Facts:

The suit involved a dispute over an agreement of sale regarding agricultural land. The parties settled the matter and entered into a compromise accepted by the Lok Adalat, resulting in an award. Subsequently, one party filed a suit challenging the validity of the award, alleging fraud and misrepresentation.

Issues:

Whether the suit challenging the award of Lok Adalat was maintainable or whether it should have been challenged through a writ petition under Article 226 or/and 227 of the Constitution.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the challenge to the award of Lok Adalat should be made through a writ petition under Article 226 or/and 227 of the Constitution, and only on very limited grounds. The Court reiterated the principle laid down in State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh, which established the exclusive remedy of filing a writ petition for challenging Lok Adalat awards. The Court clarified that the term "law" in Order 7, Rule 11 (d) of the Code includes judicial precedents, and therefore, the suit challenging the Lok Adalat award was barred by law.

The Court set aside the High Court's decision, restored the trial court's order rejecting the plaint, and allowed the defendants' application under Order 7, Rule 11 (d) of the Code, resulting in the rejection of the plaint. However, the Court granted liberty to the respondents to challenge the award by filing a writ petition in the High Court and emphasized that it had not examined the merits of the case, leaving it to the writ court to decide accordingly.

Facts:

The respondent was accused in a case involving fraudulent inducement and financial irregularities.

The respondent's bank accounts were frozen during the investigation.

The respondent was granted bail under certain conditions, including monthly deposits of a specific amount.

The respondent sought modification of bail conditions, which was rejected.

Subsequently, the respondent filed a criminal application before the Bombay High Court seeking relief, including de-freezing of bank accounts.

This application was withdrawn with liberty reserved to apply for discharge if a charge-sheet was filed.

The respondent then filed another application for similar relief before a Single Judge of the High Court.

Issues:

Whether filing another application for similar relief after withdrawing a previous application constitutes an abuse of process.

Held:

The Supreme Court agreed with the state's argument and set aside the Single Judge's decision, stating that the filing of another application for the same relief after withdrawing a previous application constituted an abuse of process. The court did not address other legal questions raised in the case and kept them open for future consideration. Consequently, the respondent's application before the High Court stands dismissed.

Facts:

Meraj Ahmad was appointed on a temporary basis as a Livestock Development Assistant in Uttar Pradesh.

An FIR was lodged against him under Section 302 of the IPC, leading to the termination of his services.

Meraj Ahmad was acquitted of the charges and subsequently sought fresh appointment, explicitly stating he would not claim benefits from his prior service.

He was appointed as a Livestock Extension Inspector with the condition that he would not be entitled to the benefit of his past service.

Meraj Ahmad filed writ petitions challenging the termination of his previous service and seeking continuity in employment.

Issues:

Whether Meraj Ahmad is entitled to continuity of service despite his prior termination and explicit agreement to forego benefits from his previous employment.

Whether the judgments of the Single Judge and Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court granting him continuity of service were justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Meraj Ahmad, by seeking fresh appointment and explicitly agreeing to forego benefits from his previous service, relinquished any claim to continuity of service. The Court found that the Single Judge and Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court erred in granting him continuity of service, considering his voluntary acceptance of termination and subsequent appointment. Therefore, the Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court and the direction to grant continuity of service to Meraj Ahmad from the date of termination. The Court made no order as to costs.

Facts:

The deceased was arrested by accused No. 2 and accused No. 5, who were serving as Inspector In-charge and Police Constable, respectively.

The deceased was brought to the police station in a fit condition but was later found dead in police custody with multiple injuries on his body.

Both accused No. 2 and accused No. 5 claimed alibi, stating they had left the police station around the time of the incident.

Issues:

Whether the plea of alibi set up by the accused respondents is tenable in law.

Whether the circumstances prove the accused respondents' responsibility for the injuries causing the death of the deceased.

Held:

The court held that the acquittal of the accused respondents under Section 304 Part II read with Section 34 IPC could not be legally sustained. The plea of alibi was rejected based on inconsistencies in the evidence.

Considering the circumstantial evidence and the fact that the deceased was in custody of the accused respondents at the time of his death, the court concluded that they were responsible for the injuries causing his death. The accused respondents were convicted of the offense under Section 304 Part II read with Section 34 IPC and were sentenced to ten years of rigorous imprisonment. The appeals consequently are allowed.

Facts:

The dispute arises between members of a Hindu family, including uncle, aunt, and nephews, regarding ownership and partition of agricultural lands.

The family tree is provided, showing the relationship between the parties involved.

The appellants filed a suit seeking declaration and partition of certain properties claimed to be self-acquired, while the respondents contested this claim, asserting that the properties were ancestral and had been partitioned previously.

Issues:

Whether the properties claimed by the appellants as self-acquired were indeed so.

Whether the partition of ancestral properties had occurred as claimed by the respondents.

Held:

The Court upheld the findings of the trial court and the high court, which concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove their case regarding the ownership of the properties in question.

The Court emphasized the burden of proof on the plaintiffs to establish their claims, which they failed to discharge.

The legal presumption of jointness in a Hindu family and the absence of evidence to the contrary led to the rejection of the plaintiffs' claims.

The appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The dispute arose regarding the proper annual valuation of premises for tax assessment under the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980.

The premises consisted of a two-storey building and adjoining land.

The Assessing Officer had determined the valuation of the premises for two assessment years, which was challenged by the appellant before the Tribunal.

Issues:

What is the proper annual value of the premises under Section 174 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980?

How should the annual value be determined for tax assessment purposes?

Held:

The Supreme Court analyzed Section 174 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, which distinguishes between land with buildings and open land without buildings for the purpose of annual valuation. It held that these sections operate in separate fields, and the two categories should not be clubbed together for assessment.

The Court disagreed with the High Court's direction to treat land and building as separate units for assessment. It upheld the Tribunal's decision to apply Section 174(1) for determining the gross annual value of the premises. The Court restored the Tribunal's order dated 18.11.2002.

The result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed.

Facts:

The appellant, Maharaja Amrinder Singh, challenged the decision of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, which allowed the appeals filed by the Revenue (Commissioner of Wealth Tax) under Section 27-A of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957. The High Court set aside the orders passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and restored the order of assessment passed by the Assessing Officer for levying penalty for the entire period of delay in respect of Assessment Years 1981-82, 1982-83, and 1983-84.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in allowing the appeals filed by the Revenue and setting aside the orders passed by the Tribunal.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court had proceeded to decide the appeals without formulating the substantial questions of law, as required by Section 27-A of the Wealth Tax Act.

The Court found that the High Court failed to determine whether the appeals involved any substantial questions of law and, therefore, the impugned orders of the High Court were not legally sustainable. Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the impugned orders, and remanded the cases to the High Court for deciding the appeals afresh, directing the High Court to formulate the substantial questions of law involved in the appeals and decide them accordingly. As a result, the appeals succeed and are allowed.

Facts:

The respondent leased premises to the appellant-company from 1964 to 1985.

Legal proceedings ensued when the respondent sought possession.

Various orders were passed by lower courts and the High Court.

The appellant eventually surrendered possession on 08.10.1998.

The respondent filed a fresh suit (Civil Suit No. 457 of 1998) claiming damages for wrongful possession.

Issues:

Whether the subsequent suit for mesne profits is maintainable?

Whether the respondent had relinquished the claim for mesne profits in previous proceedings?

Held:

The Supreme Court agreed with the appellant's argument, stating that the subsequent suit for mesne profits was not maintainable. The court emphasized that the respondent had relinquished the claim for mesne profits in previous proceedings, and subsequent actions were barred by Order II Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code.

The court ruled in favor of the appellant, holding that the possession of the appellant was not illegal or unauthorized, and the respondent was not entitled to claim mesne profits for the period in question.

Facts:

Samar Kumar Roy filed a suit against Jharna Bera seeking a declaratory decree and perpetual injunction regarding their alleged marriage.

The plaintiff passed away during the pendency of the suit, and his mother applied to be substituted as his legal representative.

The High Court set aside the substitution, stating that no right to sue survived after the plaintiff's death.

The appellant's counsel argued that the suit was maintainable under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act even after the plaintiff's death.

Issues:

Whether a suit filed under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act by a legal representative of a deceased plaintiff is maintainable.

The jurisdiction of family courts in matters related to such suits.

Whether the suit is time-barred.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that A suit for declaration of a legal character, including the status of parties to a marriage, under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, could be filed by a third-party plaintiff or continued by the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff. This was affirmed by various judgments from different High Courts.

The exclusion of jurisdiction under the Family Courts Act, 1984 applied only to suits or proceedings specifically related to the Hindu Marriage Act or the Special Marriage Act, and not to suits filed under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act.

The cause of action would begin to run from the date of the plaintiff's death, and in this case, the appellant's application to continue the suit was timely.

The appellant's counsel offered to settle the matter by sharing the deceased plaintiff's estate with the respondent, and the court directed the respondent to file an affidavit disclosing the amounts received due to her alleged marriage with the deceased plaintiff, with half of the total amount stated therein to be payable to the appellant.