Facts:

The Board of Revenue, in accordance with Section 90, introduced Rule 106 (Tha) via a notification dated 06.11.2012, imposing fees on the import of rectified spirit. The High Court held that the State lacked legislative competence to impose such fees, asserting that rectified spirit is non-potable liquor unfit for human consumption. The State argued that the fee was not on raw rectified spirit but on pure alcoholic liter ('LPL') used in the production of potable liquor.

Issues:

The legislative competence of the State to impose fees on the import of rectified spirit, particularly concerning whether it pertains to non-potable liquor or is intended for the production of potable liquor.

Held:

The court clarified that the levy under Rule 106 (Tha) is not on the imported rectified spirit itself but on the manufactured product, Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL), which is potable alcohol suitable for human consumption (Para 10).

The imposition only fructifies upon the completion of the distillation process, specifically when the product IMFL is ready for bottling. The levy is not at the stage of import or initial distillation of rectified spirit but just before bottling the final product (Para 10).

The court emphasized that the levy is on the produced foreign liquor before it is bottled for sale, and the State has the legislative competence to regulate potable alcohol, including levying charges for regulating its production (Para 11).

The court distinguished the nature of the levy, stating that it is not in the form of a tax or excise duty but rather charges for regulating the production of potable liquor and preserving public health and morality (Para 14).

The fact that the manufacturer had obtained licenses for import and production of foreign liquor does not mean the State surrendered its rights. The amended provision enables the State to levy charges for ceding its rights related to foreign liquor production (Para 15).

Decision: The appeal is allowed, upholding the State's authority to levy charges on the production of potable liquor using imported rectified spirit under Rule 106 (Tha) of the Jharkhand Excise Act, 1915.

Facts:

The case revolves around the intestate death of 'JDA,' leaving behind his wife, sons, daughters, and adopted children. The adopted daughter 'TKJ' married and passed away, leading to a dispute over the partition of the property. The trial court dismissed the suit, leading to appeals by the plaintiffs and defendant nos. 3-5.

Issues:

The conversion and relinquishment claim of 'TKJ,' the status of defendant nos. 3-5 as adopted children, and the entitlement to a share in the suit property.

Held:

Conversion and Relinquishment: The High Court erred in granting the plaintiffs a 1/4th share based on TKJ being the heir. The trial court's dismissal was justified, considering TKJ's conduct during her lifetime. Defendant no.2's expenses for property improvement supported the defense's claim.

Maintainability of Appeal: The appeal at the instance of defendant nos. 3-5 was maintainable, as they were aggrieved by the trial court's decree. The court clarified the nature of cross objections.

Division of Property: The suit property was to be divided among defendant no.2, defendant no.3, and defendant nos. 4 & 5. The High Court's share allocation was modified to give each a 1/3rd share.

Decision: The High Court's decision was quashed, and the trial court's decree dismissing the suit was restored. The appeal by defendant nos. 3-5 was partly allowed, modifying the property division.

FACTS:

Appellants challenged the fourth amendment to the Regulations.

Appellants operated a 9.90 MW Biomass Power Plant declared operational on May 3, 2013.

Amendment aimed to revise norms for determining generic tariff for the second control period starting from April 1, 2013.

Appellants argued amendment was arbitrary and discriminatory.

ISSUES:

Validity of the fourth amendment to the Regulations.

Classification of projects commissioned in different financial years during the same control period.

HELD:

The High Court's decision lacked intelligible discussion and was disposed of in a casual manner. The Supreme Court refrained from expressing any opinion on the merits but directed a fresh consideration by the High Court.( Paragraph 8)

The importance of a writ petition under Article 226/227 for challenging elaborate orders like the one passed by the Commission on August 4, 2015. The Supreme Court agrees with the appellants on this point.( Paragraph 10)

In conclusion, the Supreme Court allows the appeal, sets aside the High Court's judgment, and restores the case to the High Court for reconsideration on its own merits.

REFERRED CASES:

PTC India Ltd. Vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, Through Secretary, (2010) 4 SCC 603

Facts:

The procurer initiated a bidding process for power supply, and the appellant secured a bid to supply 1000 MW power at a specified rate. The bid was based on GMDC's commitment to supply coal. Disputes arose between the appellant and GMDC, leading to the termination of the PPA by the appellant.

Issues:

The validity of the appellant's termination of the PPA, interpretation of the relevant provisions in the PPA (Article 3.4.2 and Article 3.1.2), and the entitlement of the appellant to compensatory tariff.

Held:

The Appellate Tribunal's approach was deemed erroneous, and a harmonious reading of Article 3.4.2 and Article 3.1.2 of the PPA indicates that either party has the right to terminate the contract for non-compliance.( Para 25)

The Tribunal's interpretation that Article 3.4.2 can be invoked only with an agreement on a violation of Article 3.1.2 conditions is incorrect. This would amount to rewriting the contract and render Article 3.4.2 ineffective.( Para 26)

Both the Commission and the Appellate Tribunal erred in concluding that termination under Article 3.4.2 requires an agreement on non-compliance by both parties, which would render the provision meaningless.( Para 31)

The specific provision under Article 3.4.2 prevails over the general provisions in Article 14 of the contract.( Para 34)

The appellant was justified in invoking Article 3.4.2 due to GMDC's non-compliance with conditions in Article 3.1.2.( Para 43)

The Tribunal's finding that the appellant's bid was not based on GMDC's commitment to supply indigenous coal was erroneous. The appellant was legally entitled to terminate the agreement.( Para 44)

The appellant is entitled to compensatory tariff considering the economic justice principle, including adjustment of project costs and interest on expenditures.( Para 49)

Referring to Section 62 of the Electricity Act, 2003, the parties are directed to the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) for the determination of compensatory tariff payable to the appellant from the termination date.( Para 50)

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over property No. 43, Prithviraj Road, New Delhi, with the appellants being the legal heirs of late V.N. Vasudeva, who purchased the property in an auction conducted by the Income Tax Department. The respondents, grandsons of Kirodimull Lohariwala, filed a Title Suit and a Writ Petition challenging the auction sale.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 293 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the constitutional validity of filing suits in civil courts against income tax authorities.

Held:

The court observes that Section 293 of the Income Tax Act puts a complete bar on filing suits in any civil court against the revenue or income tax authority. The High Court's earlier judgments seemed to have overlooked this legal provision. The court emphasizes the principles for the maintainability of a review application, as outlined in Kamlesh Verma Vs. Mayawati and Others.

In holding that the High Court's earlier judgment failed to consider the bar under Section 293 of the Income Tax Act, the court directs a reconsideration of the case on its own merits. The appeal is dismissed, and the High Court is directed to decide the writ petition expeditiously.

Facts:

The appellants filed a suit, and the respondents sought the rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the CPC, arguing that it disclosed no cause of action. The lower court bifurcated the plaint, and the High Court opined that the suit could continue against the company (defendant No. 1) alone.

Issues:

Whether it is permissible for the civil court to reject the plaint against specific defendants while allowing it to continue against others under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the CPC.

Held:

The court emphasized that the plaint must be rejected as a whole or not at all, and it is not permissible to reject the plaint against specific portions or defendants under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC.

The court examined the reliefs claimed by the respondent (Axis Bank Ltd.) in their notice of motion, seeking the rejection of the plaint only against them. The court found this relief to be a jurisdictional error, emphasizing that the plaint must be rejected as a whole or not at all.

The court noted that even if some reliefs against the bank are barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, such objections can be raised at a later stage using other remedies, and the court should consider them on their merits.

The court allowed the appeals, set aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench, and restored the order of the Single Judge dismissing the notice of motion. The notice of motion filed by the bank to reject the plaint against them was dismissed with liberty to the bank.

FACTS:

A notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued in 1998 for acquiring land in Maharashtra.

The Special Land Acquisition Officer passed an award in 2000, fixing the compensation rates for different types of land.

The respondents filed a reference under Section 18 of the Act, challenging the compensation awarded.

The Reference Court rejected the valuation report presented by the respondents, citing issues with the categorization of custard apple trees.

The High Court partially allowed the appeal, relying on the valuation report and a similar report accepted in a different reference case.

ISSUES:

The primary issue is the correctness of the valuation report and the compensation amount awarded for the acquired land.

The appellant raises concerns about the competency, eligibility, and reliability of the witness who prepared the valuation report.

HELD:

The Supreme Court criticized the High Court for not properly analyzing the evidence and contentions raised by the appellant. The Court emphasized that the witness was extensively cross-examined on aspects such as competency, eligibility, and the reliability of the valuation report. The High Court's reliance on a similar report accepted in a different case was deemed inappropriate. The case is remanded back to the High Court for reconsideration, allowing both parties to present their arguments and evidence afresh.

REFERRED CASES:

Chindha Fakira Patil (dead) through LRs. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Jalgaon, (2011) 10 SCC 787

Facts:

A criminal case was registered for various offenses against the appellant and other accused persons.

The appellant filed a discharge application under Section 227 Cr.P.C., claiming lack of material for the case against him.

The investigation was entrusted to the National Investigation Agency (NIA), and a charge sheet was submitted.

The trial Court dismissed the discharge application, and the High Court confirmed the decision.

Issues:

Whether there was sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

Whether the court should conduct a mini-trial at the discharge stage.

Whether a prima facie case of conspiracy existed among the accused persons.

Held:

The court emphasized that the trial Judge must exercise judicial discretion to determine whether a case for trial has been made out, without holding a mini-trial.

The court found prima facie material of conspiracy among the accused persons, justifying the framing of charges.

Legal principles related to Section 227 CrPC were cited, emphasizing the court's role in evaluating the material for a prima facie case.

The court observed that its remarks should not prejudice the rights of the parties during the trial.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the judgments of the trial Court and the High Court.