Facts:

The plaintiff filed a suit in Indore concerning two properties (one in Indore and another in Mumbai). The relief sought included declaring a Will in favor of certain defendants as null and void, challenging a sale deed related to the Mumbai property, and contesting transfer documents for the Indore property. Defendant Nos. 7 and 8 sought dismissal of the suit against them, citing territorial jurisdiction and misjoinder of parties and causes of action.

Issues:

Jurisdictional challenges and misjoinder of parties and causes of action in a suit involving properties in different jurisdictions.

Interpretation of Sections 16 and 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Held:

Sections 16 and 17 of the C.P.C. are part of one statutory scheme. Section 16 establishes the general principle that suits are to be instituted where the subject-matter is situated, while Section 17 provides an exception to this general rule.

The word 'property' in Section 17, though used in the singular, can be read as 'properties' by virtue of Section 13 of the General Clauses Act. The expression 'portion of the property' can encompass one or more properties in different jurisdictions, provided the suit is based on the same cause of action.

A suit concerning immovable properties in different courts' jurisdictions can be instituted in any court where any portion of the property or one or more properties is situated, as long as the suit is based on the same cause of action for the properties in different jurisdictions.

Section 39 of the CPC indicates that a decree may include immovable property situated outside the local limits of the court passing the decree. Section 39(1)(c) reinforces the idea that a suit may be filed concerning immovable property outside the court's local jurisdiction.

Section 17 is permissive, allowing discretion in some cases not to file one suit concerning immovable property located in the local jurisdiction of more than one court.

The suit encompassed three sets of defendants, each with different causes of action for properties in two jurisdictions. The causes of action for the Indore and Bombay properties were distinct and could not be combined in a single suit.

Order II Rule 2 prohibits the clubbing of different causes of action in a suit. Rule 3 allows uniting several causes of action against the same defendant or defendants jointly, which is not applicable in the present case involving different sets of defendants.

Defendant Nos. 7 and 8's application rightly highlighted misjoinder of parties and causes of action, and the trial court correctly struck out the pleadings and relief related to the Bombay property.

The trial court rightly allowed the application filed by Defendant Nos. 7 and 8, and the High Court's dismissal of the writ petition was justified.

Facts:

Respondent No.1 appeared for the preliminary examination for the Grade-I position in Tripura Judicial Service.

The results were declared, and Respondent No.1 was initially qualified but later declared as not qualified after the main examination.

Allegations of incorrect marking and seeking re-evaluation led to the filing of a Writ Petition, which was initially dismissed.

The respondent sought a review, claiming errors in marking and questioning the lack of provision for re-evaluation under the 2003 Rules.

Issues:

Legitimacy of filing a Review Petition after the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition.

The absence of a provision for re-evaluation under the 2003 Rules.

Justifiability of court intervention in the absence of a legal right to claim revaluation.

Held:

The filing of the Review Petition after the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition is subject to conflicting opinions in legal precedents. The court does not find merit in treating it as an affront to its order and allows the review.

The absence of a specific provision for re-evaluation under the 2003 Rules is acknowledged, and the court discusses the limitations of court intervention in the absence of such provisions.

The court emphasizes that, generally, revaluation should not be directed without a statutory provision. However, in rare and exceptional cases, where a clear error is demonstrated, the court may exercise its power under Article 226.

Decision: The court allows the appeal, setting aside the impugned judgment, and dismisses the Review Petition. No order as to costs.

FACTS:

The appellant filed a Criminal Writ Petition in 2002, seeking registration of a criminal complaint regarding the wrongful killing of his son by the police.

Delhi High Court directed CBI to register a complaint and investigate.

CBI filed a Closure Report in 2008, which was not accepted by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate.

Cognizance was taken against thirteen police officers, and the matter was committed to the Court of Sessions.

Accused filed Revision Petition, leading to petitions before the Delhi High Court.

High Court directed the Magistrate to reconsider cognizance, leading to multiple rounds of petitions and orders.

The High Court eventually dismissed the Appellant's petition in 2014, with the liberty to approach the Sessions Judge.

ISSUES:

The appropriate forum for revisionary jurisdiction under Section 397 of Cr.P.C.

The delay in the legal proceedings.

HELD:

The Court acknowledged the prolonged nature of the case, emphasizing the need for speedy justice.

The Court refrained from deciding on the question of law regarding concurrent revisionary jurisdiction.

The order of the High Court was set aside, and the case was restored before the High Court with a request for expeditious consideration.

The Court clarified that it did not express any opinion on the merits of the case.

Liberty was granted to approach the Supreme Court again if any party was aggrieved by the High Court's order.

Facts:

Plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction, claiming 'Charnoi' land used for grazing cattle.

Defendant's father applied for the land, asserting ownership under Section 5(f) of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act.

Board of Revenue granted the land to the defendant's father, and subsequently to defendant Nos. 2 and 3.

Plaintiffs challenged these orders, leading to the present appeal.

Issues:

Whether the land recorded as 'Charnoi' vests in the State or is saved as a grove under Section 5(f).

Validity of the Board of Revenue's order.

Held:

The Trial Court decreed the suit, emphasizing 'Charnoi' land's communal use.

The Appellate Court reversed, classifying it as a grove saved under Section 5(f).

The High Court upheld the Trial Court's decision, relying on khasra entries and the communal nature of 'Charnoi' land.

The Supreme Court analyzed Section 4 and Section 5(f), emphasizing the primary use of the land.

'Charnoi' land, being common grazing land, automatically vests in the State under Section 4(1)(a).

Section 5(f) doesn't apply as it pertains to groves, and the use of the land as 'Charnoi' negates its classification as a grove.

The High Court's decision aligns with the law, and the appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant filed a Criminal Complaint against the respondent for dishonoring a cheque issued towards repayment of a "friendly loan." The cheque was presented twice and returned unpaid on both occasions.

Issues:

Whether prosecution based on a second or successive default in payment is permissible without a statutory notice after the first default.

Whether the payee is entitled to the presumption under Section 139 despite a fiduciary relationship between the parties.

Held:

The court held that there is no impermissibility in prosecuting based on a second or successive default, even without a statutory notice after the first default.

The presumption under Section 139 applies, and even a blank cheque voluntarily signed by the accused attracts the presumption unless proven otherwise.

The High Court erred in reversing the concurrent factual findings without a jurisdictional error. The burden is on the accused to rebut the presumption under Section 139.

The High Court's finding that the appellant's case was doubtful or not beyond reasonable doubt was erroneous.

The conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is confirmed, and the respondent is sentenced to a fine of Rs. 16 lakhs as compensation to the appellant.

Facts:

The first Respondent-plaintiff claimed to be a tenant and filed a suit in 2004 for permanent injunction against the appellant-landlord.

The appellant contested, asserting that the first respondent handed over possession in a previous suit (RCS No.1004/1988) which was withdrawn after a settlement.

The trial court dismissed the suit, stating lack of proof of actual possession by the first respondent.

Issues:

Whether the first respondent proved actual possession on the date of the suit.

Validity of the withdrawal of the earlier suit and the subsequent possession.

Held:

The trial court rightly dismissed the suit as the first respondent failed to prove actual possession on the date of filing.

The settlement in RCS No.1004/1988 and the withdrawal did not establish continuous possession by the first respondent.

The First Appellate Court and High Court erred in relying on Purshis Ex.-41 to infer possession without concrete evidence.

Lack of rent payment since 1991 and non-compliance with business requirements further discredited the first respondent's claim.

The first respondent's objection to property development, unsupported by evidence, was rejected by the Corporation.

The High Court's decision affirming the First Appellate Court is set aside, and the appeal is allowed. The first respondent's suit is dismissed.

Facts:

The respondents initiated an Execution Petition seeking delivery of possession of Schedule ‘B’ property. The appellants, claiming to be lessees, filed an application in the District Court for a declaration of their entitlement to possession. The District Court granted their application. However, the High Court dismissed the claim, and a subsequent Special Leave Petition (SLP) was also dismissed.

The appellants, undeterred, commenced fresh proceedings seeking directions for compensation for improvements over the property before delivery of possession. This application was dismissed by the District Court, leading to the appellants' contention that their claims were not subjected to proper scrutiny.

Issues:

Whether the claims asserted by the appellants were barred by the principle of constructive res judicata, considering their failure to raise the claims during the earlier Execution Application.

Held:

The appellants, although strangers to the decree, had the right to adjudicate their claim to remain in possession independently. They were entitled to assert their claim under Order XXI Rule 97 even prior to dispossession. The court had the authority to adjudicate all related questions under Order XXI Rule 101, leading to a decree under Rule 103.

The appellants' present claim for compensation under Section 4(1) of the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, 1958, was closely linked to their earlier claim to remain in possession. The failure to assert this claim during the initial Execution Application invoked the deeming fiction in Explanation IV to Section 11, applying the principle of constructive res judicata.

The provisions of Order XXI Rules 97 to 103 constituted a comprehensive code, offering the sole remedy for both parties to a suit and strangers to a decree. Failing to raise all pertinent issues during the earlier Execution Application would lead to a multiplicity of proceedings and undue delay in realizing the fruits of the decree.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's conclusion that the claims advanced by the appellants were barred by the principle of constructive res judicata.

FACTS:

The appellant, a "Kanoongo/Patwari" in Didihat, Uttarakhand, was charged under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The charge was based on accepting illegal gratification from Gopal Singh in 1985, promising not to arrest or implicate him in a pending criminal case.

ISSUES:

Conviction under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Quantum of the jail sentence imposed by the lower courts.

HELD:

The court refers to Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, which allows imprisonment from one to seven years and provides for the court to impose a sentence of less than one year for special reasons recorded in writing.( Para 14)

Citing the case of K.P. Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), the court emphasizes the factors to consider in determining the adequacy of a sentence, including the reformative, deterrent, and punitive aspects, the age and health of the accused, and the nature of the offense.( Para 18)

The court lists eight special reasons justifying a reduction in the sentence, including the age of the appellant (78 years), the 34-year pendency of the case, the appellant's health conditions, the minimal bribe amount, and the trauma suffered.( Para 20)

The court exercises its powers under the proviso to Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, altering the jail sentence to the time already undergone (1 month and 10 days) and enhances the fine from Rs. 3000 to Rs. 10,000.( Para 22)

The appellant is not required to undergo any further jail sentence, provided he pays the fine amount of Rs. 10,000 within three months. If Rs. 3000 is already paid, he must deposit Rs. 7000.( Para 24)

REFERRED CASES:

K.P. Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2015) 15 SCC 497.

Facts:

The dispute centers around the possession of land under the Uttarakhand Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1960.

The appellant claimed Sirdari rights based on being recorded as an occupant, citing a Government order and an entry made by the Patwari (Lekhpal).

The High Court set aside the trial court's decree, emphasizing the order of the Assistant Record Officer in 1961 directing the deletion of the appellant's name and challenging the validity of the Patwari's entry.

The exchange of land between the government and individuals under an order dated 05.09.1960 is crucial to the case.

Issues:

Whether the appellant can claim Sirdari rights based on being recorded as an occupant, considering the order for deletion by the Assistant Record Officer.

The validity and authority of the entry made by the Patwari in 1379-1385.

Held:

The Court held that the order of the Assistant Record Officer directing the deletion of the appellant's name is crucial. The statutory benefit conferred under Section 10(e) cannot be obtained if the person is no longer recorded as an occupant. The Court emphasized that the entries in the revenue records cannot confer rights if made fraudulently or surreptitiously.( Para 6)

The Court reiterated that Asami rights could not have been obtained by the appellant as the order for deleting his name from possession was passed during a record operation.( Para 9)

The entry made by the Patwari lacked authority, and the Patwari was not competent to confer any right. The Court upheld the High Court's view that the entries are open to attack if made fraudulently or surreptitiously.( Para 14)

The Court highlighted the exchange of land documented in the order dated 05.09.1960, wherein Plot No.719 was given in exchange to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent.( Para 16)

Amar Singh himself admitted in a document dated 14.05.1956 that the escheated land of Tulsa Devi would be released from his possession, and he would be in possession of only specific plots, excluding Plot No.719.( Para 18)