Facts:

The Government of Kerala constituted a Committee named "Private Hospital Industrial Relation Committee" under Section 9 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, to revise minimum wages for employees in private hospitals and allied institutions.

The constitution of the Committee was challenged in the High Court of Kerala by certain private hospital owners, contending that employees nominated as employers' representatives were not appropriate as they were employees themselves.

Issues:

Whether the composition of the Committee, including the nomination of employees as employers' representatives, was in accordance with Section 9 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.

Whether the High Court erred in upholding the constitution of the Committee.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the constitution of the Committee, including the nomination of employees as employers' representatives, was in accordance with Section 9 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. The Court reasoned that employees nominated to represent their employers' interests could adequately defend their employer's interest in the Committee. The Court emphasized that such representation was a well-accepted practice and cited precedent in support of its interpretation. As equal representation was provided to both employers and employees in the Committee, and the nominated employees were well-versed in the subject matter, the Court found no flaw in the constitution of the Committee. Accordingly, the appeal challenging the constitution of the Committee was dismissed.

Facts:

The respondents, M. Mani and T.A. Mathivanan, were employees of BHEL working as Driver Grade II.

They were accused of unauthorizedly removing a heavy machine from the plant premises.

BHEL conducted a departmental enquiry, which found both respondents guilty and dismissed them from service in 1991.

The respondents challenged their dismissal in Labour Court cases, arguing that the departmental enquiry was not conducted properly.

The Labour Court initially ruled in favor of the employees, ordering their reinstatement with back wages.

Upon appeal, the Single Judge of the High Court set aside the Labour Court's decision and remanded the case back to the Labour Court for fresh consideration.

The Division Bench of the High Court allowed the respondents' appeals, directing their reinstatement but denied them back wages.

Issues:

Whether the departmental enquiry conducted by BHEL was legal and proper.

Whether the criminal court's acquittal of the respondents invalidated the findings of the departmental enquiry.

Whether the punishment of dismissal imposed by BHEL was commensurate with the gravity of the charge.

Held:

The Court held that the departmental enquiry conducted by BHEL was legal and proper. (Para. 16)

The criminal court's acquittal of the respondents did not invalidate the findings of the departmental enquiry. (Para. 21)

The punishment of dismissal imposed by BHEL was commensurate with the gravity of the charge of theft, if proven in the enquiry. (Para. 28)

An act of theft committed by an employee while on duty is a serious charge, justifying dismissal from service. (Para. 29)

The appeals were allowed, and the Division Bench's judgment was set aside. The dismissal orders of the respondents were held to be legal and proper. (Para. 33)

Facts:

NIMS applied for land allotment in Jaipur but later encroached upon Khasra No. 526 without proper authorization.

Various legal proceedings ensued, including appeals and writ petitions, regarding the encroachment.

Ramgarh Dam, once a significant water source for Jaipur, suffered due to encroachments and construction in its catchment areas.

Issues:

Whether NIMS's encroachment on Khasra No. 526 was legal.

What actions should be taken regarding the unauthorized constructions on the encroached land.

The broader issue of enforcing laws regarding land use and encroachment, especially in cases affecting critical resources like water.

Held:

The Court held that NIMS had encroached upon Khasra No. 526 without proper authorization, violating relevant laws. The Court dismissed NIMS's petitions and directed the demolition of unauthorized constructions on the encroached land. NIMS was ordered to pay a substantial cost of Rs. 10 lakhs per petition. The Court emphasized the importance of enforcing the rule of law, particularly concerning unauthorized constructions and encroachments, even if carried out by influential entities like NIMS. Additionally, the Court prioritized resolving water scarcity issues over NIMS's interests, highlighting the broader public interest at stake.

Facts:

The case involved a challenge to the policy decision of the Government of India regarding diesel pricing, brought by the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation. The corporation argued that the decision was arbitrary, illegal, unjust, unconstitutional, and violated Articles 12 and 14 of the Constitution of India. They sought relief from the dual pricing policy of diesel and reimbursement of excess charges.

Issues:

The validity of the government's policy decision on diesel pricing and subsidy for bulk consumers.

Held:

The Court held that the grant of subsidy is a matter of privilege, not a right, and can be withdrawn at any time by the government. Such decisions are not subject to judicial review.

The Court emphasized that while public service corporations like the State Road Transport Corporation render essential services, they cannot claim subsidy as a matter of right.

The Court dismissed the writ petitions challenging the policy decision and disposed of the appeals and transferred cases accordingly.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute between the Union of India (lessee) and Bengal Shrachi Housing Development Limited (lessor) regarding the liability to pay service tax for commercial premises under clause 6 of the lease deed.

Issues:

Determination of the liable party for paying service tax in the lease agreement.

Interpretation of relevant sections, acts, rules, and articles in deciding the liability.

Held:

The Finance Act, 1994, and Service Tax Rules, 1994 govern the liability of service tax payment. (Para 12)

As per Rule 2(1)(d) of the Service Tax Rules, the lessor is liable for paying service tax in cases where the service of renting immovable property is agreed to be provided by the lessor. (Para 13)

The taxable event is the provision of the service (renting out immovable property), and the liable person is the service provider (lessor). (Para 18, 21)

The expression "primarily leviable upon" in clause 6 of the lease deed refers to the taxable person, i.e., the person liable to pay the tax, which in this case is the lessor. (Para 24)

Despite legal provisions, the Court considered the sanction letter from the Government of India and a subsequent letter indicating the Union of India's acknowledgment of liability to pay service charges. (Para 34, 35)

Consequently, while legally, the lessor is primarily liable for paying service tax, the Court declined to exercise discretion in favor of the Union of India, upholding the judgment based on factual grounds. (Para 36)

Decision: The judgment of the High Court was set aside on legal grounds but upheld on factual grounds, considering the express acknowledgment of liability by the Union of India.

Facts:

The case involved an incident in 1980 where six accused persons were involved in a confrontation with two individuals, resulting in injuries to one and death to the other.

The accused were charged under various sections of the IPC including Sections 147, 148, 302, 324/149, and 325/149.

The trial court convicted five accused and sentenced them, while one accused was acquitted.

The High Court partly allowed the appeal filed by the accused, modifying their sentences but upholding their convictions.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's modification of the sentences was appropriate, specifically in the case of the respondent, Tribhuwan.

Whether the time already spent by the respondent in jail should be considered as part of his sentence.

Held:

The Court held that while the High Court was correct in upholding the conviction of the respondent, Tribhuwan, it erred in fully setting aside his jail sentence. The Court affirmed the mandatory nature of both jail sentences and fines upon conviction under Section 325 IPC.

However, considering the time already served by the respondent in jail (40 days), and the extensive delay in legal proceedings (37 years), the Court reduced the respondent's sentence to the time already served, along with a fine. If the fine had been paid, no additional jail time would be required.

This decision was based on the interpretation of Sections 325 IPC and 428 of the CrPC, as well as the precedent set in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Najakat Alia Mubarak Ali (2001) 6 SCC 311. The appeal thus is allowed

Facts:

The dispute arose over the ownership and possession of a plot of land (referred to as "the suit land") in Panchkula. The plaintiff (appellant) claimed rights to the suit land based on an agreement dated 24.04.1980 and an alleged will in his favor by the original owner. The defendants (respondents) denied the existence of the agreement and will and asserted their ownership over the suit land.

Issues:

The validity of the agreement and will presented by the plaintiff, the ownership rights of the defendants, and the legality of the sale of the suit land to a third party.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts and dismissed the appeal. The Court found that the plaintiff failed to prove the existence of the agreement and will, thereby lacking any title to the suit land. It was determined that the plaintiff's suit was misconceived and barred by limitation, as it was filed almost 12 years after the agreement's execution. The Court emphasized that the proper remedy for the plaintiff should have been to file a civil suit for specific performance of the agreement immediately after its execution or within three years from the date of execution. Since the plaintiff failed to do so and sought relief other than specific performance, the suit was deemed misconceived and rightly dismissed.

Relevant Paragraphs from Judgment:

Decided on : 06-11-2017

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) - Section 100

Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Sections 9 and 100—Civil suit—Locus Standi to file—Appellant who failed to prove agreement had no prima facie case in his favour to file a suit nor he had even any locus to file suit in relation to suit land once agreement was held not proved—Proper remedy of appellant was to file a civil suit to claim specific performance of agreement in question in relation to suit land and such suit should have been filed immediately after execution of agreement or/and within three years from date of execution—Suit filed by appellant almost after 12 years from date of agreement was a misconceived suit and was rightly dismissed—Appeal dismissed.

FACTS:

Smt. Chandra Narayan Das filed a complaint against the appellants alleging multiple offenses under the Indian Penal Code.

The complaint was dismissed by the Magistrate, and subsequent appeals were made to the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court.

During the pendency of the case in the High Court, the original complainant, Smt. Chandra Narayan Das, passed away.

Legal representatives of the deceased complainant sought to be substituted in place of the original complainant to prosecute the case further.

ISSUES:

Whether legal representatives can be substituted to prosecute a case after the death of the original complainant.

The applicability of relevant provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding the non-appearance or death of the complainant.

The discretion of the Magistrate to proceed with a complaint even after the death of the complainant.

HELD:

The High Court did not commit any error in allowing the legal heirs of the complainant to prosecute the Criminal Misc. Petition. The provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, do not explicitly prohibit the substitution of legal representatives after the death of the complainant. The Court cited Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and emphasized that even in the case of a summons-case, it is not mandatory to reject the complaint upon the death of the complainant. The Court further highlighted the absence of any provision in the Code indicating that a complaint in a warrant case should be rejected due to the death of the complainant. The Court referenced previous judgments such as Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas v. State of Maharashtra and Balasaheb K. Thackeray v. Venkat @ Babru to support the proposition that legal representatives can continue the prosecution after the death of the complainant. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The case concerned provisions of the Forester, Forest Guard, Ranger-Surveyor, Surveyor, Head Clerk, Accountant and Clerk-cum-Typist (Recruitment) Rules, 1987, specifically regarding eligibility criteria for participating in LDCE for promotion to the post of Forester.

Recruitment Rules stipulated that 75% of Forester posts were to be filled based on seniority-cum-fitness, while the remaining 25% were to be filled based on LDCE.

The requirement for participating in LDCE included completion of five years of service as Forest Guard and possession of a graduate degree.

Issues:

The constitutional validity of the requirement of being a graduate for participating in LDCE, particularly whether it violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

Held:

The court held that the requirement of being a graduate for participating in LDCE violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

It noted that while the Department could prescribe eligibility criteria, introducing an additional requirement based on educational qualification was discriminatory.

The LDCE was meant to encourage accelerated promotion based on merit, and introducing a requirement for graduation without any quota reserved for graduates was unjustifiable.

The judgment declared the requirement of being a graduate for participating in LDCE unconstitutional.

However, it clarified that this ruling would not affect promotions already made under the existing rules.

For future promotions, the LDCE should be conducted afresh, allowing all eligible Forest Guards, irrespective of educational qualification, to participate.