Facts:

Six accused initially tried for the offense.

Two accused acquitted; four accused (appellants) convicted under Section 302/34 of I.P.C.

High Court affirmed Trial Court's view of circumstantial evidence.

High Court reversed the observation that a witness (PW-5) was an eyewitness.

Issues:

Whether circumstances are enough to establish guilt under Section 302/34 of I.P.C. for all appellants?

Evidence of common intention or prior meeting of minds lacking.

Medical evidence showing fatal injuries caused by a blunt weapon.

Held:

Prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence.

No evidence of common intention or prior meeting of minds among appellants.

No evidence that appellants Bikash Bora, Atul Bora, and Haren Rautia caused fatal injuries.

Appellant Dipankar Bora implicated due to recovery of the weapon from his house.

Dipankar Bora found guilty; conviction under Section 302 of I.P.C. upheld.

Offense not converted to Section 304(II) of I.P.C.

Three appellants acquitted due to lack of evidence, Dipankar Bora's conviction sustained.

Facts:

The respondents initiated an Execution Petition seeking delivery of possession of Schedule ‘B’ property. The appellants, claiming to be lessees, filed an application in the District Court for a declaration of their entitlement to possession. The District Court granted their application. However, the High Court dismissed the claim, and a subsequent Special Leave Petition (SLP) was also dismissed.

The appellants, undeterred, commenced fresh proceedings seeking directions for compensation for improvements over the property before delivery of possession. This application was dismissed by the District Court, leading to the appellants' contention that their claims were not subjected to proper scrutiny.

Issues:

Whether the claims asserted by the appellants were barred by the principle of constructive res judicata, considering their failure to raise the claims during the earlier Execution Application.

Held:

The appellants, although strangers to the decree, had the right to adjudicate their claim to remain in possession independently. They were entitled to assert their claim under Order XXI Rule 97 even prior to dispossession. The court had the authority to adjudicate all related questions under Order XXI Rule 101, leading to a decree under Rule 103.

The appellants' present claim for compensation under Section 4(1) of the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, 1958, was closely linked to their earlier claim to remain in possession. The failure to assert this claim during the initial Execution Application invoked the deeming fiction in Explanation IV to Section 11, applying the principle of constructive res judicata.

The provisions of Order XXI Rules 97 to 103 constituted a comprehensive code, offering the sole remedy for both parties to a suit and strangers to a decree. Failing to raise all pertinent issues during the earlier Execution Application would lead to a multiplicity of proceedings and undue delay in realizing the fruits of the decree.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's conclusion that the claims advanced by the appellants were barred by the principle of constructive res judicata.

FACTS:

The appellant, a "Kanoongo/Patwari" in Didihat, Uttarakhand, was charged under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The charge was based on accepting illegal gratification from Gopal Singh in 1985, promising not to arrest or implicate him in a pending criminal case.

ISSUES:

Conviction under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Quantum of the jail sentence imposed by the lower courts.

HELD:

The court refers to Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, which allows imprisonment from one to seven years and provides for the court to impose a sentence of less than one year for special reasons recorded in writing.( Para 14)

Citing the case of K.P. Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), the court emphasizes the factors to consider in determining the adequacy of a sentence, including the reformative, deterrent, and punitive aspects, the age and health of the accused, and the nature of the offense.( Para 18)

The court lists eight special reasons justifying a reduction in the sentence, including the age of the appellant (78 years), the 34-year pendency of the case, the appellant's health conditions, the minimal bribe amount, and the trauma suffered.( Para 20)

The court exercises its powers under the proviso to Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, altering the jail sentence to the time already undergone (1 month and 10 days) and enhances the fine from Rs. 3000 to Rs. 10,000.( Para 22)

The appellant is not required to undergo any further jail sentence, provided he pays the fine amount of Rs. 10,000 within three months. If Rs. 3000 is already paid, he must deposit Rs. 7000.( Para 24)

REFERRED CASES:

K.P. Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2015) 15 SCC 497.

Facts:

Respondent No.1 filed a Civil Suit in 2013 under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, claiming wrongful dispossession from a shop.

Appellant denied the claims, asserting tenancy since 2004.

Landlady (Respondent No.2) filed a statement supporting the appellant's tenancy.

Trial court dismissed an Order 39, Rule 1 application for injunction, finding in favor of the appellant.

The appellate court affirmed, emphasizing the tenancy agreement and lack of evidence supporting dispossession.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's revisionary jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC can be invoked against interlocutory orders post the 1999 amendment.

Whether the High Court, in exercising revisionary powers, can ignore the established guidelines for granting interlocutory injunctions.

Held:

The proviso to Section 115 CPC, added in 1999, restricts the High Court's revisionary powers against interlocutory orders.

Revisional jurisdiction is to correct jurisdictional errors only. Errors of fact or law, unless affecting the court's jurisdiction, are not grounds for revision.

The judgment deviated from established legal principles and the limitations imposed by Section 115 CPC.

A Section 6 suit being a summary proceeding, the trial court is directed to dispose of the case within six months.

Decision: The impugned judgment is set aside, and the judgments of the lower courts are restored. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

An altercation took place on October 8, 2003, leading to the respondent shooting the victim with a firearm, resulting in bleeding injuries. The complaint highlighted a longstanding dispute between the parties over a love marriage and a disc cable connection business.

Issues:

The nature of injuries and whether they were grievous or life-threatening, impacting the applicability of Section 307 of the Penal Code.

Held:

The judgment emphasizes that proof of grievous or life-threatening hurt is not essential for an offense under Section 307. It cites various precedents, including State of Maharashtra v Balram Bama Patil, to establish that the intention of the accused can be deduced from surrounding circumstances, not solely relying on the severity of injuries.

Decision: The High Court's judgment is set aside, and the Trial Court's order of conviction under Section 307, along with a sentence of three years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 1000, is restored. The appeal by the State is allowed, and the respondent is directed to surrender to serve the sentence.

Facts:

Appellant filed a private complaint alleging the commission of an offence under Section 193 of the IPC against respondents based on false affidavits filed in a contempt case.

Magistrate took cognizance, and the High Court set aside the order, stating the need for prior court complaint as per Section 195 of the Cr.P.C.

Issues:

Whether the Magistrate's cognizance based on a private complaint under Section 193 of the IPC was valid?

Applicability of Section 195(1)(b)(i) and Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Cr.P.C. in the context of forgery committed outside the court.

Held:

The offences under Section 195(1)(b)(i) and Section 195(1)(b)(ii) are distinct. The former relates to false evidence and offences against public justice, while the latter pertains to offences concerning a document produced in court.

Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. mandates prosecution under Section 195(1)(b) to be initiated only with the sanction of the court under whose proceedings the offence was allegedly committed.

Private complaints are barred in cases under Section 193 IPC, and the procedure under Section 195 Cr.P.C. is mandatory.

The case falls under Section 195(1)(b)(i), and the Magistrate erred in taking cognizance based on a private complaint.

The High Court rightly set aside the Magistrate's order, and the appeal is disposed of.

Facts:

The plaintiffs alleged attempted encroachment by the defendants on their land. The Trial Court dismissed the suit, but the First Appellate Court remitted additional issues for finding on the encroachment, directing the Trial Court to appoint a Local Commissioner for demarcation.

Issues:

Whether the Local Commissioner's failure to follow applicable instructions for demarcation justifies the High Court's dismissal of the entire suit?

Held:

The Court emphasizes that irregularities in the Local Commissioner's report should result in discarding the report and necessitate a fresh one. The flaw itself should not nullify the appointment of the Local Commissioner or lead to the dismissal of the suit.( Para 16)

The Court disapproves of the High Court's approach in dismissing the suit outright after rejecting the Commissioner's report. The plaintiffs presented oral and documentary evidence, overlooked by the High Court.( Para 17)

For a just determination, the Court decides to set aside the High Court's judgment, restore the suit, and issue a fresh Commission. The Trial Court should reconsider the suit, keeping in mind the observations made.( Para 18)

Facts:

On 15 June 2004, MoEF issued guidelines regulating the diversion of forest land for non-forest purposes.

On 7 March 2008, the Government of Tamil Nadu approved the diversion of forest land for the construction of an intake well for drinking water purposes.

The National Green Tribunal received a complaint alleging the misuse of water for industrial purposes instead of the approved drinking water purposes.

Issues:

Whether the diversion of forest land for drinking water purposes was misused for industrial purposes.

Compliance with Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, and MoEF guidelines.

Held:

The Tribunal directed the TWAD Board to prohibit the use of water for industrial purposes and clarified the prohibition was only for industrial units.

The Court restored the position as per the interim order of the Tribunal, allowing the supply of water for industrial purposes, subject to fully meeting drinking water requirements.

The Collector was directed to monitor the decision to release water for industrial purposes, ensuring no compromise on drinking water and irrigation needs.

A joint meeting of the State Government and TWAD Board was ordered to resolve the proposal under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980.

The appeals were disposed of accordingly.

FACTS:

The petitioners, representing PTOs/HGOs, challenged certain eligibility conditions and provisions in the Haj Policy 2019-2023.

The Government of India, following a detailed process and consultation, formulated the Haj Policy, taking into account suggestions from stakeholders.

ISSUES:

Dispute over eligibility conditions and provisions in the Haj Policy.

Grievances raised by PTOs/HGOs regarding the financial criteria, documentation requirements, and other aspects of the Policy.

HELD:

The judgment emphasized the significance of the Haj pilgrimage for the Muslim community, highlighting the regulatory measures implemented by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the bilateral agreement between India and Saudi Arabia.

The Court acknowledged the grievances of PTOs/HGOs and detailed the modifications made in the Haj Policy, including the removal of certain eligibility conditions and simplification of documentation.

The judgment highlighted the exhaustive process of formulating the Policy, including invitations for suggestions, comments, and a mid-term review provision after two years.

The Court rejected the challenge to the eligibility criteria for HGO categories, emphasizing the importance of both experience and financial strength for PTOs, particularly given the responsibility of arranging various aspects of the pilgrimage.

The judgment underscored the limited scope of judicial review in policy matters, citing precedents that established the court's reluctance to interfere with policy decisions unless they are against the law or manifestly arbitrary.

REFERRED CASES:

Benett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, (1972) 2 SCC 788.

Maharashtra State Board of Secondary & Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27

State of Madhya Pradesh v. Nandlan Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566.

Union of India and Others v. Rafique Shaikh Bhikan and Another, (2013) 4 SCC 699.