Facts:

The appellant, M/s Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd., entered into contracts with the Public Health and Engineering Department (PHED) of the State Government for providing and laying pipelines for water supply schemes.

Dispute arose regarding the taxability of these contracts under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954.

The High Court affirmed findings that the contracts were divisible and subject to sales tax, based on the substantial value of materials supplied by the appellant.

Issues:

Whether the contracts entered into by the appellant were divisible under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954.

Whether the imposition of tax and penalty under Section 7AA of the Act was justified.

Held:

The Court held that the contracts in question were indeed divisible, and the imposition of tax and penalty was justified under Section 7AA of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954. This conclusion was based on the finding that a substantial part of the contract value pertained to materials supplied by the appellant, which were subject to sales tax.

The Court distinguished the present case from the precedent cited by the appellant, emphasizing that the issue at hand was divisibility rather than classification as a works contract. This interpretation aligned with the legal principles established in previous cases such as Larsen and Toubro Limited v. State of Karnataka and Kone Elevator India Private Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu.

Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the findings of the lower authorities, confirming the taxability of the contracts under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954.

Facts:

The case stemmed from the history of illegal mining and environmental damage in Karnataka, leading to the intervention of the Court and the establishment of a Monitoring Committee for the sale of illegally extracted iron ore.

Various stakeholders, including petitioners, mining companies, and the State of Karnataka, presented differing opinions on the proposed changes to the sale mechanism.

Issues:

Whether the existing policy of selling iron ore through the Monitoring Committee's e-auction system should be replaced with alternative mechanisms proposed by the Central Empowered Committee and the State of Karnataka.

Held:

The Court concluded that the situation had not yet reached a point where the existing system of sale through the Monitoring Committee could be replaced. It emphasized the need to continue with the current system until significant progress was made in related aspects, such as environmental restoration and regulation of mining activities.

The application seeking to bypass the Monitoring Committee's e-auction system was rejected, and the Court declined to accept the suggestions put forth by the Central Empowered Committee and the State of Karnataka. I.A. No.248 accordingly is disposed of in the above terms.

Facts:

The case involves a challenge to Rule 1.5(1) of the Demobilized Armed Forces Personnel (Reservation of Vacancies in the Himachal Pradesh State Non-Technical Services) Rules, 1972, which provides benefits for ex-servicemen in terms of seniority and pay in civil employment based on their past service in the armed forces. The challenge pertains to whether such benefits should be extended only to ex-servicemen who joined the armed forces during Emergency periods or if they should also apply to those who joined during peacetime.

Issues:

The justification for providing benefits based on past service in the armed forces, the distinction between ex-servicemen who joined during Emergency periods and those who joined during peacetime, and the proper implementation of the rules regarding reservations for ex-servicemen.

Held:

The Court upheld the validity of the rules providing benefits to ex-servicemen but restricted these benefits to those who joined the armed forces during Emergency periods. This holding is consistent with the rationale that individuals who join during Emergency periods make greater sacrifices compared to those who join during peacetime.

The Court emphasized the need for a clear rationale and reasonable limits in providing reservations and benefits to ex-servicemen. While reserving a quota for ex-servicemen is permissible within reasonable limits and does not violate the equality provision of the Constitution, departure from the normal rule of seniority should be justified by weighty reasons.

Ex-servicemen who joined during Emergency periods are considered to have made greater sacrifices and are entitled to benefits in terms of seniority. However, those who joined during peacetime are not entitled to the same benefits, as they joined the armed forces as a profession like any other.

The judgment also addressed the issue of proper implementation of the rules, ensuring that ex-servicemen are given the option to accept reserved vacancies at the time of initial appointment.

Facts:

M/s. Aneja Consultancy, founded in 1984, faced financial troubles, leading to the inability to repay deposits made by various individuals.

Respondent No. 2 deposited Rs. 86,000 with the company in June/July 1987.

Respondent No. 2 lodged an FIR on May 30, 1998, against Samir Sahay and his father under Section 420 IPC, alleging fraudulent activities related to depositing money with the company.

Samir Sahay filed an application for discharge, stating that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute him under Section 420 IPC.

Issues:

Whether the ingredients of Section 420 IPC were established in the case against Samir Sahay.

Whether Samir Sahay fraudulently or dishonestly induced the complainant to deposit money.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the ingredients of Section 420 IPC were not established in the case against Samir Sahay. The Court emphasized the necessity to establish fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of inducement for the offense of cheating. Since there was no evidence to suggest such fraudulent intention on Samir Sahay's part, the Court allowed the appeal. The Court set aside the orders of the Chief Judicial Magistrate and the High Court, discharging Samir Sahay from the charges under Section 420 IPC in Case No. 545 of 2002.

Facts:

UDA granted leasehold rights to USO for constructing residential houses.

IISCO (a subsidiary of SAIL) was ordered to be wound up, and its assets, including the leasehold rights, were auctioned by the Official Liquidator.

The appellant company purchased the leasehold rights.

UDA later renewed the lease agreement for another thirty-year term and subsequently converted the leasehold rights into freehold rights.

The renewal and conversion were challenged, leading to the present appeals.

Issues:

Whether the renewal of the lease and its subsequent conversion to freehold were valid.

What considerations should guide decisions regarding lease renewal by a public authority.

Whether third-party purchasers' rights should be protected.

Held

The provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Vikasit Bhoomiyo, Griho, Bhavano Tatha Anya Sanrachanao Ka Vyayan Niyam, 1975, allow for lease transfer with renewal provisions, but renewal is not an absolute right. It is subject to discretion guided by public interest and fairness .

The original purpose of the lease was for constructing a residential colony, not for commercial exploitation. The appellant company's acquisition of the leasehold interest did not automatically entitle it to renewal .

The decision to renew the lease must consider various factors, including the original purpose of the lease, fulfillment of obligations, market value of the land, and revenue generation for the development authority. UDA's decision to renew the lease without due consideration of these factors was flawed.

The subsequent conversion of the land to freehold was deemed invalid due to underlying fraud in the transaction (Para 9).

Protection was granted for third-party purchasers who had executed registered sale deeds prior to the judgment, while the relief was suitably molded to ensure fairness.

Decision: The judgment of the High Court was upheld, with directions to protect the rights of genuine third-party purchasers. The relief granted was in line with the equitable principles.

Facts:

The dispute revolved around agricultural land claimed by the plaintiff based on inheritance rights and by the defendants based on a purported Will.

The Trial Court granted the suit partially in favor of the plaintiff, awarding symbolic possession due to a tenant's occupation.

Both parties appealed to the District Judge, who affirmed the Trial Court's decision.

Subsequently, second appeals were filed before the High Court by both parties.

Issues:

Whether the High Court properly framed substantial questions of law before hearing the second appeals.

Whether the High Court's failure to do so rendered its judgment legally unsustainable.

Held:

The Supreme Court found fault with the High Court's judgment for not properly framing substantial questions of law. It emphasized the necessity of doing so under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Referring to the case of Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by L.Rs., the Court reiterated that the existence of substantial questions of law is a prerequisite for the exercise of jurisdiction in second appeals.

Since the High Court did not fulfill this requirement, the Supreme Court set aside its judgment and remanded the case for fresh consideration. The High Court was directed to formulate substantial questions of law and decide the appeals accordingly, in accordance with the law laid down in Santosh Hazari case.

Facts:

The case originated from actions taken by the Bar Council of India to identify fake lawyers within its members or those not associated with any Bar Association.

The Court directed the transfer of all related matters pending in different High Courts to the Supreme Court for hearing.

Issues:

The petitioners sought immediate elections for State Bar Councils due to the expiration of terms, while the Bar Council of India emphasized the importance of verifying candidates to eliminate fake lawyers.

Held:

The Court provided a final opportunity for advocates to rectify defective applications and submit complete forms for degree verification within 15 days.

A timeline was outlined for verification of applications by State Bar Councils and the declaration of election schedules by the Bar Council of India.

All State Bar Councils were directed to conclude proceedings by December 31, 2017, and submit replies to the Bar Council of India for a status report.

A retired Supreme Court Judge was requested to supervise the verification process, with all parties directed to provide full assistance and cooperation.

Facts:

FIR No.9/2015 was registered against 27 individuals by the Anti-Corruption Bureau and Economic Offences Wing.

Chargesheet was filed against 16 persons, including senior officers of the Chhattisgarh State Civil Supplies Corporation.

Three of the accused, Girish Sharma, Arvind Singh Dhruv, and Jeet Ram Yadav, were cited as witnesses in the chargesheet.

Some accused applied to summon these three individuals as accused, which was initially rejected by the trial court but allowed by the High Court.

The appellants argued that Section 306 Cr.P.C. was not applicable and that the decision to summon them as accused was unjustified.

Issues:

Whether the decision to summon the appellants as accused was justified.

Whether the procedure under Section 306 Cr.P.C. was the only option available.

Whether the decision to cite the appellants as witnesses binds the court.

Held:

The decision of the High Court was based solely on the existence of material against the appellants, without considering the larger interest of justice.

The decision erroneously assumed that Section 306 Cr.P.C. was the only procedure available to cite an accomplice as a witness.

The court has discretion to decide whether to take cognizance, considering all relevant considerations, including the utility of the appellants as witnesses.

The matter was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration, instructing not to consider statements made by the appellants as proposed witnesses.

The High Court was directed to consider the stage of the trial and expedite proceedings.

Criminal Appeal Nos. 939-940 of 2017 were disposed of in the same terms as Criminal Appeal Nos. 941-942 of 2017.

SLP(Crl.)No.5563 of 2017 was dismissed as withdrawn, and T.P.(Crl.)No.241 of 2017 was dismissed for lack of merit.

Facts:

The case involves an appeal against a judgment passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital concerning the admissibility of a demarcation report created during conciliation proceedings between the parties.

Issues:

Whether the demarcation report made during conciliation proceedings is admissible as evidence in judicial proceedings.

Held:

The court emphasized the broad scope of confidentiality under Section 75 and applied the "relating to" test from previous judgments to establish that the demarcation report falls within the realm of conciliation proceedings (Para 5).

It further clarified that the demarcation report, having its genesis in conciliation proceedings, cannot be admitted as evidence, as doing so would compromise the confidentiality essential for achieving the objectives of conciliation (Para 7).

The court distinguished a Canadian Supreme Court judgment cited by the respondent, highlighting that the facts of the present case are different, and the demarcation report is inseparable from conciliation proceedings (Para 8).

The appeal was allowed, overturning the judgment of the High Court, with the provision that the respondent may introduce a separate demarcation report obtained from authorities as evidence (Para 9).

The appeal is disposed of accordingly (Para 10).