Facts:

The respondents filed a suit for the declaration of title and possession. The appellants contested, claiming abandonment of the land by the respondents, issuance of lease to the predecessors-in-interest of the appellants, and possession since then. The trial court dismissed the suit based on the patta-lease (Ex.D-20), stating it was issued to the appellants' predecessor, and the respondents' entries in revenue records were dubious. The first appellate court doubted Ex.D-20, decreeing the suit. The High Court affirmed the first appellate court's findings.

Issues:

Validity of the patta-lease (Ex.D-20).

The authenticity of the respondents' claim to the suit land.

Alleged connivance with the patwari for entries in revenue records.

Admissibility and interpretation of additional evidence.

Held:

In an Article 136 appeal, concurrent findings are generally not interfered with unless shown to be perverse. Interference is warranted when the findings are patently unreasonable (Para 10).

Plaintiffs, in a suit for title and possession, must succeed on the strength of their title. The burden lies on them to establish their title, which they failed to do (Para 13).

The admissions in the written statement about the lease to the plaintiffs' fathers do not absolve the plaintiffs from proving their continued entitlement to the patta-lease (Para 14).

Section 58 of the Evidence Act allows the court discretion to require admitted facts to be proved. Mere allegations of fraud do not rebut the presumption of genuineness under Section 90 (Para 15).

The evidence and records establish that the suit land was abandoned by the respondents' fathers, leading to an auction and lease issuance to the appellants' grandfather. The patta (Ex.D-20) is presumed genuine under Section 90 (Paras 16-19).

Revenue records consistently favor the appellants, strengthening their case. Entries in favor of the respondents for two years are insufficient, and findings of revenue authorities support the appellants' claim (Para 20).

The respondents failed to produce any document proving Ex. D-20 as forged. The Commissioner's order and other evidence establish connivance in entries, discrediting the respondents' case (Paras 22-23).

The findings of misconduct by the patwari, as per Ex.D-1, were ignored by the lower courts. Production of additional evidence under Order XLI, Rule 27, is permissible under specified circumstances (Paras 26-28).

The order of the Tahsildar dated 28.07.1971 is accepted as additional evidence, as it directly relates to the dispute and is referred to in Ex.D-1. Other additional documents are not admitted (Paras 30-31).

The High Court erred in dismissing the appeal without proper consideration of evidence and materials on record. The findings of revenue misconduct were crucial, and the High Court did not weigh the evidence adequately (Para 42).

Facts:

Dispute over promotions to the post of Junior Management Scale II in Mahakoshal Kshetriya Bank.

Rules formulated under Section 29 of the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976, governed the promotions.

The Rules prescribed a selection process involving a written test, interview, and performance appraisal reports for the preceding five years.

The eligibility criteria and mode of selection were defined, but no minimum qualifying marks were specified for the interview and performance appraisal reports.

Issues:

Disagreement on the application of the seniority-cum-merit principle.

Challenge to the decision fixing a benchmark of minimum 12 marks in the interview and performance appraisal reports.

Held:

The learned Single Judge set aside the promotion list, directing the preparation of a fresh list with minimum cut-off merit marks, emphasizing seniority-cum-merit.

The Division Bench, without finding any irregularity, dismissed the appeals and ordered a fresh promotion exercise.

Both the Single Judge and Division Bench erred in holding that fixing minimum qualifying marks for interview and performance appraisal violates the seniority-cum-merit principle.

Relying on precedent, it was established that fixing benchmarks based on aggregate performance is permissible and does not contradict seniority-cum-merit.

The Division Bench's decision to set aside the entire selection test was unwarranted, as there was no finding of its vitiation.

The appeals were allowed, and the judgments of the Single Judge and Division Bench were quashed. The respondent-authority was directed to prepare a fresh promotion list, considering those who met the minimum qualifying criteria, following seniority.

Facts:

FCI advertised for the post of Assistant Grade-II (Hindi) with specific eligibility criteria.

The original writ petitioner applied, was shortlisted, and ranked sixth in the merit list.

Despite being ranked, the petitioner did not receive a final letter of appointment and was not on the selected list.

The denial was based on the petitioner's failure to produce an experience certificate for one year's translation work from English to Hindi and vice-versa.

Issues:

Whether the non-production of the experience certificate along with the application is fatal to the petitioner's case?

Whether subsequent production of certificates during verification should be considered?

Held:

The Division Bench, considering the distinction between essential requirements and the mode of proof, ruled that non-production of the certificate along with the application is not fatal.

The court emphasized that the essential is possession of the required qualification/experience before the given date, and the mode of proof is secondary.

The FCI's failure to call for additional evidence during document verification was noted, and the certificates subsequently produced were considered valid.

The Division Bench set aside the FCI's rejection and directed consideration of the petitioner for appointment on merit if other conditions are met.

Facts:

The Respondent manufactured goods falling under Chapter 72 of The Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, specifically Pig Iron and HR Coil Sheets.

Invoices included 'Dharmada,' a charitable donation from customers, credited to charity by the Respondent.

Issues:

Whether 'Dharmada' should be added to the assessable value for the payment of central excise duty.

Held:

The Deputy Commissioner, in a show cause notice, held that 'Dharmada' should be added to the assessable value.

The Commissioner (Appeals) affirmed this decision.

The CESTAT, in an appeal by the Respondent, overturned the decision, citing the precedent of Mohan and Co., Madras vs. CCE Madras.

The Supreme Court, in Civil Appeal No. 531 of 2008, considered the Collector vs. Panchmukhi Engineering Works case, asserting that 'Dharmada' should be a part of the assessable value.

The present case, linked to M/s D.J. Malpani vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Nashik, held that 'Dharmada' cannot be included in the transaction value for assessments.

In view of the judgment in Civil Appeal No. 5282 of 2005, M/s D.J. Malpani vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Nashik, the present appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The respondent floated an e-public tender for call center services. The appellant, facing a show cause notice for blacklisting in another tender, participated and won the bid. The show cause notice alleged providing false information.

Issues:

Interpretation of clause 20(i) and 20(ii) regarding blacklisting in the tender.

Validity of the Business Continuity Certificate submitted by the appellant.

Held:

The Court held that clause 20(i) did not require disclosure of a show cause notice; initiation of blacklisting is a different stage. The format provided specific conditions for disclosure, and the appellant complied. The undertaking given by the appellant did not necessitate disclosure of a show cause notice. The Court emphasized the seriousness of blacklisting and the need for clarity in the tender format.(Para 13-28)

The Court rejected doubts raised by respondent No.3 on the Business Continuity Certificate, stating that disputes on such technicalities are better suited for suits, not writ proceedings. It cautioned against courts substituting their interpretation for that of the tendering authority. Respondent No.1's reluctance to accept the doubts also played a role in the decision.(Para 29-35)

The Court cautioned against routine challenges to tenders, emphasizing the need for efficiency in public sector contracts. It referred to precedents that highlight the Court's limited role in interpreting commercial contracts. The impugned order was set aside, and the writ petition dismissed.(Para 36-43)

Facts:

The complainant alleged providing a hand loan of Rs.6,00,000/- to the accused, who, in turn, issued a cheque dated 27.02.2012. The cheque was dishonored by the bank on 01.03.2012, citing insufficient funds. The trial court acquitted the accused, emphasizing the complainant's failure to prove financial capacity. However, the High Court overturned this decision, leading to an appeal.

Issues:

The complainant's capacity to lend Rs.6,00,000 to the accused, with the accused challenging the complainant's financial standing based on various transactions.

Held:

The Court summarily states principles established by the Supreme Court regarding Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Notably, the execution of a cheque implies a presumption under Section 139 that it was for debt discharge, which is a rebuttable presumption.

The complainant admitted receiving Rs.8,00,000 as retirement benefits and making a payment of Rs.4,50,000 in 2010. The accused argued that within two years, the complainant disbursed Rs.18,00,000 to various individuals, questioning the complainant's financial capacity.

The burden to prove financial capacity shifted to the complainant due to a probable defense raised by the accused. The complainant's unsatisfactory responses during cross-examination and failure to explain financial capacity were noted.

The Court emphasized that the trial court's findings were based on evidence presented by the defense. The High Court's criticism of the trial court's decision as perverse was deemed unsustainable, and the original judgment was restored.

Facts:

The prosecutrix was familiar with the accused since 2009, and they were involved in a love affair. The appellant established a physical relationship with her under the pretext of marriage. However, after keeping the prosecutrix and her family members in the dark for about two months, the appellant refused to marry her and performed marriage with another girl. The Sessions Court convicted the appellant under Section 376 of the IPC, and the High Court confirmed the judgment.

Issues:

Whether the prosecutrix's consent, given under the belief of a false promise of marriage, could excuse the accused from the charge of rape under Section 375 of the IPC.

Held:

The court held that if it is established that the accused had no intention to marry from the inception and induced consent based on false promises, such consent would be a consent on a misconception of fact under Section 90 of the IPC. This would not excuse the accused, and he could be convicted for rape under Section 375 and 376 of the IPC (Para 12).

The prosecution successfully proved that the accused never intended to marry the prosecutrix, and her consent was based on a false promise. The court rejected the argument that the prosecutrix, being educated, should have known about the accused's impending marriage. Both courts rightly convicted the accused under Section 376 of the IPC, maintaining the seriousness of rape as a morally reprehensible crime (Para 14, 15).

Despite the accused's subsequent marriage and any actions of the prosecutrix, the court, considering the circumstances and a request by the appellant's counsel, reduced the sentence from 10 years' rigorous imprisonment to seven years, the minimum prescribed at the relevant time (Para 16).

Facts:

The Competent Authority under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (MISA) directed the detention of 'R' on 5.11.1974, prior to the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA), coming into force on 13.12.1974. On 19.12.1974, the Competent Authority under COFEPOSA directed further detention. The detenu's son filed a writ of habeas corpus on 29.4.1975. Proclamation of Emergency on 25.6.1975, subsequent amendments to COFEPOSA, and the enforcement of SAFEMA on 25.1.1976 were critical developments. Emergency was lifted on 21.3.1977, leading to the revocation of detention orders on 22.3.1977.

Issues:

The applicability of SAFEMA to the case of 'R' concerning the detention orders under COFEPOSA during the Emergency period.

Held:

The order of detention under Section 3(1) of COFEPOSA could be made to prevent activities prejudicial to foreign exchange. The maximum period of detention varied based on declarations under Section 9 and Section 12A of COFEPOSA.

Section 2 of SAFEMA applied to persons with orders of detention under COFEPOSA, subject to the proviso in Section 2(2)(b). The substantive provision would not apply if the order was revoked during specified periods outlined in the proviso.

Part (i) of the proviso to Section 2(2)(b) dealt with cases where Section 9 or Section 12A of COFEPOSA did not apply. In this case, neither Section 9 nor Section 12A applied, making SAFEMA applicable.

The order of detention was not revoked under any proviso conditions nor set aside by a competent court. SAFEMA provisions applied, as per Part (i) of the proviso.

The High Court rightly observed that the detention "had run right through the duration or continuance of the emergency." The failure to agitate the matter on merits during the pendency of the writ petition was noted.

The representation dated 17.01.1975, rejection communicated on 11.02.1975, and the absence of grievances regarding communication of grounds or identical grounds weakened challenges to the detention order under COFEPOSA.

The Competent Authority and the Appellate Tribunal under SAFEMA found the properties mentioned in the schedules illegally acquired and forfeited. The Writ Petition deserved to be rejected.

Facts:

The appellant was enrolled in the Corps of Signals of the Indian Army as a Radio Mechanic on 18 February 1971.

On 18 August 1981, he was discharged from military service under Army Rule 13(3) on account of being placed in a low medical category.

The appellant claimed to suffer from a Chronic Duodenal Ulcer due to his participation in Operation Cactus Lilly in 1971.

The appellant moved the Armed Forces Tribunal for the grant of war injury pension, which was declined based on the view that the disability was not attributable to participation in action.

The appellant sought disability pension for the period between 1996 and 2014.

Issues:

Whether the appellant should be granted disability pension between 1996 and 2014?

Held:

On 26 November 2018, the Court allowed the appeal for consideration of disability pension between 1996 and 2014.

The chart submitted by the respondents indicated varying assessments of disability over the years, leading to the denial of disability pension from 24 March 1995.

With effect from 30 January 2014, the appellant's disability was assessed at 20% on a permanent basis for life by the Military Hospital, Danapur Cantt.

The Court found the denial of disability pension for the period between 24 March 1995 and 30 January 2014 misconceived, considering the previous order passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal rounding off the disability element.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant directed to be granted arrears on account of disability pension between 24 March 1995 and 30 January 2014 in accordance with applicable rates.