Facts:

The appellant's tender for a railway project was accepted, and an agreement was signed between the appellant and the respondent.

Disputes arose during the project, leading to its abandonment by the appellant.

The appellant initiated arbitration proceedings in 1996.

The Arbitral Tribunal passed an award in 2006.

The respondent sought to set aside the award, leading to litigation.

Issues:

Whether the Division Bench erred in considering the arbitrability of the dispute for the first time on appeal.

Whether the appellant's issuance of a 'No Claims Certificate' affected the maintainability of their claim.

Whether the Arbitrator was justified in awarding interest on the disputed amount.

Held:

The Court held that the Division Bench erred in considering the arbitrability of the dispute for the first time on appeal, especially since the issue had not been raised earlier in the proceedings .

Regarding the 'No Claims Certificate,' the Court stated that the issue should have been raised earlier, and since it was not, the appellant's claim was maintainable .

However, the Court held that the Arbitrator was not justified in awarding interest on the disputed amount due to the contractual prohibition on interest payment .

Therefore, the Court partly allowed the appeals, directing the respondent not to recover the excess amount withdrawn by the appellant .

Facts:

The case revolves around a complaint wherein the Collector held that the property in possession of the appellant-Trust vested in the State Government under Section 29 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, due to the absence of heirs following the death of the owner ('M'). The Trust challenged this order before the High Court via writ petition, which was dismissed, leading to an appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court issued a limited notice initially, but subsequently granted leave to appeal.

Issues:

The jurisdiction of the Collector in adjudicating matters under Section 29, the scope of Article 142 in rendering justice, the principles underlying escheat, the burden of proof in cases of escheat, and the powers of the Administrator General in adjudicating property disputes.

Held:

The constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, as per Article 142, is based on the advancement of justice. The Court's power to render justice should not be restricted by a narrow interpretation of its mandate. The scope of an appeal, whether initially limited or not, does not raise a matter of jurisdiction but one of judicial discretion. The guiding principle in such cases should be the advancement of substantial justice. This principle allows the Court to consider the entire controversy at the final hearing without being inhibited by previous observations or orders.

Section 29 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 embodies the principle of escheat, which applies in cases of intestacy where there is a total absence of a qualified heir. The state does not take the property as a rival or preferential heir but as the lord paramount of the whole soil of the country. However, the government takes the property subject to all its obligations and liabilities. Escheat comes into operation only in the event of a failure of heirs.

The onus of proof lies heavily on the party asserting the absence of a qualified heir in cases of escheat. The law does not readily accept a claim for escheat without clear evidence of a failure of heirs. This principle is based on the norm that private titles are not overridden in favor of the state without a clear case being made out based on statutory provisions. The Collector acted in excess of jurisdiction by adjudicating a matter involving civil disputes which should have been addressed by a civil court.

Administrative authorities, including the Collector, do not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate matters of title involving civil disputes. Such adjudications must follow the ordinary civil jurisdiction of a court. The powers of the Collector under Section 167 of the Uttar Pradesh Zaminidari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 are limited and did not apply in this case.

The Administrator General, while entrusted with duties to safeguard the administration of estates left behind by deceased individuals, does not have adjudicatory powers. Such powers are reserved for the High Court. The Administrator General's role is to protect estates in circumstances where no person to whom a court would have jurisdiction has come forth. Adjudication of property disputes falls within the purview of the High Court.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the order of the Collector is set aside.

Facts:

The petitioner, Ponnaiyah Ramajayam Institute of Medical Sciences, sought Letter of Permission (LOP) for establishing a new medical college for the academic years 2016-17 and 2017-18. Although conditional permission was granted for the academic year 2016-17, the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare later debarred the petitioner from admitting students for the subsequent two academic years due to deficiencies in infrastructure and clinical materials. The Medical Council of India (MCI) was authorized to encash the petitioner's bank guarantee. The petitioner challenged this decision, leading to judicial intervention.

Issues:

The adequacy of the petitioner's infrastructure and clinical materials for establishing a new medical college. Additionally, the scope of judicial review concerning administrative decisions regarding medical education is addressed.

Held:

The Court analyzed successive inspections conducted by the MCI, which revealed significant deficiencies in faculty, residents, OPD attendance, and bed occupancy. The Court noted the statutory obligation of the MCI to ensure the required standard of medical education. Given these findings, the Court emphasized its limited role in judicially reviewing administrative decisions concerning medical education. The Court upheld the decision of the Central government to deny the petitioner's request for LOP for the academic year 2017-18.

The Court directed the MCI to conduct a fresh inspection within three months and provide the petitioner with an opportunity to rectify any deficiencies. Subsequently, the Central government was instructed to make a final decision based on the findings of the fresh inspection. Students admitted to the petitioner's college for the academic year 2016-17 were permitted to continue their studies until completion of the course.

Facts:

Shantanu married Supriya, and they had a daughter.

On 23.12.2000, Shantanu took Supriya and their daughter for a ride in his car. They did not return home for a long time.

Supriya's father made inquiries and found Supriya lying unconscious in the car at a certain location.

Supriya was pronounced dead, and Shantanu, along with two others, was arrested by the police.

The accused were charged and convicted under various sections of the IPC based on evidence presented during the trial.

Issues:

Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

Whether the conviction under Section 302 IPC could be upheld despite the acquittal under Section 120B IPC.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after considering the submissions of the parties and perusing the records, affirmed the findings of the lower courts and dismissed the appeals. The Court held:

The trial court and the High Court thoroughly examined the oral and medical evidence on record, which conclusively established the guilt of the accused.

The defense's theory, including the appellant's claim of being innocent and falsely implicated, was disbelieved by the lower courts based on the evidence presented.

The failure to prove the charge under Section 120B IPC did not affect the validity of the conviction under Section 302 IPC, as the evidence supported it.

Therefore, the appeals were dismissed, and the appellant, who was on bail, was directed to be taken into custody forthwith.

Facts:

The respondent, Reliance Industries Ltd., is engaged in the manufacturing and selling of polymers and chemicals in Gujarat.

The company purchases raw materials, including furnace oil, natural gas, and light diesel oil, for the manufacturing process, on which varying rates of VAT are paid.

The issue arises regarding the interpretation of Section 11(3)(b) of the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, 2003, which deals with the reduction of tax credit in specific circumstances.

Issues:

Whether the tax credit should be reduced both under sub-clause (ii) and sub-clause (iii) of Section 11(3)(b) of the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, 2003, or only once.

Held:

The Court interpreted Section 11(3)(b) as a non-obstante clause, indicating that the reduction of tax credit should occur in all applicable situations provided under sub-clauses (i), (ii), and (iii).

There is no overlap between sub-clause (i) and sub-clauses (ii) and (iii), as they are disjunctive, indicated by the use of the word "or" between them.

However, between sub-clauses (ii) and (iii), where overlap is possible, the Legislature intended for reduction to apply under both provisions.

Taxing statutes are to be interpreted literally, and the intention of the Legislature regarding tax credits should be upheld.

The reduction of tax credit by 4% would apply whenever a case falls under both sub-clause (ii) and sub-clause (iii), subject to the limitation that reduction cannot exceed the VAT paid on the raw materials.

Therefore, in cases where VAT paid on raw materials is already 4%, such as furnace oil, the reduction cannot exceed that amount.

Facts:

The matter was referred to arbitration by the court, resulting in an award. The appellants challenged the award in a civil court. The respondents argued that the application to make the award a Rule of the Court should be filed in the Supreme Court since the arbitrator was directed to file the award there. The appellants emphasized the right to appeal and questioned the assumption of jurisdiction by the court.

Issues:

whether the Supreme Court can entertain an application to make an arbitration award a Rule of the Court when it retains control over the arbitral proceedings.

Held:

The court noted a difference of opinion on the entertainability of such applications and referred the matter to a larger bench for resolution. The court recognized the need for clarity due to conflicting opinions and deferred the decision pending a ruling from a larger bench.

Facts:

The assessee, Mis. M. K. AGRO TECH. PVT. LTD., purchased oiled sunflower cake, extracted oil from it, and sold both the oil and the de-oiled sunflower cake in the market. The de-oiled cake is exempt from VAT.

Issues:

Whether the assessee was entitled to a full or partial rebate of input tax under Section 17 of the KVAT Act, considering the sale of both taxable and exempt goods.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision was erroneous. Section 17 of the KVAT Act allows for partial rebate on the sales of taxable goods and goods exempt under Section 5. This provision is applicable when the sale of such goods takes place, regardless of whether they are by-products or manufactured products.

The Court pointed out that the High Court failed to consider Rule 131(3) of the KVAT Rules, which provides for cases where input tax relates to both taxable and exempt goods, allowing for partial deduction.

Departure from literal construction in favor of purposive construction was deemed improper. Taxing statutes should be interpreted literally, and the literal interpretation in this case did not lead to absurd results. The purpose of Section 17 is to provide partial rebate in situations where both taxable and exempt goods are sold, which is exactly the situation in this case.

De-oiled cake qualifies as goods and is sold by the assessee, satisfying the conditions for partial rebate under Section 17. The entire scheme of the KVAT Act should be considered, and Section 17 should be applied accordingly.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, holding that Section 17 of the KVAT Act was applicable, and the High Court's decision was erroneous. The Court emphasized the importance of literal interpretation of taxing statutes and upheld the partial rebate of input tax as provided by law.

Facts:

The National Green Tribunal (NGT) observed that members appointed to SPCBs lacked the necessary expertise and qualifications as suggested by the Central Government. Consequently, the NGT issued directions to State Governments to reconsider the appointments already made and laid down guidelines for future appointments to the SPCBs.

Issues:

Whether the NGT exceeded its jurisdiction in directing the State Governments to reconsider the appointments and in laying down guidelines for SPCB appointments.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the NGT exceeded its jurisdiction in directing the State Governments to reconsider the appointments and in laying down guidelines for SPCB appointments. This is because, for the NGT to exercise its jurisdiction, there must be a substantial question relating to the environment raised in a dispute capable of settlement by the NGT. The appointment of SPCB Chairpersons and members does not qualify as such a dispute .

The Court emphasized the importance of good governance and the preservation of the environment, emphasizing constitutional obligations to protect and improve the environment. However, the appointment of SPCB Chairpersons and members falls outside the NGT's jurisdiction, being a matter for constitutional courts to address through remedies like a writ of quo warranto .

The Court recommended that the Executive in all states frame appropriate guidelines for SPCB appointments within six months to ensure suitable professionals and experts are appointed. Additionally, it allowed public-spirited individuals to move the appropriate High Court for a writ of quo warranto if any appointee does not meet statutory or constitutional requirements.

Decision: The Supreme Court set aside the NGT's directions regarding SPCB appointments but emphasized the importance of appointing qualified professionals to these bodies for effective environmental regulation and preservation. The appeals are disposed of

Facts:

The case involved a dispute over the sale of immovable property belonging to a public trust under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. The property comprised a Parsi Fire Temple and other structures with tenants. A joint venture agreement for development-cum-sale was entered into between the trust and a developer for a sum of Rs. 2,95,00,000/-.

Issues:

Whether the sale transaction of the trust property complied with the provisions of Section 36 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950.

Held:

The court reiterated the requirements of Section 36, emphasizing that the Charity Commissioner must consider the interest, benefit, and protection of the trust before granting sanction for the sale or lease of trust property (Para 22-23).

It was found that the Charity Commissioner had failed to fulfill their duty under Section 36 by not considering the interest and benefit of the trust. The sale transaction was deemed to be against the trust's interest, and the order was considered perverse (Para 24).

The court observed that the sale of such a valuable property for a paltry sum without proper valuation or public notice was unacceptable (Para 26).

The joint venture agreement was deemed to be a cloak for facilitating the sale of the property, indicating collusion between the trustees and the developer (Para 29).

The requirement of publishing a public notice in a newspaper could not have been waived, as it would have disclosed the actual value of the property (Para 31).

The court set aside the order of the Charity Commissioner and the High Court, directing the repayment of the sale amount to the developer and imposing costs on them (Para 34-35).

Decision: The decision of the court was to allow the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Charity Commissioner and the High Court, and directing the repayment of the sale amount to the developer along with imposed costs.