Facts:

The appellant, Girish Kumar, challenged the promotion of Respondent No. 3 to the post of Section Officer, contending that the latter did not fulfill the eligibility criteria of three years continuous service in the feeder cadre, as required by the Recruitment Rules, 1967. The dispute arose from the deemed date of promotion granted to Respondent No. 3 under Rule 5 of the Seniority Rules, 1982.

Issues:

Whether the deemed date of promotion under the Seniority Rules, 1982 can be considered for eligibility criteria under the Recruitment Rules, 1967.

Whether Respondent No. 3, granted the deemed date of promotion, fulfilled the three years continuous service requirement for the promotional post.

Held:

The court held that the Seniority Rules, 1982 and the Recruitment Rules, 1967 operate in different fields. While the deemed date of promotion is relevant for seniority, it does not automatically fulfill the eligibility criteria for promotion under the Recruitment Rules. The term "continuous service" in the Recruitment Rules was deemed to mean uninterrupted and unbroken service. Respondent No. 3, having been promoted as Office Superintendent on a deemed date, did not meet the continuous service requirement for eligibility. The High Court's decision was set aside, and the appellant's appeal was allowed. Respondent No. 3 was declared ineligible for promotion to the post of Section Officer.

Facts:

DLF Homes Panchkula Pvt. Ltd. and certain individuals were involved in disputes over possession and refund related to flats in the DLF Valley project.

The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) and the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (SCDRC) had awarded compensation under various heads, leading to legal challenges.

Issues:

Arbitrariness in compensation awards

Principles governing interest as compensation

Multiple heads of compensation for the same default

Held:

The Court held that the grant of compensation under various heads by the NCDRC was not sustainable, emphasizing the need for a foundation based on judicially recognized principles rather than a rule of thumb.

The judgment referred to the principle laid down in Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of Orissa & Others v. G.C. Roy, (1992) 1 SCC 508, stating that interest is compensation for the beneficiary deprived of the use of the investment made.

The Court modified the compensation awards, directing the appellant to send an occupation certificate, offer possession, and pay interest at a reasonable rate. The costs were capped at Rs. 50,000, and the judgment also addressed cases seeking refunds, modifying the interest rate to 9% per annum.

Facts:

Appellant no.1 booked office space in a project by the respondent.

Builder Buyer Agreement for possession within four years.

Appellants filed a complaint seeking refund due to non-possession.

Application under Section 12(1)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act filed for class action.

Issues:

Whether the case qualifies as a class action.

Interpretation of "sameness of interest" and "common grievance."

Held:

The National Commission initially dismissed the case as a class action, stating that the purpose must be solely for earning livelihood. However, the Supreme Court, relying on precedents, held that sameness of interest is akin to a common grievance against the same person. It emphasized that persons represented need not have the same cause of action but must have a common interest or grievance. The dismissal was set aside, and the case was restored to the file of the National Commission.

Facts:

Sanjay Kumar, a 15-year-old patient, complained of abdominal pain, fever, and hemorrhage in both eyes. The surgeon operated on the patient despite a low platelet count. The patient was discharged but later died in another hospital.

Issues:

Was the surgery necessary given the patient's critical condition and low platelet count?

Is the surgeon liable for medical negligence leading to the patient's death?

Held:

The court emphasizes the need for reasonable medical decisions and states that unreasonableness in professional conduct can't escape liability.( Paragraph 12 )

The court concludes that it's a case of an unreasonable decision by the Operating Surgeon, not a minor negligence.( Paragraph 14 )

The court decides that the entire compensation of Rs. 6,00,000/- is payable by the hospital, considering the surgeon's liability as vicarious.( Paragraph 18 )

Facts:

The Government of India, on July 5, 2002, decided to disinvest its shares in ITDC, transferring one of its hotel properties, Indraprastha Hotel, to HQRL. Appellant No.3, Moral Trading & Investment Ltd., successfully bid for the shares. Legal disputes ensued, including a civil suit filed by HQRL seeking an injunction and another suit by Hillcrest Realty for a declaration of voting rights.

Issues:

The violation of various sections of the Companies Act, alleging oppression and mismanagement by the RPM Group, the absence of notice to Director 'AM' during crucial resolutions, and the overall validity of share transfers.

Held:

The Supreme Court observed that the determination of whether HQRL lost its private character and became a public limited company depended on the pending suits. Prima facie, HQRL altered its status, but the Court refrained from a final decision.( Para 62)

The order in Ram Parshottam Mittal is not final; it represents a prima facie view for the purpose of injunction. The interim observations are not considered binding.( Para 65)

Section 286, requiring notice to the Director, is crucial. The absence of notice to 'AM' during resolutions makes them unfair and invalid.( Paras 74-76)

The Directors' improper allotment of shares to themselves, excluding 'AM,' without proper notice, is deemed improper.( Para 81)

Pending suits will conclusively determine if HQRL is a private or public limited company. This impacts the applicability of sections 85 to 89 and the rights of preference shareholders.( Paras 83, 84)

Section 108 operates independently, and its violation, along with the failure to file share certificates, was noted. The High Court's order under Section 340 Cr.P.C. against 'RPM' was upheld.( Para 87)

Considering the overall scenario, the impugned order was not interfered with. However, the direction to prosecute 'RPM' was set aside.( Para 89)

Facts:

The appellant, Advocate Rakesh Tiwari, was convicted for contempt of court for his undesirable conduct towards the Chief Judicial Magistrate (C.J.M.) Alok Pandey. The incident involved the advocate entering the chamber of the C.J.M., hurling abuses, attempting to assault him, and making threats. The advocate had alleged bias and interference in a case he was involved in.

Issues:

Whether the advocate's actions constituted criminal contempt of court?

What would be an appropriate sentence for the advocate's misconduct?

Held:

The High Court found the advocate guilty of criminal contempt, noting his lack of apology and the scandalization of the subordinate court. The original sentence included imprisonment for six months, a fine of Rs. 2000, and a restriction from entering the judgeship of Allahabad. The Supreme Court modified the sentence as follows:

The six-month imprisonment is suspended for three years, subject to good conduct and a condition not to enter the District Judgeship, Allahabad, for an additional three years.

The imprisonment may be activated if the advocate breaches any condition within the three-year period.

The advocate must deposit the Rs. 2000 fine, and failure to do so will result in a three-month restriction from the District Judgeship.

Facts:

The case involves two separate alienations of distinct portions of ancestral property by the late predecessor-in-interest. The first suit challenging the initial alienation was dismissed, and subsequently, a second suit was filed for the second alienation. The trial court and appellate court dismissed the second suit, citing Order II, Rule 2 and constructive res judicata. The High Court set aside this decision.

Issues:

Whether the plaintiff should have included both claims in one suit under Order II, Rule 2?

Whether the different periods of limitation provided by Article 109 of the Limitation Act affect the application of Order II, Rule 2?

Held:

The Court held that Order II, Rule 2 requires a plaintiff to include the whole claim arising from a cause of action in one suit. If a plaintiff omits or relinquishes any portion intentionally, they are barred from suing on that part unless leave is obtained from the Court. The Court emphasized that even if different reliefs could be sought for in one suit arising from a cause of action, a second suit for a different relief can be filed with leave.

In this case, the Court found that the second alienation stemmed from the same cause of action as the first, and the mere fact of a different period of limitation does not override the bar under Order II, Rule 2. The late predecessor-in-interest executed both sale deeds, and the suits contained virtually identical averments. The plaintiff had the opportunity to seek relief for the second sale deed in the first suit but omitted to do so.

Therefore, the Court set aside the judgment of the High Court, affirming the dismissal of the second suit under Order II, Rule 2.

Facts:

The cadre of Government Teachers, for which parity is sought by Niyojit Teachers, is a dying or vanishing cadre. The State consciously refrained from appointing in this cadre post-2006, with exceptions. Currently, there are around 66,000 Government teachers compared to nearly 4 lakh Niyojit Teachers. The mode of recruitment for Niyojit Teachers significantly differs from that of Government Teachers.

Issues:

Whether Niyojit Teachers are entitled to pay parity with Government Teachers despite the dying nature of the latter cadre and distinct recruitment processes.

Held:

The cadre seeking parity is dying, and the mode of recruitment for Niyojit Teachers differs significantly from that of Government Teachers. Thus, the applicability of the doctrine of 'equal pay for equal work' is limited by factors such as the method of recruitment.( Para 58)

The Court acknowledges limitations to the applicability of the 'equal pay for equal work' doctrine, including the consideration of various dimensions of a job. Pay scales are considered an executive function, and expert bodies should evaluate such matters.( Para 68)

The State's decision to have two distinct cadres (Government Teachers and Niyojit Teachers) is justified, considering the differences in recruitment and the number of teachers in each cadre.( Para 76)

The State's rational use of resources to spread education, including the dying cadre of Government Teachers, is part of an integrated policy. Judicial intervention could create an imbalance and strain budgetary resources.( Para 77)

While the Right to Education is crucial, paying Niyojit Teachers at the same level as State Teachers is not necessary for quality education. The modalities for improving teacher quality should be decided by the Executive.( Para 78)

No violation of Niyojit Teachers' rights or discrimination against them. The State's efforts align with policy goals, and any directions to equalize salaries could disrupt the positive strides made.( Para 79)

While the State can devise a pay structure, a suggestion is made to consider raising Niyojit Teachers' scales to the level suggested by a Committee, without insisting on additional tests.( Para 80)

These appeals are allowed( Para 83)

Facts:

Respondents engaged as Store Watchmen on daily wages under NMR basis temporarily.

Engagement order explicitly stated the temporary nature of employment with no claim to further appointment.

Board decision led to closure of Sectional stores, resulting in termination of respondents' services in 1990.

Industrial dispute raised, referred to Labour Court, which ordered reinstatement and back wages at 50%.

Single Judge affirmed reinstatement, granted 50% back wages due to pendency since 1991.

Division Bench affirmed Single Judge's decision.

Issues:

Validity of termination of temporary workers.

Burden of proof regarding continuous work for 240 days.

Quantum of back wages and reinstatement.

Held:

The initial burden is on respondents to show continuous work for 240 days, but both Single Judge and Division Bench erred in placing the burden on the appellant-Board.

Considering the age of most respondents, reinstatement not applicable. Focus on 50% back wages and compensation.

Appellant-Board provided a chart calculating 50% back wages, and the amount already paid was considered in full quit of all claims, including compensation in lieu of reinstatement.