Facts:

The State of Rampur merged into the Union of India in 1947, and the ruler signed a Merger Agreement in 1949, entitling him to full ownership of private properties. The Constitution of India came into effect in 1950. The ruler died intestate, and a certificate declared the eldest son as the sole successor to his private properties.

Issues:

The nature of the ruler's properties - whether they were private properties governed by personal laws or attached to the 'Gaddi' of the State of Rampur, subject to the rule of male primogeniture.

Held:

Definition of Ruler: The court clarified that the definition of a "ruler" in Article 366(22) of the Constitution pertains to a former prince recognized as a ruler, having no territory or sovereignty. The rulers, after the merger, were rulers only in name, with no subjects or territory. (Para 12)

Nature of Gaddi and Private Property: The court distinguished between 'Gaddi' or rulership and private property, emphasizing that they have different connotations. The properties declared as private by the ruler should be treated as personal properties, not attached to the Gaddi.(Para 37-39)

Applicability of Personal Laws: The court rejected the argument that the rule of primogeniture should apply, highlighting that the rulers enjoyed rights under the Constitution, and succession to personal properties would be governed by personal laws. The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, applied, given that the ruler was a Shia. (Para 40-42)

Amendments to the Suit and Decree: The plaintiff amended the suit due to the death of some defendants, and the court accepted the worked-out shares of legal heirs as per the amended plaint. A decree was passed based on the determined shares outlined in para 9-F of the plaint. I.A. No. 3 of 2014 is dismissed. (Para 46-49)

All other applications are disposed of. (Para 50)

Facts:

The appellant, Vijendra, was accused of adulteration in milk.

The milk sample taken from the appellant was found deficient by 12% in milk fat and 27% in non-fatty solids.

The prosecution's case relied on the testimony of the Food Inspector (PW-1), who claimed that the sample was taken in the presence of an independent witness (PW-3).

PW-3, the independent witness, did not support the prosecution's case.

Issues:

Compliance with Section 10(7) and Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.

Adequacy of evidence, especially the lack of support from the independent witness.

Proper sampling procedures and the relevance of homogeneity in milk samples.

Held:

The Court noted the importance of the accused's right to receive and respond to the Analyst's report under Section 13(2) and emphasized strict compliance with legal provisions. It highlighted that the report's dispatch alone was not sufficient, and there was no proof of its delivery to the appellant within the prescribed 10-day period. The lack of compliance with procedural requirements was a critical factor in the decision.( Paragraph 16)

The Court raised concerns about the sampling procedures, especially regarding the homogeneity of the milk sample. It referred to the necessity of stirring and churning to achieve homogeneity, as established in previous legal precedents. The uncorroborated testimony of PW-1, the Food Inspector, was considered insufficient to sustain the conviction.( Paragraph 17)

In conclusion, the Supreme Court set aside the previous judgments, acquitted the appellant, and held that the prosecution had failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The decision was based on the lack of compliance with procedural requirements and the absence of supporting evidence, particularly the non-cooperation of the independent witness.( Paragraph 18)

Facts:

Pursuant to the state government's policy, the appellant was allowed to set up a Hydro Electric Project under a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with KSEB.

The MoU specified that the appellant would operate the unit for 30 years from the date of commissioning, and KSEB was responsible for constructing the transmission line.

A delay in the construction of the transmission line led to a writ petition by the appellant, seeking power free of cost and expedited construction.

Issues:

The interpretation of the contract, the delay in the construction of the transmission line, and the entitlement of the appellant to certain tariff concessions.

Held:

The court held that the contract clearly stipulated the date of commissioning as the date when power generated by the appellant was fed into the KSEB grid (Para 35).

While the contract did not specify the exact length of the transmission line, the court emphasized that, according to Clause 9, KSEB had the obligation to complete the transmission line within a reasonable period (Para 36).

The High Court's conclusion that the contract did not specify timelines for the transmission line construction was deemed incorrect (Para 36).

The court recognized the concessions provided to the appellant as matters of policy to encourage industrialization (Para 37).

Contractual obligations were emphasized, and the court noted that the delay in transmission line construction should not leave the private investor in a disadvantaged position (Para 42).

The State Government was directed to reassess the matter within the legal framework and its own policy, considering the delay and contractual obligations (Para 45).

Facts:

The Sabha's Constitution governs its affairs, including the election process for the General Council and Managing Committee.

An Election Officer issued an election program with unit-wise reservations for certain posts and reserved seats for women.

The election program was challenged, leading to a decision by the Industrial Court directing elections as per the Constitution, without unit-wise elections and without reservations for women.

Issues:

Whether the election program's stipulations were consistent with the Constitution of the Sabha.

The challenge to the Industrial Court's decision in the High Court.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the Industrial Court and the High Court, emphasizing that the election program's stipulations were not consistent with the Constitution of the Sabha. The Court held that the program must align with the governing Statute and the Sabha's Constitution. The appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.

Facts:

The Respondents booked a residential villa with the Appellants.

The agreement stipulated possession by December 31, 2014, upon timely payments.

Respondents deposited Rs. 8.14 crores, but possession was not delivered by the agreed date.

Appellants cited additional work and Stop Work Notices by Pune Municipal Corporation.

Issues:

Whether the Appellants were in deficiency of service for not delivering possession by the agreed-upon date.

Validity of the additional work claim and its impact on possession.

Responsibility for delays due to Stop Work Notices.

Held:

The Court upheld the NCDRC's decision, finding deficiencies in the Appellants' service. The Respondents were justified in seeking a refund with reasonable interest. Even if the villa is now ready, the five-year delay was deemed crucial, and the original bargain could not be imposed on the Respondents. The Court directed the refund and imposed restrictions on the sale of the villa. The appeals stand dismissed.

Facts:

The case involves a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, where the appellant's cheques were dishonored due to insufficient funds. Section 143A, introduced in 2018, allows the court to order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant. The appellant challenged the order of the Trial Court, which directed the payment of interim compensation.

Issues:

The prospective or retrospective applicability of Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, concerning the payment of interim compensation.

Held:

The court held that Section 143A is prospective and applies only to cases where offenses under Section 138 were committed after its introduction. It emphasized that Section 143A creates a new liability and exposes the accused to coercive recovery methods. The court set aside the orders of the Trial Court and the High Court, directing the return of the money deposited as interim compensation along with interest. The court allowed the appeal.

Facts:

Sunita was convicted for the murder of Sushila based on circumstantial evidence.

Prosecution relied on evidence of last seen theory, extra-judicial confession, and recovery of a Scooty.

Appellant's counsel argued the prosecution's case was unreliable, pointing out contradictions and lack of motive.

Issues:

Credibility of witnesses, especially Neeraj (PW-4) and Pirthi Singh (PW-5).

Adequacy of evidence, including last seen theory, Scooty recovery, and extra-judicial confession.

Establishing a motive for the alleged murder.

Held:

Circumstantial Evidence: The court emphasized the need for circumstantial evidence to meet specific tests, including cogency, tendency pointing towards guilt, forming a complete chain, and being inconsistent with innocence.

Evidence of Last Seen: Last seen theory, as presented by Neeraj (PW-4), was considered weak evidence by itself. The court stressed that when coupled with other circumstances, such as time of last sighting and proximity to the recovery of the body, it could be used to invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act.

Inconsistencies and Motive: The court highlighted inconsistencies in witness statements, especially regarding the height of the deceased. The suggested motive, fear of losing property, was not convincingly established.

Scooty and Extra-Judicial Confession: Evidence related to the Scooty and the extra-judicial confession was found insufficient. Lack of blood marks on the Scooty raised doubts about its use in disposing of the body.

Failure to Establish Murder: The prosecution failed to establish the place and manner of the murder. The court clarified that the appellant was not required to explain the circumstances of body parts found in a 'Bitora' in the village.

Conclusion: Given the lack of conclusive evidence, inconsistencies, and doubts raised by the appellant's counsel, the court granted the benefit of doubt and acquitted the appellant of the charges. The appeal was allowed, and the bail bonds were discharged. The appellant was to be set at liberty.

Facts:

The appellant filed an appeal against the High Court's judgment, challenging the reduction in the sentence of the accused.

The case involved offenses under various sections of IPC and the Arms Act, arising from an incident with injuries caused to PW-6 and PW-7.

The trial court convicted the accused under Section 307 IPC, sentencing them to seven years of rigorous imprisonment.

The High Court affirmed the conviction but reduced the sentence and altered charges against some accused.

Issues:

Whether the injuries caused demonstrated the accused's intention to commit murder.

Whether the High Court's reduction in sentence was justified.

Whether the sentence imposed proportionately reflected the gravity of the offense.

Held:

The Court emphasized that intention to cause death or grievous injury is necessary for a conviction under Section 307 IPC. The injuries were considered grievous, capable of causing death.

The Court criticized the High Court for undue sympathy to the accused, stressing the need for proportionate sentencing based on the gravity of the offense.

The Court set aside the High Court's judgment, increased the sentence for accused No.1 to six years and six months, and affirmed the acquittal of accused Nos.2 and 3 under Section 307 IPC.

The Court maintained the fine amount and compensation to be paid to the injured victims. Accused No.1 was directed to surrender within four weeks to serve the remaining sentence.

Facts:

Appellant appointed as a temporary Assistant Grade-III in 1983.

Absent for 1968 days between 1987 and 1993, later sanctioned as medical leave.

Promoted to temporary Assistant Grade-II in 1990.

Medical Board in 1992 found excessive leave based on medical certificates.

Termination in 1994 following unsatisfactory reply to show cause notice.

Issues:

Applicability of Regulation 24 of the 1975 Regulations.

Validity of termination without a formal domestic inquiry.

Regularization of absence as leave as a ground for termination.

Held:

The termination under Regulation 24 was not justified as appellant had over eleven years of service.

Formal domestic inquiry is necessary for termination with serious civil consequences.

Regularization of absence as leave was a valid point against termination.

High Court's decision on the termination upheld, but back wages reduced to 10% due to appellant's habitual absenteeism.

Appellant granted reinstatement but not required to work, with salary payment until superannuation in May 2020.