statements, uncertainties in weapon recovery, and lack of clarity on the type of firearm used raised reasonable doubts.

The High Court's decision to acquit accused No.2 was deemed a plausible view, not warranting interference.

The appeal by the State of Gujarat was dismissed.

Facts:

TPC, the distribution licensee for the entire Mumbai, supplied electricity to BSES/REL, a distribution licensee for the suburbs of Mumbai, from 1998 to 2006.

Standby charges were part of the tariff paid by BSES/REL to TPC. TPC, in turn, recovered standby charges from its customers.

Government of Maharashtra ordered BSES/REL to pay TPC Rs.3.5 crores per month as standby charges.

Dispute arose over the quantum of standby charges payable by BSES/REL to TPC.

Issues:

Disagreement on the quantum of standby charges. TPC claimed a 50:50 sharing ratio; MERC and APTEL decided on 23:77 ratio for BSES/REL and TPC, respectively.

Held:

Standby facility was provided by TPC in case of power failure in its generation of 1777 MW. BSES/REL purchased electricity from TPC between 29% to 37%, and standby charges were included in the tariff.

Committee formed by the Government of Maharashtra stipulated Rs.3.5 crores per month as standby charges payable by BSES/REL to TPC.

Principles of Agreement settled the basis for payment, and MERC had the authority to adjudicate disputes under the Electricity Regulatory Commission Act, 1998.

APTEL upheld the decisions of MERC, determining the ratio of standby charges as 23:77 for BSES/REL and TPC.

Majority opinion accepted that 90% of the time, energy was drawn by BSES/REL from TPC, justifying the 23:77 ratio. TPC's claim for a 50:50 sharing ratio was rejected.

Implementation of APTEL's order was not stayed, and the plea of non-implementation by TPC was not accepted. The order had been worked out, and the corresponding liability had been factored into tariffs.

FACTS:

Farid Ahmad Tak, a Junior Engineer, faced corruption charges.

A Committee, chaired by the Chief Secretary, recommended his compulsory retirement under Article 226(2) of Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services Regulations.

The decision was challenged in the High Court, arguing it relied solely on the criminal case and neglected performance records.

The Single Judge ruled in favor of Tak, questioning the validity of the retirement order.

The State appealed to the Division Bench.

ISSUES:

Was Tak's compulsory retirement solely based on a criminal case, without considering his performance records?

Did the decision align with the principles of Baikuntha Nath Das and relevant regulations?

HELD:

The Division Bench affirmed the Single Judge's decision, stating that the retirement decision relied heavily on the criminal case and ignored performance records.

The State appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing public interest and financial loss due to Tak's actions.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, finding that the High Court misunderstood key facts and principles.

The case is remitted to the Division Bench for a fresh look, as the basic premise and regulatory perspective were not adequately considered.

REFERRED CASES:

Baikuntha Nath Das and Another vs. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada and Another, (1992)2 SCC 299

M/s. Rup Diamonds and others vs. Union of India & Ors, (1989) 2 SCC 356

State of Gujarat and another vs. Suryakant Chunilal Shah, (1999) 1 SCC 529

Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association vs. Union of India and another, (1989) 4 SCC 187

Yogendra Narayan Chowdhury and others vs. Union of India and others, (1996) 7 SCC 1

Facts:

The Complainant, an industrial unit, suffered a fire incident and claimed Rs. 54,93,865 under a fire insurance policy.

Three surveyors were appointed successively, with varying assessments of the claim.

The Insurance Company repudiated the claim based on the third surveyor's report, alleging fraud and manipulation.

Issues:

Validity of successive appointments of surveyors.

Acceptance of the first surveyor's report and subsequent repudiation based on the third surveyor's findings.

Held:

The Court scrutinized whether the Insurance Company had valid reasons or identified inherent defects in the first surveyor's report. It emphasized that the right to appoint another surveyor should be exercised for valid reasons or if the report was found to be arbitrary.( Paragraph 20)

The Court observed that there was no valid reason for the Insurance Company to reject the first surveyor's report and no proof of arbitrariness. Successive appointments of surveyors were deemed unjustified, and their purpose appeared to be repudiating the claim.( Paragraph 24)

While dismissing the Insurance Company's appeal, the Court noted that the Commission failed to grant interest on the amount due to the Complainant. Accordingly, interest at 6% per annum was allowed from the date of filing the petition till the payment of the amount.( Paragraph 27)