Facts:

An oil tanker collided with a car, resulting in the death of 'RSJ' who was accompanied by his wife and children. The claimants, parents of the deceased and his wife and minor children, filed claims stating the deceased's age, occupation, salary, and prospects before the accident. The Tribunal awarded compensation, later enhanced by the High Court.

Issues:

The Tribunal's assessment errors, calculation of multiplicand, and failure to consider future prospects. Comparison with the principles established in the Pranay Sethi case.

The High Court's modification of the compensation and interest component. The deduction of an ex-gratia amount received by claimants.

Held:

The Tribunal's award suffered from fundamental errors, particularly in the assessment of multiplicand, deviating from the principles in the Pranay Sethi case.

The High Court's assessment, though slightly deviating in the enhancement of future prospects, remained in conformity with the principles in Pranay Sethi, and no modification was considered necessary.

The ex-gratia amount received by the claimants was not under any specific service rules, distinguishing it from the Shashi Sharma case. No deduction in the amount awarded by the High Court was deemed necessary.

The Tribunal's interest rate of 12% was deemed too high; the High Court's modification to 7.5% was considered reasonable.

The amount receivable by the claimants, as per the High Court's judgment, was upheld as just compensation, and no interference was warranted.

Accordingly, both these appeals fail, and are dismissed.

FACTS:

The incident occurred on 1st July 1987 in Village Prempara-Rampara, where the appellants caused injuries to Bhura Govind and Lakha Arjan, leading to their death.

The cause of the occurrence was a dispute over the right of way, as the appellants were not giving way to the deceased.

ISSUES:

Whether the appellants acted in self-defense.

Whether the injuries inflicted were in the right of private defense.

Whether the conviction under Section 302 of IPC is justified.

HELD:

The right of private defense is not available when the alleged assailants are unarmed. The appellants were armed with spears and other weapons, while the deceased were unarmed.

Multiple stab wounds on vital parts of the deceased indicate pre-meditation, ruling out the argument of a sudden fight.

The injuries on the deceased were not consistent with a right of private defense, justifying the conviction under Section 302 of IPC.

DECISION: The criminal appeal is dismissed, upholding the conviction under Sections 302 and 324 of IPC.

REFERRED CASES:

Decided on : 23-04-2019

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Sections 302, 304 and 324 - Murder - Appeal against conviction and sentence - Deceased had multiple stab wounds on the chest - Since there are multiple wounds, it cannot be said that the appellants have acted at the spur of the moment without pre-meditation and that the appellants are not taken any advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner - It is not a case of single injury which one can infer on account of sudden fight - Not find any merit in the alternate argument that the appellants are entitled to be convicted under Section 304 IPC as they have given multiple injuries on the vital parts of the deceased - Trial Court as well as the High Court was perfectly justified in law in convicting and sentencing the appellants for the offence under Section 302 IPC - Appeal dismissed.

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Sections 302, 304 and 324 - Murder - Right of Private defence - Appellants have lodged cross First Information Report - There is no evidence on the part of the appellants that the deceased were armed with any weapon in the first version, when they lodged report. The right of private defence is not available when the alleged assailants are unarmed. The right of private defence is to protect the person and the property. In such right, the person cannot cause more harm than what is necessary for the protection of the person and the property. What harm can be expected from the hands of the deceased when they were un-armed, whereas from the testimony of PW-3 and PW-4, the injured witnesses, the appellants were armed with spears and other weapons. The Post-Mortem report corroborates an oral testimony that both the deceased have received stab wounds. Therefore, the appellants cannot be said to have acted in the right of their private defence.

Counsel for Appearing Parties

Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, Advocate, Mr. Ankit Agarwal, Advocate and Ms. Deepti R. Mehrotra, Advocate, for the Appellant; Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Advocate and Ms. Puja Singh, Advocate, for the Respondent.

Facts:

The appellant's predecessor, Shri Bona Menezes, applied for occupancy rights over various parcels of land.

Landlord raised objections, specifically in relation to Survey No. 119/2A1, claiming it as 'Punja' land not leased to the applicant.

Issues:

Whether the land in Survey No. 119/2A1 qualifies as agricultural land under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961?

Whether the Land Tribunal's findings regarding possession and usage of the land were justified?

Held:

The High Court, on appeal, set aside the Land Tribunal's order, emphasizing that Punja land, if not brought under cultivation, cannot be classified as agricultural. The court also questioned the establishment of lawful tenancy and landlord-tenant relationship based on mere possession.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order. It remanded the case for reconsideration, noting that the High Court seemed to have overlooked relevant aspects and legal definitions. The Court directed the High Court to decide the writ petition afresh, emphasizing the broad definition of "land" under Section 2(18) of the Act of 1961.

Facts: The appellant, Globe Ground India Employees Union, raised an industrial dispute over the closure of their establishment and retrenchment by M/s Globe Ground India. The issue was referred to the Industrial Tribunal by the Central Government. The appellant claimed that the new company formed after closure, Bird Worldwide Flight Services Ltd., utilized the same equipment and retained most employees, alleging violation of labor laws.

Issues:

Whether the closure and retrenchment actions by M/s Globe Ground India were legal under the Industrial Disputes Act. The appellant sought reinstatement and benefits for the retrenched workers.

Held:

The court examined the corporate structure, noting that the first respondent, Lufthansa German Airlines, had a subsidiary (Globe Ground Deutschland GmbH) holding shares in the second respondent (Globe Ground India Pvt. Ltd.). The appellant argued the first respondent's involvement based on corporate relationships.

Decision: The court held that, considering the limited scope of adjudication under Section 10(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the first respondent was neither a necessary nor a proper party in answering the reference. The closure and retrenchment actions were found to be within legal bounds. The appeals were dismissed.

Facts:

The respondents allege that their father mortgaged the property for Rs. 2500 through a Deed (Ex.P-73) with a condition to repurchase within five years. The appellants argue that the transaction was a sale with a condition to repurchase. The trial court dismissed the suit, stating the debtor-creditor relationship wasn't established. The first Appellate Court reversed this decision, affirming that Ex.P-73 was a mortgage by conditional sale.

Issues:

Whether the document (Ex.P-73) should be classified as a "mortgage by conditional sale" or a "sale with a condition to repurchase."

Held:

By examining Ex.P-73, it's evident that the father of respondents borrowed Rs. 700 eight days before its execution, and this amount was adjusted from the total consideration of Rs. 2500. The intention of the parties was to terminate the debtor-creditor relationship, creating a vendor-vendee relationship. The document established a conditional sale with an option to repurchase within five years.

The mention of "borrowed a sum of Rs. 700" in the document is incidental. The recitals make it clear that the parties intended to end the debtor-creditor relationship and establish a vendor-vendee relationship. There is no mention of essential mortgage elements like interest rate or foreclosure in Ex.P-73.

The receipt Ex.P-69 cannot be relied upon as corroborative evidence of part payment. The burden of proving its genuineness was not discharged by the plaintiffs, and it cannot establish that Ex.P-73 is a "mortgage by conditional sale."

Despite the transaction and repurchase condition being in one document, Ex.P-73 does not fall within the proviso to Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act. It is a sale with a condition to repurchase, and the respondents lost their right to repurchase due to non-payment within the stipulated period.

The appeals are allowed.

Facts:

The Cantonment Board, Meerut, and others issued notices under Section 185 of the Cantonments Act, 1924, alleging unauthorized constructions by the respondents. The respondents filed writ petitions challenging these notices in the High Court.

Issues:

The authority of the appellants, and the validity of the notices. It also examined the failure to consider objections, the absence of reasons, and the stereo-typed orders by the appellate authority.

Held:

The High Court rejected jurisdictional challenges and the plea of not taking action within 12 months. However, it found procedural irregularities and lack of consideration for objections. The High Court quashed the notices but left it open for the appellants to initiate fresh proceedings.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed. The liberty granted by the High Court to initiate fresh proceedings was maintained. The appellants were directed to take fresh action in accordance with the Cantonment Act, 2006. The fresh show cause notice was to be in continuation of the earlier one, with a copy of the Inspection Report provided to the respondents.(Para 12)

Facts:

The State of Bihar issued an advertisement on July 24, 1985, inviting applications for 40 posts of Assistant Conservator of Forests (ACF). The appellants participated in the selection but were unsuccessful. Representations were made to appoint them against vacant posts beyond the advertised 40. The State appointed them on April 13, 1988, purportedly with reference to the 1985 advertisement. Further appointments occurred in 1987, 1990, 1992, and 1995. The proposal to regularize the appellants' services was approved in 2005.

Issues:

Determination of the legality of the appellants' appointment.

Seniority calculation concerning substantive appointments.

The regularisation proposal's impact on seniority.

Held:

Rule 35 of the Bihar Forest Service Rules, 1953, dictates that seniority is determined with reference to the date of substantive appointment. The appellants secured their appointments through representations, rendering them illegal and fortuitous.

The recruitment initiated in 1985 culminated with the exhaustion of the Merit List in 1987. No further appointments could be made from it. The appellants' appointments were illegal and contrary to the statutory rules.

The appellants, through persistent lobbying, secured appointments against the 1985 Advertisement, which was illegal and in violation of the rules.

A proposal to regularize their services was made, considering their 17 years of service. The irregularity of their 1988 appointments was acknowledged in the proposal.

The High Court rightly dismissed writ petitions and Letters Patent Appeals, holding that seniority is reckoned from the date of regularization in 2005, not from the illegal appointment in 1988.

Facts:

The appellant appealed against the judgment of the Sikkim High Court that enhanced his sentence from seven years to ten years under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The case originated from an incident where the appellant was convicted of attempting to sexually assault a minor girl, and the Special Judge sentenced him to seven years.

Issues:

Whether the High Court had the authority to enhance the sentence in an appeal challenging the conviction.

Whether the procedure prescribed under Section 386 proviso was followed, specifically regarding notice for enhancement.

Held:

The High Court's enhancement of the sentence from seven years to ten years was not in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The judgment was set aside to the extent of the enhancement. The sentence awarded by the Special Judge was maintained.

Decision: The appeal was partly allowed, affirming the conviction but setting aside the enhancement of the sentence. The Special Judge's sentence of seven years under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, and one month under Section 341 of IPC was upheld.

Facts:

The Respondent-State enacted the 2007 Act after the High Court declared the 2000 Act ultra vires. The challenge to the levy of Entry Tax was referred to a nine-Judge Bench by the Supreme Court. The High Court upheld the legislative competence in enacting the 2007 Act. The Supreme Court granted interim stay subject to the appellants depositing 50% of the accrued tax liability. The matter was referred to a Regular Bench after a nine-Judge Bench decision. The appellant was granted liberty to question the levy of Entry Tax under the 2007 Act, leading to Writ Petition No. 25730 of 17, challenging the validity of the 2007 Act.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in upholding the preliminary objection on the writ petition being a second petition on the same and consequential cause of action.

Whether Section 13 of the U.P. Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2007, applies mutatis mutandis to Section 33 of the U.P. Value Added Tax Act, 2008.

Whether the 2007 Act contains substantive law for the levy of interest on Entry Tax.

Held:

Writ Petition No. 25730 of 2017 was filed in pursuance of the liberty granted, challenging the vires of the 2007 Act. The Division Bench, in its judgment, explicitly restricted the consideration to the questions framed by the Regular Bench, thereby excluding issues not expressly permitted for consideration. The plea regarding the leviability of interest was specifically raised but not permitted for consideration. The Division Bench's restriction cannot operate as res judicata in a subsequent writ petition where the challenge was to the leviability of interest.

Section 13 of the U.P. Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2007, applies mutatis mutandis to Section 33 of the U.P. Value Added Tax Act, 2008. Even if Section 33 is treated as a machinery provision, it must be interpreted to make the liability effective and treated as substantive law for the levy of interest on Entry Tax.

The High Court erred in upholding the preliminary objection, and the matter is remitted to the High Court for determining the liability of interest under the 2007 Act. The questions regarding the nature and extent of liability to pay interest on Entry Tax need examination.