Facts:

The government decided to provide employment to displaced abkari workers by reserving 25% of daily wage vacancies in the Corporation.

A subsequent change in policy favored dependent sons of deceased abkari workers who lost employment after 1996.

The affected abkari workers filed a writ petition seeking the implementation of the initial government order.

Issues:

Whether there was a legitimate expectation for re-employment for all displaced abkari workers.

Whether the change in policy was arbitrary or in the public interest.

Whether the altered assurance to consider dependent sons of deceased abkari workers was justified.

Held:

The Court held that no assurance was given to provide re-employment to all displaced abkari workers. The government promised to reserve 25% of future daily wage vacancies, and no vested right accrued to all abkari workers.

The change in policy was deemed justifiable due to administrative difficulties in implementing the initial order, considering the insufficient number of vacancies.

The Court recognized the principle of substantive legitimate expectation but emphasized that administrative policies may change with evolving circumstances.

The decision makers' freedom to change policy in the public interest cannot be fettered by applying the principle of substantive legitimate expectation.

The expectation of the respondents for consideration against future vacancies was deemed not legitimate, considering the change in policy. The decision to alter the policy was made to balance the interests of displaced abkari workers and unemployed youth.

The requirement of giving an opportunity before altering the policy was discussed, noting that displaced abkari workers were consulted through their representatives.

The Court acknowledged that a claim of legitimate expectation can be raised if an administrative authority reneges from a promise without giving an opportunity, especially if past practice dictates so.

The principle of procedural legitimate expectation was discussed, emphasizing exceptions in cases where the government announces a policy but subsequently withdraws it due to overriding public interest.

The Court differentiated between primary and secondary review, stating that the Court can ask the State to justify the policy during primary review, but secondary review shows deference to the executive's decision.

The Court explained the test of proportionality involving a 'balancing test' and 'necessity test.'

The change in policy was held not disproportionate, considering the balancing act between the interests of displaced workers and unemployed youth.

The Court applied the test of proportionality to review the impugned decision of the Government, given the challenge was on the ground of violation of Articles 14, 19, and 21.

The Court rejected the argument that the order dated 07.08.2004 was a continuation of the earlier order dated 20.02.2002.

The findings recorded by the High Court regarding a right of appointment accruing to the respondents were disapproved. The Order dated 07.08.2004 was issued in modification of the Order dated 20.02.2002.

FACTS:

The appellant, Madhoor Buildwell Private Limited, filed a writ petition seeking direction for the disbursement of approved funds under the Urban Infrastructure Development Scheme.

The Scheme involved funding from the Central Government (80%), State Government (10%), and the Municipal Council (10%).

The Municipal Council issued a public tender for an underground sewer Scheme without the Central Government's fund sanction.

The State Level Sanctioning Committee and Ministry of Urban Development approved the Sewage Scheme for Yeola Municipal Council, but funds were not released due to lack of approval from the Finance Department.

ISSUES:

Whether there is a commitment from the Central Government to release funds for Yeola Municipal Council.

The legality of the Municipal Council awarding the contract without the Central Government's fund sanction.

HELD:

The High Court's order dismissing the writ petition was upheld.

The Supreme Court emphasized the necessity of a sewage system in urban areas.

Directed the State Government to consider and approve the sewer Scheme for Yeola Municipal Council within three months.

If the State Government cannot provide funds, it should seek funds from the Central Government under the AMRUT Scheme.

The Central Government is expected to consider and decide within three months based on the State Government's recommendation. The appeal stands disposed of.

Facts:

The nature of clubs registered under Section 25 of the Companies Act, emphasizing the prohibition of dividend payments and the application of profits to promote the club's objectives. The distinction between proprietary clubs and clubs with a corporate form was highlighted.

Issues:

The interpretation of the doctrine of mutuality in the context of sales tax and service tax, the impact of the 46th Amendment on taxation of club transactions,

The application of relevant legal provisions to incorporated and unincorporated members' clubs.

Held:

The judgment clarified that the doctrine of mutuality applies to clubs registered under Section 25 of the Companies Act. Such clubs, lacking shareholders and dividends, cannot be treated as separate legal entities from their members.

The 46th Amendment sought to tax sales by unincorporated clubs, assuming sales by corporate clubs were already taxable. The expression "any unincorporated association or body of persons" in the amendment was deemed applicable only to clubs not in corporate form.

The definition of "body of persons" in Article 366(29-A)(e) and Section 65B(44) was analyzed. The judgment argued that the term excludes incorporated entities like companies and registered cooperative societies, particularly in the context of service tax.

Explanation 3 in Section 65B(44) post-2012 was considered, and it was concluded that it did not apply to incorporated members' clubs, as the term "body of persons" does not include bodies corporate.

The judgment affirmed that the doctrine of mutuality remains applicable to both incorporated and unincorporated members' clubs after the 46th Amendment. Previous judgments, including Young Men’s Indian Association, continued to hold relevance.

Sub-clause (f) of Article 366(29-A) was determined to have no application to members' clubs.

The appeals of the Revenue were dismissed, and show-cause notices related to service tax on incorporated members' clubs were declared void.

Facts:

The victim child went missing at approximately 4:00 p.m.

The appellant was observed distributing chocolates to children around the time of the child's disappearance.

The police apprehended the appellant, finding him with the victim child in a naked condition.

The victim had suffered brutal assault, including vaginal and unnatural intercourse, resulting in multiple injuries.

Issues:

The reliability of evidence, burden of proof, the severity of the crime, and the appropriateness of the death penalty.

Held:

The court held that the appellant, Ravi s/o Ashok Ghumare, was conclusively proven to be responsible for the heinous crimes against the two-year-old victim (Para 30).

The medical evidence, eyewitness accounts, circumstantial evidence, and DNA analysis collectively established the appellant's guilt (Para 35, 36).

The burden to prove that the injuries were not caused by the appellant rested on him, and he failed to discharge this burden (Para 30).

The court, by majority, upheld the death sentence for the appellant, emphasizing the gravity of the crime and the lack of remorse shown by the appellant (Para 61).

Dissenting Opinion on Sentencing:

One judge dissented on the death penalty, arguing for the modification to life imprisonment based on mitigating factors, including the appellant's intoxication at the time of the crime, age, and lack of evidence on rehabilitation possibilities (Para 34).

Facts:

The appellant was convicted for kidnapping, raping, and murdering a 13-year-old girl. The prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence, including DNA analysis, to establish guilt. The trial court and High Court imposed the death sentence.

Issues:

Whether a death sentence can be awarded in cases based on circumstantial evidence.

The impact of "residual doubt" in determining the standard of proof for capital sentencing.

Validity of the conviction under Section 376A based on certain findings not supported by medical evidence.

Held:

The court affirmed the guilt of the appellant based on strong circumstantial and medico-scientific evidence (Para 37).

Emphasized that there is no absolute bar on awarding death sentences in circumstantial evidence cases, considering the potential for abuse by seasoned criminals (Para 37).

Recognized the concept of "residual doubt" in recent cases but concluded that this case did not qualify as the "rarest of rare" deserving the death penalty (Paras 61, 62, 64, 65).

Noted some residual doubts in the case, including inconsistent witness statements and discrepancies in evidence (Para 61).

Acknowledged the erroneous finding related to bleeding due to sexual intercourse but clarified that it did not impact the conviction under Section 376A (Para 39, 60).

Decision: The death penalty was set aside, and life imprisonment was substituted due to the presence of residual doubts and the case not falling within the "rarest of rare" category.

Facts:

Narsingh Yadav, the appellant, enrolled in the Indian Army on December 2, 2003.

Diagnosed with Schizophrenia, disability assessed at 20% for five years.

Invalidating Medical Board's opinion: Disability not attributable to or aggravated by military service.

Appellant discharged from army service on May 8, 2007.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's Schizophrenia can be considered attributable to or aggravated by military service.

Applicability of Rule 14 of the Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 1982.

Validity of the decision of the Armed Forces Tribunal rejecting the claim for disability pension.

Held:

The court applied Rule 14(d) and emphasized that entitlement to disability pension should be considered only if it is established that the cause of the disease was adversely affected due to factors related to conditions of military service.

Mental disorders, like Schizophrenia, are difficult to detect at the time of recruitment.

The appellant, posted in a peace station as a Vehicle Mechanic, did not face conditions causing stress and strain leading to disability attributed to military service.

The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision of the Tribunal.

Facts:

The Okhla Enclave Plot Holders' Welfare Association, in Writ Petition (C) No. 876 of 1996, alleged that the colonizer (respondent no.6) failed to adhere to the terms of the agreement in allotting plots. The matter was referred to arbitration, addressing four crucial questions.

Issues:

The portion of land claimed by the colonizer, the entity responsible for project development and allotments, relaxation of density norms, and the nature of the proceedings (arbitration or a Special Committee).

Held:

The plot holders are entitled to the entire extent of land as per the layout, irrespective of the portion claimed by the colonizer. The colonizer's claim is contingent upon payment of renewal fees and other charges.

The Town and Country Planning Department will undertake development after receiving 90% of the total amount payable by plot owners.

The arbitrator will determine development charges based on square meter cost, apportioning the total cost among eligible plot owners.

Failure to pay development charges within the specified time may result in the denial of amenities, with potential consequences such as forfeiture of plot rights.

The State of Haryana clarified that certain density norms cannot be reduced, and the arbitrator must adjust plots accordingly.

The proceedings are in the nature of a Special Committee constituted by the court, not under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Decision: The court's decision, dated October 3, 2019, establishes the entitlement of plot holders to the entire land as per the layout. The colonizer's claims are subject to specific conditions, and development responsibilities lie with the Town and Country Planning Department. The proceedings are considered a Special Committee, not arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

FACTS:

Appellant issued a fire insurance policy to the respondent for plant and machinery.

Claim arose after a fire accident on 23.04.2000.

Appellant offered Rs. 7,98,019/-, which was refused.

A meeting was held on 20.09.2001, where the appellant revised the offer to Rs. 33,80,925/-.

Respondent, dissatisfied, approached the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, which dismissed the complaint.

Matter referred to arbitration, resulting in an award dated 28.06.2004.

ISSUES:

Validity of the proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

The jurisdiction of the Court for re-presentation of the petition.

HELD:

The Court observed that the delay of 8 days in re-presentation was the only issue. It was not justified to re-examine the entire period spent before the Jaipur court as malafide. The Court set aside the orders of the lower courts and allowed the appeal, restoring the proceedings to the file of the Additional District Judge S.No.3, Jodhpur.( Para 12)

The parties were directed to appear before the Jodhpur court on 15.10.2019 for further proceedings. The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.( Para 14)

REFERRED CASES:

Consolidated Engineering Enterprises vs. The Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department & Ors. (2008) 7 SCC 169

Joginder Tuli vs. S.L. Bhatia and another (1997) 1 SCC 502

S. Ganesharaju (dead) through LRs. and Anr. vs. Narsamma (dead) through LRs. and Ors. (2013) 11 SCC 341

Shri Amar Chand Inami vs. Union of India (1973) 1 SCC 115

Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. vs. Union of India, (2019) 2 SCC 455

Union of India vs. Popular Construction Company, (2001) 8 SCC 470

Facts:

Air Commodore Naveen Jain, along with nine other officers, was being considered for promotion to the rank of Air Vice Marshal against five vacancies. Despite securing the top position in the merit list, he was not promoted due to his placement at serial number 3 in seniority.

Issues:

The interpretation and application of the Promotion Policy dated February 20, 2008. The appellant's contention was centered on lost promotion opportunities as he reached superannuation before vacancies arose.

Held:

The Promotion Policy does not explicitly state whether promotion is based on "merit-cum-seniority" or "seniority-cum-merit." However, clauses 17 and 22 clarify that the select list is prepared from the merit list and rearranged in order of seniority.( Para 10)

The Court emphasized that the Promotion Policy, as per clauses 17 and 22, ensures the determination of the final list based on merit first and then rearranging it in order of seniority. The policy, therefore, is not illegal, arbitrary, or discriminatory and does not violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.( Para 18)

The Court held that the lack of promotion due to non-availability of vacancies before superannuation is not a ground to strike down the Promotion Policy. The two-stage policy, involving shortlisting based on eligibility criteria and marks, does not make the applicability of seniority arbitrary or irrational.( Para 21)

Promotion to the post of Air Vice Marshal is governed by the Circular dated February 20, 2008, and can be claimed only in terms of eligibility and the norms fixed therein. The policy provides equal opportunities to officers within the zone of consideration, and the appellant is estopped from challenging the policy after participating in the selection process based on it.( Para 22)

The Court affirmed that the Promotion Policy, in line with the executive instructions, does not discriminate and provides equal opportunities to officers within the zone of consideration and subsequent promotion.( Para 23)

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, upholding the validity of the Promotion Policy and finding it legally sound, non-discriminatory, and in compliance with constitutional provisions.