Facts:

The Income Tax Department (appellant) filed an appeal against the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.

The High Court dismissed the appeal as infructuous after learning that the respondent company's name was struck off under Section 560(5) of the Companies Act, 1956.

The High Court, however, failed to consider Section 506(5) proviso (a) of the Companies Act and Chapter XV of the Income Tax Act dealing with "liability in special cases" and its clause (L) on "discontinuance of business or dissolution."

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the appeal as infructuous without considering the relevant provisions of the Companies Act and the Income Tax Act?

Held:

The High Court erred in dismissing the appeal as infructuous solely based on the dissolution of the respondent company.

The High Court overlooked crucial provisions in the Companies Act and Income Tax Act that prescribe how liabilities against a dissolved company should be handled.

Sections 506(5) proviso (a) of the Companies Act and Chapter XV of the Income Tax Act specifically address the cases of companies struck off under Section 506(5) of the Companies Act.

The appeal is allowed, setting aside the impugned order, and remanding the case to the High Court for a fresh consideration on merits, taking into account relevant provisions of both Acts.

The Court refrains from making observations on the merits of the case.

The High Court is urged to decide the appeal preferably within six months due to its age.

Facts:

The appellant filed two civil suits, one for permanent injunction and the other for the recovery of arrears of rent. Both suits were decreed by the Additional District Munsif. Subsequent legal proceedings, including appeals and revision petitions, led to the High Court's dismissal of the appellant's case.

Issues:

The High Court's approach to substantial questions of law framed under Section 100(4) and (5) of the Civil Procedure Code. The appellant challenged the dismissal of the second appeals based on a question not initially framed.

Held:

The court observed that the High Court had erred in dismissing the appeals on a question not framed during the proceedings. The judgment emphasized that second appeals must be decided on questions framed under Section 100(4), with the provision to frame additional questions at the time of hearing, subject to proper justification.

The court noted that the High Court failed to adhere to this procedural requirement, rendering the dismissal legally unsustainable. The case was remanded to the High Court for a fresh disposal of the appeals and revision petitions on their merits.

Facts:

Dr. Tonmoy Mondal sought voluntary retirement, which was rejected by the government.

The rejection was based on public interest, citing the need for doctors in the Health & Family Welfare Department.

Legal proceedings ensued, involving the West Bengal Administrative Tribunal and the High Court.

Issues:

The interpretation of Rule 75 and 75(aaa), especially the application of Note 3 regarding public interest.

Held:

The Division Bench of the High Court committed a fundamental jurisdictional error by reviewing a previous judgment without sufficient grounds.

The change in the composition of the Division Bench did not justify interfering with the previous judgment.

The court emphasized that a different view on the interpretation of Rule 75 does not warrant a review of a valid judgment.

The court found that the Division Bench exceeded its jurisdiction by reviewing and dismissing the writ petition.

Dr. Tonmoy Mondal was directed to report back to duty within a month, and he would not be entitled to wages for the period not served.

Decision:The impugned order dated 20.01.2017 was set aside, and the judgment and order dated 22.08.2014 were restored. The appeal was allowed with no costs.

Facts:

Respondent enrolled in the Indian Army as a Sepoy in the Army Service Corps on 25 April 1996.

Dispatched on a permanent posting to 874 ASC Battalion in Jammu and Kashmir on 11 November 2007.

Declared absent without leave on 22 November 2007, leading to a Court of Inquiry under Section 106 of the Army Act 1950.

Respondent reported to ASC Centre (North) at Gaya on 18 September 2008 after 302 days of unauthorized absence.

Summary Court Martial held on 12 November 2008, where respondent pleaded guilty to unauthorized absence and loss of equipment.

Tribunal's order on 21 August 2015 affirmed the finding but considered the dismissal as disproportionate, directing a notional service till pension eligibility.

Issues:

Whether the punishment of dismissal from service is disproportionate under the circumstances.

Interpretation of Section 39 of the Army Act regarding punishment for overstaying leave.

Held:

The Tribunal erred in finding the dismissal disproportionate, considering the respondent's 302 days of unauthorized absence and previous disciplinary action.

Section 39 of the Army Act does not mandate imprisonment for overstaying leave; Section 71(e) allows dismissal as a valid punishment.

The appeal is allowed, setting aside the Tribunal's order, and the respondent's Original Application stands dismissed.

No order as to costs.

FACTS:

Respondents had been working through an outsourcing agency since 2010 for the Appellant-Corporation.

They passed ITI and completed National Apprenticeship Certificate in the Appellant-Corporation.

Appellant issued a recruitment notification with an upper age limit of 28 years.

Age relaxation up to 40 years was provided for those directly employed with ITI qualification plus NAC or ITI qualification plus experience of tenure based contract.

ISSUES:

Whether the Respondents, working through an outsourcing agency, were entitled to age relaxation.

The challenge to the rejection of their request for age relaxation.

HELD:

The Single Judge rightly rejected the challenge as it was raised after the application period was over.

The Division Bench's assessment was incorrect; the Respondents, engaged through outsourcing, were not entitled to age relaxation.

The appeal is allowed, the judgment under appeal is set aside, and the Single Judge's order is restored.

Facts:

The case involved a Sirdar who filed an application for Bhumidar rights in respect of three plots, accompanied by a deposit of 20 times the land revenue. Subsequently, a sale deed for these plots was executed the next day.

Issues:

The application for Bhumidar rights was rejected for two plots, leading to a revision application by the Sirdar. The subsequent grant of Bhumidar Sanad in respect of one plot, post the Sirdar's demise, triggered legal proceedings initiated by the purchaser based on the sale deed.

Held:

Under Section 134 read with Section 137, a Sirdar could obtain Bhumidhari Sanad after depositing 20 times the land revenue and making an application. Sections 130 and 131 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, were substituted by U.P. Ordinance No.1 of 1977.

Section 73(1) of the U.P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1977, stated that all proceedings for acquiring bhumidhari rights under sections 134 and 135, pending on or before 28.01.1977, shall abate. The Sirdar's revision, pending against the rejection of Bhumidhari Sanad, abated by virtue of the ordinance. Section 73(2) required a refund of the deposited amount in case of abatement.

By statutory provision, Section 73 abated all pending applications and proceedings. The benefit of the provision applied to Sirdars as of the date when the ordinance was enforced. As the Sirdar was already deceased on 28.01.1977, his legal heirs couldn't avail the benefits of the ordinance to validate the sale deed for two plots.

Conclusion: The High Court erred in allowing the writ petition and decreeing the suit based on the retrospective benefits of Ordinance No.1 of 1977.

Facts:

The appeal challenges the order dated 08.02.2019, passed by NCLAT, setting aside the NCLT's order dated 10.10.2018 and directing the admission of the application against the appellant under Section 7, IBC.

Appellant contends a violation of audi alteram partem, asserting that no notice was served as required by NCLAT Rules, specifically Rule 48.

Respondent No. 1 argues that an advance copy of the appeal paper book was sent to the appellant, indicating an intent to challenge the NCLT's order.

Issues:

Whether the NCLAT proceedings violated the appellant's right to be heard and adhered to the procedural rules, especially Rule 48 of the NCLAT Rules.

Held:

The NCLAT, despite issuing notice on the appeal, failed to comply with Rule 48, which mandates service of notice along with the appeal papers on the other party.

Rule 52 necessitates the record of service details in the order sheet, which is not reflected in the materials presented.

The appellant's right to be heard, a fundamental principle of natural justice, has been violated.

The NCLAT order is set aside, and the matter is remanded back to the NCLAT for fresh consideration, emphasizing adherence to procedural rules.

The appellant and respondents are directed to approach the NCLAT for early listing on March 13, 2019, without the need for fresh notice to the appellant.

The court refrains from expressing any opinion on the case's merits, leaving it to the NCLAT's independent adjudication.

The appeal stands disposed of

Facts:

The case involved the delayed payment of Commuted Value of Pension (CVP) to an employee who received provisional pension during the pendency of a vigilance/disciplinary case. The employee applied for CVP more than three years after retirement, seeking interest from the date of retirement.

Issues:

Whether the employee was entitled to interest on the CVP due to the delayed payment and the acceptance of provisional pension.

Held:

The court held that there is no provision in the Central Civil Services (Commutation of Pension) Rules, 1981, contemplating the payment of interest on delayed CVP. The Office Memorandum dated 05.10.1999 did not explicitly preclude interest but did not mandate it either. (Para 20)

Pension is a legal and fundamental right, and interest can be ordered for belated pension payments. CVP is linked to pension and is a part of the employee's right to receive pension. Commutation is optional and governed by specific rules. (Paras 21, 22, and 23)

Rule 13(3) of Commutation Rules allows an employee to apply for CVP within three months of retirement. In the present case, the employee could not apply under Rule 13(1) as he was receiving provisional pension. However, he was not precluded from applying under Rule 13(3). (Paras 29 and 30)

The employee applied for CVP on 01.11.2012, seeking commutation without a medical examination, showing his retirement date as 31.07.2008. CVP was sanctioned in December 2012 based on this application. (Para 37)

Three situations were identified: immediate pension finalization, provisional pension with commutation, and provisional pension during disciplinary proceedings. The applicant fell into the third category, precluding commutation during provisional pension under Rule 4 of Commutation Rules. (Para 35)

The court emphasized the legal rights conferred by Rule 13(3) and the necessity to apply within the prescribed time. Interest cannot be claimed from the date of retirement in cases falling under Rule 13(1). (Para 45)

The applicant failed to make an application within three months of retirement, which would have been under Rule 13(3). Acceptance of provisional pension under Rule 69 precluded him from applying under Rule 13(1), and interest from the date of retirement was not warranted. (Para 46)