Facts:

The appellants contested the probate case, arguing that the application under Section 228 was barred by the law of limitation. The deceased executed a will in 1990, and after her demise in 2001, the respondent obtained a probate from a court in England. The appellants claimed that the respondent's application for letters of administration in India, filed in 2001, exceeded the three-year limitation period stipulated in Article 137 of the Limitation Act.

Issues:

Whether the application for letters of administration, made under Section 228, was subject to the limitation period under Article 137 of the Limitation Act. Additionally, the court needed to determine if the right to apply accrued at the time of probate or if it remained a continuous right.

Held:

The court observed that the application for letters of administration is not an action in law but in rem, allowing the right to be exercised continuously as long as the purpose of the trust exists. Referring to the precedent set in Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur, the court rejected the argument that the application was time-barred. The judgment emphasized that the right to apply accrues when necessary, and delay, while arousing suspicion, cannot be equated with an absolute bar of limitation.

Decision: The court affirmed that Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies to applications for probate or letters of administration. It clarified that the right to apply for letters of administration is a continuous right, not confined by a strict limitation period, and can be exercised as long as the purpose of the trust remains.

Facts:

The appellant filed a Writ Petition challenging the Notifications dated 27.06.2007 and 21.10.2015 issued under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition, leading to the appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

The classification of employees, segregation of wages, inclusion of certain categories in the scheduled employment, and the validity of certain provisions in the notifications.

The appellant contested that the categorization interferes with their promotion policy and that the government lacks jurisdiction to alter the conditions of service.

Held:

The deemed categorization of employees based on experience is beyond the jurisdiction of the government as it interferes with the terms of the employment contract.

Inclusion of Security inspector/ Security officer/ Supervisor in the scheduled employment is ultra vires the provisions of the Act.

Trainees who are not paid any wages cannot be included in the notification, and fixing the training period for one year exceeds the jurisdiction of the government.

Categorization of unskilled employees as semi-skilled and semi-skilled as skilled based on experience is ultra vires.

The prohibition of segregation of wages into components in the form of allowances is impermissible.

Decision: The appeals are allowed, and certain parts of the notifications are declared invalid. However, other parts of the notifications remain in force. Employers are not entitled to recover any amounts paid under the notifications, and workmen can pursue other remedies for their grievances.

Facts:

The incident occurred on 23-05-2007 at 07:30 PM. The appellant threw a burning chimney lamp at his daughter during a sudden quarrel about the placement of a bulb. The daughter sustained severe burn injuries and succumbed to them after seven days.

Issues:

Whether the act of the accused fell under Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC, considering the sudden nature of the quarrel and the absence of premeditation.

Held:

The court observed that the occurrence was sudden, with no premeditation. Considering the circumstances, the act was brought under Exception 4 to Section 300. The conviction under Section 302 IPC was modified to Section 304 Part-II, and the life imprisonment sentence was reduced to the period already undergone by the appellant.

Decision: The appeal was partly allowed, modifying the conviction and reducing the sentence based on the circumstances surrounding the incident.

Facts:

The complainant, a partner in a wood processing business, filed a complaint against the appellant, a surveyor, alleging intentional insult and criminal intimidation. The appellant's survey report had recommended repudiating the insurance claim due to misrepresentation by the insured.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's actions amounted to offenses under Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC. The Court needed to determine if the complaint presented a prima facie case for trial.

Held:

The Court, in accordance with the principles laid down in earlier judgments, examined the ingredients of Sections 504 and 506. It found that the mere allegation of abuse by the appellant did not satisfy the necessary elements for these offenses. Therefore, the rejection of the discharge application was held to be erroneous.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, setting aside the judgments of the High Court and Chief Judicial Magistrate, and the appellant was discharged from the offenses under Sections 504 and 506.

Facts:

The Respondent, employed as a Messenger in the State Bank of India, was discharged from service following a criminal conviction related to an assault incident. The assault involved the stabbing of two individuals with a broken soda bottle, leading to a charge under Section 307 IPC. The trial court, while acknowledging simple injuries and lack of intent to commit murder, convicted the Respondent under Section 324 IPC.

Issues:

Whether the assault committed by the Respondent constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude, warranting his discharge from service under Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act.

Held:

Details the chronology of events leading to the Respondent's discharge, highlighting the rejection of his appeal and subsequent intervention by the Staff Union. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court, in a Writ Appeal, set aside the order of discharge, directing reinstatement based on the contention that the criminal court had released the Respondent on probation to enable him to continue in service.

Addresses the disagreement with the High Court's reasons for setting aside the discharge order. It emphasizes the validity of the show-cause notice, citing Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, and dismisses the High Court's assertion that the bank failed to provide reasons for the discharge.

Delves into the examination of whether Section 10(1)(b)(i) is applicable to the case. It underscores the obligation of the bank to discontinue the services of an employee convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, yet disputes the characterization of the Respondent's assault under Section 324 IPC as such.

Explores the definition of 'Moral Turpitude' and lays down the tests for judging an offense involving moral turpitude. It emphasizes the need to consider factors like the act's impact on moral conscience, the motive behind it, and the character of the perpetrator. The paragraph concludes that, considering the nature of the assault and lack of intent to cause death, the crime committed by the Respondent does not involve moral turpitude.

Summarizes the reasons for affirming the High Court's judgment and dismissing the appeal.

Facts:

The appellant, N. Ramamurthy, was accused in Special Criminal Case No. 12 of 2002 for multiple offenses, including conspiracy, breach of trust, cheating, forgery, and misappropriation of funds. After the trial, he was convicted, and the Trial Court awarded various sentences. The appellant appealed to the High Court seeking suspension of execution of the sentence, which was denied based on a misconception of the total years of imprisonment.

Issues:

Misconception regarding the total years of imprisonment awarded by the Trial Court.

Applicability of Section 389 of the CrPC for suspension of execution of sentence.

Held:

The High Court's approach was fundamentally incorrect as it assumed the sentences to run consecutively, resulting in an erroneous calculation of 45 years of imprisonment. The Trial Court had explicitly ordered concurrent sentences.( Para 6)

The High Court mistakenly referred to principles related to the suspension of the order of conviction, while the appellant had only sought suspension of execution of sentence. The reference to the decision in Navjot Singh Sidhu was found to be inapt.( Para 7)

Considering the fundamental errors in the High Court's approach, the applications for suspension of execution of sentence were to be reconsidered by the High Court.( Para 8)

The Court refrained from delving into other grounds presented by the appellant, emphasizing that the High Court needed to reexamine the prayer for suspension of execution of sentence with a correct understanding of the applicable legal principles.( Para 9)

No pronouncement on the merits of the applications or the pending appeal was made, leaving the matter open for the High Court's consideration.( Para 10)

Facts:

The appellant filed a civil suit seeking declaration of title over certain properties. The dispute focused on a specific portion of land, referred to as "the suit land," which the appellant claimed was encroached upon by the respondents. The respondents asserted adverse possession as a defense, claiming ownership over the suit land.

Issues:

Whether the respondents had perfected their title over the suit land through adverse possession.

Held:

The court emphasized the classical requirement for adverse possession, stating that mere possession, no matter how long, does not necessarily imply adverseness to the true owner's title.( Paragraph 18)

Quoting precedents, the court outlined the elements of adverse possession, emphasizing the need for hostile, open, and exclusive possession for a sustained period. The burden of proving adverse possession lies with the party making such a claim.( Paragraph 20)

The court found that the lower courts were unjustified in holding that the respondents had perfected their title through adverse possession. It highlighted several reasons, including the absence of adversity or hostility between co-owners, failure of the respondents to prove their continuous and open assertion of ownership rights, and the lack of knowledge by the appellant about the extent of encroachment until 1983.( Paragraph 22)

The court noted that the appellant filed the suit within 12 years of discovering the encroachment in 1983, making the plea of adverse possession unavailable to the respondents.( Paragraph 24)

Consequently, the court set aside the impugned judgment, decreeing the appellant's suit in its entirety against the respondents. The respondents were granted three months to vacate the encroached portion and hand over possession to the appellant.( Paragraph 26)

Facts: The petitioner was sentenced to 7 years RI for an offense under Section 395 IPC, 5 years for offenses under Section 3/25(1A) of the Arms Act, and life imprisonment for offenses under Sections 307 and 302 IPC and Section 27(3) of the Arms Act. The petitioner's representation for premature release in 2010 was rejected, and a fresh representation in 2018 yielded no response, leading to the filing of the present writ petition.

Issues:

Validity of the petitioner's representation for premature release.

Consideration of convictions and sentences under different sections of the IPC and Arms Act.

Relevance of the declaration of Section 27(3) of the Arms Act as ultra vires and unconstitutional.

Held and Decision:

The court held that the conviction and sentence under Section 27(3) of the Arms Act were not valid due to its declaration as ultra vires. However, sentences under Section 395 IPC and Section 3/25(1A) of the Arms Act, though completed concurrently, cannot be considered for premature release.

Remission or commutation for one offense does not automatically release the petitioner for other offenses. The court emphasized that the Competent Authority must consider each offense separately.

Given the invalidity of Section 27(3) of the Arms Act and completion of the sentence for Section 3/25(1A), these offenses are not considered in the premature release representation. The court directed that the representation be considered only in reference to the sentence of life imprisonment concerning offenses under Sections 302 and 307 IPC.

The petitioner, convicted on multiple counts under Sections 302 and 307 IPC, may be released prematurely if the competent authority grants remission for all seven life sentences. However, this decision rests with the competent authority.

Grant or non-grant of remission is the prerogative of the Competent Authority, and the court should not interfere with this process. The decision on premature release must consider all relevant factors, including the nature of the crime and its societal impact.

The court did not direct the immediate release of the petitioner but instructed the Competent Authority to consider the representation expeditiously, focusing on the sentence of life imprisonment for offenses under Sections 302 and 307 IPC.

The court clarified that the earlier rejection of the petitioner's request for premature release should not hinder the consideration of the fresh representation dated February 5, 2018.

The Competent Authority is directed to process the representation within four months, without the need for consultation with the Central Government.

Facts:

The High Court of Delhi disposed of writ petition No. 5734 of 2016, challenging an order dated 30.06.2016 issued by the Union of India, based on a statement made by the counsel for the Union of India. The High Court did not delve into the merits of the case but set aside the order solely on the basis of the counsel's statement.

Issues:

The disposal of the writ petition without considering its merits. The appellant challenges this disposal, claiming it was based on incorrect briefing to the counsel for the Union of India.

Held:

The Court, after considering the application made by the Union of India, allows the appeal, sets aside the impugned order, and restores Writ Petition No. 5734 of 2016 to its original number before the High Court for fresh disposal on merits. The decision is based on the grounds that the High Court did not decide the writ petition on its merits but disposed of it based on an incorrect statement made by the counsel for the Union of India.

Decision: The application by the Union of India (IA No. 163521 of 2018) is allowed, and as a consequence, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order is set aside, and the writ petition is restored for fresh disposal on merits before the High Court.