Facts:

A suit was filed claiming a sum of Rs. 6,94,63,114 on 10.03.2017. The defendant was served with summons on 14.07.2017. The court allowed a grace period of 120 days for filing a written statement, and an Order 7, Rule 11 application was rejected. A subsequent application sought to rely on recent changes in the Code of Civil Procedure.

Issues:

The interpretation of the amended provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, specifically Order 8, Rules 1 and 10, and whether the consequences of not filing a written statement within the stipulated time frame are mandatory.

Held:

The court, after considering the recent amendments and various precedents, held that the consequences outlined in the amended provisions are indeed mandatory. Beyond 120 days from the date of service of summons, the defendant forfeits the right to file a written statement, and the court has no power to extend this time. The court rejected the argument that inherent powers could be invoked to circumvent these provisions.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, resulting in the removal of the written statement of Defendant No.1 from the record.

Facts:

The Trial Court convicted 11 accused persons under various sections of the IPC, including Sections 148, 302/149, 323/149, and 506/149. The High Court acquitted 8 accused persons under Section 302/149 IPC and upheld the conviction of 3 accused persons under Section 302/34 IPC. During the pendency of the appeal in the Supreme Court, one of the appellants (No. 1) expired.

Issues:

Validity of the alteration of charges from Section 302/149 IPC to Section 302/34 IPC.

Applicability of Section 149 IPC after the acquittal of 8 co-accused.

Justification for sustaining the conviction of the three appellants.

Held:

Once eight co-accused were acquitted under Section 302/149 IPC, the charge under Section 149 IPC collapsed against the three appellants as there could be no unlawful assembly consisting of less than five accused persons. In other words, the appellants (3 in number) could not be charged with the aid of Section 149 IPC for want of numbers.( Para 55)

The High Court had the jurisdiction to alter the charge from Section 149 IPC to Section 34 IPC, but in the absence of evidence of common intention among the three appellants, their conviction under Section 302/34 IPC is not legally sustainable.( Para 56)

The prosecution did not set up a case that all 11 accused persons shared a common intention under Section 34 IPC. The High Court failed to give any reasons in support of the altered conviction, and the invoking of Section 34 IPC at the appellate stage cannot be upheld.( Paras 62 and 63)

The post-mortem report indicated that both assaults by appellant Nos. 2 and 3 caused simple injuries to the victim, not resulting in her death.( Para 67)

In a case of this nature, where there is a fight between two groups and the State does not pursue the plea of Section 149 IPC against the acquitted eight accused, and no evidence is relied upon for the charge of Section 34 IPC against the three accused, the two appellants are entitled to claim the benefit of entire scenario.( Para 68)

Appellant Nos. 2 and 3 could, at best, be convicted for an offence punishable under Section 324 IPC based on their individual participation in the commission of the crime.( Para 69)

Facts:

The case involved a challenge to Rule 24(i-eeee) of the Haryana Liquor License Rules, 1970, which provided for a single L-1BF license for the entire state to deal in imported foreign liquor. The contention was that this rule was ultra vires the powers of the Financial Commissioner under the Punjab Excise Act, 1914.

Issues:

The delegation of powers, specifically whether the Financial Commissioner had the authority to amend the rules regarding the number of licenses for the entire state, a power exclusive to the State Government.

Held:

The State Government, under Section 8 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914, has general superintendence and control of Excise Administration. The power to regulate the number of licenses for a local area is exclusively vested in the State Government under Section 58(2)(e).

The delegation of this power by the State Government to the Financial Commissioner is prohibited by Section 13(a). The amendment to Rule 24(i-eeee) by the Financial Commissioner is ultra vires the powers of the latter and is struck down.

The expression "local area" in Section 58(2)(e) implies the power of the State to place restrictions on the number of licenses within a specific local area. The power to regulate the sale of liquor, including the number of licenses, is within the purview of the Financial Commissioner under Section 59.

Rule 24(i-eeee) as amended by the Financial Commissioner is upheld, and the Financial Commissioner has the power to decide the number of licenses for the entire state.

Decision: The Court, by majority, held that Rule 24(i-eeee) as amended by the Financial Commissioner is ultra vires the powers of the Financial Commissioner and is therefore struck down.

Facts:

The Income Tax Department acquired a property under Section 269UD of the Income Tax Act. After the property was auctioned, the highest bidder (respondent) obtained a sale deed. The respondent sought conversion of leasehold rights to freehold rights from Delhi Development Authority (DDA), depositing conversion charges. DDA demanded additional payment for unearned increase, which was contested.

Issues:

Validity of DDA's demand for unearned increase.

Nature of rights transferred through auction.

Interpretation of Sale Deed and auction notice.

Applicability of the principle of merger.

Held:

The auction was based on the market value, and the Income Tax Department had already paid unearned increase. DDA's demand for unearned increase was unwarranted. The High Court rightly rejected DDA's claim.( Para 1 - 12)

The Sale Deed indicated a leasehold residential plot, supported by details in the auction notice. The bid was for leasehold rights, and the terms of the auction were binding.( Para 15 - 19)

Clause 3 of the Sale Deed explained the rights granted and harmonized with Clauses 1 and 2. The auction notice specified leasehold rights, influencing the interpretation of the Sale Deed.( Para 20 - 22)

Considering Section 269UE, Clause 3 of the Sale Deed was in line with the statutory mandate, conveying that all rights were not transferred to the petitioner.( Para 24 - 25)

The principle of merger, being a government grant, wasn't highly relevant. The Sale Deed did not convey all rights, diminishing the impact of the principle of merger.( Para 27)

The petitioner was not entitled to a refund of conversion charges. DDA was directed to process the conversion application for leasehold to freehold rights.( Para 29)

Facts:

The deceased and accused were friends who traveled together.

The deceased was injected with a drug leading to overdose and subsequent death.

Prosecution alleged murder and conspiracy based on circumstantial evidence.

Issues:

Lack of direct eyewitnesses; reliance on circumstantial evidence.

Failure of prosecution to establish a clear motive for murder.

Inconsistencies in medical evidence regarding the cause and time of death.

Allegations of the accused injecting the deceased with the drug.

Held:

The court emphasized the importance of proving each circumstance separately in cases based on circumstantial evidence.

Last seen together: Room No. 203 was hired by all involved, suggesting no premeditated murder plan by the accused.

Medical evidence: The prosecution failed to link the accused to the death, and inconsistencies in medical reports raised doubt.

Motive: Alleged motive of a love triangle not proven, and the introduced motive four years later lacked credibility.

Chandru being a medical student: Inference of his involvement in the crime was unfounded.

Inconsistency in statements: Discrepancies in statements cast doubt on the reliability of the evidence.

Delay in filing the private complaint: Lack of protest during the investigation against the accused raised questions about the credibility of the complainants.

Clean hands doctrine: The complainants did not come to court with clean hands, as the motive was introduced after four years.

FACTS:

On 26.07.1989, the State Government made a reference under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for resolving disputes.

The appellant did not appear before the Industrial Tribunal and suffered an adverse ex parte award.

The Industrial Tribunal decided the reference ex parte against the appellant.

The Single Judge set aside the award in a writ petition filed by the appellant.

The Division Bench of the High Court allowed the respondent's appeal and set aside the Single Judge's order in the appellant's absence.

The review petition filed by the appellant was dismissed.

ISSUES:

Whether the appellant, having not appeared before the Industrial Tribunal, is entitled to contest the reference on merits.

Whether there was a sufficient cause for the appellant's absence before the Industrial Tribunal.

HELD:

The appellant did not receive an opportunity to contest the reference before the Industrial Tribunal.

The cause shown for the appellant's absence constitutes a sufficient cause, entitling them to claim an opportunity to contest the reference on merits.

The appellant did not appear before the Tribunal from the inception, thus having no opportunity to contest the matter.

Every party has the right to contest the case on merits, and no exception disentitled the appellant.

Substantial justice demands an opportunity for both parties to contest the case on merits.

The appeals are allowed, setting aside the impugned orders and the ex parte award. The case is remanded to the Industrial Tribunal.

The appellant is granted an opportunity to file a written statement, and parties can amend statements, file documents, and present oral evidence.

The Industrial Tribunal is directed to decide the reference within six months from the date of appearance.

Facts:

The landlord, initially a minor on tillers day, filed an application under Section 31(3) for personal cultivation upon attaining majority. The application was dismissed, leading the tenant to initiate proceedings under Section 32G. The original authority rejected the tenant's claim, citing non-compliance with Section 32F(1A). The appellate authority reversed this finding, but the Tribunal upheld the original authority's decision. The tenant's writ petition in the High Court was dismissed, and the review petition faced a similar fate.

Issues:

Whether the tenant, upon rejection of the landlord's application under Section 31, attains the status of a deemed purchaser under Section 29 r/w Section 32.

Whether compliance with the provisions of Section 32F(1A) is necessary for a tenant who has acquired deemed status.

Held:

The First Proviso to Section 32(1) along with Section 29 establishes that if a landlord's possession application is rejected, the tenant is deemed to have purchased the land. Section 32F, however, entitles the tenant to purchase, especially in cases involving a minor landlord attaining majority.( Para 52)

Sections 29, 32, and 32F deal with two mutually exclusive situations. If a tenant has a deemed status under Section 29 r/w Section 32, there is no need for the tenant to apply for purchase under Section 32F. The two scenarios are distinct.( Para 53)

In the present case, if the landlord invoked Section 29 r/w Section 32, and the application was rejected, the tenant would acquire deemed status. In such cases, Section 32F need not be invoked.( Para 54)

The appellant, being a tenant of the first respondent, acquired deemed status with the rejection of the landlord's application. No further action, such as sending intimation under Section 32F(1A), was required.( Para 65)

Despite discrepancies in dates, the appellant produced orders by the Appellate Authority and the Tribunal, showing that the landlord litigated the matter at multiple levels. Discrepancies should not be a basis for adverse findings against the appellant.( Para 64)

Facts:

IMTRAT personnel filed writ petitions seeking parity between BCA and FA.

Cabinet decision dated 30.11.1999 regarding the removal of depression on BCA and imposition of charges for free facilities.

Ministry of Defence order dated 20.09.2005 implemented the cabinet decision prospectively.

High Court allowed writ petitions on 22.11.2005, setting aside the Ministry of Defence order to the extent it gave relief prospectively.

Issues:

Interpretation of the term "civilian counterparts."

Validity of the clarification made in the impugned judgment dated 07.05.2007, affirming parity between BCA and FA.

Held:

High Court not justified in concluding a legitimate case for parity. Differences in requirements and entitlements outlined.

IMTRAT and MEA personnel have distinct terms of appointment and conditions of service, negating the case for parity.

Clarification beyond the scope of the original order. No valid grounds for granting parity. Original order directions fully complied with.

Decision: Partly allowing the appeal, the Court held that there was no valid ground for parity between BCA payable to IMTRAT personnel and FA payable to MEA personnel. The clarification in the impugned judgment exceeded the scope of the original order, and the differences in requirements and entitlements between the two groups were emphasized.

Facts:

Faquirey was convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Trial Court.

The High Court converted the conviction to an offense under Section 304 Part I, IPC, and sentenced Faquirey to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment.

The incident involved Faquirey shooting the deceased due to a grudge, stemming from the deceased's past conduct regarding Faquirey's wife.

Issues:

Whether the conviction under Section 302 IPC was rightly converted to Section 304 Part I, IPC by the High Court.

Application of Exception I to Section 300 IPC in the context of provocation.

The voluntariness of the provocation and its relevance to the accused's liability.

Held:

The shot fired by Faquirey was a result of a grudge against the deceased, and the High Court erred in converting the conviction.

Exception I to Section 300 IPC was discussed, emphasizing that culpable homicide is not murder if the offender is deprived of self-control by grave and sudden provocation.

The First Proviso to Exception I highlights that the provocation should not be voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for harming another person.

The court concluded that the provocation in this case was voluntary on Faquirey's part, and he cannot claim exemption under Section 304 Part I, IPC.

The High Court's conversion of the conviction was deemed a serious error, and the judgment of the Trial Court convicting Faquirey under Section 302 IPC and sentencing him to life imprisonment was restored.

Despite Faquirey having served 10 years, he was directed to surrender within four weeks to serve the remaining sentence.