Facts:

The case involves an appeal to the Supreme Court arising from a dismissal of an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The appellants sought to quash the complaint and criminal proceedings related to offenses under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506 IPC, and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

Issues:

Differentiation between two sets of allegations in the complaint.

Validity of summoning orders for specific offenses against the appellants.

Timing and motive behind the filing of the complaint, especially in relation to divorce proceedings.

Held:

In taking cognizance of an offense, a Magistrate is not required to pass a detailed order. However, when a Magistrate issues process against a person not charged with the offense for which summoned, the summoning order can be challenged.

Two sets of allegations were present: one for offenses under Sections 323, 504, and 506 IPC and another for offenses under Sections 498A IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The appellants not implicated in the first set of allegations could not be summoned for those offenses .

Specific allegations supported by evidence justified summoning the appellant in Crl. Appeal No. 595 of 2019 under Sections 323, 504, and 506 IPC. The court refrained from pronouncing on the veracity of the incident at this stage.

Criminal prosecution can proceed only when a prima facie offense is disclosed. The judicial process should not be a tool for oppression or harassment. The High Court has the authority to quash proceedings if they meet the parameters set by the Supreme Court .

Complaint under Section 498A IPC and Sections 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act filed by the father of the victim during divorce proceedings indicated a motive to harass the accused. The High Court erred in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings.

The divorce decree does not negate examination of criminal offenses committed within the jurisdiction despite divorce being granted. The complaint under Section 498A IPC and Sections 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act was considered retaliatory to the divorce petition.

The High Court's impugned judgment lacked a reference to the allegations, necessitating a detailed factual analysis before applying legal principles. Failure to do so constituted an error.

Facts:

Appellant joined Syndicate Bank in 1979 as a Law Officer.

Went on deputation to Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad, and Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad.

Applied for the post of Presiding Officer at Debt Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow, during the deputation.

Received appointment letter but faced delays and lack of response from Syndicate Bank.

Respondent Bank sought retirement, alleging unauthorized absence due to failure to join immediately after deputation.

Appellant's resignation accepted by the Bank, but pension benefits denied.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's failure to immediately join the bank after deputation constitutes unauthorized absence.

Validity of denying pensionary benefits based on the interpretation of Pension Regulations.

Held:

The court found the Bank's stance unjustified and unsustainable, considering the technicality of the appellant's immediate return after deputation.

Emphasized that there was no interruption in service, and the appellant had obtained a 'No Objection Certificate' for the new position.

Criticized the Bank for an unjustified ego issue and laxity in responding to the appellant's request for permission to take over the new post.

Quashed the impugned orders and allowed the Writ Petition, directing the Bank to remit the appellant's dues with interest within two months.

Imposed costs of Rs.25,000 on the respondent No.1 Bank.

Final Result : Allowed

Facts:

The appellant, Kalabai, threw a burning stove on the deceased during a quarrel between the deceased and her husband.

The incident resulted in serious burn injuries to the deceased, leading to her death.

Issues:

The offense committed by the appellant—whether it constituted murder under Section 302 IPC or a lesser offense under Section 304 Part II IPC.

Held:

The appellant argued for a reduction in the offense based on a precedent, Hari Shanker vs. State of Rajasthan (1998) 8 SCC 355, where a similar act was downgraded from murder to Section 304 Part II IPC.

The Court considered the dying declaration of the deceased, stating that the appellant threw a burning stove on her during a quarrel.

The Court noted the absence of evidence indicating any intention or motive to kill on the part of the appellant.

Relying on the precedent, the Court concluded that the facts and circumstances warranted reducing the offense from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC.

The Court partially allowed the appeal, altering the appellant's conviction and reducing the sentence from life imprisonment to rigorous imprisonment for five years.

Facts:

The case involves a jute mill, its closure, and subsequent proceedings under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. The appellant, a trade union, issued a demand notice under Section 8 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code on behalf of approximately 3000 workers for outstanding dues. The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) dismissed the petition, stating that a trade union does not qualify as an operational creditor.

Issues:

Whether a trade union falls within the definition of "person" under Section 3(23) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.

Whether a trade union can be considered an operational creditor for claims related to employment.

Held:

The Court interprets Section 5(20) and 5(21) of the Code, defining operational creditor and operational debt. Rule 6 and Form 5 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016, recognize the possibility of joint applications by workmen. The Court concludes that a trade union, established under the Trade Unions Act, qualifies as a "person" under Section 3(23) and can be an operational creditor for employment-related claims.( Para 4)

Examining the Trade Unions Act, the Court notes that a trade union is established under a statute and can sue and be sued as a body corporate. The general funds of a registered trade union can be spent on the conduct of trade disputes, including claims for wages and other dues.( Para 6)

Citing the Bombay High Court's judgment in Sanjay Sadanand Varrier, the Court emphasizes that a registered trade union can prosecute or defend legal proceedings for the rights of its members. This principle is applicable to petitions filed under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.( Para 8)

The Court, emphasizing the importance of justice and procedural flexibility, rejects the argument that individual petitions by workmen would be less burdensome. It asserts that a registered trade union can represent its members collectively and files a joint petition under Rule 6 and Form 5.( Para 10)

The NCLAT's refusal to consider whether a trade union falls under the definition of "person" is deemed incorrect. The NCLAT's assertion that a trade union is not an operational creditor due to no direct services to the corporate debtor is also rejected. The Court allows the appeal, setting aside the NCLAT's judgment, and remands the matter for expedited consideration on merits.( Para 11)

Facts:

The appellant, a Government Contractor, entered into an agreement for a highway project with the State of Tamil Nadu. Disputes arose, leading to the partial termination of the contract by the State. The appellant, dissatisfied with the decision, approached the High Court, challenging the termination.

Issues:

The adequacy of the notice served under Section 80 CPC. The State contended that the notices did not comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 80, rendering the suit not maintainable.

Held:

The court, after considering the legal notice dated 14.01.2000 and subsequent letters, held that there was sufficient compliance with Section 80 CPC. The introduction of Section 80(3) allowed for substantial compliance, and the court emphasized the need to interpret the section in a manner that advances justice rather than defeating it.

Decision: The court set aside the High Court's judgment, ruling that the legal notice adequately met the requirements of Section 80 CPC. The matter was remitted to the High Court for a disposition on merits. The court urged a swift resolution, considering the age of the case.

Final Result: Disposed

Facts:

The case revolves around two appellants accused of gang rape under Section 376(2)(g) IPC and conspiracy under Section 120-B IPC. The prosecution alleges that the appellants, close friends, drugged and raped a sixteen-year-old victim.

Issues:

The absence of specific charges framed for gang rape (Section 376(2)(g) IPC), leading to the argument that the convictions are erroneous.

Held:

Upon examination of the evidence, the court finds that although charges weren't explicitly framed under Section 376(2)(g) IPC, the clear evidence of the victim being subjected to rape by both appellants justifies the conviction under Explanation 1 to Section 376.

Decision: The court, after refusing to interfere with the conviction, focuses on the quantum of sentence. It reduces the original sentences of fifteen years to eight years for gang rape and ten years to eight years for conspiracy, considering factors such as the appellants' lack of criminal antecedents, their conduct post-conviction, and their background.

Final Result : Allowed

Facts:

The case revolves around the award of bonus marks to candidates seeking appointment as Primary School Teachers in Zila Parishads in Rajasthan in 1998-99. The Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court declared the award of bonus marks unconstitutional, leading to a series of litigations.

Issues:

The primary issue was the validity of awarding bonus marks in the appointment process, specifically whether such preferential treatment based on place of birth, residence, or urban/rural background was constitutionally permissible.

Held:

The Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court declared the award of bonus marks unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court, invoking the doctrine of prospective overruling, protected appointments made before November 18, 1999.

Candidates who had not filed writ petitions on or before November 17, 1999, were not entitled to appointment upon recalculation of marks by excluding bonus marks.

The Court clarified that its directions did not apply to cases where the principle of res judicata would be applicable, i.e., decisions that became final without further challenge.

Facts:

The appellant, registered as an NBFC, filed its return of income for AY 2008-2009, engaging in trading in shares. The assessing officer treated the loss from share trading as speculation loss, leading to a dispute.

Issues:

The nature of the appellant's principal business (granting loans and advances or trading in shares), the applicability of Section 73, and the retrospective effect of the amendments to the Explanation to Section 73.

Held:

The appellant's admission that share trading was its sole business during the assessment year was crucial. The High Court was justified in rejecting the submission that the principal business was granting loans and advances. The amendment to the Explanation to Section 73 was not retrospective, and its effect applied from 1 April 2015. Consequently, the loss from share trading in AY 2008-2009 couldn't be set off against profits from futures and options.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, and there shall be no order as to costs.

Facts:

The appellant, a Manager in Bank of Baroda, was accused of criminal breach of trust, cheating, forgery, and conspiracy. The charges were related to the alleged opening of a fictitious savings bank account and misappropriation of funds.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, being a manager of a nationalized bank, can claim the benefit of Section 197 Cr.P.C.?

Was the sanction for prosecution under Section 197 Cr.P.C. applicable to the appellant?

Held:

The appellant, not being removable from his office with the sanction of the Government, cannot claim the protection of Section 197 Cr.P.C.

The court upheld the rejection of the appellant's application for discharge on the grounds of lack of sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. The court also deleted certain observations regarding forgery made by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, emphasizing that such conclusive opinions should be avoided at the pre-trial stage.

Decision: The appeal was partly allowed to the extent of deleting specific observations regarding forgery made by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. The court upheld the order of the High Court and the order of the CMM rejecting the appellant's application under Section 197 Cr.P.C.