Facts:

The case involved a prosecution under sections 132 and 135(1)(a) of the Customs Act concerning the export of antiquities. The appellant, Sharad Gandhi, challenged the prosecution, invoking the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972.

Issues:

The compatibility of the Customs Act with the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, especially regarding the prohibition on the export of antiquities. The interpretation of Section 30 of the Antiquities Act and the applicability of the Customs Act were central to the case.

Held:

The principles of ejusdem generis were applied to interpret the relationship between the Customs Act and the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act. The court emphasized the need to consider legislative intent and purposive interpretation to understand the coexistence of both laws (Para 17).

Section 30 of the Antiquities Act was analyzed, and the court concluded that the words "any other law for the time being in force" should be construed ejusdem generis with the specific laws mentioned in the section (Paras 27, 28).

Legislative intent behind Section 30 was to allow the application of other laws dealing with antiquities to continue after the passing of the Antiquities Act, but the Customs Act was not included in the scope (Para 38).

Section 4 of the Antiquities Act already provided for the applicability of the Customs Act with certain qualifications, ensuring its application except where inconsistent with the Antiquities Act (Para 40).

The court examined whether prosecution under Sections 132 and 135(1)(a) of the Customs Act was permitted under Section 4 of the Antiquities Act. It clarified that such prosecution was permissible as long as the ingredients of the offenses were satisfied (Para 42).

The court addressed the distinction between the offenses under Section 25 of the Antiquities Act and Section 132 of the Customs Act. It emphasized that the ingredients of these offenses were distinct and different (Para 42).

The court rejected the argument that prosecution under Section 132 would violate Section 25 or Section 26 of the Antiquities Act, highlighting the different elements of the offenses (Para 67).

The prosecution's case involved the interception of a wooden box declared as 'Stone Figure Handicrafts,' later identified as an antiquity. The charges under Section 135(1)(a) were based on fraudulent evasion of export prohibition (Paras 69, 71).

Section 135(1)(a) was analyzed in the context of the Antiquities Act and the Foreign Trade (Development & Regulation) Act 1992. The court clarified the distinct elements of this offense compared to Section 25 of the Antiquities Act (Para 76).

The court considered the mandate of Section 4 of the Antiquities Act and its impact on the prosecution under Section 135(1)(a). It concluded that such prosecution was consistent with Section 25 read with Section 26 of the Antiquities Act (Para 77).

Section 24 of the Antiquities Act, dealing with the power to decide the status of an article as an antiquity, was highlighted. The court emphasized the role of the Director General of Archaeological Survey of India in making such determinations (Para 78).

The concept of 'inconsistency' as found in Article 254 of the Constitution was briefly discussed, though acknowledging its limited applicability to the case (Para 80).

The court recognized the Antiquities Act as a comprehensive law but highlighted its non-exhaustive nature. It emphasized the legislative intention allowing multiple offenses arising from the same set of facts (Para 83).

The court concluded that full play was given to the Customs Act, ensuring its application where not inconsistent with the Antiquities Act (Paras 84, 85).

Facts:

The dispute arising from the interpretation of Section 24(1)(b) and Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, relating to compensation and lapsing of land acquisition, respectively.

Issues:

Whether the proviso in Section 24 applies to Section 24(1)(b) or Section 24(2).

Held:

The court establishes that Section 24(1) deals with compensation, while Section 24(2) deals with the lapsing of land acquisition. The proviso, accordingly, pertains to Section 24(1)(b) and not Section 24(2) [Para 9].

The court highlights the scheme of Section 24(1), emphasizing enhanced compensation even in cases under the repealed Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The proviso acts as an exception to Section 24(1)(b) in cases where compensation for a majority of land holdings has not been deposited, allowing the application of more favorable provisions of the 2013 Act [Para 10].

Reading the proviso as applicable to Section 24(2) would lead to anomalies, arbitrary results, and potential violation of Article 14 of the Constitution [Paras 11, 12, 13].

The language of the proviso makes it clear that it does not refer to the award under Section 24(2). Reading it as a proviso to Section 24(1)(b) ensures compatibility with awards made under Section 11, irrespective of the timeline [Para 14].

Emphasizing the beneficial nature of the 2013 Act, the court advocates a construction that furthers its purpose. The preferred view is the one aligned with the legislation's objectives [Para 15].

Due to the referral of the Indore Development Authority case to a Bench of five Judges, the present judgment is also referred to the same Bench for further consideration [Para 17].

FACTS:

Marriage of deceased Shilpa, daughter of Sudhir Kumar Gupta (PW-1), was solemnized with Dimpal @ Akash Deep.

Shilpa complained about dowry demands by her husband and in-laws.

On 19.08.2012, Shilpa was set ablaze and named several individuals, including the appellants, in her dying declaration.

FIR registered against nine accused, including the appellants, under various sections.

ISSUES:

Whether there is sufficient evidence to summon the appellants for trial under Section 302 IPC.

Whether the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. was exercised judiciously.

HELD:

The trial court and the High Court erred in summoning the appellants under Section 319 Cr.P.C.

The dying declaration mentions only one accused, and the evidence lacks specificity regarding the role of the appellants.

Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. requires stringent tests before summoning additional accused, and the evidence falls short of establishing a prima facie case against the appellants.

The vague allegations in the complaint and evidence do not justify summoning the appellants under Section 498A IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

The Investigating Officer's decision not to charge the appellants under certain sections supports the lack of a strong case against them.

The trial court and the High Court did not apply well-settled principles in exercising jurisdiction under Section 319 Cr.P.C.

The impugned order is set aside, and the appeals are allowed. The Sessions Judge is directed to proceed with the trial.

REFERRED CASES:

Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab and Others (2014) 3 SCC 92

Sarabjit Singh and Another vs. State of Punjab and Another (2009) 16 SCC 46

Facts:

The Designated Court held that there was no prior sanction under section 20-A(2) of TADA before taking cognizance of the offense.

The sanction order analyzed only the FIR and proposal from DSP, indicating a lack of valid sanction.

The possession of walky-talkies by one of the respondents led to questions about the sufficiency of the sanction and the application of mind by the sanctioning authority.

Issues:

Validity of sanction orders under section 20-A(2) of TADA.

Adequacy of the sanction regarding the possession of walky-talkies.

The power of the Designated Court to convict for offenses under other enactments.

Held:

The sanction order (Exh.84) failed to validly sanction the prosecution but rather permitted the application of TADA provisions. Citing precedent (Gadhvi’s case), the wording of the sanction was considered indicative of its invalidity.( Paragraph 13)

The sanction dated April 1, 2005 (Exh.57) regarding respondent No.3 suffered from non-application of mind, especially in the context of possession of walky-talkies, which do not qualify as classified arms and ammunition.( Paragraph 19)

The Designated Court has the power to try offenses under other enactments connected with TADA, but reliance on confessional statements under TADA was deemed inadmissible for such offenses. The evidence regarding search and seizure was found to have fatal deficiencies, leading to the conclusion that the respondents were not guilty.( Paragraphs 23, 24, 25)

Facts:

The appellant, Shri Ram Mandir, claimed to be a private temple, managed by successive Gurus in a Guru-shishya tradition. The appellant contested the government's interference in the temple's administration and possession of agricultural lands.

Issues:

Whether Shri Ram Mandir is a private or public temple.

The validity of the government's appointment of a District Collector as the Manager.

The hereditary or Guru-shishya nature of the succession.

The appellant's right to challenge government control after leasing temple lands.

Held:

Recognition of Shri Ram Mandir as a Public Temple The onus of proving private temple status lies with the appellant. Lack of pleadings on the temple's construction and public participation in worship led to the conclusion that Shri Ram Mandir is a public temple.( Para 12)

Importance of Public Participation Public participation is a crucial factor in determining a temple's character. The entry of Shri Ram Mandir in the list of public temples supports its public nature.( Para 14)

Succession by Guru-shishya Relationship The absence of blood relation between successive pujaris indicates a departure from hereditary succession, supporting the finding that Shri Ram Mandir is a public temple.( Para 16)

Government Appointment of Pujari and Estoppel The appellant's acceptance of temple lands on lease from the government estops them from denying government control. Appointment of pujaris by the government further strengthens this position.( Para 18)

Inam Rights and Ownership of Temple Lands Documents demonstrate Inam rights granted to Shri Ram Mandir, refuting the appellant's claim of individual ownership. The appellant's lease of temple lands from the government reinforces government control.( Para 20)

Dismissal of Appeal Concluding that Shri Ram Mandir is a public temple, the appeal is dismissed.( Para 26)

FACTS:

The dispute revolves around a Purchase Order dated 01.10.2008, where Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited (MTNL) was to provide last mile connectivity within two months. The Appellant failed to provide the required connectivity by the stipulated time, leading to the termination of the contract by the Respondent.

ISSUES:

Did the Appellant have justified reasons for not providing last-mile connectivity?

What compensation is the Respondent entitled to for the breach of contract?

HELD:

The petitioner (Appellant) failed to provide last-mile connectivity within the stipulated time. The defense of lack of access and permission was deemed weak. The Tribunal found the petitioner's case unacceptable and ruled in favor of the Respondent.( Para 25)

Considering the delay and failure on the part of the petitioner, the Tribunal explored the possibility of reducing the claimed amount based on the actual cost of providing last-mile connectivity. However, lacking reliable materials for cost assessment, the Tribunal invoked clause 16.2(b) of the Agreement, limiting liquidated damages to a maximum of 12%.( Para 26)

The Tribunal allowed the claim in part. The principal amount to be refunded or paid back to the petitioner was determined as Rs. 84,74,087/-. Interest at the rate of 9% from the due date until the judgment date was also directed.( Para 28)

REFERRED CASES:

Alopi Parshad and Sons Ltd. v. Union of India, (1960) 2 SCR 793

Kailash Nath Associates v. DDA, (2015) 4 SCC 136

Kanhayalal Bisandayal Bhiwapurkar (Dr.) v. Indarchandji Hamirmalji Sisodia, AIR 1947 Nag 84

Moselle Solomon v. Martin & Co., ILR (1935) 62 Cal 612

Mulamchand v. State of M.P., (1968) 3 SCR 214

Orissa Industrial Infrastructure Development Corpn. v. Mesco Kalinga Steel Ltd., (2017) 5 SCC 86

Facts:

The land in question underwent ceiling proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, subsequently being allotted to a hospital on a 30-year lease. Challenges to the notification issued under Section 10(3) of the Act were raised by the respondents. The High Court upheld the notification, but the Supreme Court suggested the availability of alternative remedies.

Issues:

The maintainability of a civil suit seeking a declaration that the proceedings under the Act were null and void, and the respondents be declared owners of the land.

Held:

The judgment establishes that the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, is a self-contained code, providing a comprehensive framework for dealing with landowners' rights exceeding prescribed ceiling limits. The Act gives finality to appellate orders under Section 33, and bars civil suits under Sections 30(5) and 40.

The jurisdiction of civil courts is held to be excluded implicitly due to the finality provided by Section 33(3), availability of remedies through appeals, and the Act's completeness. The Act expressly excludes civil court jurisdiction under Sections 30(5) and 40.

The civil court lacks jurisdiction to grant reliefs sought in the suit, as it is impliedly barred under the Act.

The respondents had multiple legal remedies available, including filing a civil suit, submitting a statement to the Competent Authority under Section 6, and raising objections under Section 10(1). Failure to pursue these remedies led to the implied bar on filing a civil suit.

Dismissal of a writ petition and SLP affirmed the conformity of proceedings under the Act. The suit property vested in the state, precluding the filing of a civil suit.

Any remedy for the respondents was under the Act, and filing a civil suit was impliedly barred.

The Act's intention to exclude civil court jurisdiction is evident from various sections.

The civil court lacks jurisdiction over land subject to ceiling proceedings under the Act.

Respondents' belated challenge to ceiling proceedings is meritless, and the situation is irreversible after the state's acquisition and lease to hospitals.

The Division Bench of the High Court erred in allowing the appeal, contrary to the trial court's dismissal, which was justified.

Facts:

The case originated from matrimonial proceedings where certain averments were made in anticipatory bail applications. Allegations of perjury were raised against the appellant for deliberate false statements.

Issues:

Whether the statements in the anticipatory bail application were deliberately and consciously false?

Whether there is sufficient unimpeachable evidence to support perjury charges?

Whether the High Court's grounds were substantial for initiating prosecution under Section 340?

Held:

The High Court felt a prima facie case for perjury existed and ordered prosecution. The statements in anticipatory bail applications were contested, and the Sessions Court held that initiation of proceedings under Section 340 was premature.

The same statements were made in the High Court's anticipatory bail application, leading to the High Court's order. The appellant argued that the investigation report was preliminary and inconclusive. The High Court's order was primarily based on different grounds for granting anticipatory bail.

The law on initiating proceedings under Section 340 was discussed, emphasizing the need for deliberate and conscious false statements. It was noted that evidence had not been led, and the investigation report couldn't be considered unimpeachable. The High Court's grounds were deemed insufficient for prosecution.

Counsel for the respondent cited judgments supporting the initiation of proceedings by the High Court. The Court distinguished these cases as not applicable to the present situation, emphasizing the lack of fabricated documents or a detailed independent inquiry.

The Court rejected the argument that the High Court failed to satisfy itself on the expediency of justice. The appellant's claim of suppression of the Sessions Court order was dismissed.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's order was set aside.

Facts:

The complainants booked apartments in a project titled "DLF Valley, Panchkula." The developer failed to hand over possession within the agreed-upon time, leading to various complaints.

Issues:

Compensation for delayed possession, and the entitlement of heirs in the case of a deceased original allottee.

Held:

The entitlement of heirs in the case of a deceased original allottee cannot be determined at this stage and must be left to a competent court. However, 3/4 of the sum is directed to be made over to the widow for herself and on behalf of two children, while the remaining 1/4 shall be made over to the mother.

In all refund cases, interest at the rate of 9% is awarded from the day of deposit till the date of refund. In cases of possession sought, the compensation period is after the expiry of three years from the date of the agreement, with interest at the rate of 9%.