Facts:

The appellants, widow and son of a deceased bus driver who died due to electrocution, filed a claim for damages under Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. The respondents contested the claim on grounds of limitation, citing Article 82 of The Limitation Act, 1963.

Issues:

The applicable period of limitation for claims under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, whether it was governed by Article 82 or Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Held:

The court held that Article 82's two-year limitation period applies to claims under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. This was determined despite the appellants' argument that Article 113 should apply. However, considering a compensation scheme under the respondent's rules, the court invoked its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to grant compensation of Rs. 7 lakhs to the appellants. The respondents were directed to pay this amount within two months, failing which they would be liable for 12% per annum interest from the date of the accident. This decision was made under the peculiar facts of the case and should not be considered a precedent.

Facts:

The appellant college, Karpagam Faculty of Medical Sciences and Research, was debarred by the respondent (Union of India and others) from admitting students in the MBBS course for the academic session 2017-2018. The High Court declined interim relief for the appellant for that academic session. Despite a direction from the Supreme Court to reconsider the matter, the respondent reiterated its earlier decision. The appellant challenged this decision, arguing against successive inspections conducted by the Medical Council of India (MCI).

Issues:

Whether the appellant college is entitled to recognition/approval for the academic session 2017-18 without addressing deficiencies highlighted in the latest assessment report.

Whether the successive inspections conducted by the MCI were justified in this case.

Held:

The fact that the appellant college received permission for the academic session 2016-17 does not automatically entitle it to recognition/approval for the academic session 2017-18 without rectifying identified deficiencies.

No plausible explanation was offered by the appellant college regarding the deficiencies pointed out.

The inspections conducted were not successive surprise inspections but were conducted for different purposes related to the renewal of permission and recognition/approval for different academic sessions.

The decision of the Ministry dated May 31, 2017, confirmed after reconsideration on August 31, 2017, is upheld.

The proposal for recognition/approval submitted by the appellant college for the academic session 2017-18 is treated as having been made for the academic session 2018-19.

Decision: The appeal is disposed of, affirming the decision of the Ministry and directing further actions to address deficiencies highlighted during the inspection process.

Facts:

The appellant, Rima Taipodia, appealed against an order passed by the High Court of Gauhati in Writ Appeal No. 06 of 2012.

The High Court directed Taipodia to appear before the State Medical Board for assessment of disability for a Group-B post appointment.

The requirement for the appointment was a minimum of 40% disability, as per the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Rules, 1996.

Taipodia had not been examined by the State Medical Board previously, and the certificates relied upon were not issued by the State Medical Board.

Issues:

Whether the disability certification obtained by the appellant meets the requirements under the relevant rules.

Whether the appellant's disability percentage meets the minimum threshold required for the appointment.

Held:

The Supreme Court highlighted that under the rules, it's necessary for a Disability Certificate to indicate if the disability is permanent or if there's a chance of variation in its degree over time.

The disability certificate relied upon by Taipodia was not time-bound, indicating a permanent disability. Therefore, if the State Medical Board assessed the disability to be below 40%, it meant Taipodia did not meet the required disability percentage as per the law.

The Court dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in it.

The Court directed the respondent-state to take appropriate action regarding the appointment, considering the appellant's disability percentage falling below the required threshold.

If the person next in line (Respondent No. 3) has the required disability percentage for appointment, the state is directed to proceed with their appointment.

Facts:

Atma Singh, the appellant, filed a suit claiming joint possession of land owned by his deceased brother, Pal Singh. Gurmej Kaur, Pal Singh's mother, remarried after the death of her husband, Narain Singh, and eventually inherited Pal Singh's estate upon his death. Atma Singh challenged Gurmej Kaur's right to inherit Pal Singh's estate based on her remarriage.

Issues:

Whether Gurmej Kaur, after her remarriage, was entitled to inherit the estate of her son, Pal Singh, under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, or if her remarriage barred her from such inheritance under the provisions of the Hindu Widow's Re-Marriage Act, 1856.

Held:

The court held that Gurmej Kaur, despite her remarriage, retained her right to inherit Pal Singh's estate as his mother under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The judgment emphasized the distinction between a widow's position, who loses inheritance rights upon remarriage, and a mother's position, which is considered differently in Hindu law.

The court concluded that the provisions of the Hindu Widow's Re-Marriage Act, 1856, did not affect Gurmej Kaur's right to inherit her son's estate. Consequently, the plaintiff's appeal was dismissed, and the decision of the lower courts, upholding Gurmej Kaur's inheritance rights, was affirmed.

Facts:

Dharampal's family occupied land claimed by the Punjab Wakf Board, alleging adverse possession since 1953.

The Wakf Board filed suits against Dharampal's father previously, leading to a dismissal in 1971, and another suit in 1991 against Dharampal and others.

Issues:

Whether the current suit was barred due to the earlier suit's dismissal under Order 9 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code.

Whether Dharampal established adverse possession over the land.

Whether the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred under Section 55-C of the Wakf Act, 1954.

Held:

Dismissal of Earlier Suit: The argument that the current suit was barred under Order 9 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code lacked merit. The previous suit was against Dharampal's father alone, and the parties and part of the cause of action were different.

Adverse Possession: Dharampal failed to establish adverse possession adequately. Adverse possession requires hostile possession denying the true owner's title, which was not proven.

Jurisdiction of Civil Court: The argument regarding Section 55-C of the Wakf Act, 1954, was dismissed. The relevant amendment was never notified, and the Wakf Act, 1954, including the amending Act, was repealed by the Waqf Act, 1995. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the civil court was not affected.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the decision of the lower courts in favor of the Punjab Wakf Board.

Facts:

Respondent No.6, the Management of Church of South India, operated several schools in Kerala, including Samuel LMS High School, Parassala, and Light to the Blind School, Varkala.

The appellant was appointed as a Music Teacher at Samuel LMS High School, while the respondent, who applied for the same position, was not selected.

Respondent contended that due to the common management, she should have been promoted based on her seniority at Light to the Blind School.

Issues:

Whether the respondent, having participated in the selection process, could challenge it after being unsuccessful.

Whether the schools operated by Respondent No.6 were considered separate units.

Held:The Supreme Court held that the respondent, having participated in the selection process, was estopped from challenging it later. Additionally, the Court ruled that the schools operated by Respondent No.6 were distinct entities.

Therefore, the respondent's claim for promotion based on seniority was dismissed. The Court's decision was based on established legal principles, as evidenced in various precedents cited in the judgment.

Facts:

The appellant, Karan Singh, appealed against the Delhi High Court's judgment, which set aside the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal directing the Delhi Transport Corporation to pay him pension and other benefits.

Singh was initially appointed as a Conductor by the Corporation after completing training from March 15, 1983, to May 26, 1983. He was granted regular appointment from November 27, 1983, and subsequently opted for voluntary retirement under the Corporation's scheme.

Despite completing 10 years of service, Singh was denied pension benefits, leading to litigation.

Issues:

Whether the period of training and leave without pay should be counted towards Singh's qualifying service for pension.

Held:

The Tribunal and High Court had differing opinions on whether Singh's service qualified for pension.

The Tribunal initially ruled in Singh's favor, while the High Court reversed this decision.

The Court noted the appellant's argument regarding the inclusion of the training period and leave without pay in his qualifying service.

After considering the submissions, the Court found that Singh's service, adjusted for the training period and leave without pay, totaled 9 years, 10 months, and 11 days.

However, pending the decision on a reference made in another case, the Court decided to await the outcome before proceeding further.

The Court referenced the need for a larger bench to reconsider the issue of leave without pay and its impact on qualifying service, as highlighted in previous judgments.

Facts:

The High Court relied on a judgment (referred to as Swaran Singh's case) in determining compensation for land acquisition, where the exemplar of 1997 was used for an acquisition in 1999.

The appellant challenged this reliance, arguing that the High Court did not consider various transactions entered into before the issuance of Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's reliance on the judgment in Swaran Singh's case was justified.

Whether the methodology used by the High Court in determining compensation was appropriate.

Whether previous awards or judgments should be blindly followed in determining compensation.

Whether dismissals of special leave petitions without reasons constitute binding precedents.

Held:

The High Court's reliance on Swaran Singh's case was deemed unjustified as it failed to consider other transactions and the nature of the transaction relied upon in that case.

While some increase in compensation may be warranted due to development, the High Court's cumulative increase of 15% was not justified. Instead, a flat increase of 12-13% should have been applied.

Previous awards or judgments cannot be blindly followed; they should be considered only as evidence, with due regard to the facts and circumstances of the case at hand.

Awards or judgments not involving the same parties are not binding precedents. Blindly following them may lead to injustice, as every case has unique circumstances.

The current value reflected by comparable sale deeds is more reliable for determining compensation. Previous awards or judgments, especially those relating to acquisitions made 5 to 10 years ago, may not provide an accurate basis for compensation.

Mistakes or illegalities in previous awards or judgments should not be perpetuated; instead, new evidence and circumstances of the current case should be considered.

To rely on a judgment or award not included in the evidence, an application must be made under the appropriate procedural rules. Such judgments or awards cannot be considered during arguments unless they form part of the recorded evidence.

Dismissals of special leave petitions without reasons do not constitute binding precedents.

Decision: The compensation determined by the High Court was deemed excessive. Instead, the compensation was fixed at Rs. 95 lakhs per acre, along with statutory benefits.

Facts:

The marriage between the appellant and respondent occurred in 1994, with two children born in 1995 and 2003. Since 2008, the parties had been living separately, and disputes led to civil and criminal proceedings. Eventually, a settlement was reached in April 2017, seeking divorce by mutual consent, with the appellant agreeing to provide permanent alimony to the respondent. A petition was filed before the Family Court seeking waiver of the statutory six-month waiting period for the second motion, citing long separation and no possibility of reconciliation.

Issues:

Whether the six-month waiting period under Section 13B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, could be waived by the court in exceptional circumstances.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after examining various precedents, held that the waiting period mentioned in Section 13B(2) is not mandatory but directory. The Court outlined factors to consider before granting waiver, including the length of separation, efforts at mediation, settlement of issues between parties, and the likelihood of reconciliation. The Court emphasized the need to consider the interests of justice and the objective of providing a chance for reconciliation while avoiding prolonging the parties' agony.

The Court's decision was based on several paragraphs of the judgment, including Paragraphs 18 to 23, which specifically address the interpretation of Section 13B(2) and the factors guiding the court's discretion in granting waiver.

Additionally, the Court mentioned the possibility of conducting proceedings via video conferencing and allowing representation through close relations in cases where personal appearance is not possible.

The parties were granted the liberty to move the concerned court for fresh consideration in light of the Supreme Court's order, and the appeal was disposed of accordingly.