Facts:

Dispute arose between M/S. UTTARAKHAND PURV SAINIK KALYAN NIGAM LIMITED (Appellant) and NORTHERN COAL FIELD LIMITED (Respondent).

Agreement dated 21.12.2010 contained an arbitration clause.

Legal Notice issued by Appellant on 29.05.2013 demanding payment.

Notice of Arbitration sent on 09.03.2016, no response from Respondent.

Application filed under Section 11 on 20.09.2016, Respondent raised limitation as a ground to oppose the appointment of arbitrator.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the application filed under Section 11 on the ground of limitation?

Held:

The Court held that, post the 2015 Amendment Act, the scope of the High Court's jurisdiction under Section 11 is limited to examining the existence of the arbitration agreement. The doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz empowers the arbitrator to rule on its own jurisdiction. The exception to this rule is when the arbitration agreement is impeached as being procured by fraud or deception. In this case, the issue of limitation, being a jurisdictional issue, is required to be decided by the arbitrator under Section 16, not by the High Court at the pre-reference stage under Section 11. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and directed the issue of limitation to be decided by the arbitral tribunal.

Facts:

The plaintiff initially filed a suit for injunction to restrain the defendant from obstructing possession. Subsequently, a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell the property was filed. The earlier injunction suit was dismissed for default, and the later suit for specific performance was also dismissed on the grounds of non-compliance with Order 2 Rule 2.

Issues:

Whether the subsequent suit for specific performance is barred under Order 2 Rule 2.

Application of Order 2 Rule 2 principles regarding the inclusion of the whole claim.

Held:

Order 2 Rule 2(1) mandates the inclusion of the entire claim in a suit, but allows the plaintiff to relinquish a portion to bring it within the court's jurisdiction. A plaintiff who omits or intentionally relinquishes any part of the claim is not entitled to sue for it later without court leave (Order 2 Rule 2(2) and (3)).

To invoke Order 2 Rule 2, the subsequent claim's cause of action must have arisen when the first claim was before the court.

In this case, the plaintiff's earlier suit for injunction included details of the agreement to sell, the price, earnest money, and the demand for performance. The cause of action for specific performance arose when the defendant denied contract performance, concurrent with the earlier suit. The plaintiff failed to sue for specific performance without court leave, invoking Order 2 Rule 2(3).

The bar under Order 2 Rule 2 is justified as the plaintiff was entitled to sue for specific performance when filing the earlier injunction suit but omitted to do so. The cause of action in both suits was identical.

The plaintiff, having paid a sum to the defendant, is entitled to a refund with interest for the deposited amounts.

The court issued directions under Article 142 for the refund, maintaining the judgment of the High Court.

Facts:

The prosecution alleged that the appellant-Inspector demanded a bribe for providing electricity connection to a shed. A trap was laid, and currency notes were chemically treated. The raiding party, along with witnesses, proceeded to the DESU office. The appellant, upon receiving the bribe, was caught, and the tainted money was recovered from his pocket.

Issues:

The appellant challenged his conviction, citing major contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses.

Held:

The deviations between the testimonies of PW2 and PW-3 do not negate the demand, payment of bribe, or the seizure of the bribe. Minor discrepancies in the details of handwash or pant wash are insufficient to justify acquittal. Para No.: 8, 9, 10, 11

The reason for the demand and payment of the bribe was established despite contradictions in the testimony of PW-6. The appellant's contention that the shed did not have an electricity connection was rejected. Para No.: 12

The statutory presumption under Section 20 of the Act is applicable as the conditions for drawing such a presumption were met. The appellant failed to provide a reasonable explanation to rebut the presumption. Para No.: 13, 14

The validity of the sanction order was upheld. The sanctioning authority properly examined the material before granting sanction for prosecution. Para No.: 16, 17

Procedural lapses in the investigation, regarding the rank of the investigating officer, were considered irregularities. However, no prejudice was alleged or argued by the appellant. Para No.: 19

A mere error or irregularity in the sanction is not considered fatal unless it results in a failure of justice. Section 19(1) of the Act is procedural and does not affect the court's jurisdiction once cognizance has been taken. Para No.: 20, 21

Facts:

The case involves allegations of irregularities in the procurement of ration, leading to an investigation. A prima facie case was found against 12 Army personnel, including the respondent. A hearing of the charge under rule 22 was convened, where the Commanding Officer found no prima facie case against the respondent. The respondent retired, but proceedings were continued against him invoking Section 123 of the Army Act. The General Court Martial was convened, and the respondent challenged the validity of the order through an Original Application (O.A.) under Sections 14 and 15 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act.

Issues:

Jurisdiction of the Armed Forces Tribunal to entertain an appeal against the order convening the General Court Martial.

Interpretation of Sections 14 and 15 regarding the scope of "service matters" under the Armed Forces Tribunal Act.

Held:

The Tribunal held that an appeal under Section 15 was not maintainable as there was no order, decision, finding, or sentence by the Court Martial. However, Section 14 allows an application in any service matter, and "service matters" include conditions of service, which encompasses dismissal from service. The Tribunal emphasized a wide construction of Section 14, affirming its jurisdiction over service matters of Army personnel.

The words "relating to" in the definition of "service matters" in Section 3(o) should be interpreted broadly. The proceedings against the respondent, leading to a potential termination of service, were deemed related to his service. The Tribunal highlighted that an interpretation conferring jurisdiction should be preferred over one taking away jurisdiction.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation and application of provisions related to arbitration, specifically Sections 34 to 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The matter also delves into the constitutional validity of the amendments introduced by the 2019 Amendment Act, particularly Section 87, and the relevance of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issues:

The interpretation of Sections 34 to 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, with a focus on the automatic stay of awards.

The impact of the 2019 Amendment Act on the judgment in the BCCI case.

The constitutional validity of Section 87, including its removal of Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment Act.

The application and interpretation of Section 3(7) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, concerning the term 'Corporate person.'

Held:

Interpretation of Sections 34 to 36: The Court clarified that Section 36 does not automatically stay an arbitral award during the pendency of a challenge under Section 34. The purpose of Section 36 is to enforce a final and binding award under the CPC once the challenge period has expired or the application has been refused.( Paragraphs: 13, 22, 25-27, 30)

Removal of the Basis of the BCCI Judgment: The Court rejected arguments that the 2019 Amendment Act removes the basis of the BCCI judgment. It emphasized the need to examine the substance of the amendment, regardless of its mention in the Statement of Objects and Reasons.(Paragraphs: 41, 45, 46)

Constitutional Validity of Section 87: The Court held that the introduction of Section 87 and the deletion of Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment Act were manifestly arbitrary. It found the amendments contrary to the objectives of the 2015 Amendment Act and the Arbitration Act, 1996.(Paragraphs: 47-49, 50, 51)

Interpretation of 'Corporate person' under the Insolvency Code: The Court rejected suggestions to modify the definition of 'Corporate person' under Section 3(7) of the Insolvency Code. It clarified that entities like NHAI, performing governmental functions, cannot be subjected to insolvency proceedings. (Paragraphs: 57, 58, 59, 63, 65)

FACTS:

Post the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly elections, no single party had the majority.

Efforts were made by the Governor to explore government formation, leading to President's Rule imposition.

Subsequent developments involved invitations to various parties to form the government, ultimately resulting in the swearing-in of Devendra Fadnavis as Chief Minister.

The Shiv Sena, NCP, and INC challenged the Governor's actions, claiming that the oath of office to Fadnavis was unconstitutional.

ISSUES:

The constitutional validity of the Governor's actions in inviting Fadnavis to form the government.

Whether a floor test should be conducted to determine the majority support for the Chief Minister.

HELD:

The Court emphasized the need to protect democratic values and ordered an immediate floor test to ascertain if the Chief Minister had majority support. Referring to precedents, the Court highlighted the importance of timely floor tests in such situations to prevent horse-trading and ensure a stable government.( Paragraphs 17-20)

The Court issued specific directions for the floor test, including the appointment of a Pro-tem Speaker, administering oaths to elected members, conducting the floor test without secret ballot, and live telecasting the proceedings.( Paragraph 26)

REFERRED CASES:

Anil Kumar Jha vs. Union of India, (2005) 3 SCC 150

Chandrakant Kavlekar vs. Union of India, (2017) 3 SCC 758

G. Parmeshwara vs. Union of India, (2018) 16 SCC 46

Jagdambika Pal vs. Union of India, (1999) 9 SCC 95

S.R. Bommai vs. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1

Union of India vs. Sh. Harish Chandra Singh Rawat, (2016) SCC Online SC 442

Union of India vs. Shri Harish Chandra Singh Rawat, (2016) SCC OnLine SC 618

Facts:

The spouse of the appellant, a tenant, faced a suit for eviction under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1997.

Issues:

Whether the spouse of a deceased original tenant is entitled to protection from eviction for non-residential premises beyond a period of five years from the date of the original tenant's death.

Held:

Discusses the interpretation of Section 2(g) and the differentiation between protection for residential and non-residential premises. Highlights the omission in the legislation regarding the spouse's entitlement under the second proviso.( Para 10)

Expresses agreement with the High Court's conclusion that legislative amendment is necessary to include the spouse in the protection granted to other heirs under the second proviso. Acknowledges the inadvertent omission and calls for attention from lawmakers.( Para 12)

Grants time to the appellant to vacate the premises until 30 June 2020 but upholds the eviction decree. Urges legislative consideration for the inclusion of the spouse in the protective provisions.( Para 13)

Facts:

The prosecution established harassment under Section 498-A, alleging dowry demand as the motive. The deceased was subjected to harassment to coerce her and her parents to meet an unlawful monetary demand.

Issues:

Whether the proved cruelty under Section 498-A, along with the suicide within seven years of marriage, warrants a conviction under Section 306 with the aid of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act.

Whether the prosecution sufficiently demonstrated that the accused's actions directly led to the deceased's suicide.

Held:

The evidence of PW-10, the deceased's father, corroborated by PW-13, substantiates the harassment for an unlawful demand under Section 498-A.( Para 11)

Mere guilt under Section 498-A and death within seven years doesn't automatically lead to Section 306 conviction. The prosecution must establish a direct link between the accused's act and the suicide.( Para 27)

The prosecution failed to prove that the cruelty left the deceased with no choice but suicide. No evidence showed immediate cruelty prior to the suicide, and a two-month gap existed between the last visit and the suicide.( Paras 33-34)

Unlike previous cases, the charge didn't specify that the deceased was driven to suicide due to harassment. Conviction under Section 498-A is maintained, but the conviction under Section 306 is set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the Section 306 charge.( Paras 35-37)

Facts:

The case involves the prosecution of the Municipal Commissioner and Chief Officer of the City Municipal Council by the Karnataka State Pollution Control Board for offenses under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974.

Issues:

Whether City Municipal Councils can be considered a Department of the Government.

The liability of Municipal Commissioners and Chief Officers under the Water Act.

The interpretation of Sections 47, 48, and 49 of the Water Act.

Held:

The Water Act, 1974, enacted by Parliament, aims to prevent and control water pollution. It establishes Boards for these purposes and confers powers on them. (Para 7)

Section 48 of the Water Act is applicable when offenses are committed by any Department of Government. City Municipal Councils, created under the Karnataka Municipalities Act, are considered bodies corporate, distinct from government departments. (Paras 11, 15)

Municipal Councils, including City Municipal Councils, are created by State enactments and are controlled by the Government, receiving financial assistance. However, they are not considered Departments of the Government. (Para 14, 18)

The Scheme of the Water Act indicates separate representation for the Government, local authorities, and companies or corporations owned, controlled, or managed by the State Government. Municipalities, including City Municipal Councils, do not qualify as Departments of the Government. (Paras 15)

Article 243P of the Constitution defines "Municipality" as an institution of self-Government. City Municipal Councils cannot be treated as Departments of the State Government. They are entrusted with Municipal functions, including ensuring a clean environment and controlling pollution. (Paras 16, 18)

Section 47 of the Water Act pertains to offenses by companies, defining "company" broadly as "any body corporate." City Municipal Councils fall under this definition. (Paras 19, 20)

Section 47 can be applied to offenses by body corporates like City Municipal Councils. The Karnataka State Pollution Control Board's complaint under Section 49 for the prosecution of Municipal Commissioners and Chief Officers is deemed appropriate. (Paras 29, 31)