Facts:

The case involves an incident on March 13, 1994, where the appellants, among others, were accused of attacking and ultimately causing the death of the father-in-law of the complainant. The charges were framed under various sections of the Penal Code, including s.141, s.149, s.302, and s.326.

Issues:

The appellants' alleged participation in the unlawful assembly, the common object of the assembly, and their roles in the attack on the deceased.

Held:

The statement of PW1, recorded soon after the incident, supported by PW2 and PW3, detailed the accused's presence and actions. Both trial and high courts found no reason to doubt this account. Discrepancies were attributed to the lapse of time since the occurrence.

The FIR, lodged promptly after the incident by residents (PW2 and PW3), validated PW1's account, and minor discrepancies in recalling accused details did not undermine the prosecution's case.

The "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" maxim was deemed inapplicable in India. The court emphasized that rejecting part of a witness's statement doesn't discredit the entire testimony, especially when the witness is found reliable overall.

Confessional statements (Ex.P.6 and Ex.P.8) were used to recover weapons, and while DW4 suggested a different timeline for injuries, it didn't dispute the core events. The active roles of A-1 and A-2 were proven, with the presence of other accused established by multiple witnesses.

The argument that appellants other than A-1 and A-2 lacked a common object was dismissed. The court held that the evidence showed a collective attack on the deceased due to his role in Panchayat affairs against caste Hindus.

Judicial orders, it was emphasized, are case-specific. The cumulative effect of facts led both courts to conclude that all appellants, as part of an unlawful assembly, shared the common object leading to the deceased's murder.

Facts:

The appellant, Jagdish, was convicted for the murder of his wife and five children. The trial court, High Court, and Supreme Court confirmed the death sentence. The mercy petition, filed on 13.10.2009, was rejected by the President of India on 16.07.2014. The appellant challenged the rejection on the grounds of a nearly 5-year delay in deciding the mercy petition.

Issues:

Whether the delay in deciding the mercy petition justifies the commutation of the death sentence?

Is this case one of the "rarest of rare" instances for awarding a death sentence?

Held:

The Review Petition is not entertained on the merits of the case, as three courts had a concurrent finding of the appellant's guilt.

The issue of the delay in deciding the mercy petition is considered separately. The Court refers to V. Sriharan's case, emphasizing that an exorbitant delay renders the execution arbitrary and inexecutable. The delay in this case is deemed unreasonable.

The State of Madhya Pradesh's unexplained delay of more than 4 years in forwarding the mercy petition is criticized. The Court cannot condone such unexplained delays, especially in death penalty cases.

The Court takes into consideration the appellant's 14-year incarceration and the nature of the crime. Despite the brutal nature of the crime, the Court commutes the death sentence to life, specifying that life imprisonment means the entire remaining life, with no possibility of release until death.

The Review Petition and Writ Petition are partly allowed in the aforementioned terms.

Facts:

The accused, Dattatraya @ Datta Ambo Rokade, was convicted by the trial court for the rape and murder of a minor child. The high court affirmed the conviction and the death sentence imposed by the trial court. The Supreme Court heard the appeal challenging the conviction and sentence.

Issues:

Validity of the conviction for offenses under various sections, including rape and murder.

Appropriateness of the death sentence imposed by the trial court.

Held:

The forensic reports, coupled with the extrajudicial confession made by the accused, substantiate the guilt. The DNA analysis establishes the accused's involvement in the rape of the victim, confirming the convictions under Sections 302, 376(2)(f), 377 of the IPC, and Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the POCSO Act (Paras 85, 86, and 96).

While the accused's actions were heinous and cruel, there is no evidence of premeditated murder or diabolic planning. The absence of intent to kill the minor child led the court to commute the death sentence to life imprisonment (Paras 122, 125, 126, 127, and 128).

The court highlighted the inadequate defense representation and the denial of an effective hearing on the question of sentence under Section 235(2) of the CrPC. The accused was not given the opportunity to present mitigating circumstances, leading to the commutation of the death sentence (Paras 136, 137, 138, and 139).

The court emphasized that Section 235(2) of the CrPC is not a mere formality and must be obeyed in letter and spirit. The trial judge's failure to elicit relevant facts and provide an opportunity to present mitigating factors led to the commutation of the death sentence (Paras 103, 105, 139, 140, and 141).

The court exercised its authority to prescribe the length of incarceration, directing that the accused should undergo imprisonment for life till his natural death, with no remission of sentence due to the heinous nature of the crime (Paras 143 and 144).

Facts:

A piece of land, allotted to M/s. Shalimar Tar Products Ltd., was in unauthorized occupation. The Port Trust initiated eviction proceedings and recovered possession. The question arose regarding the right to seize and dispose of goods and materials found on the premises, including those not belonging to the erstwhile tenant/licensee.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 6 of the Public Premises Act and its applicability to goods belonging to third parties found on public premises after an eviction order.

Held:

Section 6 of the PP Act applies to any person in unauthorized occupation, including goods not belonging to the erstwhile tenant/licensee.

The Estate Officer is entitled to sell goods, even of a stranger, found on premises under unauthorized occupation.

Section 6 of the PP Act must be read independently of Sections 59 and 61 of the Major Port Trusts Act.

The provision aims to enable authorities to take consequential steps after receiving possession of public premises and for the recovery of dues.

Decision: The Court disposed of the appeals, affirming the right of the Port Trust to seize and dispose of goods on public premises, even if not belonging to the unauthorized occupant. The Full Bench's judgment was upheld.

Facts:

The case involves the termination of services of Mahendra Prasad Jakhmola by Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. A dispute was referred to the Labour Court under Section 4(k) of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Issues:

The justification of the termination and the applicability of the notification dated 24.04.1990 under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970.

Held:

The Labour Court, relying on the notification, concluded that the workmen were directly employed by the appellant and ordered reinstatement without backwages.

The appellant contested the review petition, denying any concession made before the Labour Court and asserting the inapplicability of the notification.

The High Court, in the first instance, upheld the Labour Court's decision, considering the workmen's duties identical to regular employees and the alleged contract with the contractor as 'sham.'

The Supreme Court set aside the judgments, finding the Labour Court's decision perverse. The notification, exempting the appellant, was erroneously applied.

The Court emphasized that concessions on mixed questions of fact and law cannot solely determine the case. Gate passes and concessions did not establish a direct relationship between the appellant and the workmen.

The Court held that the extended definition of 'employer' in the Act requires evidence that the work performed by contract labour is ordinarily part of the industry, which was lacking in this case.

The High Court's findings were deemed contrary to the evidence on record, and the contract labour relationship was not proven to be 'sham.'

The Court rejected arguments based on non-compliance with the Labour Court's award and the contractor's minimal profit, emphasizing the need for a factual foundation.

Facts:

The appellant was tried and found guilty for the murder of a minor child named 'Rishikesh.' The trial court awarded capital punishment, which was confirmed by the High Court. The appellant, aged 22 at the time, had spent 18 years in jail.

Issues:

The appeal against the capital punishment imposed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and confirmed by the High Court.

Held:

The appellant did not challenge the conviction but sought commutation of the death sentence. The appeal was restricted to the sentence imposed by the Sessions Judge, confirmed by the High Court.( Para 4)

Mitigating circumstances favoring commutation included the appellant's age at the time of the crime, good conduct in jail, efforts at rehabilitation, completion of graduation, and reflection on past mistakes. The appellant's behavior and conduct in jail indicated reformative potential.( Para 6)

After considering the facts and circumstances, the court concluded that capital punishment was not warranted. Mitigating circumstances favored the accused, justifying commutation to life imprisonment.( Para 6.1)

Referring to legal precedents, including Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab and Shyam Singh alias Bhima vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, the court decided in the interest of justice to commute the death sentence to life imprisonment.( Para 8)

Facts:

Parties entered into separate contracts for the sale of Non-Basmati Parboiled Rice of Thailand origin. The contracts were governed by GAFTA 48, and disputes were to be resolved through Arbitration 125 as per GAFTA 125 in London. The Arbitral Tribunal passed two separate awards. The respondent filed two execution cases under Part-II of the 1996 Act before the High Court for the enforcement of the foreign arbitral awards. The petitioner raised objections regarding the maintainability of the execution case, which were rejected.

Issues:

Whether the objections raised by the petitioner in the earlier round regarding the maintainability of the execution case were valid?

Whether the conduct of the petitioner, including changing the company's name and registered office address, affected the proceedings?

Whether the subject foreign awards were deemed to be decrees and thus enforceable?

Held:

The petitioner's contention that objections were limited to the maintainability of the execution case and not the enforceability of foreign awards is dismissed. The petitioner had the opportunity to raise all available grounds. The High Court had made it clear that the subject foreign awards were deemed to be decrees, implying enforceability. The petitioner's attempts to protract the execution on untenable grounds are rejected.

The grounds regarding maintainability of the execution case could not be considered in isolation from the enforceability of foreign awards. Section 48 does not allow piecemeal consideration, and both aspects must be addressed simultaneously. The petitioner's application is rejected, barred by constructive res judicata.

The petitioner's conduct, including changing the company's name and registered office address, indicates an attempt to overreach the Court. Such actions are criticized, and the special leave petitions are rejected.

The High Court's view on the petitioner's grounds questioning the enforceability of foreign awards is upheld. The limited scope for interference in foreign awards under Section 48 is acknowledged. The attempt to have a re-look at the award is not permissible.

The Arbitral Tribunal considered all aspects, and even if errors occurred, they are matters for correction through appeal under English Law. The Court doesn't express an opinion on the merits. Exemplary costs of Rs. 20,00,000/- are awarded to the respondent. The Registrar (OS), Calcutta High Court is directed to encash FDs and remit the amount to the respondent.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of Section 80-IC of the Income Tax Act, 1961, pertaining to the deduction of profits and gains for specified industrial undertakings in certain states. The appellants, existing units in Himachal Pradesh, set up new industrial units and claimed 100% deduction for the initial five years. After substantial expansion, they sought 100% deduction for an additional five years instead of the prescribed 25%.

Issues:

Whether existing units, after substantial expansion, are entitled to 100% deduction for the next five years under Section 80-IC.

The applicability and interpretation of the term "initial assessment year" within the context of Section 80-IC.

Held:

Sub-section (3) of Section 80-IC provides for a 10-year deduction period, starting with the initial assessment year. This includes 100% deduction for the first five years and 25% for the subsequent five years. The deduction is applicable to manufacturing units in specified states, including Himachal Pradesh.

Sub-section (6) of Section 80-IC imposes a 10-year cap on the maximum period for which the deduction can be allowed to any undertaking or enterpriseThe judgment in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. M/s. Classic Binding Industries, which opined that there cannot be another 'initial assessment year' within a span of 10 years, is deemed erroneous. This view was based on a misinterpretation of Section 80-IB(14), which is materially different from Section 80-IC.

The definition of 'initial assessment year' in Section 80-IC allows for multiple initial assessment years within the 10-year period. The purpose of Section 80-IC is to encourage industrial development in specified states.

Substantial expansion, as defined in Section 80-IC, qualifies as an 'initial assessment year,' justifying 100% deduction. The legislative intent is to promote expansion, generate employment, and enhance industrial growth in challenging states.

Conclusions: (a) The judgment in Classic Binding Industries failed to consider the Section 80-IC definition of 'initial assessment year' and does not lay down correct law. (b) New units in Himachal Pradesh are entitled to 100% deduction for the first five years and 25% for the next five years. (c) Substantial expansion within the 10-year period designates the year of expansion as a new 'initial assessment year,' warranting 100% deduction. (d) The total deduction period is capped at 10 years, regardless of the timing of substantial expansion.

Facts:

On 13.05.1996, the respondent assaulted his father, causing a fatal injury. The prosecution claimed the respondent's guilt under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. The Trial Court convicted him and sentenced him to 3 years' rigorous imprisonment. The High Court modified the sentence to 3 months and 21 days, considering factors such as the spontaneous nature of the incident and the respondent's age.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in reducing the sentence awarded by the Trial Court based on mitigating factors.

Held:

The Trial Court convicted the respondent for culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II IPC. While acknowledging mitigating factors like the spontaneous nature of the incident and the respondent's age, the Trial Court sentenced him to 3 years' rigorous imprisonment. The High Court further reduced the sentence to the period already undergone.

In the appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in extending undue sympathy and reducing the sentence to an inadequate level. The Court emphasized the need for proportionality between the crime and punishment, maintaining a balance between mitigating and aggravating circumstances. The respondent was ordered to surrender within 4 weeks to serve the remaining sentence.