Facts:

The employees acquired engineering degrees through distance education mode from Deemed to be Universities and sought promotion based on these degrees. The employer contended that the degrees were not valid as the institutions were not approved by AICTE.

Issues:

Whether qualifications obtained through distance education mode from Deemed to be Universities are valid for promotion, and whether AICTE's approval is necessary for such degrees to be recognized.

Held:

The distinction between "Technical Education" and "Technical Institution" as per the AICTE Act indicates that AICTE has authority over the parameters and norms of technical education, regardless of the institution imparting it.( Para 36)

AICTE has the exclusive jurisdiction over the decision of whether subjects leading to engineering degrees can be taught through distance education. Without explicit guidelines from AICTE permitting such courses, Deemed to be Universities cannot offer engineering degrees through distance education.( Para 38)

Deemed to be Universities started engineering courses through distance education mode without AICTE's approval, which was a violation of norms.( Para 39)

Deemed to be Universities, despite their status, cannot equate themselves with regular universities in terms of authority. They must still comply with AICTE regulations for technical education courses.( Para 42)

The Distance Education Council (DEC) created under the IGNOU Act had no authority to act as a regulator for other universities. Its permissions for distance education courses were illegal, especially without AICTE's involvement.( Para 44)

The permissions granted by DEC to Deemed to be Universities for offering engineering degrees through distance education were illegal and could not be rectified by ex post facto approvals.( Para 45)

Degrees obtained by students enrolled during the academic sessions 2001-2005 from these Deemed to be Universities were suspended until they passed examinations supervised by AICTE-UGC.( Para 46)

Degrees of students enrolled after the academic sessions 2001-2005 were recalled and canceled, and the tuition fees were to be refunded.( Para 48)

An investigation was directed into the conduct of officials involved in granting illegal permissions, to be carried out by the CBI.( Para 49)

UGC was instructed to consider withdrawing the Deemed to be University status of the concerned institutions and to prevent unauthorized use of the term "University" by Deemed to be Universities.( Para 50)

The judgment highlighted issues of commercialization and lack of oversight in education, calling for immediate action to address systemic failures.( Para 52)

Facts: The case involved the alleged forgery of a letter dated 10.04.1992, purportedly issued by the Regional Manager of RIICO, Sriganganagar, which was filed in a civil court on 27.04.1992. The appellant filed an FIR under Section 420 IPC on 29.04.1992, alleging forgery. The investigation concluded that police could not investigate further due to Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC. The appellant challenged this decision through various legal avenues.

Issues: The main issue was the interpretation of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC and its applicability to the case. Additionally, the court examined whether there was sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of forgery against the respondent.

Held and Decision: The Supreme Court held that the provision under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC would only apply if the offences listed therein were committed concerning a document after it had been produced in court. Since there was no evidence to suggest that forgery occurred after the letter was filed in court, this provision did not apply. The Court further observed that the lower courts had thoroughly considered the evidence and found no prima facie case of forgery against the respondent. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant, M/S. K.LAKSHMANYA AND COMPANY, filed returns for assessment years 1993-94 and 1994-95.

Upon completion of assessment, interest under Sections 234(A) to (C) was levied.

The appellant sought waiver of interest due to hardship from the Settlement Commission, which partially waived the interest.

The Assessing Officer refused to grant interest on the refund, leading to appeals and subsequent legal proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the appellant is entitled to interest under Section 244(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, when a refund arises due to a partial waiver of interest by the Settlement Commission.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the appellant is entitled to interest under Section 244(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, when a refund arises due to a partial waiver of interest by the Settlement Commission. The court emphasized the automatic nature of the right to claim interest once statutory provisions are complied with, and rejected arguments that the Settlement Commission's power to waive interest does not extend to providing interest under Section 244(a).

The Court referred to previous judgments, including Needle Industries Pvt. Ltd. and Sandvik Asia Ltd., to affirm the right of the assessee to claim interest on refunds. The Court concluded that a refund becomes due when an order reduces or waives tax or interest, entitling the assessee to interest. Therefore, the appeals were allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and ruling in favor of the appellant's entitlement to interest on the refund.

Facts:

The case involves a joint venture agreement between Venture Global Engineering LLC (V) and Tech Mahindra Ltd. (S), wherein both companies formed a joint venture company (JVC) with equal shareholding. Provisions in the agreement stipulated the purchase of shares by the non-defaulting shareholder in the event of default by the other, at book value. V declared bankruptcy, leading to arbitration proceedings where the arbitral award favored V. Subsequent disclosures revealed manipulation of V's balance sheet by its chairman and founder, inflating profits.

Issues:

Whether the arbitral award is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation, and suppression of material facts.

Whether the award violates public policy, particularly regarding FEMA and other legal provisions.

The applicability of Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to international commercial arbitration.

Held:

Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre held that the arbitral award was obtained through misrepresentation and suppression of material facts, rendering it in violation of public policy under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act. The acts of manipulation and fabrication of accounts by V's chairman amounted to an event of default under the joint venture agreement. The award was set aside, and the matter was concluded at the appellate level without the need for further litigation.

Justice Chelameswar disagreed with the trial court's conclusion that the award was induced or affected by fraud. He criticized the lack of legal analysis and clarity in the trial court's judgment, particularly regarding the alleged violation of FEMA. Chelameswar upheld the High Court's decision to restore the award, emphasizing the need for reasoned decisions and avoidance of prolonged litigation.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute regarding the computation of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, following a fatal accident. The deceased's income, future prospects, and conventional heads of compensation are central to the dispute.

Issues:

The determination of just compensation under sections 163-A, 166, and 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

The application of appropriate multipliers and future prospects in computing compensation.

The quantification of conventional heads of compensation such as loss of estate, loss of consortium, and funeral expenses.

Held:

The court held that just compensation should be determined based on fairness, reasonableness, and equitability, guided by the principles established in the Sarla Verma case and reaffirmed in the Reshma Kumari case.

Future prospects should be added to the income of the deceased, with specific percentages based on age and employment status. T

he court outlined detailed percentages for different age brackets and employment types. Conventional heads of compensation should not be determined on a percentage basis. The court specified reasonable figures for loss of estate, loss of consortium, and funeral expenses, with provisions for periodic enhancement.

Judicial discipline demands that decisions be consistent with previous judgments of co-equal or larger benches. A decision can be considered per incuriam if it overlooks relevant legal precedents.

Decision: The court provided clear guidelines for computing compensation in motor vehicle accident cases, emphasizing fairness, consistency, and adherence to legal principles.

Facts:

The case pertains to the murder of an activist who had been protesting against illegal mining in and around the Gir Forest Sanctuary in Gujarat. The appellant and his nephew were implicated in the murder, leading to a trial where a significant number of witnesses turned hostile.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in ordering a de novo trial under Article 226.

Whether the strictures against the Presiding Officer were warranted.

Whether the bail granted to the appellant should be cancelled due to alleged threats to witnesses.

Held:

The High Court's decision to order a de novo trial under Article 226 was justified considering the exceptional circumstances where witnesses turned hostile due to potential threats or inducements. However, the entire retrial was not deemed necessary, and only crucial witnesses need to be re-examined.

The court emphasized the importance of a victim-centric approach in criminal justice, balancing the rights of the accused with the interests of the victim and society at large. The aim is to ensure a fair trial and convict the actual perpetrators of the crime .

While the observations about the role of the trial court judge were warranted, the strictures against the Presiding Officer were considered excessive, especially considering his imminent retirement and lack of cogent evidence against him .

The prima facie case for cancellation of bail was established due to allegations of threats to witnesses and the complainant's family. Therefore, the appellant's bail was temporarily cancelled until crucial witnesses are re-examined, and additional conditions were imposed upon his release .

Decision: The Court directed a retrial of the case, re-examining only crucial witnesses, and modifying the strictures against the Presiding Officer. The appellant's bail was temporarily cancelled, with conditions imposed upon his release pending further trial proceedings .

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between SEDCO FOREX INTERNATIONAL INC., represented by Mr. Navin Sarda, and the Commissioner of Income Tax in Meerut. The dispute revolves around the tax treatment of income derived from the exploration of mineral oils in India.

Issues:

The court pertain to the interpretation and application of Sections 44BB and 4488 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, regarding the taxability of specific types of income related to the exploration of mineral oils.

Held:

The court examined the provisions of Section 44BB, which starts with a non-obstante clause, indicating that the formula for computing income under this section is to be applied regardless of other provisions. The court clarified that a sum equal to 10% of specified amounts shall be deemed as profits and gains of such business chargeable to tax under the head 'profits and gains of the business or profession'. (Para 42, 43, 44)

It was established that mobilisation fees paid for moving a rig from a foreign location to an offshore site in India are taxable under Section 44BB, as they fall under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2) of the said section. The court reasoned that such fees are paid for services and facilities provided in connection with the extraction of mineral oil in India. (Para 47, 48)

The court reiterated the principles of taxability for non-residents as outlined in Section 9 of the Income Tax Act, emphasizing that non-residents are taxed in India only on income attributable to operations within Indian territory. (Para 38, 39)

Regarding the reimbursement for tools lost during operations, the court concluded that such reimbursement is not taxable under Section 44BB, as it doesn't fall under the specified amounts mentioned in sub-section (2). (Para 51)

Facts:

Land in various villages was acquired for development purposes by the State of Haryana.

Notifications were issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, followed by declarations under Section 6 of the Act.

The Collector classified the land into two categories based on the Belting System and fixed compensation rates.

Reference petitions were filed by landowners seeking enhancement of compensation, which were dismissed by the Additional District Judge.

Appeals were filed before the High Court, which partially allowed them, leading to the present appeals before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the application of the Belting System for determining compensation was justified.

Whether the sale deeds of nearby land should be the basis for determining compensation.

Whether the compensation awarded by the lower courts required enhancement.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the application of the Belting System for determining compensation, considering the nature and extent of the acquired land. It was deemed a justified method, especially when dealing with large chunks of land with varying characteristics. The Court found that the sale deeds of nearby small plots were not suitable for determining compensation for large areas and thus rejected them as the basis for compensation calculation.

The Court modified the compensation rates, setting them at Rs. 45,00,000/- per acre for one category of land and Rs. 35,00,000/- per acre for another, along with statutory compensation as awarded by the lower courts.

The decision was based on principles established in previous cases such as Union of India v. Mangatu Ram (1997) 6 SCC 59 and Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited v. G. Mohan Reddy (2010) 15 SCC 412.

Facts:

The appellant sought specific performance of an agreement to sell property with the respondent.

The agreement contained provisions regarding the forfeiture of earnest money in case of breach by either party.

The key issue was whether specific performance could be granted based on the terms of the agreement and Section 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

Issues:

Whether specific performance could be granted in the absence of explicit clauses in the agreement regarding the option for specific performance.

Held:The Supreme Court held that specific performance could be granted based on the interpretation of the agreement terms and Section 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The omission of a clause explicitly stating the option for specific performance in the agreement does not preclude the possibility of seeking specific performance, especially when the agreement provides for forfeiture of earnest money with an equal amount as penalty/damages.

The court emphasized that the purpose of naming a sum as damages in the agreement is to secure performance, not to provide an option for payment in lieu of specific performance.

Therefore, the court ordered specific performance of the agreement to sell the property, directing the appellant to pay a specified amount to the respondent within a specified timeframe. The court also clarified the terms regarding the payment of the remaining balance of the sale price and the delivery of vacant possession of the property. The appeal is allowed.