Facts:

The accused (respondent No. 2) was facing trial for offenses under Sections 302, 304-B, and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code due to the death of his wife in Nigeria under unnatural circumstances. The appellant, mother of the deceased, moved an application under Section 311 CrPC to summon Dr. I. Yusuf, the witness who conducted the first post-mortem in Nigeria.

Issues:

Whether the Trial Court erred in rejecting the application under Section 311 CrPC, considering the age of the case and the availability of a copy of the post-mortem report.

Held:

The court held that the Trial Court and the High Court failed to appreciate the relevance of Dr. I. Yusuf's evidence and the necessity to summon him. It emphasized that the age of the case alone cannot be decisive when a material witness needs examination. The court opined that the Trial Court should ensure material evidence comes on record for a just conclusion.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, setting aside the previous orders. The application under Section 311 CrPC was allowed, and the Trial Court was directed to take necessary measures for the examination of Dr. I. Yusuf, either by issuing a commission or recording his statement through video-conferencing, ensuring expeditious proceedings.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute arising from a Will wherein the testator bequeathed his property to his son, with a life interest granted to his widowed daughter. The daughter had the right to reside in the property and use the rent income for herself, but was restricted from transferring, mortgaging, selling, or gifting the property. The question at hand is whether, upon the death of the widowed daughter, the tenant becomes a trespasser and is liable to be removed.

Issues:

Validity of a suit for possession after the death of the widowed daughter.

Interpretation of the life estate granted to the testator's daughter.

Applicability of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.

Held:

The definition of 'landlord' under Section 2(c) includes the daughter of the testator holding a life interest in the property. The life estate granted to the daughter enabled her to create a tenancy, making her a 'landlord' as per the 1949 Act.( Para 12)

The provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 are applicable to the tenant, granting the tenant a protected status. The status of a statutory tenant remains even after the death of the testator's daughter. The remedy for the appellants is to pursue eviction proceedings based on grounds specified in the enactment.( Para 14)

Statutory protection for tenants under specific tenancy laws aims to protect the interests of tenants. Restrictions on possession recovery have been imposed as a legislative policy for the benefit of tenants.( Para 15)

Facts:

The case involved an appeal against the order of the High Court confirming the Magistrate's decision for further investigation post the discharge of the accused. The FIR was filed against the appellant, and upon completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed. However, the Magistrate, while discharging the accused, directed further investigation, leading to the appeal.

Issues:

Whether the Magistrate, post-discharge of the accused, has the jurisdiction to order further investigation under Sections 173(8) and 227 of the CrPC?

What is the distinction between the powers available to the Magistrate at the pre-cognizance and post-cognizance stages?

Held:

The Magistrate lacks jurisdiction to suo moto direct further investigation after discharging the accused. The powers available to the Magistrate for further investigation at the pre-cognizance stage may not be exercised at the post-cognizance stage, particularly after discharging the accused. The court highlighted the availability of the investigating agency's option to apply for further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, and both the order of the Magistrate for further investigation and the High Court's confirmation were quashed. However, the investigating officer was given the liberty to file an application for further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC.

Facts:

The dispute involves Bharat Broadband Network Limited (Appellant) and United Telecoms Limited (Respondent). The arbitration agreement provided for the appointment of an arbitrator by the Managing Director of the appellant-company. The Managing Director's appointment was challenged due to ineligibility as per the Seventh Schedule.

Issues:

Whether the proviso to Section 12(5) applies?

The eligibility of the arbitrator as per the Seventh Schedule.

Applicability of waiver by express agreement in writing.

Interpretation of Sections 12, 13, and 14 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

Held:

Section 12(1) mandates disclosure of circumstances affecting an arbitrator's independence. Challenge procedures are outlined in Sections 12(3) and 13(2), followed by an application under Section 34 post-award.

Section 12(5) deals with de jure inability, overriding prior agreements. Ineligibility can be waived post-dispute by an express agreement in writing, as per the proviso.

The Law Commission emphasizes minimum levels of independence. In Section 12(5) cases, Section 14(1)(a) applies, leading to automatic termination and substitution of the arbitrator.

The Managing Director's appointment, post the introduction of Section 12(5), was invalid under the TRF Ltd. judgment. The Amendment Act, 2015, applies retrospectively, rendering the appointment void.

The proviso to Section 12(5) applies only with a subsequent express agreement in writing. Analogies to other sections like Section 7 are rejected.

Decision: The appeals are allowed. The Managing Director's appointment as an arbitrator is held void, falling under Section 12(5). The proviso does not apply due to the absence of an express agreement in writing.

Facts:

The deceased husband of the Appellant obtained a personal loan from the Respondent-Finance Company, secured by a Group Insurance Policy.

The insurance premium was paid by the deceased through a Demand Draft.

The Appellant's husband passed away shortly after obtaining the loan.

The Respondent-Finance Company sought to recover the loan from the Appellant, leading to a dispute.

The District Forum ruled in favor of the Appellant, citing negligence in obtaining the insurance policy timely.

The State Commission upheld the decision, but the National Commission reversed it.

Issues:

Whether the Appellant's husband paid the insurance premium.

Whether the delay in obtaining the insurance policy constituted deficiency of service.

Held:

The National Commission erred in finding no evidence of premium payment; the Respondent-Finance Company admitted receiving a Demand Draft.

Deductions from the loan account were part of the composite transaction, not just processing fees.

The delay in obtaining the insurance policy was a deficiency of service by the Respondent-Finance Company.

Section 64VB(2) of the Insurance Act establishes the coverage from the date of premium payment.

Decision: The Order of the National Commission is set aside. The Civil Appeal is allowed. The Respondent-Finance Company is directed to pay Compensation of Rs. 50,000/- and Costs of Rs. 25,000/- to the Appellant.

Facts:

Respondent appointed as a Chowkidar on daily wages by the Appellant - Punjab Urban Planning and Development Authority on 01-12-1995.

Government of Punjab revised the Policy for regularization on 23-01-2001.

Respondent's services regularized on 26-12-2001, but irregularities alleged.

High Court directed Appellant to pass a speaking order on irregularities.

Respondent's services annulled on 22-05-2003 due to insufficient service prior to 22-01-2001.

Legal proceedings initiated by Respondent challenging annulment.

Issues:

Validity of Respondent's regularization.

Legality of annulment of Respondent's services.

Applicability of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Held:

Respondent sought regularization without fulfilling the mandatory 3 years' continuous service requirement.

Respondent's name interpolated in the final list for regularization, making the appointment illegal and void.

Order of regularization obtained by misrepresentation cannot be sustained.

Annulment of services justified due to fraudulent means of appointment.

Respondent not entitled to benefits under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

High Court erred in applying regulations for regular employees to an illegal appointment.

Appointment declared void ab initio; annulment upheld.

Civil Appeal allowed, and High Court's decision set aside.

FACTS:

Dispute over a shop premises between the complainant and respondent Nos. 2 and 3.

The complainant alleges that the respondents committed offenses under IPC.

Pendency of civil suits - Eviction Suit and Title Suit.

High Court quashed the complaint based on the perception that it's a civil dispute and witness contradictions.

ISSUES:

Whether the mere pendency of a civil suit justifies quashing criminal proceedings.

Whether the High Court had the jurisdiction to assess witness statements at the Section 482 stage.

HELD:

The High Court erred in not examining whether the allegations in the complaint make out offenses under Sections 323, 379 read with Section 34 IPC. Mere pendency of a civil suit doesn't negate a criminal case. The focus should be on the specific allegations in the complaint.( Para 10-15)

The High Court lacked jurisdiction to assess witness statements at the Section 482 stage. Witness contradictions are issues for trial, not pre-trial. The errors in the High Court's approach render its decision legally unsustainable.( Para 16-17)

The reasoning and conclusion of the High Court are set aside. The order of the Judicial Magistrate, which found a prima facie case, is restored. The trial should proceed unbiased by the High Court's observations.( Para 18-19)

REFERRED CASES:

State of Haryana and Others vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors., AIR 1992 SC604

Facts:

Respondent Nos. 2, 3, and 4 facing prosecution for various offenses.

Argument by defense that no offense under Section 307 IPC against them based on medical reports.

Additional Sessions Judge discharged respondent Nos. 2 to 4 from Section 307 IPC.

Appellant filed criminal revision in High Court, which was dismissed.

Appellant challenges High Court decision in the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether lower courts justified in discharging respondent Nos. 2 to 4 from the charge under Section 307 IPC?

Held:

Mere perusal of medical reports prima facie establishes a case under Section 307 IPC against respondent Nos. 2 to 4.

Error by both lower courts in discharging accused based on premature appreciation of evidence.

The stage to find fault in medical reports arises when prosecution presents evidence; not at the discharge stage.

Directions to Additional Sessions Judge to frame charges under Section 307 IPC against respondent Nos. 2 to 4.

Clarification that accused can argue against the charge after evidence is presented.

Decision: Appeal allowed, impugned order set aside, and Additional Sessions Judge directed to frame the charge under Section 307 IPC against respondent Nos. 2 to 4.

Facts:

Appellant No. 1 (Ashok Kumar Mehra) and Appellant No. 2 (Kushwant@Sukhwant Kumar Mehra) were prosecuted for the murder of Inderjit Dhiman.

The Sessions Judge acquitted both appellants in Sessions Case No. 10/1998.

The State and the Complainant appealed in the High Court, resulting in the conviction of both appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC.

Appellant No. 1 (father) passed away during the pendency of the appeals.

Appellant No. 2 claimed juvenility on the date of the offense.

Issues:

Whether appellant No. 2 is entitled to the benefit of the Juvenile Justice Act if his age is determined to be below 18 years on the date of the offense.

Whether the plea of juvenility can be raised even if not raised before the Trial Court.

Held:

The appeal of appellant No. 1 stands abated due to his death.

Appellant No. 2, being a juvenile on the date of the offense, is entitled to the benefit of the Juvenile Justice Act.

The genuineness of the date of birth was not disputed, and appellant No. 2 had filed a birth certificate in the Sessions Court.

The appeal of appellant No. 2 is allowed, setting aside the impugned order.