Facts:

Appellant, Naresh Chandra Bhardwaj, a Scale II Officer at Bank of India, sanctioned loans later classified as Non-Performing Assets.

Procedural abnormalities in the loan process were identified, posing a potential loss of Rs. 70.32 lakh to the Bank.

Disciplinary proceedings ensued, leading to the appellant's removal from service.

Issues:

Whether the punishment of removal from service could be altered to compulsory retirement.

Parity in punishment concerning two other officers, Mr. R.K. Mishra and Mr. V.K. Srivastava, who faced compulsory retirement for similar losses.

Held:

The Court emphasized limited judicial review on the quantum of punishment, primarily within the domain of disciplinary authorities.

Parity in punishment must be based on identical charges and post-incident conduct, with absolute equality.

Financial implications, specifically the appellant's pension option, played a role in the decision.

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal, altering the appellant's punishment from "removal from service" to "compulsory retirement," citing the lack of financial difference and identical roles with other officers.

Facts:

The State of Bihar issued an advertisement on July 24, 1985, inviting applications for 40 posts of Assistant Conservator of Forests (ACF). The appellants participated in the selection but were unsuccessful. Representations were made to appoint them against vacant posts beyond the advertised 40. The State appointed them on April 13, 1988, purportedly with reference to the 1985 advertisement. Further appointments occurred in 1987, 1990, 1992, and 1995. The proposal to regularize the appellants' services was approved in 2005.

Issues:

Determination of the legality of the appellants' appointment.

Seniority calculation concerning substantive appointments.

The regularisation proposal's impact on seniority.

Held:

Rule 35 of the Bihar Forest Service Rules, 1953, dictates that seniority is determined with reference to the date of substantive appointment. The appellants secured their appointments through representations, rendering them illegal and fortuitous.

The recruitment initiated in 1985 culminated with the exhaustion of the Merit List in 1987. No further appointments could be made from it. The appellants' appointments were illegal and contrary to the statutory rules.

The appellants, through persistent lobbying, secured appointments against the 1985 Advertisement, which was illegal and in violation of the rules.

A proposal to regularize their services was made, considering their 17 years of service. The irregularity of their 1988 appointments was acknowledged in the proposal.

The High Court rightly dismissed writ petitions and Letters Patent Appeals, holding that seniority is reckoned from the date of regularization in 2005, not from the illegal appointment in 1988.

Facts:

The appellant appealed against the judgment of the Sikkim High Court that enhanced his sentence from seven years to ten years under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The case originated from an incident where the appellant was convicted of attempting to sexually assault a minor girl, and the Special Judge sentenced him to seven years.

Issues:

Whether the High Court had the authority to enhance the sentence in an appeal challenging the conviction.

Whether the procedure prescribed under Section 386 proviso was followed, specifically regarding notice for enhancement.

Held:

The High Court's enhancement of the sentence from seven years to ten years was not in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The judgment was set aside to the extent of the enhancement. The sentence awarded by the Special Judge was maintained.

Decision: The appeal was partly allowed, affirming the conviction but setting aside the enhancement of the sentence. The Special Judge's sentence of seven years under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, and one month under Section 341 of IPC was upheld.

Facts:

The Respondent-State enacted the 2007 Act after the High Court declared the 2000 Act ultra vires. The challenge to the levy of Entry Tax was referred to a nine-Judge Bench by the Supreme Court. The High Court upheld the legislative competence in enacting the 2007 Act. The Supreme Court granted interim stay subject to the appellants depositing 50% of the accrued tax liability. The matter was referred to a Regular Bench after a nine-Judge Bench decision. The appellant was granted liberty to question the levy of Entry Tax under the 2007 Act, leading to Writ Petition No. 25730 of 17, challenging the validity of the 2007 Act.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in upholding the preliminary objection on the writ petition being a second petition on the same and consequential cause of action.

Whether Section 13 of the U.P. Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2007, applies mutatis mutandis to Section 33 of the U.P. Value Added Tax Act, 2008.

Whether the 2007 Act contains substantive law for the levy of interest on Entry Tax.

Held:

Writ Petition No. 25730 of 2017 was filed in pursuance of the liberty granted, challenging the vires of the 2007 Act. The Division Bench, in its judgment, explicitly restricted the consideration to the questions framed by the Regular Bench, thereby excluding issues not expressly permitted for consideration. The plea regarding the leviability of interest was specifically raised but not permitted for consideration. The Division Bench's restriction cannot operate as res judicata in a subsequent writ petition where the challenge was to the leviability of interest.

Section 13 of the U.P. Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2007, applies mutatis mutandis to Section 33 of the U.P. Value Added Tax Act, 2008. Even if Section 33 is treated as a machinery provision, it must be interpreted to make the liability effective and treated as substantive law for the levy of interest on Entry Tax.

The High Court erred in upholding the preliminary objection, and the matter is remitted to the High Court for determining the liability of interest under the 2007 Act. The questions regarding the nature and extent of liability to pay interest on Entry Tax need examination.

Facts:

The appellant, M/s. Diyas Mantra Lighting Private Limited, challenged the order of the Principal Commissioner of Customs (Preventive) and the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT). The dispute involved the valuation of imported electric decorative lightings, with allegations of undervaluation and evasion of customs duty.

Issues:

Whether the sequential application of Customs Valuation Rules was followed in the determination of the value of imported goods?

Whether the appellant's plea regarding the non-significance of the brand 'Diyas' and 'mAntra' was justified?

Held:

The Court observed a fundamental mistake in the implementation of the statutory Rules, emphasizing the necessity of sequential application. It questioned the authority's choice to ignore Rules 3 to 5 and directed a fresh assessment following the correct sequence. The Court clarified that all available pleas could be raised and addressed on merits in the subsequent proceedings.

Decision: The orders of the Principal Commissioner of Customs (Preventive) and CESTAT were set aside, and the matter was remitted for a fresh assessment adhering to the sequential application of Customs Valuation Rules.

Facts:

The accused (respondent No. 2) was facing trial for offenses under Sections 302, 304-B, and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code due to the death of his wife in Nigeria under unnatural circumstances. The appellant, mother of the deceased, moved an application under Section 311 CrPC to summon Dr. I. Yusuf, the witness who conducted the first post-mortem in Nigeria.

Issues:

Whether the Trial Court erred in rejecting the application under Section 311 CrPC, considering the age of the case and the availability of a copy of the post-mortem report.

Held:

The court held that the Trial Court and the High Court failed to appreciate the relevance of Dr. I. Yusuf's evidence and the necessity to summon him. It emphasized that the age of the case alone cannot be decisive when a material witness needs examination. The court opined that the Trial Court should ensure material evidence comes on record for a just conclusion.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, setting aside the previous orders. The application under Section 311 CrPC was allowed, and the Trial Court was directed to take necessary measures for the examination of Dr. I. Yusuf, either by issuing a commission or recording his statement through video-conferencing, ensuring expeditious proceedings.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute arising from a Will wherein the testator bequeathed his property to his son, with a life interest granted to his widowed daughter. The daughter had the right to reside in the property and use the rent income for herself, but was restricted from transferring, mortgaging, selling, or gifting the property. The question at hand is whether, upon the death of the widowed daughter, the tenant becomes a trespasser and is liable to be removed.

Issues:

Validity of a suit for possession after the death of the widowed daughter.

Interpretation of the life estate granted to the testator's daughter.

Applicability of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.

Held:

The definition of 'landlord' under Section 2(c) includes the daughter of the testator holding a life interest in the property. The life estate granted to the daughter enabled her to create a tenancy, making her a 'landlord' as per the 1949 Act.( Para 12)

The provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 are applicable to the tenant, granting the tenant a protected status. The status of a statutory tenant remains even after the death of the testator's daughter. The remedy for the appellants is to pursue eviction proceedings based on grounds specified in the enactment.( Para 14)

Statutory protection for tenants under specific tenancy laws aims to protect the interests of tenants. Restrictions on possession recovery have been imposed as a legislative policy for the benefit of tenants.( Para 15)

Facts:

The case involved an appeal against the order of the High Court confirming the Magistrate's decision for further investigation post the discharge of the accused. The FIR was filed against the appellant, and upon completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed. However, the Magistrate, while discharging the accused, directed further investigation, leading to the appeal.

Issues:

Whether the Magistrate, post-discharge of the accused, has the jurisdiction to order further investigation under Sections 173(8) and 227 of the CrPC?

What is the distinction between the powers available to the Magistrate at the pre-cognizance and post-cognizance stages?

Held:

The Magistrate lacks jurisdiction to suo moto direct further investigation after discharging the accused. The powers available to the Magistrate for further investigation at the pre-cognizance stage may not be exercised at the post-cognizance stage, particularly after discharging the accused. The court highlighted the availability of the investigating agency's option to apply for further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, and both the order of the Magistrate for further investigation and the High Court's confirmation were quashed. However, the investigating officer was given the liberty to file an application for further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC.

Facts:

The dispute involves Bharat Broadband Network Limited (Appellant) and United Telecoms Limited (Respondent). The arbitration agreement provided for the appointment of an arbitrator by the Managing Director of the appellant-company. The Managing Director's appointment was challenged due to ineligibility as per the Seventh Schedule.

Issues:

Whether the proviso to Section 12(5) applies?

The eligibility of the arbitrator as per the Seventh Schedule.

Applicability of waiver by express agreement in writing.

Interpretation of Sections 12, 13, and 14 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

Held:

Section 12(1) mandates disclosure of circumstances affecting an arbitrator's independence. Challenge procedures are outlined in Sections 12(3) and 13(2), followed by an application under Section 34 post-award.

Section 12(5) deals with de jure inability, overriding prior agreements. Ineligibility can be waived post-dispute by an express agreement in writing, as per the proviso.

The Law Commission emphasizes minimum levels of independence. In Section 12(5) cases, Section 14(1)(a) applies, leading to automatic termination and substitution of the arbitrator.

The Managing Director's appointment, post the introduction of Section 12(5), was invalid under the TRF Ltd. judgment. The Amendment Act, 2015, applies retrospectively, rendering the appointment void.

The proviso to Section 12(5) applies only with a subsequent express agreement in writing. Analogies to other sections like Section 7 are rejected.

Decision: The appeals are allowed. The Managing Director's appointment as an arbitrator is held void, falling under Section 12(5). The proviso does not apply due to the absence of an express agreement in writing.