Facts:

The appellant-company received approval for constructing a multi-storeyed Private Parking Lot (PPL) and a residential building. However, subsequent regulatory changes led to disputes over permissions and construction levels.

Issues:

The legality of construction above the sanctioned levels, the applicability of deemed permissions, and challenges to the notice seeking revocation of commencement certificates.

Held:

Deemed Permission Under Section 48: Section 48 of the MRTP Act, highlighting the importance of completion up to plinth level within a specified period.Regulation 5(6) is discussed in conjunction with Section 48, emphasizing that construction up to the plinth level within four years does not necessitate fresh permission.

Validity of PPL Construction:The PPL construction beyond plinth level is deemed permissible under Regulation 6(4) of the 1991 Regulations.The court asserts that the completion of the PPL was valid, and the Corporation is directed to take possession.

Refuge Area Determination: The determination of refuge area by the Commissioner is upheld, dismissing challenges raised based on possible misuse.

Deemed Permission for PPL: The order regularizing the PPL construction is deemed lawful, as the court affirms the existence of deemed permission.

Decision: The partly allows the appeal, dismissing transfer petitions. The Corporation is directed to take possession of the PPL and decide on the 13 floors (44th to 56th) of the residential building.

Facts:

The suit property, inherited by Princess Leelavathi, devolved on late K. Basavaraja Urs and defendant No.1 under the Hindu Succession Act.

Agreement executed on 24.4.1979 for the sale of the property to the plaintiffs by late K. Basavaraja Urs, represented by defendant No.1 as power of attorney.

Plaintiffs alleged non-compliance with the agreement, leading to the filing of the suit for specific performance.

Issues:

Validity of the agreement and its binding nature on defendant No.1.

Claims of the plaintiffs regarding possession, consideration, and the defendant's alleged delay in executing the sale deed.

Defendant No.1's contention of signatures on blank papers and the disputed ownership structure.

Held:

The agreement was found to be between late K. Basavaraja Urs through power of attorney, not binding on defendant No.1's individual share.

The plaintiffs were aware of the joint family property and the ownership structure, thus estoppel did not apply.

Modified the decree to grant plaintiffs only ½ share in the property, considering the devolution under section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act.

The court directed the trial court to divide the property equally between the parties.

Facts:

The case involves candidates from states other than Delhi (OBC outsiders) who applied for Special Education Teacher vacancies in Delhi. They obtained CTET qualification with relaxed pass norms but were deemed ineligible by the Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board. The matter reached the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), where the applicants claimed their selection based on merit despite not meeting the CTET pass marks for the unreserved category.

Issues:

Whether candidates from outside Delhi, securing CTET qualification with relaxed norms, can be considered for General Category vacancies.

Whether candidates, after availing concession under the OBC category, can compete for unreserved category seats.

Held:

The Court held that candidates from outside Delhi, obtaining CTET qualification under relaxed norms for the OBC category, are ineligible for General Category vacancies. The judgment distinguishes the present case from Vikas Sankhala (2017) 1 SCC 350, stating that the principles applied in Vikas Sankhala do not align with the present scenario. The Court emphasizes that migration to the unreserved category is not permissible for candidates who obtained qualification with relaxation. The decision of the High Court in favor of the respondents is set aside, and the appeal is allowed.

Facts:

Dispute between Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL) and Go Airlines (India) Limited regarding aviation fuel supply, delayed payments, and interest.

Arbitration invoked by BPCL, and a counter claim filed by Go Airlines regarding the issuance of CENVAT invoices.

Issues:

Whether the counter claim falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement.

Whether the counter claim is arbitrable.

Whether the counter claim is within the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator.

Held:

The High Court set aside the Arbitrator's order, stating that the Arbitrator had jurisdiction to entertain the counter claim related to CENVAT invoices. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision and remitted the case to the Arbitrator for a proper inquiry.

Jurisdiction and Counter Claim (Para 23): The High Court held that rejecting the counter claim solely on the ground of lack of jurisdiction was not justified. The Supreme Court affirmed this, emphasizing the need for the Arbitrator to decide the merits of the counter claim after a proper inquiry.

Observations on CENVAT Credit (Para 25): The Supreme Court clarified that the High Court's observations on the availability of CENVAT credit under the CENVAT Rules, 2004 should not be considered as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.

Facts:

The case originated from a conflict of opinion in a smaller bench, leading to its reference to a larger bench. The litigants sought recusal of a judge who had expressed an opinion in a previous judgment, arguing that this may lead to a biased decision.

Issues:

The legitimacy of a judge participating in a larger bench after expressing an opinion in a smaller bench, the grounds for recusal based on legal pre-disposition, and the potential abuse of court through bench hunting.

Held:

The judgment clarified that rendering a decision on an issue of law in a smaller bench does not disqualify a judge from being part of a larger bench when a reference is made. This practice was noted as consistent in various High Courts and the Supreme Court.

Recusal based on legal pre-disposition was deemed unfounded, emphasizing that litigants cannot choose judges based on their previous judgments. Allowing recusal in such circumstances might open the floodgates for forum shopping.

The judgment highlighted the risks of abuse of court through bench hunting if requests for recusal were readily accepted. It underscored the importance of maintaining the Chief Justice's roster-making powers to prevent interference with the judicial system.

The decision-making process and duty of a judge were emphasized, stating that judges should discharge their duties without fear or favor and in a dispassionate manner, as per their oath.

Decision: The judgment concluded by rejecting the request for recusal based on legal pre-disposition, affirming the judge's participation in the larger bench. It emphasized the need to uphold judicial discipline and prevent litigants from influencing the composition of benches.

Facts:

The case involves Shri P. Chidambaram, a member of parliament and senior member, who faced charges under several sections, including Section 120B IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The appellant was arrested and had been in custody for about two months.

Issues:

The denial of regular bail to the appellant by the High Court. The prosecution claimed that the appellant had influenced witnesses and posed a risk of further influencing them.

Held:

The court emphasized the necessity of expressing prima facie reasons for granting or refusing bail, highlighting that recording reasons is essential for transparency. However, an elaborate examination of evidence and detailed discussion of the case's merits at the bail stage should be avoided.

The court outlined the factors to be considered when granting bail, including the nature of the accusation, severity of punishment, likelihood of tampering with witnesses, the accused's presence at trial, character of the accused, and public or state interests.

The court criticized the High Court for primarily focusing on the nature of allegations and the merits of the case without considering well-established principles for granting or refusing bail.

The court acknowledged that the appellant was not a "flight risk," and measures like surrendering the passport and issuing a lookout notice could prevent abscondence.

The court discussed allegations of influencing witnesses, noting the lack of direct evidence and specific details. The appellant's conduct during interim protection and the absence of witness interference were highlighted.

The court questioned the lack of contemporaneous materials and specific details in the prosecution's claim of witness tampering, considering it speculative and lacking substance.

The court, considering factors such as age, health, and the absence of a flight risk, held that the appellant was entitled to bail after being in custody for nearly two months.

Facts:

Appellant's father, a resident of Sindh, claimed ownership of 83.11 acres of land, which was verified by the settlement claim officer.

The appellant, after his father's death, sought allotment of the remaining land balance, which was allotted by the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration (CCLA).

Issues:

Whether the Central Government, after transferring land to the State Government, could make allotments to displaced persons post May 24, 1980.

Whether the CCLA, as a delegate of the Central Government, had the authority to make allotments despite the power of allotment being vested with the Managing Officer under Section 17 of the Act.

Held:

The Court examined the authority of the Central Government to make allotments after transferring land to the State Government and whether the CCLA, as a delegatee of the Central Government, could exercise allotment powers.( Para 22)

The transfer of land to the State Government was completed on May 24, 1980, through a circular specifying the administration, management, and disposal of remaining evacuee property. The land transfer was effective from June 1, 1980, subject to certain conditions.( Para 23)

The Court affirmed that the Circular dated May 23, 1980, related to the administration, management, and disposal of compensation pool in accordance with Section 16 of the Act. The Central Government was empowered to constitute authorities or corporations for these purposes.( Para 24)

The argument suggesting that the Central Government retained control and administration of evacuee property was dismissed. The CCLA, as per the Act's scheme, had no power to make allotments as he exercised appellate or revisional jurisdiction. Allotment powers were vested in Managing Officers.( Para 28)

The Court held that the CCLA, as a delegatee of the Central Government, could not deal with land that had been transferred to the State Government. Therefore, the allotment made in favor of the appellant on February 26, 2003, was unsustainable.( Para 29)

Based on the Division Bench judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram Chander, as approved by the Supreme Court in Pala Singh, the Central Government or its delegatee could not allot land after its transfer to the State.( Para 30)

While disagreeing with the High Court's opinion that transferred land was excluded from the compensation pool, the Court clarified that the land transferred to the State remained part of the compensation pool and could be utilized by the State Government after settling displaced persons.( Para 31)

Facts:

Various civil appeals arising out of Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) were presented before the Supreme Court.

The central issue involved the recovery of unearned increase by BIADA when industrial land allocated to an entity was subsequently transferred.

Specifics of the case involving M/s. Hindustan Coca-Cola Beverages Pvt. Ltd. were discussed, including the original lease to M/s. Orient Beverages Ltd., subsequent transfers, and amalgamation.

Issues:

Whether BIADA is entitled to recover unearned increase on transferred allocated land.

The basis for calculating unearned increase - BIADA value plus development charges or market value/circle rate at the time of transfer.

Held:

The court holds that BIADA is entitled to recover unearned increase, and the calculation should be based on the circle rate or market value of the land at the time of transfer.

Rejecting the argument for recovery based on BIADA value plus development charges, the court emphasizes considering the market value or circle rate for a fair share in the unearned increase.

In the specific case of M/s. Hindustan Coca-Cola Beverages Pvt. Ltd., the court directs the payment of interest on the amount demanded and paid during a certain period.

Another case involving land allotted to M/s. Shankar Saw Mills is remitted back to the Patna High Court for further consideration based on the shareholding structure of the transferee company, M/s. Samras Products Pvt. Ltd.

The court clarifies that while deciding in favor of BIADA, no recovery will be made from respondents in one case due to a previous court order maintaining the status quo. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The case involves parties Bijay Kumar Singh and others (Appellants) versus Amit Kumar Chamariya and another (Respondents). The dispute centers around the eviction proceedings initiated under Section 6 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, based on the grounds of non-payment of arrears of rent.

Issues:

Interpretation of the mandatory nature of sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997.

Determination of the outer limit for the extension of time to deposit arrears of rent as per the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 7.

Examination of the consequences arising from the non-deposit of admitted arrears of rent, as contemplated under sub-section (3) of Section 7.

Held:

The Court held that the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 7 are mandatory and must be scrupulously followed by tenants to avoid eviction under Section 6 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997. The outer limit for the extension of time to deposit arrears of rent is determined by the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 7. Failure to deposit admitted arrears of rent within the specified timeframe, along with the absence of an application for dispute determination, will lead to eviction. The deposit of rent, coupled with an application for dispute determination, is a pre-condition for avoiding eviction on the grounds of non-payment of arrears of rent. The appeals are dismissed.