Facts:

The case pertains to the interpretation of Section 9(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, concerning the time limit for rectifying defects in the application for the initiation of the corporate insolvency resolution process.

Issues:

Whether the time limit mentioned in the proviso for subsection (5) of Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, is mandatory or directory in nature.

Held:

The court found that the provision for removing defects within seven days is directory, not mandatory (Para 20).

It was discussed whether the rejection of the application due to failure to rectify defects should be considered a rejection on merits or an administrative action. The court concluded that such rejection should be viewed as administrative, allowing the applicant to file a fresh, complete application (Para 21).

The court outlined three stages of the application process: filing, scrutiny, and adjudication. It emphasized that while time limits are important during the adjudication stage, they are less so during the pre-adjudication stage (Para 22).

It was noted that it's in the applicant's best interest to rectify defects promptly, as an incomplete application will not be entertained (Para 23).

The court suggested a balanced approach where the time limit is seen as directory but failure to adhere to it requires the applicant to provide a sufficient explanation for the delay. The adjudicating authority will then decide whether the explanation is acceptable before proceeding with the application (Para 24 and 25).

Decision:

The court held that the proviso to Section 9(5), providing for removing defects within seven days, is directory in nature. However, failure to remove objections within this time frame requires the applicant to provide a sufficient explanation. The decision to entertain the application on merits will depend on the adjudicating authority's satisfaction with the explanation provided (Para 25).

Fact:

The Municipal Corporation of Delhi issued a notice under Section 126 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, proposing to enhance the rateable value of a property owned by Dharma Properties Pvt. Ltd. The notice was received by the respondent after the specified period.

Issues:

Whether the notice received after the specified period would be invalid.

Whether the assessment for subsequent/future periods could be based on such a notice, even if it was invalid for the initial assessment year.

Held:

The Court held that the notice was indeed time-barred as it was received after the specified period. The Court agreed with the High Court's decision on this issue, emphasizing that the giving of notice requires communication or informing the recipient, and mere dispatch does not suffice (Para. 12-14).

However, the Court disagreed with the High Court's decision regarding subsequent assessment years. It held that the notice, though invalid for the initial assessment year, could still be valid for subsequent years if received within the Assessment Year. The Court emphasized the scheme of assessment under the Act, where assessment for property tax is demanded only from the ensuing year in which the assessment is finalized. The appeal is accordingly allowed. (Para. 15-21)

Facts:

The appellant, Ratanlal, challenged the High Court's decision to allow the re-examination of two witnesses, PW4 and PW5, in a criminal trial. The witnesses had initially supported the prosecution but later filed applications claiming their earlier statements were made under police influence.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the Sessions Judge's order and allowing the re-examination of the witnesses.

Additionally, the question of locus standi was raised regarding the appellant's right to challenge the High Court's decision.

Held:

The appellant's right to challenge the High Court's order was established, emphasizing that criminal jurisprudence recognizes the pursuit of justice by anyone with a bona fide connection to the case.

The Supreme Court elucidated on the scope of Section 311 of the CrPC, highlighting its purpose to ensure a just decision by empowering courts to summon, examine, or recall witnesses.

The Court found no valid reason for the delay in filing the re-examination applications by PW4 and PW5, indicating potential tampering. Therefore, the High Court erred in setting aside the Sessions Judge's order.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, overturning the High Court's order, and instructed the Trial Court to proceed without considering the evidence obtained from the re-examination of PW4 and PW5.

Facts:

The case stemmed from a letter by (Retd.) Chief Justice R. C. Lahoti highlighting unnatural deaths in prisons, which was treated as a public interest litigation. The focus was on addressing the alarming number of unnatural deaths, particularly suicides, in prisons across India.

Issues:

Defining natural and unnatural deaths.

Addressing suicides in prisons and implementing prevention strategies.

Need for prison reforms to ensure dignity and rights of prisoners.

Compensation for custodial deaths and recognition of victims' rights.

Custodial deaths of children in child care institutions under Juvenile Justice Acts.

Held:

On the issue of defining natural and unnatural deaths, the court referred to guidelines by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

Regarding suicides in prisons, the court emphasized the importance of implementing prevention strategies outlined by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and distributing relevant documents.

The court highlighted the need for prison reforms to prioritize reformation and rehabilitation over retribution and deterrence.

Compensation for custodial deaths was deemed essential, recognizing the victims' rights regardless of their status as criminals.

The court raised concerns about custodial deaths of children in child care institutions and urged authorities to address this issue with greater concern.

Decision: The court issued several directions, including the registration of public interest petitions by High Courts, circulation of relevant documents to prison authorities, training programs for police officials, appointment of counselors for prisoners, and the establishment of oversight mechanisms.

Facts:

The respondent's sales tax assessment for the assessment year 1998-99 was completed under the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973, with a refund ordered on 12.05.2000.

The Act of 1973 was repealed by the Haryana Value Added Tax Act, 2003, on 01.04.2003.

A show cause notice was issued to the respondent on 07.06.2004 regarding the earlier refund, invoking suo-moto revisional powers under Section 40 of the Act of 1973, leading to an order on 12.07.2004 holding the respondent liable for recovery.

The respondent challenged this order before the High Court, contending that the exercise of revisional power under Section 40 of the Act of 1973, after the enforcement of the Act of 2003, was unsustainable.

Issues:

Whether the exercise of revisional power under Section 40 of the Act of 1973, after its repeal by the Act of 2003, is sustainable.

Interpretation of Section 61 of the Act of 2003 and its implications on pending proceedings under the repealed Act.

Held:

The Court analyzed the provisions of Section 61 of the Act of 2003 and emphasized that the saving clause saved only pending proceedings under the repealed Act. Since there were no pending proceedings against the respondent under the Act of 1973 when the Act of 2003 came into force, the exercise of suo-moto revisional powers after repeal was unsustainable. The Court also noted that the legislative wisdom recognized this limitation and amended Section 61 in 2010.

In conclusion, the Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the exercise of revisional power under Section 40 of the Act of 1973, after its repeal, was unsustainable, and the orders of the High Court did not warrant interference.

Facts:

The case involved the acquisition of part of a building without acquiring the land underneath by the State of Maharashtra. The owner of the building was different from the owner of the land, which belonged to the government.

Issues:

Whether it is permissible for the State to acquire part of a building without acquiring the land underneath, where the ownership of the land lies with the government.

Whether such acquisition would amount to overreach of the State's power of eminent domain or violation of Article 300A of the Constitution.

Held:

The definition of 'land' under Section 3(a) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is broad and inclusive, encompassing benefits arising from land and things permanently attached to the earth or to anything attached to the earth.

Section 49 of the Act allows for the acquisition of part of a building or house, with the owner having the option to express whether the whole building should be acquired. The court has the power to decide whether the land proposed to be taken forms part of the building or not, and whether it is reasonably required for the full and unimpaired use of the building.

In cases where the owner of the building is different from the owner of the land, and the land belongs to the government, the government can acquire a portion of the building for public purpose without acquiring the land. The government acquires only the private interest belonging to the owner, as it already owns the land .

The purpose of the Land Acquisition Act is to compensate owners adequately for acquisitions made for public purposes. Acquisition of parts of buildings is permissible if the rights in those parts are capable of being acquired, even if the underlying land is not acquired.

Article 300A of the Constitution prohibits deprivation of property without compensation. However, when only a building or a part thereof is acquired, and not the underlying land, the rights of the owner are not infringed as they do not own the land. The acquisition is legally justified as it is done in accordance with the law and for a public purpose.

While land and building become one unit after being married, the valuation of a particular floor or part of the building can still be determined, taking into account various factors including the support provided by the land and the value of the land in the locality.

Facts:

The petitioners challenged the decision of the Central Government to decline confirmation of a conditional Letter of Permission (LOP) for establishing a new medical college. Despite the petitioners' application for the academic session 2016-17, the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, based on the Medical Council of India's (MCI) recommendation, barred the college from admitting students for the academic sessions 2017-2018 and 2018-2019 and authorized the encashment of the bank guarantee.

Issues:

The deficiencies noted during inspection, the petitioners' explanations for these deficiencies, and the justification of the Central Government's decision to decline confirmation of the LOP.

Held:

The court upheld the Competent Authority's decision based on the deficiencies observed during the inspection, finding the explanations provided by the petitioners unsatisfactory. The absence of faculty members and residents, as well as other deficiencies, were deemed significant and could not be overlooked. The court directed that existing students admitted on the basis of the conditional LOP be allowed to continue their studies.

Furthermore, the Medical Council of India was instructed to conduct an inspection to assess the college's performance and deficiencies, allowing the college an opportunity to rectify any shortcomings. The Ministry was directed to make a final decision within a specified timeframe. Until then, the bank guarantee offered by the college should not be encashed. Writ petition and interlocutory application are disposed of.

Facts:

The case involved a challenge to the recruitment ratio for Assistant Engineers in the Tamil Nadu Engineering Service.

Various government orders and amendments to rules dating back to 1972 were considered.

Dispute arose regarding the eligibility criteria and recruitment methods for Assistant Engineers.

Issues:

Whether the recruitment ratio prescribed by the Tribunal was appropriate.

Interpretation of the relevant rules and amendments governing the recruitment of Assistant Engineers.

Whether the actions of the respondents were in accordance with the law.

Held:

The Court noted that amendments in 1983 made Overseers and Civil Draftsmen Grade II and III ineligible for promotion to Assistant Engineer, altering the position set in 1972.

However, the Rules of 1985 allowed for promotion to Assistant Engineers from Overseers and Civil Draftsmen, provided they met the requisite qualifications and experience.

The Court rejected the appellant's argument regarding illegal usurpation of the quota for direct recruitment, affirming that those selected through direct recruitment should be counted towards the quota of direct recruitment, not as part of the quota for recruitment by transfer.

The Court found the appeals bereft of merits and dismissed them accordingly.

Facts:

Including the supply of necessaries to a vessel owned by Third Element Enterprises, the subsequent legal proceedings initiated by Chrisomar Corporation to recover its dues, and the dispute regarding ownership of the vessel at the time of arrest.

Issues:

The applicability of Sections 62 and 63 of the Indian Contract Act.

Clarification on the distinction between maritime claims and maritime liens.

Determination of the relevant date for asserting a maritime claim.

Examination of whether the subsequent agreement between the parties constituted novation of the original contract.

Burden of proof regarding ownership of the vessel.

Held:

The court held that Section 63 of the Contract Act applied to the facts of the case, as the subsequent agreement did not completely replace the original contract but dealt with one aspect (payment) while keeping the original transaction alive.

It was clarified that while necessaries supplied to a vessel constitute a maritime claim, they do not automatically create a maritime lien on the vessel.

The court determined that a maritime claim can only be asserted at the time of vessel arrest, not at the time of institution of the suit.

The argument that the subsequent agreement amounted to novation of the original contract was rejected, as it was found to reinforce the original contract rather than supersede it.

The burden of proof regarding ownership of the vessel was found to be on the respondent, who failed to prove the change of ownership in their favor at the time of arrest.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, setting aside the judgment of the High Court and restoring the decree of the trial court in favor of Chrisomar Corporation.