Facts:

The first respondent was married to Vijay Kumar Jindal in 2010, and they have two children.

The first respondent filed a petition under Section 12 of the Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005, seeking maintenance.

The complaint alleges that the house where the couple resided belonged to a joint family, and the appellant and his deceased brother carried on a joint business.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, as the brother of the deceased spouse, can be held liable for maintenance under the Act.

Held:

The appellant contested the basis of liability, arguing that the joint business with the deceased brother does not justify directing him to pay maintenance.

The court found sufficient averments in the complaint, especially in paragraph 10, indicating a joint family setup, joint business, and shared household.

The court clarified that the fulfillment of Section 2(f), Section 2(q), and Section 2(s) requirements would be a matter of evidence at trial.

An order for interim maintenance was justified based on the material available at this stage.

The court disposed of the appeal, emphasizing that the order does not preclude a final adjudication on the merits of the complaint.

Facts:

The appellant, PR. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX-6, filed an appeal under Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, challenging the dismissal of the Revenue's appeal by the High Court. The appeal pertained to the notice issued by the Assessing Officer under Section 148 and the subsequent assessment order. The respondent, NOKIA INDIA PVT. LTD., raised objections, contending that the notice was based on a mere change of opinion and, therefore, was bad in law. The ITAT upheld the respondent's appeal, and the High Court dismissed the Revenue's appeal on the grounds of not involving any substantial question of law.

Issues:

The appeal include the legality of the notice issued under Section 148, whether it was based on a change of opinion, and if the High Court was justified in dismissing the appeal on the ground of not involving any substantial question of law.

Held:

The High Court erred in dismissing the appeal in limine, as there are substantial questions of law involved.

The questions for consideration include the justification of the notice issued under Section 148 and whether it was legally sustainable, considering the requirements of Section 148.

The ITAT's findings on the legality of the notice and the merits of the case need to be reconsidered.

The appeal is allowed, and the impugned order is set aside. The case is remanded to the High Court for a fresh decision on merits, addressing the substantial questions of law raised.

FACTS:

The appellant applied for an electricity connection in December 1996 and submitted a required test report in March 2005.

The respondent argued that the delay in granting the connection was due to the appellant's failure to submit the test report promptly.

A criminal complaint was lodged by the appellant, leading to a High Court order on 14 August 2015, directing the grant of the electricity connection on 4 September 2015.

ISSUES:

Whether the delay in granting the electricity connection was solely attributable to the appellant's failure to submit the test report promptly.

Whether the compensation awarded by the NCDRC was adequate.

HELD:

The court acknowledged the initial delay caused by the appellant in submitting the test report.

The court found no cogent explanation for the decade-long delay by the respondent after the test report submission.

A criminal writ petition was instituted, leading to a High Court order directing the grant of the electricity connection.

The court enhanced the compensation awarded by the NCDRC to Rs. 5,00,000, considering the appellant's hardship and inconvenience.

The enhanced compensation was ordered to be paid within four weeks, and in default, it would carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum.

The civil appeal was allowed in these terms with no costs.

Facts:

Respondent No. 1, a school teacher, faced termination for objectionable behavior with girl students. Criminal proceedings were initiated, leading to two FIRs and subsequent police investigation.

Issues:

The key issues revolved around the termination process, the Inquiry Committee's findings, and the delayed decisions of the Nominee of Respondent No. 1 and the State Awardee Teacher due to concerns about contempt of court.

Held:

The Court emphasized the seriousness of the allegations, noting that two FIRs were filed, investigations conducted, and chargesheets filed, supporting prima facie evidence of the accusations.( Para 14)

The Court referred to the need for a sensitive approach in cases of sexual harassment, emphasizing the broader probabilities and the obligation to rely on the victim's statement when credible.( Para 15)

Highlighted that the Management had not acted hastily and had followed due process, including intimation to the Department and constitution of an Inquiry Committee. The termination decision was justified based on the Committee's findings.( Para 16)

The Tribunal and High Court's failure to appreciate the matter correctly was noted, and the appeal was allowed, setting aside the decisions of the lower courts and affirming the order of termination.( Para 17)

Facts:

The appellant, G. Ramesh, filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 against Vainqueur Corporate Services, a partnership firm.

The complaint alleged dishonour of cheques issued by the accused (partners) for data entry work.

The High Court, through a petition under Section 482 of CrPC, quashed the proceedings, stating inadequacy in averments to implicate criminal liability.

Issues:

Whether the complaint contained sufficient averments to implicate the first respondent (partner) under Section 141(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

The misinterpretation by the High Court of considering the first accused as a company instead of a partnership firm.

Held:

The complaint sufficiently describes the nature of the partnership, the business conducted, and the role of each accused in relation to the dishonoured cheques.

The High Court's error in considering the first accused as a company is acknowledged, and it is clarified that the first accused is a partnership firm.

Averments in the complaint meet the requirements of Section 141(1), holding the first respondent liable for the offence.

Quashing of the criminal case against the first respondent by the High Court is deemed erroneous.

The appeal is allowed, setting aside the judgment and order of the High Court.

Facts:

Plaintiffs (Respondent Nos. 1-3) filed a suit seeking perpetual injunction against the defendants, including the appellants (Defendant Nos. 1 and 2).

Appellants contested the suit, and the Trial Court dismissed it. The First Appellate Court upheld the dismissal.

Plaintiffs appealed in the High Court, which allowed the appeal, setting aside the lower court's decision and decreeing perpetual injunction.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in allowing the plaintiffs' second appeal and decreeing perpetual injunction.

Validity of concurrent findings of fact by the Trial Court and First Appellate Court.

Held:

The High Court erred in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. The Trial Court and First Appellate Court had rightly concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove the necessary elements for perpetual injunction.

Possession by one co-sharer is deemed possession by all, unless denial of rights, exclusion, and ouster occur for the statutory period.

The plaintiffs did not establish exclusive possession, and the appellants, as purchasers from a co-sharer, had the right to defend their title and possession.

The High Court failed to appreciate the legal and factual context and wrongly interfered with the concurrent findings. The appeal was allowed, and the Trial Court's judgment dismissing the suit was restored.

Facts:

Marriage solemnized in 2006 between the appellant-wife and respondent-husband.

In 2009, a son named Krish alias Master Krishav Gautam was born.

In 2012, the respondent-husband filed a divorce petition under Section 13(1)(ia)(iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

Trial Court decreed the divorce petition ex-parte, directing the son to be admitted to Col. Satsangi's Kiran Memorial Public School, New Delhi.

Appellant-wife filed an appeal against the ex-parte order.

Dispute arose regarding the school where the child should study, leading to conflicting directions.

Issues:

Custody and schooling arrangements for the child.

Violation of court orders regarding the child's education.

Maintenance for the appellant-wife.

Held:

The boy, Krish @ Master Krishav Gautam, expressed a desire to continue studying in his old school, Global International School, Shahjanpur.

In the interest of the child's welfare, he cannot be compelled to join Col. Satsangi's Kiran Memorial Public School, New Delhi.

High Court directions regarding the child's admission were set aside.

The appellant-wife is directed to elect one forum for maintenance.

The respondent-husband, being the natural father, is granted visitation rights. He can take the child on Sundays and public holidays.

The child is allowed to continue studying at Global International School, Shahjanpur.

High Court is requested to dispose of the appeal expeditiously.

Facts:

The respondent filed an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, against the appellants' predecessors-in-title.

The application was based on a partnership dated 05.07.1960, named "Gupta Bus Service," which later dissolved due to disputes.

The appellants contended that, being an "unregistered partnership," the application under Section 20 of the Partnership Act was not maintainable.

Issues:

Whether the application for arbitration is maintainable considering the partnership in question is an unregistered partnership.

Held:

The Civil Judge overruled the appellants' objection, stating that the application is maintainable.

The High Court upheld this decision.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order, and remanded the case for fresh consideration.

The High Court failed to consider the law laid down in Krishna Motor Service vs. H.B. Vittala Kamath (1996) 10 SCC 88.

The matter should be reconsidered in light of the mentioned decision, and the High Court is urged to dispose of the writ petition expeditiously.

Facts:

Atul Chandra Das, through his legal representatives, filed appeals against the dismissal of his suit for ejectment and the decreeing of the title suit.

Das claimed ownership of a property based on a sale and subsequent decree for specific performance.

The respondents, legal heirs of the previous owner, contested Das's claim, asserting a mortgage by conditional sale.

Issues:

Whether the transaction was a sale or a mortgage by conditional sale.

Applicability and inconsistency between Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 37A of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act.

Jurisdiction and application of the State Act to the suit.

Held:

The court found that the State legislature intended to override the proviso to Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act by enacting Section 37(A) of the State Act.

Despite inconsistency, Section 37(A) of the State Act prevails in the State due to the assent given by the President under Article 254(2).

Das's claim of ownership was rejected, and the mortgage by conditional sale was upheld.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts.