Facts:

Mangalam Publications (I) Private Limited, a private limited company, paid interim relief to its employees from 01.04.1996 to 31.03.2000 based on recommendations from the Manisana Wage Board.

The Employees State Insurance Corporation (ESIC) demanded ESIC contributions from Mangalam Publications for the period during which interim relief was paid.

Mangalam Publications argued that the interim relief should not be considered as "wages" under Section 2(22) of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948, citing an office memorandum issued by the Government of India.

Issues:

• Whether the interim relief payments made by Mangalam Publications to its employees constitute "wages" under Section 2(22) of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948.

• Whether Mangalam Publications is liable to pay Employees State Insurance contributions for the period in question.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the interim relief payments made by Mangalam Publications to its employees fall within the definition of "wages" as per Section 2(22) of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948. The Court emphasized the wide interpretation of the term "wages" in the Act, stating that any ambiguous expression should be construed in favor of employees, given the welfare nature of the legislation.

The Court disagreed with the High Court's interpretation that the interim relief should be treated as an ex-gratia payment and not as "wages" for the purpose of Employees State Insurance contributions. It emphasized that the effect of the Employees State Insurance Act, enacted by the Parliament, cannot be circumvented by departmental office memoranda.

Therefore, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the decision of the Employees Insurance Court, holding that Mangalam Publications is liable to pay Employees State Insurance contributions for the period from 01.04.1996 to 31.03.2000.

Facts:

The petitioner-College applied for grant of approval and recognition under Section 11(2) of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956. Assessors inspected the institution on various dates, evaluating the standard of examination and recommending approval. Subsequent surprise inspections highlighted deficiencies, leading to recommendations by the Medical Council of India (MCI) to debar the college from admitting students. Despite the college's assertion of remedying deficiencies, further assessments revealed major shortcomings. The Central Government then decided against permitting admissions for certain academic sessions.

Issues:

Whether surprise inspections and subsequent denial of approval were legally acceptable.

Whether allegations of malafide against assessors vitiated the inspection process.

The importance of compliance and its assessment during renewal and recognition under Section 11(2) of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956.

Held:

The Court held that surprise inspections are permissible within the framework of the Medical Council Act, 1956. Institutions must maintain compliance, and surprise inspections serve to verify this compliance. The grievance against surprise inspections lacks merit, given the necessity for institutions imparting medical education to remain compliant.

Allegations of malafide against assessors were dismissed. The presence of malafide depends on the specific facts of each case, and in this instance, no evidence supported the claim of malafide. Mere allegations do not invalidate an inspection or proceeding.

Compliance is crucial, especially during renewal and recognition assessments under Section 11(2) of the Act. Scrutiny during recognition is stringent, as minor deficiencies may escalate over time. Given the legality of surprise inspections and absence of malafide, the Central Government's decision was deemed valid .

Decision: Students already admitted to courses are permitted to continue, with the MCI directed to ensure their degrees upon completion. An inspection for recognition for the academic year 2018-2019 was ordered, with deficiencies communicated for rectification while adhering to principles of natural justice. The application submitted for the previous academic year is to be treated as an application for the subsequent year, and the bank guarantee remains valid without being encashed.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute over the determination of seniority based on the effective date of advice for appointment, rather than the actual date of appointment or joining.

T. Raju approached the High Court seeking to be advised from a specific rank list and his contention was upheld.

Issues:

The main issue was the interpretation of Rule 27 regarding the determination of seniority in appointments made on the advice of the Commission.

Specifically, the court had to determine whether seniority should be based on the date of advice or the date of actual appointment.

Held:

The court held that seniority should be determined based on the effective date of advice, as per Rule 27 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958. This was to ensure fairness and prevent disruptions to the seniority order. The court clarified that the difference between advice and appointment is significant, and seniority should not be affected by delays in appointment.

The judgment affirmed the entitlement of T. Raju to have his seniority based on the effective date of advice for his appointment, as directed by previous court judgments. The court further directed the re-fixing of T. Raju's seniority accordingly, with any resulting monetary benefits being only notional.

It ordered that any reversion of candidates due to the revision of seniority should be deferred until T. Raju retires from service. Additionally, the court instructed the appropriate appointments and promotions for T. Raju within a specified timeframe, based on the revised seniority. Finally, the appeals filed by the State and K.R. Babu were dismissed, and pending applications were disposed of, with no orders as to costs.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute between Mobilox Innovations Private Limited and Kirusa Software Private Limited. Mobilox Innovations had withheld payment against invoices raised by Kirusa Software, alleging a breach of agreement by the latter. Correspondence between the parties indicated a disagreement over the breach of terms of the agreement, leading to Mobilox withholding payments.

Issues:

Whether there is an operational debt exceeding Rs. 1 lakh.

Whether documentary evidence shows that the debt is due and payable.

Whether there is an existence of a dispute between the parties or a record of pending legal proceedings related to the debt.

Interpretation of the word "and" in Section 8(2)(a) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Adherence to timelines specified in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Determination of the existence of a dispute based on plausible contentions requiring further investigation.

Held:

The adjudicating authority must determine whether the conditions specified in Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, are met before admitting an application for the initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) (Para 25).

The word "and" in Section 8(2)(a) must be read as "or" to avoid anomalies and ensure that disputes prevent bankruptcy proceedings even if they arise shortly before the insolvency process begins (Para 29).

Changes in legislation from earlier versions to the final enactment of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, were highlighted, emphasizing amendments to definitions and procedural requirements (Para 23).

Adherence to timelines specified in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, is crucial, and failure to comply requires recording of reasons for extension (Para 26).

The existence of a dispute should be determined based on whether a plausible contention requiring further investigation exists, rather than examining the merits of the dispute initially (Para 30).

Facts:

The appellants borrowed funds from the respondent, Hero Fincorp Ltd., against the security of seven immovable properties.

The appellants' account with the respondent became a Non-Performing Asset (NPA).

Prior to the invocation of arbitration, the SARFAESI Act was extended to Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs) like the respondent.

Notices were issued under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act for the properties mortgaged by the appellants.

The respondent initiated arbitration proceedings as per the agreement between the parties, which contained an arbitration clause.

Issues:

Whether simultaneous proceedings for debt recovery under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and the SARFAESI Act, 2002, are permissible?

Held:

The court held that simultaneous proceedings under the SARFAESI Act and the Arbitration Act are permissible. It emphasized that the SARFAESI Act provides a remedy in addition to the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1996.

The court clarified that the initiation of arbitration proceedings does not prejudice the rights of the respondent to seek relief under the SARFAESI Act. It highlighted that arbitration is an alternative to civil proceedings, and the parties have the freedom to choose a forum for resolving their disputes.

The court reiterated that the SARFAESI Act is a procedural remedy, not a substantive right. It emphasized that both the SARFAESI Act and the Arbitration Act serve as cumulative remedies for secured creditors.

The court addressed the issue of retroactivity and clarified that the SARFAESI Act applies to all existing agreements, irrespective of the notification status of the lender as a financial institution at the time of the agreement.

The court emphasized that the SARFAESI Act provides a procedural remedy against security interest already created and applies to existing borrowers, even if the lender was not a notified financial institution at the time of agreement.

Facts:The case involves allegations against individuals who received confidential information about impending trades of their company and traded on it, leading to substantial profits. The practice under consideration is 'front-running' in the securities market.

Issues:

Whether non-intermediary front-running constitutes a prohibited practice under relevant securities regulations.

Held:Discuss the definition of fraud, the evolution of regulations, and the elements necessary to establish fraudulent practices under the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003.

Analyze Regulation 2(c) of the 2003 Regulations and emphasize the broad and expansive nature of the definition of fraud. Paragraphs 6 to 14 discuss the application of this definition to the facts of the case, including the involvement of the accused individuals in trading based on confidential information.

Decision:The court concludes that non-intermediary front-running constitutes a prohibited practice under the relevant securities regulations. The accused individuals, by trading on confidential information, were found to have committed fraud, inducing others to deal in securities. Consequently, they are held liable for breaching securities market integrity.

Facts:

The arbitral tribunal, appointed with the consent of the parties, directed the respondent-claimant to file its statement of claim.

However, the respondent failed to file the statement of claim within the stipulated time.

Consequently, the arbitral tribunal terminated the proceedings as per Section 25(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

The respondent subsequently filed an application before the arbitral tribunal, seeking the recall of the order terminating the proceedings, citing reasons for the non-filing of the statement of claim.

The appellant contested the maintainability of the application, arguing that the arbitral tribunal had become functus officio after terminating the proceedings under Section 25(a).

Issues:

Whether the arbitral tribunal has the jurisdiction to recall its order terminating the proceedings under Section 25(a)?

Whether the termination of proceedings under Section 25(a) can be treated as covered by Section 32(2)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996?

What is the nature of arbitration proceedings, and does the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, apply to such proceedings?

Held:

The arbitration process is quasi-judicial and equitable in nature, differing from litigation in a court. The power and functions of the arbitral tribunal are statutorily regulated. The tribunal is empowered to recall its order terminating proceedings under Section 25(a) if sufficient cause is shown by the respondent.

The termination of proceedings under Section 25(a) cannot be treated as covered by Section 32(2)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Section 32(2)(c) contemplates different grounds for termination, distinct from the situation arising under Section 25(a).

The arbitral tribunal has the power of procedural review, akin to a quasi-judicial authority. While the tribunal is not bound by the procedural rules of the Civil Procedure Code, it can draw sustenance from its fundamental principles. The principles underlying Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be invoked by the arbitrator unless parties agree otherwise.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, affirming the decision of the High Court. The arbitral tribunal is directed to reconsider the application filed by the respondent for the recall of the order terminating the proceedings, taking into account the principles outlined in this judgment.

Facts:

The case concerned the constitutional validity of Section 115-O of the Income Tax Act, 1961, inserted by the Finance Act of 1997, which imposed an additional tax on the dividend distributed by a company. The tea companies involved argued that the income from which the dividend was distributed was agricultural income to the extent of 60%.

Issues:

Whether the imposition of an additional tax on dividend distribution by domestic companies fell within the legislative competence of the Parliament, considering the argument that such income was agricultural income, subject to the exclusive power of the State Legislature.

Held:

The court interpreted the legislative powers of the Union Parliament under Entry 82 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, which deals with "Taxes on income other than agricultural income." It held that the imposition of additional tax on dividend distribution fell within the legislative competence of the Parliament (para 22).

The court clarified that the income from which the dividend was distributed did not necessarily retain the character of agricultural income when distributed as dividends to shareholders (para 24).

It was emphasized that any limitation imposed on Section 115-O would alter the provision and was not warranted (para 27).

Decision: The court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 115-O and ruled that any limitation imposed on the provision would be unwarranted (para 34).

Facts:

The appellant was charged with the murder of Shantabai, a widow residing with her son. The prosecution alleged that the appellant, who frequently visited Shantabai, was last seen with her before her disappearance. Later, Shantabai's decomposed body was found in a dry well.

Issues:

The reliability of circumstantial evidence, including the recovery of silver ornaments from the appellant's house and the timing of events leading to Shantabai's death.

Held:

The court found various discrepancies and contradictions in the prosecution's case, including errors in the timing of events and inconsistencies in witness testimonies. Despite strong suspicion against the appellant, the court held that suspicion alone is insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, considering the material contradictions and failure to establish a complete chain of circumstances, the court granted the appellant the benefit of doubt and set aside his conviction under Section 302 of the IPC. This decision was in line with established legal principles regarding circumstantial evidence and the requirement for a complete chain of circumstances to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We accordingly allow the appeal.