Facts:

The appellant vessel caused damage to a coal loader during berthing. The dock complex initially placed responsibility on the vessel, but the Master of the vessel denied liability. Subsequently, the Master accepted liability under protest, and the vessel was allowed to sail. A government-appointed Committee, composed of technical experts, found that the accident resulted from dynamic situations and could not assign individual responsibility.

Issues:

Determination of liability for damage caused during berthing.

Validity of the Master's acknowledgment of liability under protest.

Assessment of factors contributing to the accident.

Consideration of the Committee's findings.

Held:

The Committee, appointed by the Government, consisted of technical experts who found that the dynamic situation during the accident precluded assigning individual responsibility. The Committee considered all relevant factors, leading to the trial court's just and correct view, decreeing the suit in favor of the appellant.( Paragraph 19)

The Division Bench of the High Court considered factors such as the delay in obeying instructions to drop the anchor. However, the evidence on this aspect was not clear, and the Committee did not identify delay in anchoring as a contributing factor. The Division Bench erred in taking this factor into account.( Paragraph 22)

Two crucial aspects emerged: non-intimation by the Master about deballasting and the Berthing Master's failure to check the vessel's draft. While other factors were natural or beyond control, these two features were at the core of the matter. The Berthing Master, experienced in navigating vessels, had the duty to check the draft.( Paragraph 23)

The Committee's thorough inquiry concluded that individual responsibility could not be solely attributed to the Master. The assessment of all relevant factors by the Committee, including the failure of the Berthing Master and other contributing factors, supports the trial court's just and correct perspective. The Division Bench's view was erroneous.( Paragraph 24)

Facts:

The petitioners filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, asserting that the delayed appointment of Information Commissioners in the Central Information Commission (CIC) and State Information Commissions (SICs) hampers the functionality of the Right to Information Act. Allegations were made regarding a lack of transparency in the appointment process, prompting the petitioners to seek clear terms and conditions for such appointments.

Issues:

Timely appointment of Information Commissioners.

Lack of transparency in the appointment process.

Need for clear terms and conditions for appointments.

Held:

The right to information is a fundamental right derived from Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 of the Constitution. Transparency is essential for a healthy democracy (Para 10).

The Right to Information Act, 2005, provides a legal framework for citizens to exercise their fundamental right to information, emphasizing good governance (Para 19).

Delays in filling vacancies were acknowledged, and directions were given to fill them promptly. Transparency in the appointment process was affirmed, with a recommendation for wider representation beyond government employees (Para 34-40).

The court emphasized the need for express stipulation of terms and conditions in advertisements and on websites for Information Commissioner appointments (Para 41-42).

Concerns were raised about the pendency of cases and the inadequacy of Information Commissioners in certain States, leading to recommendations for additional appointments (Para 46-63).

Specific directives were issued for the defunct State Information Commission in Andhra Pradesh to be activated promptly (Para 50-51).

Recommendations were made for filling vacancies in various State Information Commissions within specified timelines (Para 54-66).

The Central Government's transparent appointment process was endorsed, and all states were directed to follow suit. Additionally, specific terms and conditions for appointments should be stipulated in advertisements and on websites (Para 67).

Facts:

The case involves a fatal motor vehicle accident where the deceased, a government school teacher, and a pillion rider were involved in a collision with a bus driven negligently. The tribunal awarded compensation, but the High Court reversed the decision based on the perceived unreliability of witnesses and a hyper-technical approach.

Issues:

Validity of the tribunal's compensation award.

Reliability of witnesses and the hyper-technical approach adopted by the High Court.

Standard of proof in motor accident cases.

Held:

The High Court's reversal of the well-considered tribunal judgment was criticized for its hyper-technical and trivial approach. The tribunal's finding of negligence by the bus driver was upheld.

In motor accident cases, the standard of proof is of preponderance of probability, not beyond all reasonable doubt. The tribunal's role is to determine compensation based on established facts.

The tribunal's just approach was contrasted with the High Court's strict interpretation of evidence. The court emphasized the importance of fair cross-examination and rejected the High Court's undue emphasis on witness lists.

The inability of a witness to identify the age of the pillion rider doesn't undermine the evidence's veracity. The tribunal's reliance on evidence, including FIR and charge-sheet, was deemed justifiable.

Non-examination of the pillion rider is not fatal to the case, given the sufficient evidence on record. The tribunal's acceptance of the appellants' claim was deemed appropriate.

The bus driver's failure to provide any statement and the tribunal's reliance on evidence established the driver's negligence. The High Court's disregard of evidence was criticized.

The site plan lacked proper explanation and evidence, making it unreliable for establishing negligence. The tribunal's reliance on evidence was justified.

The evidence of a witness unequivocally established the bus driver's negligence. The High Court's rejection of this evidence was deemed unjust.

The appellants did not challenge the High Court's rejection of their appeal on the adequacy of compensation. The tribunal's award, including income tax deduction, was restored.

Facts:

The appellant was declared a foreigner by a Foreigners' Tribunal, citing discrepancies in the name of his grandfather and the father residing in different villages. The High Court upheld this decision, emphasizing the petitioner's failure to adequately disclose material facts related to his citizenship in the written statement.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's declaration as a foreigner was erroneous. The contention focused on the adequacy of the information provided in the written statement and the reliability of the documents presented.

Held:

Upon thorough examination of documents, the Court noted discrepancies in the spelling of the grandfather's name but emphasized the consistency in the father's name. The Court found it untenable to dispute the identity of Kematullah despite variations in spelling. The appellant successfully established familial identities through various documents.( Para 3)

The Court rejected doubts arising from the father's change of residence to another village, deeming it insufficient to question the established identities. The judgment of the High Court and the Foreigners' Tribunal were set aside, and the appeal was allowed. (Para 4)

Consequently, the appellant was ordered to be released immediately.( Para 5)

Facts:

The writ petitions were filed under Article 32 challenging the procedure for calling candidates for the final examination of Civil Judge (Junior Division).

The contention was that the Rule 5A(3) of the Bihar Civil Service (Judicial Branch) (Recruitment) Rules, 1955, was in violation of the Supreme Court's previous decision in Malik Mazhar Sultan vs. Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission, (2008) 17 SCC 703.

Rule 5A(3) limited the candidates for the final written examination to 10% of the total number of candidates who appeared for the preliminary examination.

Issues:

Whether Rule 5A(3) is in violation of the precedent set in Malik Mazhar Sultan?

Whether the limitation of calling only 10% of candidates for the final written examination is arbitrary and unreasonable?

Held:

The Court held that Rule 5A(3) violates the precedent set in Malik Mazhar Sultan, where a specific ratio of 1:10 for calling candidates for the final examination was specified.

The Court found the provision of calling only 10% of candidates for the final examination to be arbitrary and unreasonable, restricting the number of candidates unreasonably.

It was noted that Rule 5A(3) lacked a provision for minimum passing marks in the preliminary examination, and the Court emphasized the need for such criteria.

The Court struck down Rule 5A(3) and directed the concerned authorities to ensure minimum passing marks are fixed for future examinations.

The Court allowed the writ petitions and clarified that it was not addressing other issues as the High Court was considering a proposal for amending the Rules.

Facts:

Respondent No.1 applied for the position of Assistant Teacher in 1985.

Appointed on probation from April 1, 1995.

Approval sought for appointment, delayed process.

Writ petition filed for approval, followed by suspension and termination.

Legal proceedings initiated against the termination order.

Issues:

Maintainability of the writ petition against a private school receiving grant-in-aid.

Legality of the termination order based on insubordination and breach of discipline.

Held:

Examining maintainability, the court referred to Section 8(2) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973, emphasizing procedural safeguards for employees, concluding that the writ application is maintainable. Citing precedents, the court rejected the argument against maintainability.

Regarding the termination, the court found the order stigmatic and arbitrary. Emphasizing the lack of approval for termination, it held that the dismissal was illegal and void. Quoting Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India, the court highlighted the need for a proper inquiry before punitive actions.

Given the arbitrary nature of the termination, the court dismissed the appeal and allowed reinstatement with full entitlements and back wages.

Facts:

The case revolves around the exclusion of 'Services' under Entry 41 of List II of the Seventh Schedule from the legislative and executive domain of the National Capital Territory of Delhi (NCTD). The challenge pertains to a notification dated May 21, 2015, which addresses the Union Territory cadre, including Indian Administrative Service and Indian Police Service Personnel. Additionally, the jurisdiction of the Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) is also contested, specifically its limitation to investigate offenses committed by employees of the GNCTD.

Issues:

Validity of the exclusion of 'Services' from the legislative and executive domain of the NCTD.

Legality of restricting ACB's jurisdiction to investigate offenses under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Held:

Per A.K. Sikri, J.:

The Court acknowledges the doubtfulness in categorizing All India Services and DANICS Services as State Public Services under Entry 41 of List II. A mechanism is proposed to avoid conflicts, suggesting that transfers and postings of higher officials be handled by the LG, while a Civil Services Board decides on lower-level officers. Similar Boards are recommended for DANICS officers.( Para 1-1.4)

The exclusion of ACB's jurisdiction to investigate offenses of Central Government employees is upheld, emphasizing the broad interpretation of legislative entries. The Court concludes that the impugned notifications restricting ACB's jurisdiction are valid and prevent jurisdictional conflicts. (Para 2)

The Court underscores that Entries 1, 2, and 18 of List II are excluded from the jurisdiction of GNCTD, and control over 'public order' rests with the Central Government. This exclusion is justified to avoid confusion or overlap in controlling and coordinating crucial aspects related to the nation's capital.( Para 3)

The Court asserts that the Notifications dated November 08, 1993, and subsequent modifications are valid, restricting ACB's jurisdiction to investigate Central Government employees and preventing dual investigation.( Para 4)

Per Ashok Bhushan, J. (Partly Dissenting):

The judgment asserts that Entry 41 of List II is not available to the Legislative Assembly of GNCTD, leading to the conclusion that the GNCTD cannot exercise executive power over 'Services.' The decision emphasizes the need for executive powers to be exercised under laws framed by Parliament or delegated powers.( Para 1-5)

The Court affirms the LG's role in issues related to 'Services' under Art.239AA(4) and stresses that the GNCTD can exercise executive powers delegated to it. It argues that the LG, as per Art.239AA(4), shall act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.( Para 6)

The Court discusses the power to appoint a Special Public Prosecutor under s.24, Cr.P.C., and concludes that in respect of Entries 1 and 2 of List III, the GNCTD has legislative competence under Art.239AA.( Para 7)

FACTS:

The appellant was convicted for offenses under Sections 279 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. The Judicial Magistrate awarded specific sentences, but the appellant challenged the order, primarily contesting the lack of specification on whether the sentences would run concurrently or consecutively.

ISSUES:

The absence of clarity in the Magistrate's order regarding the concurrent or consecutive nature of the sentences imposed under Sections 279 and 304-A of the IPC.

HELD:

The appellant argued that the Judicial Magistrate erred in not specifying whether the sentences would run concurrently or consecutively, citing Section 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

The Court acknowledged the mandatory requirement under Section 31 and found that the Magistrate indeed erred in not ensuring compliance.

The Court held that in a case where an accused is convicted for multiple offenses in a trial, it is necessary for the Magistrate to specify, under Section 31, whether the sentences for each offense would run concurrently or consecutively.

Recognizing the oversight, the Court modified the order of the Magistrate and directed that the sentences awarded for both Section 279 and Section 304-A IPC would run concurrently.

The Court affirmed the finding of conviction and sentence under both sections, emphasizing that three Courts had previously found the prosecution's case against the appellant valid.

Facts:

Respondent No.1, a limited company, closed its cement factory in Gujarat, leading to a dispute with the appellant Union over unpaid wages.

The Labour Court in Gujarat ruled in favor of the Union, issuing a recovery order.

Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) in Calcutta, where Respondent No.1's registered office is located, ordered the sale of properties for an unpaid loan by Respondent No.1.

Issues:

Whether the Gujarat High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the Special Civil Application (SCA) filed by the appellant.

Held:

The Single Judge held that Gujarat High Court has territorial jurisdiction.

The Division Bench set aside the Single Judge's order, stating that no part of the cause of action arose in Gujarat.

The Supreme Court held that Article 226(2) empowers a High Court to entertain a petition if the cause of action arises wholly or in part within its territorial jurisdiction.

The cause of action partially arose in Gujarat, considering the location of the cement factory, the Labour Court's involvement, and the claim regarding outstanding wages.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, setting aside the Division Bench's order, and restoring the Single Judge's decision that the SCA is maintainable in the Gujarat High Court. The case is remanded to the Single Judge for further proceedings.