Facts:

The Government of India, on July 5, 2002, decided to disinvest its shares in ITDC, transferring one of its hotel properties, Indraprastha Hotel, to HQRL. Appellant No.3, Moral Trading & Investment Ltd., successfully bid for the shares. Legal disputes ensued, including a civil suit filed by HQRL seeking an injunction and another suit by Hillcrest Realty for a declaration of voting rights.

Issues:

The violation of various sections of the Companies Act, alleging oppression and mismanagement by the RPM Group, the absence of notice to Director 'AM' during crucial resolutions, and the overall validity of share transfers.

Held:

The Supreme Court observed that the determination of whether HQRL lost its private character and became a public limited company depended on the pending suits. Prima facie, HQRL altered its status, but the Court refrained from a final decision.( Para 62)

The order in Ram Parshottam Mittal is not final; it represents a prima facie view for the purpose of injunction. The interim observations are not considered binding.( Para 65)

Section 286, requiring notice to the Director, is crucial. The absence of notice to 'AM' during resolutions makes them unfair and invalid.( Paras 74-76)

The Directors' improper allotment of shares to themselves, excluding 'AM,' without proper notice, is deemed improper.( Para 81)

Pending suits will conclusively determine if HQRL is a private or public limited company. This impacts the applicability of sections 85 to 89 and the rights of preference shareholders.( Paras 83, 84)

Section 108 operates independently, and its violation, along with the failure to file share certificates, was noted. The High Court's order under Section 340 Cr.P.C. against 'RPM' was upheld.( Para 87)

Considering the overall scenario, the impugned order was not interfered with. However, the direction to prosecute 'RPM' was set aside.( Para 89)

Facts:

The appellant, Advocate Rakesh Tiwari, was convicted for contempt of court for his undesirable conduct towards the Chief Judicial Magistrate (C.J.M.) Alok Pandey. The incident involved the advocate entering the chamber of the C.J.M., hurling abuses, attempting to assault him, and making threats. The advocate had alleged bias and interference in a case he was involved in.

Issues:

Whether the advocate's actions constituted criminal contempt of court?

What would be an appropriate sentence for the advocate's misconduct?

Held:

The High Court found the advocate guilty of criminal contempt, noting his lack of apology and the scandalization of the subordinate court. The original sentence included imprisonment for six months, a fine of Rs. 2000, and a restriction from entering the judgeship of Allahabad. The Supreme Court modified the sentence as follows:

The six-month imprisonment is suspended for three years, subject to good conduct and a condition not to enter the District Judgeship, Allahabad, for an additional three years.

The imprisonment may be activated if the advocate breaches any condition within the three-year period.

The advocate must deposit the Rs. 2000 fine, and failure to do so will result in a three-month restriction from the District Judgeship.

FACTS:

Appellants filed a complaint before NCDRC citing deficiency of service by the respondents related to a residential flat booking.

NCDRC issued a conditional order on 16 November 2018, requiring the appellants to file a rejoinder and evidence within four weeks.

NCDRC, on 15 February 2019, dismissed the complaint, citing the appellants' failure to file the rejoinder and evidence.

ISSUES:

Was the dismissal of the complaint justified based on a technicality?

Did the NCDRC's observation regarding the appellants lacking merit in the case influence the decision unfairly?

HELD:

The judgement clarifies that the ground for rejecting the complaint was technical and disregarded the principles of substantial justice. The court emphasized that such dismissals on technicalities go against the purpose of establishing the NCDRC and burden the litigants, defeating the objective of ensuring justice in consumer fora.( Paragraph 2 )

Highlights the court's concern about marginal delays not being condoned by the NCDRC due to stipulated timeframes in the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The court acknowledges the challenges in disposing of complaints promptly due to resource constraints and urges consumer fora to consider this reality.( Paragraph 4 )

Sets aside the impugned order of the NCDRC and restores the consumer complaint to its file, emphasizing that the dismissal was based on a mere technicality. No notice was issued to the respondent in this case.( Paragraph 5 )

Notes the readiness of the appellants with the rejoinder and affidavit of evidence, instructing the NCDRC to take them on record.( Paragraph 6 )

The Appeal is accordingly disposed of..( Paragraph 7 )

Facts:

Respondents engaged as Store Watchmen on daily wages under NMR basis temporarily.

Engagement order explicitly stated the temporary nature of employment with no claim to further appointment.

Board decision led to closure of Sectional stores, resulting in termination of respondents' services in 1990.

Industrial dispute raised, referred to Labour Court, which ordered reinstatement and back wages at 50%.

Single Judge affirmed reinstatement, granted 50% back wages due to pendency since 1991.

Division Bench affirmed Single Judge's decision.

Issues:

Validity of termination of temporary workers.

Burden of proof regarding continuous work for 240 days.

Quantum of back wages and reinstatement.

Held:

The initial burden is on respondents to show continuous work for 240 days, but both Single Judge and Division Bench erred in placing the burden on the appellant-Board.

Considering the age of most respondents, reinstatement not applicable. Focus on 50% back wages and compensation.

Appellant-Board provided a chart calculating 50% back wages, and the amount already paid was considered in full quit of all claims, including compensation in lieu of reinstatement.

Facts:

A Company Petition was filed, and documents (No. 1 to 54) were submitted by the Respondents. The Appellant alleged theft/misappropriation of these documents. Documents 2 to 28 were alleged to be photocopied and returned, while documents 29 to 54 were not returned.

Issues:

The alleged theft/misappropriation of documents and the validity of the criminal complaint based on these allegations.

Held:

The court found that the allegations in the complaint lacked material particulars and were vague regarding the commission of theft (Para 39, 42, 47).

Specific averments against the respondents were missing, and the statements lacked details on how the accused were responsible for moving the documents out of the appellant's possession (Para 48).

The statements of the employee were considered insufficient, being a bare statement without specific allegations against the accused (Para 54).

The Magistrate's order lacked application of mind, and the issuance of summons was not well-founded, lacking a prima facie case against the accused (Para 57).

The complaint lacked particulars regarding the time and place of theft, and how the documents went out of the complainant's possession (Para 58).

The court emphasized the restricted scope of enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. and the serious responsibility of the Magistrate to ensure sufficient grounds before issuing process (Para 61).

The court ruled that the use of documents in pending litigations did not amount to theft and lacked dishonest intention or wrongful gain, resulting in no wrongful loss to the appellant (Para 70).

Considering the facts and the number of litigations, the court deemed the continuation of criminal proceedings an abuse of the court's process, quashing the criminal complaint (Para 89).

Facts:

The appellant, originally the defendant, purchased a property in 1971.

The property was subject to the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act of 1973.

The Land Reforms Tribunal found excess land held by the appellant in 1976.

The appellant entered into an agreement to sell the property in 1985 with the respondent.

The respondent paid part of the sale consideration, demanded the original sale deed, and sought measurement of the land.

The appellant, allegedly breaching the agreement, did not execute the sale deed or measure the land.

The respondent filed a suit for specific performance in 1993.

Issues:

Whether the plaintiff (respondent) was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.

Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the alternative relief of refund of advance sale consideration.

To what relief is the plaintiff entitled?

Held:

The learned trial Court and the High Court found that the appellant breached the agreement by not performing her contractual obligations. The plaintiff (respondent) demonstrated readiness and willingness to perform his part, as observed in the cross-examination and upheld by both courts. The absence of a specific mention in the agreement regarding land measurement was not decisive, as the respondent rightfully insisted on obtaining title documents and land measurement. The appellant's failure to provide necessary documents and measure the land released the respondent from the obligation to deposit the balance sale consideration. The plaintiff's deposit within the extended time showed his bona fides. The plea of hardship raised by the appellant was not entertained due to its absence in the written statement. The decisions cited by the appellant were found inapplicable. The appeal was dismissed, confirming the decree for specific performance.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute over the ownership of properties, with the plaintiffs claiming a 3/4th share in the suit properties. The properties were purchased by the father-in-law in the name of his wife (defendant no.1), leading to allegations of benami transactions.

Issues:

Whether the lower courts erred in shifting the burden to the defendants to prove that the sale transactions were not benami.

Whether the payment of part sale consideration alone is sufficient to determine a transaction as benami.

Whether the surrounding circumstances, relationships, motives, and subsequent conduct were adequately considered in determining the intention behind the transactions.

The impact of the Benami Amendment Act, 2016 on the case.

Held:

The trial court and the High Court erred in shifting the burden to the defendants without the plaintiffs proving, by cogent evidence, the intention of the father-in-law to purchase the properties in the name of his wife (defendant no.1). The reasoning and findings of the lower courts were not in line with the established circumstances by the Supreme Court.( Para 8.4, 9)

The payment of part sale consideration cannot be the sole criterion for deeming a transaction benami. The intention behind the contribution of purchase money must be assessed based on various factors, including the relationship between the parties.( Para 9.1)

The stamp duty at the time of the execution of the Sale Deed alone cannot establish a transaction as benami. Insufficient consideration of other documentary evidence by the lower courts.( Para 9.2)

The Release Deed executed by defendant no.1, on payment of Rs.10,000, was misinterpreted as evidence of joint family properties. Defendant no.1 clarified that it was to avoid future litigation, not an acknowledgment of joint family properties.( Para 9.3)

Defendant no.1's Will and subsequent revocation indicated her consistent belief that the properties were self-acquired, purchased from Stridhana and the sale of jewelry.( Para 9.4)

Plaintiffs claimed that the properties were purchased from funds received by selling ancestral properties, but the timing of transactions contradicts this. The properties were acquired before the sale of ancestral properties.( Para 10, 11)

The Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988, and its 2016 amendment were discussed. The court rejected the argument that the amendment affects the presumption of transactions in the name of the wife or children being for their benefit.( Para 12)

Once established that the Sale Deeds were not benami transactions, plaintiffs have no share in the suit properties (except specified ones). The judgments granting 3/4th share to the plaintiffs were quashed and set aside.( Para 12.1, 13)

Facts:

The appellants, belonging to the Scheduled Caste category, challenged the selection process for the limited departmental examination for the promotion to the post of Sub-Inspector (Civil Police) in the Police Department of Uttar Pradesh. The examination was conducted by the UP Police Recruitment and Promotion Board, and the appellants alleged that the selection process was undertaken without applying the Reservation Policy.

Issues:

Whether the selection process was conducted in accordance with the Reservation Policy.

Whether the criteria for securing 50% marks should be reckoned subject-wise or paper-wise.

Held:

The Court emphasized the importance of maintaining the merit-based selection process and upheld the requirement of a minimum of 50% marks in each subject.( Para 13)

The Court rejected the reliance on a previous order, stating that it did not decide the current controversy and could not serve as a precedent.( Para 14)

The Court dismissed the appeal, stating that the appellants did not fulfill the criteria of obtaining 50% marks in each subject.( Para 15)

Facts:

The appellant is a society running educational institutions, including a non-Governmental Educational Institution.

The employees were engaged on a temporary basis and were terminated due to the abolition of posts in light of financial losses faced by the institution.

Issues:

Whether the removal of employees due to the abolition of posts falls under the purview of Section 18 of the Act?

Whether the decision of the Managing Committee to abolish posts was arbitrary or mala fide?

Held:

The Court examines the applicability of Section 18 of the Act and Rule 39 of the 1993 Rules in cases of removal due to the abolition of posts.( Paragraph 9)

Reference to the decision in Shri Maheshwari Senior Higher Secondary School vs. Bhikha Ram Sharma (1996) 8 SCC 22, emphasizing that in cases of termination due to the abolition of posts, no enquiry under the Rules is required.( Paragraph 11)

The Court discusses the State's communication, stating no approval is needed for removal if the posts were not aided and appointments were not approved by the Education Department.( Paragraph 13)

Critique of the Division Bench's observation that the issue was raised for the first time, highlighting the consistent stand of the Management on the applicability of Section 18. The present appeals are allowed. ( Paragraph 14)