Facts:

DLF Homes Panchkula Pvt. Ltd. and certain individuals were involved in disputes over possession and refund related to flats in the DLF Valley project.

The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) and the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (SCDRC) had awarded compensation under various heads, leading to legal challenges.

Issues:

Arbitrariness in compensation awards

Principles governing interest as compensation

Multiple heads of compensation for the same default

Held:

The Court held that the grant of compensation under various heads by the NCDRC was not sustainable, emphasizing the need for a foundation based on judicially recognized principles rather than a rule of thumb.

The judgment referred to the principle laid down in Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of Orissa & Others v. G.C. Roy, (1992) 1 SCC 508, stating that interest is compensation for the beneficiary deprived of the use of the investment made.

The Court modified the compensation awards, directing the appellant to send an occupation certificate, offer possession, and pay interest at a reasonable rate. The costs were capped at Rs. 50,000, and the judgment also addressed cases seeking refunds, modifying the interest rate to 9% per annum.

Facts:

Appellant no.1 booked office space in a project by the respondent.

Builder Buyer Agreement for possession within four years.

Appellants filed a complaint seeking refund due to non-possession.

Application under Section 12(1)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act filed for class action.

Issues:

Whether the case qualifies as a class action.

Interpretation of "sameness of interest" and "common grievance."

Held:

The National Commission initially dismissed the case as a class action, stating that the purpose must be solely for earning livelihood. However, the Supreme Court, relying on precedents, held that sameness of interest is akin to a common grievance against the same person. It emphasized that persons represented need not have the same cause of action but must have a common interest or grievance. The dismissal was set aside, and the case was restored to the file of the National Commission.

Facts:

Appellant sought eviction of respondent due to bona fide need and habitual rent default.

Rent Controller granted permission for eviction, but objection raised under Maharashtra Slum Act.

Suit withdrawn, permission sought from Slum Authority, which was granted after due process.

Civil suit filed for eviction, leading to a final decree by the Appellate Court.

Writ petition filed challenging Slum Authority's permission, resulting in High Court interference.

Issues:

Whether Slum Authority's permission, granted after due process, was legally sound.

High Court's interference under Article 227 based on Slum Authority's alleged oversight.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after due consideration, set aside the High Court's judgment and upheld the Appellate Authority's detailed examination. The High Court's concerns about the Slum Authority's consideration of relevant factors were deemed incorrect. The respondent had multiple opportunities to present his case, and the Appellate Authority had scrutinized the matter sufficiently. The Supreme Court found no reason for the High Court's interference under Article 227 of the Constitution.

"In the circumstances, the view that weighed with the High Court was not correct." Para No. 11: "We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and order dated 19.06.2014 passed by the High Court...and restore the order dated 31.10.2002 passed by the Appellate Authority." Para No. 12: "This appeal stands allowed. No order as to costs."( Para No. 10)

Facts:

The case involved a second appeal where the appellant contended that the regular second appeal had been decided without framing a question of law. The appellant relied on judgments from the Punjab and Haryana High Court and the Madhya Pradesh High Court to support this contention.

Issues:

Whether a second appeal required the formulation of a substantial question of law, especially in light of the conflicting judgments from different High Courts.

Held:

Sole contention that the regular second appeal was decided without framing a question of law.( Para 3)

Different legal position in Punjab and Haryana High Court due to Constitution Bench Judgment in Pankaiakshi (Dead) through L.Rs. and Ors. vs. Chandrika and Ors.( Para 4)

Section 97 of the Amendment Act and Section 100 of the Code amended to require a substantial question of law in second appeals.( Para 7)

Constitution Bench's opinion on the applicability of Section 97 to state amendments and the saving clause in the Amendment Act.( Para 9)

Effect of the Constitution Bench's judgment on the State of Punjab, stating that a second appeal does not require a substantial question of law.( Para 10)

Discussion of the Constitution Bench's judgment in Pankajakshi case and its impact on the interpretation of Section 97.( Para 11)

Dismissal of the appeal based on the legal position clarified by the Constitution Bench.( Para 12)

Facts:

The appellant, Girish Kumar, challenged the promotion of Respondent No. 3 to the post of Section Officer, contending that the latter did not fulfill the eligibility criteria of three years continuous service in the feeder cadre, as required by the Recruitment Rules, 1967. The dispute arose from the deemed date of promotion granted to Respondent No. 3 under Rule 5 of the Seniority Rules, 1982.

Issues:

Whether the deemed date of promotion under the Seniority Rules, 1982 can be considered for eligibility criteria under the Recruitment Rules, 1967.

Whether Respondent No. 3, granted the deemed date of promotion, fulfilled the three years continuous service requirement for the promotional post.

Held:

The court held that the Seniority Rules, 1982 and the Recruitment Rules, 1967 operate in different fields. While the deemed date of promotion is relevant for seniority, it does not automatically fulfill the eligibility criteria for promotion under the Recruitment Rules. The term "continuous service" in the Recruitment Rules was deemed to mean uninterrupted and unbroken service. Respondent No. 3, having been promoted as Office Superintendent on a deemed date, did not meet the continuous service requirement for eligibility. The High Court's decision was set aside, and the appellant's appeal was allowed. Respondent No. 3 was declared ineligible for promotion to the post of Section Officer.

Facts:

Sanjay Kumar, a 15-year-old patient, complained of abdominal pain, fever, and hemorrhage in both eyes. The surgeon operated on the patient despite a low platelet count. The patient was discharged but later died in another hospital.

Issues:

Was the surgery necessary given the patient's critical condition and low platelet count?

Is the surgeon liable for medical negligence leading to the patient's death?

Held:

The court emphasizes the need for reasonable medical decisions and states that unreasonableness in professional conduct can't escape liability.( Paragraph 12 )

The court concludes that it's a case of an unreasonable decision by the Operating Surgeon, not a minor negligence.( Paragraph 14 )

The court decides that the entire compensation of Rs. 6,00,000/- is payable by the hospital, considering the surgeon's liability as vicarious.( Paragraph 18 )

Facts:

The Gauhati High Court initiated suo moto action following the death of 15 young laborers in mining operations in the State of Meghalaya.

The National Green Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, took over the case (O.A. No.73 of 2014) and issued directions to stop illegal mining and assess the environmental impact.

Orders were passed by the Tribunal, allowing transportation of coal under certain conditions.

Subsequent orders by the Supreme Court permitted transportation of a specified quantity of coal, but an unfortunate incident led to the suspension of transportation.

Various applications were filed seeking permission to transport coal, leading to conflicting orders.

Issues:

Determination of whether to permit the transportation of coal, considering environmental concerns and the ban imposed by the National Green Tribunal.

Held:

The Court permitted the transportation of 75,050 metric tonnes of coal, for which transport challans had already been issued.

Emphasized that the State of Meghalaya must ensure strict compliance and prevent any illegal mining under the guise of permitted transportation.

Directed the State to maintain detailed records of transported coal, including quantity, payments, transporter details, owner details, and verification certificate dates.

The mechanism for verification and transportation was to be finalized and publicized within a week, with transportation allowed from 17th May, 2019, to 31st May, 2019. No transportation was permitted after 31st May, 2019.

Facts:

The appellant, Advocate Rakesh Tiwari, was convicted for contempt of court for his undesirable conduct towards the Chief Judicial Magistrate (C.J.M.) Alok Pandey. The incident involved the advocate entering the chamber of the C.J.M., hurling abuses, attempting to assault him, and making threats. The advocate had alleged bias and interference in a case he was involved in.

Issues:

Whether the advocate's actions constituted criminal contempt of court?

What would be an appropriate sentence for the advocate's misconduct?

Held:

The High Court found the advocate guilty of criminal contempt, noting his lack of apology and the scandalization of the subordinate court. The original sentence included imprisonment for six months, a fine of Rs. 2000, and a restriction from entering the judgeship of Allahabad. The Supreme Court modified the sentence as follows:

The six-month imprisonment is suspended for three years, subject to good conduct and a condition not to enter the District Judgeship, Allahabad, for an additional three years.

The imprisonment may be activated if the advocate breaches any condition within the three-year period.

The advocate must deposit the Rs. 2000 fine, and failure to do so will result in a three-month restriction from the District Judgeship.

Facts:

The case involves two separate alienations of distinct portions of ancestral property by the late predecessor-in-interest. The first suit challenging the initial alienation was dismissed, and subsequently, a second suit was filed for the second alienation. The trial court and appellate court dismissed the second suit, citing Order II, Rule 2 and constructive res judicata. The High Court set aside this decision.

Issues:

Whether the plaintiff should have included both claims in one suit under Order II, Rule 2?

Whether the different periods of limitation provided by Article 109 of the Limitation Act affect the application of Order II, Rule 2?

Held:

The Court held that Order II, Rule 2 requires a plaintiff to include the whole claim arising from a cause of action in one suit. If a plaintiff omits or relinquishes any portion intentionally, they are barred from suing on that part unless leave is obtained from the Court. The Court emphasized that even if different reliefs could be sought for in one suit arising from a cause of action, a second suit for a different relief can be filed with leave.

In this case, the Court found that the second alienation stemmed from the same cause of action as the first, and the mere fact of a different period of limitation does not override the bar under Order II, Rule 2. The late predecessor-in-interest executed both sale deeds, and the suits contained virtually identical averments. The plaintiff had the opportunity to seek relief for the second sale deed in the first suit but omitted to do so.

Therefore, the Court set aside the judgment of the High Court, affirming the dismissal of the second suit under Order II, Rule 2.