Facts:

The case involves a civil appeal (No. 1577 of 2019) arising from a service law matter related to the promotion of C. Girija and others. The notification inviting applications for filling up of 05 posts under the 30% LDCE quota, the declaration of the panel on 09.01.2001, and subsequent events form the factual backdrop. C. Girija, a general category candidate, sought the inclusion of her name in the panel for promotion as APO.

Issues:

The timeliness of C. Girija's claim for inclusion in the promotion panel.

Legality of the notification regarding the reserved vacancy.

Tribunal and High Court's jurisdiction in entertaining the applicant's claim.

Held:

The claim for inclusion in the panel, first raised on 25.09.2007 after more than six and a half years, is deemed stale. The filing of a representation does not provide a fresh cause of action. The delay and laches persist even though the representation received a reply from Railways on 27.12.2007. The tribunal and High Court overlooked the staleness of the claim.

C. Girija participated in subsequent selections under the 30% LDCE quota, including the one in 2005 where she was declared unsuccessful. The delay and laches are not erased by filing a representation in 2007 regarding the 2001 selection. The tribunal and High Court should not have entertained the stale claim.

The tribunal and High Court's observations regarding vacancies after the relevant period are clarified. The Railways' explanation for the bifurcation of vacancies and determination of reserved vacancies is deemed plausible. The applicant, having participated in the selection process, cannot challenge the bifurcation after the fact.

C. Girija retired on 31.05.2015, and there is no impediment to computing and paying her retirement benefits. The delay in payment warrants compensation through interest. Respondent Nos.1 to 4 are directed to determine and pay the retirement benefits within the stipulated period with an 8% p.a. interest from 01.07.2015.

Facts:

Appellants were employees under the Kerala Water Authority.

Three pay revisions occurred on 13 February 1990, 24 April 1995, and 19 August 1999.

An intermediate post of Senior Operator was created during the third pay revision, altering the pay scales of Head Operators.

The creation of the intermediate post was challenged in a writ petition, leading to a Single Judge's decision.

Issues:

Legality of creating an intermediate post without amending the Special Rules.

Impact of the abolition of the intermediate post on the pay scales of Head Operators.

Held:

The High Court held that the creation of the intermediate post required a statutory amendment and couldn't be done administratively.

The State Government, complying with the judgment, deleted the post and restored the pay scales of Operators, Head Operators, and Mechanical Superintendents.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, and no costs are awarded. The High Court directed no recoveries to be made.

Facts:

Appellant unit's industrial effluents, after partial treatment at another company (JETL), are let into the Water Supply and Sewerage Board's sewer line.

The Board levies sewerage cess on the appellant based on Section 55 and Clause 16 of the agreement between the appellant and the Board.

Issues:

The appellant contests the levy, arguing it is not directly connected to the Board's sewer line.

The appellant claims it is covered under the proviso to Section 55.

Held:

Section 55 of the Act contemplates the levy of sewerage cess on the occupier, irrespective of whether the area is served by the Board's sewerage system.

The appellant, being an occupier of a "non-domestic premise," is liable to pay sewerage cess as it discharges sewage effluents into the Board's sewer line.

The agreement with JETL is an internal contractual arrangement, and the appellant remains liable for statutory sewerage cess.

The appellant's effluents, after partial treatment at JETL, are ultimately let into the Board's sewer line, justifying the imposition of sewerage cess.

The proviso to Section 55 does not exempt the appellant, as its premises are ultimately connected to the Board's sewer system.

Decision: The appeals are dismissed, upholding the levy of sewerage cess on the appellant.

The appellant is directed to pay any arrears of sewerage cess with interest as per the stipulated period.

Facts:

The settlement between the employer-Board and the workers stipulated the revision of Dearness Allowance rates twice a year based on the All India Consumer Price Index Numbers. The State Government, facing financial constraints, revised the rates later than the Central Government. The employer-Board adopted the State Government's decision in revising Dearness Allowance rates.

Issues:

The workers' union sought direction to align Dearness Allowance payments with those of Central Government employees, challenging the Board's decision to adopt the State Government's rates.

Held:

The payment of Dearness Allowance was governed by the 1998 Wage Settlement and Board Proceedings BP (FB) No.58. Revisions were in line with State Government decisions, and subsequent settlements reiterated this practice. (Para 1-19)

The union, having agreed to Dearness Allowance alignment with State Government employees, cannot demand a higher rate. The court stressed the employer's dependence on financial ability and the State Government's difficult financial position. (Para 19-28)

The High Court erred in not considering the financial constraints and principles governing wage revisions. The Board's decision to adopt State Government rates was not arbitrary, given the challenging financial situation.(Para 28-31)

The Board did not unilaterally alter the settlement terms. The respondent union cannot selectively challenge parts of the Board's proceedings. The court affirmed the Board's decision to set a cut-off date for revised Dearness Allowance, considering financial constraints. (Para 31-166)

Facts:

The case involved an application for an extension of the period for investigation under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The Investigating Officer (IO) filed two applications on the same day – one for the extension of the investigation period and the other under s.43D of the Act, enumerating detailed grounds, signed by the Public Prosecutor. The respondents challenged the order before the High Court, arguing that the Public Prosecutor did not apply his mind, thus failing to fulfill the mandatory requirement of the proviso to s.43D(2)(b).

Issues:

Whether the requirements of the proviso to Section 43D(2)(b) were met in the application for extension of the investigation period.

Held:

The proviso to Section 43D(2)(b) sets out specific requirements for its proper application. These include the inability to complete the investigation within 90 days, a report by the Public Prosecutor indicating progress and reasons for detention, and the satisfaction of the court. The document, in the form of an application under Section 43D, detailed the development and progress in the investigation, meeting the requirements of the proviso. (Para 1)

The grounds for extension included the respondents' alleged involvement in a banned organization, voluminous electronic records, funding investigations, a conspiracy spread across cities, and telephonic interconnections with other accused persons. The material in the document fulfilled the proviso's requirements.( Paras 15-16)

An analysis of the document purporting to be the report of the Public Prosecutor revealed a thorough consideration of the extension request. The Public Prosecutor's signature and changes in the second application indicated an application of mind, satisfying the essential condition for the report.( Para 2)

The second document, as the report of the Public Prosecutor, was filed on the same day as the IO's application, demonstrating the application of mind. The State of Maharashtra was represented through the Assistant Commissioner of Police, and the document clearly outlined the grounds for seeking an extension. (Paras 19, 22)

The first document provided reasons for the extended period, while the second detailed grounds extensively. The public prosecutor scrutinized both documents, showing an application of mind and expanded reasons for the extension. The second document was not a mere reproduction but an analysis of the first.( Paras 36, 37, 39)

Conclusion: The infirmities in the form of the documents did not entitle the respondents to default bail, as there was a substantial application of mind by the Public Prosecutor. The High Court's order was set aside.

Facts:

The complainant alleged that on March 29, 2007, the accused formed an unlawful assembly, trespassed into the complainant's land, cut and removed the wheat crop, and abused the complainant and his family.

Issues:

The trial court acquitted the appellants, finding a dispute over land possession and lack of cogent evidence. The High Court reversed the acquittal, leading to the appeal.

Held:

The Trial Court carefully analyzed the testimony, highlighting discrepancies in the complainant's account and the absence of independent witnesses. It concluded that the offense was not established.

The High Court's judgment lacked an application of mind to the basic facet that it was dealing with an appeal against acquittal. No perversity of approach by the Trial Judge was found. The well-considered findings of the Trial Court were maintained, and the judgment of acquittal was upheld.

Facts:

The Income Tax Department acquired a property under Section 269UD of the Income Tax Act. After the property was auctioned, the highest bidder (respondent) obtained a sale deed. The respondent sought conversion of leasehold rights to freehold rights from Delhi Development Authority (DDA), depositing conversion charges. DDA demanded additional payment for unearned increase, which was contested.

Issues:

Validity of DDA's demand for unearned increase.

Nature of rights transferred through auction.

Interpretation of Sale Deed and auction notice.

Applicability of the principle of merger.

Held:

The auction was based on the market value, and the Income Tax Department had already paid unearned increase. DDA's demand for unearned increase was unwarranted. The High Court rightly rejected DDA's claim.( Para 1 - 12)

The Sale Deed indicated a leasehold residential plot, supported by details in the auction notice. The bid was for leasehold rights, and the terms of the auction were binding.( Para 15 - 19)

Clause 3 of the Sale Deed explained the rights granted and harmonized with Clauses 1 and 2. The auction notice specified leasehold rights, influencing the interpretation of the Sale Deed.( Para 20 - 22)

Considering Section 269UE, Clause 3 of the Sale Deed was in line with the statutory mandate, conveying that all rights were not transferred to the petitioner.( Para 24 - 25)

The principle of merger, being a government grant, wasn't highly relevant. The Sale Deed did not convey all rights, diminishing the impact of the principle of merger.( Para 27)

The petitioner was not entitled to a refund of conversion charges. DDA was directed to process the conversion application for leasehold to freehold rights.( Para 29)

Facts:

The deceased and accused were friends who traveled together.

The deceased was injected with a drug leading to overdose and subsequent death.

Prosecution alleged murder and conspiracy based on circumstantial evidence.

Issues:

Lack of direct eyewitnesses; reliance on circumstantial evidence.

Failure of prosecution to establish a clear motive for murder.

Inconsistencies in medical evidence regarding the cause and time of death.

Allegations of the accused injecting the deceased with the drug.

Held:

The court emphasized the importance of proving each circumstance separately in cases based on circumstantial evidence.

Last seen together: Room No. 203 was hired by all involved, suggesting no premeditated murder plan by the accused.

Medical evidence: The prosecution failed to link the accused to the death, and inconsistencies in medical reports raised doubt.

Motive: Alleged motive of a love triangle not proven, and the introduced motive four years later lacked credibility.

Chandru being a medical student: Inference of his involvement in the crime was unfounded.

Inconsistency in statements: Discrepancies in statements cast doubt on the reliability of the evidence.

Delay in filing the private complaint: Lack of protest during the investigation against the accused raised questions about the credibility of the complainants.

Clean hands doctrine: The complainants did not come to court with clean hands, as the motive was introduced after four years.

FACTS:

On 26.07.1989, the State Government made a reference under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for resolving disputes.

The appellant did not appear before the Industrial Tribunal and suffered an adverse ex parte award.

The Industrial Tribunal decided the reference ex parte against the appellant.

The Single Judge set aside the award in a writ petition filed by the appellant.

The Division Bench of the High Court allowed the respondent's appeal and set aside the Single Judge's order in the appellant's absence.

The review petition filed by the appellant was dismissed.

ISSUES:

Whether the appellant, having not appeared before the Industrial Tribunal, is entitled to contest the reference on merits.

Whether there was a sufficient cause for the appellant's absence before the Industrial Tribunal.

HELD:

The appellant did not receive an opportunity to contest the reference before the Industrial Tribunal.

The cause shown for the appellant's absence constitutes a sufficient cause, entitling them to claim an opportunity to contest the reference on merits.

The appellant did not appear before the Tribunal from the inception, thus having no opportunity to contest the matter.

Every party has the right to contest the case on merits, and no exception disentitled the appellant.

Substantial justice demands an opportunity for both parties to contest the case on merits.

The appeals are allowed, setting aside the impugned orders and the ex parte award. The case is remanded to the Industrial Tribunal.

The appellant is granted an opportunity to file a written statement, and parties can amend statements, file documents, and present oral evidence.

The Industrial Tribunal is directed to decide the reference within six months from the date of appearance.