Facts:

Bhana, the original owner of the disputed properties, had two marriages and children from both wives.

A gift of the suit land was made to Smt. Banti, Bhana's second wife, in 1950 for maintenance, leading to mutation in her favor.

Litigation ensued between the parties, challenging the gift, and a civil suit in 1953 upheld reversionary rights of the son, Darshan Singh.

Bhana executed a will in 1973, bequeathing his estate to plaintiffs, excluding Smt. Banti and the appellant (Ajit Kaur).

The trial court held that Banti became the absolute owner after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiffs.

Issues:

Validity of the will dated 5th January 1973.

Applicability of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Reversionary rights and possession over the disputed property.

Held:

The Court examined the validity of the will dated 5th January 1973, and the appellate court's findings on a subsequent will dated 21st February 1973 were considered. The latter was held to be not legally executed and proved.

The Court discussed Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, emphasizing that possession must be under some vestige of a claim, right, or title. Mere possession would not confer pre-existing rights.

The effect of mutation in revenue records was clarified, stating that it does not create or extinguish title. The court highlighted that fiscal proceedings do not confer a right of acquisition.

The Court rejected the appellant's claim of absolute ownership based on possession at the time of the Act's enforcement, as the possession lacked a valid claim, right, or title.

Facts:

'HAM' founded Hamdard Dawakhana as a sole proprietor.

'HAM' passed away, leaving behind wife and two sons, 'AH' and 'MS.'

In 1948, 'AH,' 'MS,' and their mother executed a Deed to manage Hamdard.

'AH' became the sole surviving Wakif Mutawalli as per the 1948 Deed.

In 1964, 'AH' appointed his two sons 'AM' and 'HA' as Mutawallis.

Dispute arose after the death of 'AM' over the Chief Mutawalli position.

Issues:

Dispute over the appointment of Chief Mutawalli.

Applicability of the rule of primogeniture.

Interpretation of the 1948 Deed as amended in 1973.

Held:

The order of the Division Bench cannot be sustained. The nature of Hamdard is not Wakf as defined in the Wakf Act, 1995. Consent order in appeal relates to interim injunction issues, not the issues in the suit. The argument that consent order relates to issues framed after pleadings is rejected.

The 1973 Deed is not a new document but an amendment of the 1948 Deed. The entire document, as amended in 1973, must be read together to determine the Chief Mutawalli appointment process.

Rule of primogeniture is not explicit in the amended clauses. The 1973 Deed specifies the senior most male descendant as Chief Mutawalli, supporting equal representation to heirs of both sons of Wakif Mutawalli.

The constitution of the Board in 1995 does not negate the seniority principle. The 1973 Deed does not show the applicability of the rule of primogeniture but equal representation. Delay and laches argument are not tenable.

Ad interim mandatory injunction is granted to protect parties' rights. The argument against directing parties to do something not in existence at the time of filing is rejected. The order of the Division Bench is set aside, and the Single Bench's decision is restored. The suits will be decided based on evidence.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over the ownership of scheduled properties. The appellants claim rights based on sale deeds executed by 'JK' in 1955, asserting her as the granddaughter of 'R,' the original owner. The respondents, however, assert ownership through a chain of transactions from the second wife of 'R,' 'S.'

Issues:

The validity of the appellants' claim based on the sale deeds executed by 'JK,' the interpretation of the Mysore Hindu Law Women’s Rights Act, 1933, and the application of the Limitation Act, 1908, particularly Articles 140 and 141.

Held:

The widow, 'S,' held a limited estate, and her rights were not absolute under Section 11 of the Mysore Hindu Law Women’s Rights Act, 1933.

No vested interest existed for reversioners as long as 'S' was alive, and 'JK' could be considered a reversioner only after the death of 'S' in 1938.

The period of limitation for filing a suit for recovery of possession commenced upon the death of the widow in 1938, and the 12-year limitation period ran out in 1950, extinguishing the alleged reversioner 'JK's right.

'JK's sale deed in 1955 conveyed no right, and even if the limitation period started from that date, it ran out in 1967.

The High Court's judgment, affirming the Appellate Court, was upheld, dismissing the appeals.

Facts:

The case revolves around the determination of seniority in the context of the Telecommunications Engineering Service (Group "B" Posts) Recruitment Rules, 1996. The appellant challenges the seniority list, arguing that it should be based on OMs dated 22.12.1959 and subsequent OMs, as the Rules, 1996 are silent on the issue.

Issues:

Interpretation of seniority rules in the absence of explicit provisions in the Rules, 1996.

Challenge to the seniority list based on the order of Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh in TA No.84-HR-2009 (Dewan Chand vs. Union of India).

Held:

The Rules, 1996 do not provide for the determination of seniority. OMs dated 22.12.1959, 24.06.1978, 07.02.1986, 03.07.1986, and 07.02.1990 are considered for determining seniority. It is settled law that executive instructions can determine seniority in the absence of statutory rules.( Para 16)

Referring to BSNL vs. S.K. Dubey, the Court emphasizes that in the absence of express provisions, no retrospective promotion or seniority can be granted.( Para 20)

The fate of this appeal is sealed by the judgment dated 12.08.2014 in Transferred Case (Civil) No... of 2014 (Rajesh Banta & Ors. vs. Dewan Chand & Ors.) and the three-Judge Bench judgment in BSNL & Ors. vs. S.K. Dubey & Ors.( Para 22)

FACTS:

The Appellant, a Builder, launched a residential project named "Araya Complex." The Respondent entered into an Apartment Buyer's Agreement with the Appellant. The Agreement specified a timeline for obtaining the Occupancy Certificate and delivering possession, which the Appellant failed to meet. The Respondent filed a Consumer Complaint seeking a refund and compensation.

ISSUES:

Whether the Respondent is entitled to a refund due to the Appellant's failure to deliver possession within the stipulated time.

The validity of the terms of the Apartment Buyer's Agreement.

HELD:

The Court held that the delay in possession constituted a deficiency of service. Referring to precedent, it established the right of the allottee to seek a refund and compensation for unreasonable delays.

The Court analyzed clauses in the Apartment Buyer's Agreement, deeming them one-sided, unfair, and unreasonable. Such terms were considered contrary to the principles of equality before the law.

The Court rejected the Builder's contention regarding the interest rate awarded, citing precedent that allowed reasonable interest on delayed payments.

Acknowledging the equitable nature of the National Commission's order, the Court upheld the awarded interest rate, applying relevant rules.

The Court affirmed the National Commission's decision, stating that the Builder failed to fulfill contractual obligations, justifying the allottee's right to refund and relief.

CONCLUSION:The Civil Appeals were dismissed, affirming the National Commission's order. The Builder was granted three months to refund the amount to the allottee.

REFERRED CASES:

Bangalore Development Authority v. Syndicate Bank, (2007) 6 SCC 711

Bharathi Knitting Company v. DHL Worldwide Express Courier Division of Airfreight Ltd., (1996) 4 SCC 704

Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and Ors. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and Ors., (1986) 3 SCC 156

Fortune Infrastructure & Anr. v. TrevorD' Lima & Ors., (2018) 5 SCC 442

Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta, (1994) 1 SCC 243

Facts:

The appellant filed a suit for the declaration of title concerning premises in Kasba Fatehpur's main market.

A compromise was reached between the erstwhile owner and the first defendant, leading to the sale of premises to the first defendant.

The appellant alleged that he arranged the money for the purchase and conducted the business in the shop even after it was registered in the name of the first defendant.

Issues:

Whether the matter comes within the purview of Section 4(3) of the Benami Act.

Whether the plea raised by the appellant is barred under Section 4 of the Act.

Held:

The rejection of the plaint under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC was not justified as the matter required fuller and final consideration after evidence was led by the parties.

The plea of the appellant, as raised on the face of it, was not barred under the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, setting aside the views of the lower courts, and the application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC was dismissed. The Trial Court was directed to expedite the pending Suit and dispose of it within six months.

Facts:

The respondent, ZAHOOR AHMAD SHAH WATALI, was named as Accused No.10 in an FIR registered for various offenses under the Indian Penal Code and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The respondent filed a bail application, which was rejected by the Designated Court but later reversed by the High Court.

Issues:

The appropriateness of granting bail to the respondent. The court needs to determine whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accusations against the respondent are prima facie true.

Held:

The court outlines the factors to be considered for deciding a bail application, emphasizing the nature and gravity of the charge, among other considerations.

The court delves into the meaning of "prima facie true" in the context of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, highlighting the lighter degree of satisfaction required at this stage compared to other special enactments.

The court emphasizes that the application of Section 43D of the 1967 Act is from the registration of FIR until the conclusion of the trial, and it is the court's duty to peruse the case diary and relevant materials for recording its opinion.

After considering the totality of the report, documents, and evidence, the court finds reasonable grounds to believe that the accusations against the respondent are prima facie true. The respondent is accused of being part of a larger conspiracy, acting as a fund-raiser and finance conduit.

The court rejects the High Court's approach of discarding certain documents and statements, emphasizing that the admissibility of evidence is a matter for trial, not for bail consideration.

The court upholds the Designated Court's decision, stating that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against the respondent are prima facie true. The High Court's order granting bail is reversed.

The respondent is not entitled to bail for offenses falling under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act. The Designated Court's decision rejecting the bail application is affirmed.

Facts:

The case revolves around the constitutional validity of the Banking Regulation (Amendment) Act, 2017, specifically Sections 35AA and 35AB. Additionally, a circular issued by the Reserve Bank of India on February 12, 2018, pertaining to the resolution of stressed assets is challenged.

Issues:

Constitutionality of Sections 35AA and 35AB on grounds of arbitrariness.

Lack of guidelines for the exercise of power conferred by the amendments.

Ultra vires nature of the RBI circular dated February 12, 2018, in connection with Sections 35A, 35AA, and 35AB.

Held:

The amendments confer regulatory powers upon the RBI and are not manifestly arbitrary.

Adequate guidance can be derived from various provisions in the Banking Regulation Act, including Sections 14A, 17, 18, 20, 25, 29, 30, and 31.

Section 35AA requires Central Government authorization for RBI to issue directions regarding insolvency resolution. Prior to Section 35AA, such directions could have been issued under Sections 21 and 35A, but now must align with Section 35AA.

Section 35AB is not without prejudice to Section 35AA, indicating the separate exercise of powers. The impugned circular is declared ultra vires as it lacks satisfaction of Section 45L(3) and applies indiscriminately to banking and non-banking institutions.

Stressed assets can be resolved either through the Insolvency Code or other means. Section 35AA pertains specifically to insolvency resolution, while Sections 35A and 35AB address stressed assets through different powers.

Facts:

The Municipal Corporation, Kanpur, contested the payment of gratuity to its employees, citing the Retirement Benefits and General Provident Fund Regulations, 1962. The contention was that gratuity should be governed by these Regulations rather than the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

Issues:

Applicability of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, to Municipalities.

Interpretation of conflicting provisions in the Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act and the Payment of Gratuity Act.

Held:

The appellant argued that gratuity is payable under the 1962 Regulations framed under the 1959 Act. However, the Court held that the Act applies to Municipalities, citing a notification issued by the Central Government on 08.01.1982. This notification, not considered by the High Court, clarified the Act's applicability to local bodies.

Examining Sections 1(3)(c) and 3 of the 1962 Act, the Court found the appellant not covered by clauses (a) and (b) of Section 1(3) of the Act. The notification dated 08.01.1982 specified local bodies, including Municipalities, as establishments to which the Act applies.

Section 14 of the Act was invoked, asserting its overriding effect over conflicting provisions in any other enactment. The Court emphasized that the provision in the State Act contemplating gratuity payment becomes inapplicable to local bodies under Section 14.

The appellant's argument that the State Act provides a more restrictive benefit was rejected. The Court emphasized that liberal payment of gratuity, as per the central legislation, is in the interest of employees.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, affirming the orders of the Controlling Authorities and the High Court.