Facts:

The case pertains to the participation of an MP in a Panchayat Samiti's special meeting for a 'No Confidence Motion' against the Pramukh. The dispute arose regarding the interpretation of relevant sections, rules, and articles governing the composition and functioning of the Panchayat Samiti.

Issues:

Whether the MP, being an ex-officio member of the Panchayat Samiti, is entitled to participate and vote in the special meeting for a 'No Confidence Motion' against the Pramukh.

Held:

Constitutional Framework: The judgment begins by elucidating the constitutional framework regarding the composition of Panchayats, emphasizing the freedom of the State legislature to make laws in accordance with Article 243C. (Para 12-15)

Election of Chairperson: It clarifies that the chairperson of the Panchayat Samiti is elected by the elected members, distinguishing them from other persons mentioned in Article 243C(3). (Para 18)

Composition of Panchayat Samiti: Section 107(3) explicitly includes the MP as a member with the right to vote in the Panchayat Samiti meetings. (Para 16)

Regulation and Rules: The judgment delves into the Regulation and Rules, outlining the specific provisions for moving and carrying forward a 'No Confidence Motion.'(Para 21-23)

Quorum Requirement: The court emphasizes the quorum requirement of not less than two-thirds of the "total membership," including ex-officio members. (Para 24-25)

Who Can Vote on 'No Confidence Motion': It dismisses the notion that only directly elected members can vote, asserting that the law allows all members to participate in the process. (Para 26)

Inclusive Nature of Regulation: The judgment defends the inclusivity of the Regulation, expressly permitting all members, including those from Section 107(3), to participate and vote. (Para 28)

Conclusion: The court concludes by reiterating the statutory right of elected representatives, including the MP, to participate in and vote on a 'No Confidence Motion.'(Para 32)

Facts:

The case involved appeals filed against the High Court of Karnataka's order dated February 26, 2016, where a series of appeals were disposed of concerning the appellant (assessee) and the Commissioner of Income Tax (Revenue) under Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Issues:

The court was the failure of the High Court to frame specific questions of law as required by Section 260-A(3) of the Act.

Held:

The court, referring to a similar case (Civil Appeal No. 3968 of 2019), emphasized the distinction between questions proposed by the appellant for admission and questions framed by the court. It highlighted that the appeal is heard on merits only on the questions framed by the High Court. The court observed that if the High Court considered the appeal devoid of substantial questions of law, it should have explicitly recorded such findings. In the absence of this, the court concluded that the High Court did not adhere to the mandatory procedure prescribed in Section 260-A of the Act. The court allowed the appeals.

Facts:

The appellant, S. Subramanian, challenged the High Court's decision in Second Appeal Nos. 4 and 5 of 2009, wherein the High Court set aside the findings of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court, decreeing the suits in favor of the respondent, S. Ramasamy.

Issues:

Whether the suit property, initially self-acquired by Sengoda Gounder, retained its character or became joint family property through voluntary blending.

The High Court re-evaluated the evidence, including settlement deeds and a will, to arrive at a different conclusion than the lower courts.

Held:

The Supreme Court, while allowing the appeals, held that the High Court erred in re-appreciating the evidence on record in a second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC. The Court emphasized that the High Court should not substitute its opinion for that of the First Appellate Court unless the findings were erroneous, contrary to law, or based on inadmissible evidence.

The Court further stated that the substantial questions of law framed by the High Court were not substantial, and the High Court's interference with the findings on blending of the suit property was impermissible. The Court reinstated the judgments of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court, dismissing the suits.

Facts:

The respondent, serving as Deputy Commissioner, faced allegations of corruption related to a land acquisition matter. The complainant filed a case with the Lokayukta Police, leading to a series of events, including a spy camera recording of a meeting between the complainant and the respondent.

Issues:

Admissibility of electronic evidence without a certificate under Section 65B.

Validity of preliminary inquiry before lodging an FIR.

Whether the prosecution had enough evidence beyond electronic records.

Compliance with the principles of Section 239 regarding the discharge of the accused.

Held:

The failure to produce a certificate under Section 65B at the charge sheet stage is a curable defect. The necessity for the certificate arises when electronic records are presented as evidence during the trial.

The preliminary inquiry conducted before lodging an FIR was consistent with the decision in Lalita Kumari, as it aimed to ascertain whether the information disclosed a cognizable offence.

The High Court erred in concluding that the absence of a Section 65B certificate was fatal to the prosecution, overlooking other material on which the prosecution relied.

The trial court should proceed on the assumption that the material brought by the prosecution is true while evaluating whether the facts disclose the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. A mini-trial is not permitted at the discharge stage.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment. The order of the trial judge dismissing the discharge application is maintained.

Facts:

The appellant, Shree Shree Ram Janki Ji Asthan Tapovan Mandir, sought to transfer land belonging to the Deity as permitted by statutory provisions. However, the High Court of Jharkhand, in response to a Public Interest Litigation filed by Respondent No. 8, directed the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to investigate allegations against the government and the board governing the trust, claiming illegality in the transfer of Deity's property. The High Court cast doubt on the permission granted by state authorities, asserting fraudulent practices.

Issues:

Whether the Deity has the legal right to transfer its land.

Whether the High Court was justified in directing a CBI investigation based on allegations against the government and trust board.

Whether the High Court erred in disregarding statutory provisions permitting the transfer of trust property.

Held:

The Division Bench found the High Court's conclusion that the Deity could not transfer its land untenable. It emphasized the reliance on statutory provisions supporting the land transfer and criticized sweeping remarks against the government. The Court asserted that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering a CBI investigation into a civil dispute involving property transfer within the religious trust.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's order, and the writ petition was dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant floated a scheme in 1982 for Economically Weaker Sections. The respondent registered in 1982, deposited Rs 500, and an additional Rs 500 in 1985. The registration explicitly stated no guarantee of allotment. The respondent filed a consumer complaint in 1993, 11 years post-registration. Despite Rule 30 requiring written consent for the draw, none was provided by the respondent. Multiple developments, including an enhanced registration amount and an office order in 2002, occurred over the years.

Issues:

Whether mere registration conferred an entitlement to allotment and if the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) could compel the appellant to allot a flat to the respondent.

Held:

The Registration Booklet's Clause 5, Rule 15, and Rule 30 of the Rules of 1979 were crucial in determining that mere registration did not guarantee allotment. The respondent had the obligation to show readiness for participation in the draw, which was not fulfilled. The NCDRC's direction to allot a flat for a specified sum was against the principles of contract law governing the case.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, setting aside the NCDRC's order. No costs were imposed.

Facts:

The case involved a challenge to the amended Recruitment Rules equating the post of Principal, Grade ‘A’ (Senior Scale) with that of JCIF.

Issues:

The dissimilarity in the nature of duties, responsibilities, and powers exercised by officers holding the posts.

Held:

The High Court, relying on previous decisions, dismissed the writ petition, upholding the tribunal's decision to quash the amended rules.

The tribunal and the High Court failed to consider relevant factors that led to the amendment, including the concurrence of the UPSC and government deliberations.

The UPSC's conscious decision, considering pros and cons, amounted to a policy decision, rendering the tribunal's decision unjustified.

Duties of JCIF and Principal, Grade ‘A’ (Senior Scale) were found to be identical or similar, further justifying the amendment.

The impugned judgment of the High Court was quashed, and the order of the tribunal was set aside.

Facts:

The case involves a suit for title and permanent injunction based on a sale deed. The defendants claimed that the suit property had been part of a partition and fell into the share of the husband of defendant no.1 and father of defendant no.2 and 3. The trial court dismissed the suit, asserting collusion in executing a sham document. The first appellate authority upheld this decision.

Issues:

The admissibility of the partition deed and the authenticity of the sale deed. The trial court and the first appellate court found the sale deed to be nominal, while the High Court, in appeal, held that the partition deed required registration and, therefore, was inadmissible.

Held:

The jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 100 of the CPC, post the 1976 amendment, is confined to second appeals involving a substantial question of law. The substantial question framed by the High Court was not substantial at all. Both lower courts had given reasoned decisions based on evidence, and the High Court erred in re-appreciating evidence, which was impermissible under Section 100 of the CPC.

The father of defendants was not a signatory to the sale deed, making it not binding on him or his heirs. The sale deed was not acted upon, and even if it were registered, a defendant could challenge its validity. The High Court's interference with the findings of the lower courts on this matter was unwarranted.

The partition deed relied upon by the defendants was deemed a family arrangement and did not require registration. The execution of this document was established and proved by witnesses, including the plaintiff's admission of the oral partition. The High Court's finding on its inadmissibility was not justified.

The sale deed executed in favor of the plaintiff had discrepancies in the stated consideration, and both lower courts had found it to be sham. The High Court should not have interfered with these findings.

Facts:

The appellant, Kalabai, threw a burning stove on the deceased during a quarrel between the deceased and her husband.

The incident resulted in serious burn injuries to the deceased, leading to her death.

Issues:

The offense committed by the appellant—whether it constituted murder under Section 302 IPC or a lesser offense under Section 304 Part II IPC.

Held:

The appellant argued for a reduction in the offense based on a precedent, Hari Shanker vs. State of Rajasthan (1998) 8 SCC 355, where a similar act was downgraded from murder to Section 304 Part II IPC.

The Court considered the dying declaration of the deceased, stating that the appellant threw a burning stove on her during a quarrel.

The Court noted the absence of evidence indicating any intention or motive to kill on the part of the appellant.

Relying on the precedent, the Court concluded that the facts and circumstances warranted reducing the offense from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC.

The Court partially allowed the appeal, altering the appellant's conviction and reducing the sentence from life imprisonment to rigorous imprisonment for five years.