Facts:

The tenants, represented by Harbhajan Singh and others, challenged the vires of the Punjab Religious Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1997, asserting their entitlement to protection against eviction under the East Punjab Rent Act. The contention was that the Religious Premises Act, a special enactment concerning landlord-tenant relationships, cannot supersede existing enactments like the East Punjab Rent Act.

Issues:

Challenge to the vires of the Punjab Religious Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1997, in light of existing enactments governing general landlord-tenant relationships.

Whether withdrawal of protection to tenants of land and buildings belonging to religious institutions under the Religious Premises Act is justified.

Held:

The State legislature has the authority to enact separate laws on a similar subject if they serve different objectives and protect distinct sets of rights. The Religious Premises Act, specific to premises of religious institutions, is distinct from the East Punjab Rent Act, which deals with general landlord-tenant relationships.

Section 3 defines "unauthorized occupation of religious premises," emphasizing that valid grants, leases, and allotments protect occupants from being deemed unauthorized. The crucial criterion is adherence to the terms of the grant, lease, or allotment.

Eviction proceedings under Sections 4 and 5 empower the Collector to order eviction after due process, with a subsequent right of appeal and judicial review. The Collector must be satisfied that the premises are in unauthorized occupation.

Properties of religious institutions form a separate and distinctive class, justifying differential treatment under the law. Granting exemption to such properties from rent control legislation is a reasonable classification based on intelligible differentia and serves public purposes.

Various central and state legislations treat religious institutions as a separate class, further supporting the validity of such classification.

Exempting buildings belonging to charities, religious, or secular institutions from rent control legislation does not violate Article 14, as it is a reasonable classification based on intelligible differentia and serves public purposes.

The legislative intent behind rent control legislations is to remedy specific issues without unduly curtailing landlords' rights.

The legislature can provide special procedures for eviction as long as they have a reasonable nexus to the legislative objective and the class of landlords justifies such treatment.

The Religious Premises Act, being a specific enactment, prevails over the East Punjab Rent Act, and the classification of "religious institutions" aligns with the underlying public interest.

Facts:

The case involves the conviction of appellants (accused no. 1 and 2) under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code for inflicting fatal knife blows on the stomach of the victim-deceased. Six accused were initially charged, and the incident occurred when the deceased, riding a motorcycle, was obstructed by all accused, leading to the fatal injuries.

Issues:

The quality of evidence, the credibility of eyewitness testimonies (PW-1 and PW-2), and the convictions of appellants in contrast to the acquittals of other accused. The defense raised concerns about deficiencies in the investigation, delay in FIR registration, and the absence of evidence regarding previous enmity.

Held:

The Supreme Court, under Article 136, refrains from reappreciating evidence unless a manifest error of law or procedure is demonstrated or the conclusion of lower courts is evidently perverse. (Para 12)

The testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2, the eyewitnesses, were extensively cross-examined but remained unshaken regarding the appellants' involvement in inflicting fatal injuries. The Court upheld their credibility, emphasizing the distinct role of the appellants. (Paras 15-16)

Discrepancies in the statements of prosecution witnesses about the condition of the deceased when admitted to the hospital do not undermine the case, considering medical reports confirming the semi-conscious state. The Court rejects the argument of uniformity in witness reactions. (Para 23)

The Court dismisses the appeal, upholding the concurrent view of the Trial Court and the High Court on the appellants' guilt. The so-called deficiencies pointed out by the appellants in the investigation are deemed insignificant. (Para 22)

The delay in registering FIR was considered and rejected by the Trial Court, with the Supreme Court upholding this finding. The Court relies on the contemporaneous record to support the absence of delay. (Paras 24-26)

The defense's contradictory stands regarding the cause of injuries were dismissed as baseless, with the Court highlighting the lack of evidence supporting these claims. The acquittal of accused in cross-cases related to another incident does not impact the appellants' guilt in the present case. (Paras 27-28)

Facts:

The appellants owned a piece of land.

The respondent company proposed a joint venture for construction.

An agreement was signed, and the respondent was to complete construction within three years.

Construction commenced but was abandoned in 1999.

The appellants terminated the agreement in 2001.

A compromise and cancellation agreement was executed in 2004, and a portion of the security deposit was returned.

Dispute arose, leading to arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issues:

Whether the arbitrator provided adequate opportunity for evidence and cross-examination.

Determination of the cost incurred by the respondent for the construction.

Validity of the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

Held:

The Court, after a detailed examination of the proceedings, held that the arbitrator's procedure was flexible, and the parties had agreed to rely on affidavits and documents without cross-examination. The Court rejected the contention that the arbitrator denied proper opportunity for cross-examination. The Court also found that the arbitrator had considered the claim of the respondent regarding construction costs and rejected it due to lack of reliable evidence. The Court further emphasized that the delay and breach by the respondent had consequences, and the appellants were directed to pay a sum of Rs. 45,00,000 to the respondent, allowing them possession of the land.

Facts:

The appeal arises from a judgment by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh quashing charges framed by the trial court against the accused. The case involves the death of Gopal Saran, where the appellant alleged that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were involved in preventing her from approaching her husband's dead body and locking her in a room.

Issues:

The framing of charges and whether there is a prima facie case against the accused.

The High Court quashed the charges, asserting that the trial court failed to apply its mind while framing charges.

Held:

The Court noted that the circumstances alleged in the charge sheet show a prima facie case against the accused. Strict proof is not required at this stage, and the court should only consider if there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused.( Para 11)

Referring to Sections 227 and 228 of the CrPC, the Court emphasized that at the stage of framing charges, the court is not required to hold an elaborate inquiry. The judge is to look for a strong suspicion that leads to presuming there are grounds to proceed with the trial.( Para 12)

The High Court's interference with the trial court's order was deemed incorrect. The charges framed against the accused were reinstated, and the trial court was directed to proceed with the matter in accordance with the law.( Para 16)

This appeal is allowed.( Para 17)

Facts:

The corporate debtor held a mining lease granted by the Government of Karnataka, which was set to expire. The Resolution Professional sought the benefit of a deemed extension of the lease, but the State Government rejected the proposal. The NCLT set aside the State Government's order, citing a violation of the moratorium declared under Section 14(1) of the IBC, 2016. The High Court granted a stay on the NCLT's directions.

Issues:

Whether the High Court should have interfered under Articles 226/227 despite the availability of a statutory alternative remedy of appeal to NCLAT.

Whether the NCLT had jurisdiction to entertain an application against the State Government for a direction to execute Supplemental Lease Deeds for the extension of the mining lease.

Whether NCLT is competent to inquire into allegations of fraud in the initiation of the corporate insolvency resolution process.

Held:

Jurisdiction of High Court: The NCLT, being a specialized tribunal, does not have the status of a superior court with powers of judicial review over administrative actions. The High Court can intervene under Articles 226/227 only in cases where there is a lack of jurisdiction on the part of the statutory/quasi-judicial authority.

NCLT's Jurisdiction over Mining Lease Extension: The decision of the State Government to refuse the deemed extension of the mining lease falls within the public law domain. NCLT, created by a special statute, does not have the jurisdiction to review such public law decisions. The moratorium provided in Section 14 of IBC does not impact the government's right to refuse lease extension.

NCLT's Competence to Inquire into Fraud: NCLT has the jurisdiction to inquire into allegations of fraud, particularly in the fraudulent initiation of the corporate insolvency resolution process. However, the fraudulent initiation of CIRP is not a ground to bypass the alternative remedy of appeal provided in Section 61.

The appeals are dismissed

Facts:

Lt. Col. Sameer Singh, an Army officer, was considered for Permanent Secondment to DGQA.

His case was not recommended by the Quality Assurance Selection Board (QASB) based on the TARs for the years 2014-15 and 2015-16, indicating he was 'NOT YET FIT' and 'NOT FIT' respectively.

Singh filed a writ petition, asserting that he fulfilled the criteria of the Office Memorandum dated 12.05.2011.

The Delhi High Court ruled in favor of Singh, holding that TARs could not be considered.

Issues:

Whether TARs should be taken into consideration for Permanent Secondment, post the implementation of the office memorandum dated 12.05.2011.

Held:

The court upheld the judgment of the Delhi High Court, dismissing the appeal. The key points include:

The office memorandum dated 12.05.2011 specifically lays down criteria for Permanent Secondment, superseding all previous instructions, including the one from 08.04.2004.

The court rejected the argument that the earlier memorandum should still apply, emphasizing that the 2011 memorandum is broader and supersedes all previous instructions.

The court highlighted that even though a letter in 2014 emphasized the importance of TARs, it could not override the clear language of the 2011 memorandum, which did not include TARs as a criterion.

The TAR may be considered for grading an officer for Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) but cannot be considered for Permanent Secondment, as per the office memorandum of 2011.

Facts:

The Calcutta High Court, by judgment and order dated 23.06.1998, directed that contract casual laborers would be entitled to payment of wages equivalent to Class IV employees.

FCI floated a tender for the appointment of a Handling and Transport Contractor for the Bikna Depot, including the supply of casual labor.

Despite pending appeals and the absence of a schedule of rates for casual labor in the contract, the respondent-contractor submitted a tender quoting 471% above the schedule rates.

FCI accepted the tender, and the contractor was appointed for a period of two years at the negotiated rate of 471% above the schedule rates.

Disputes arose regarding the payment of wages to casual laborers, leading to contempt proceedings, appeals, and various court orders.

Issues:

Whether the contractor is entitled to 471% above schedule rates (ASOR) for the supply of casual laborers, especially after a specific Supreme Court order regarding wages.

The determination of the profit receivable by the contractor from the contract.

Held:

The controversy primarily involves the interpretation of Clause 24 and whether the contractor is entitled to 471% ASOR for supplying casual laborers. The Supreme Court clarified that the wages for casual laborers shall be according to the rates specified in its order dated 14.01.2010 in Civil Appeal Nos. 9472-9473/2003, and the contractor is not entitled to 471% ASOR.( Paragraph 6)

The Division Bench directed the Chairman of FCI to determine the exact amount of wages payable, applying the Supreme Court order dated 14.01.2010, and to verify how the differential rates for casual laborers were determined between January and March 2000 and October to December 2001. The direction regarding profit determination was found unsustainable.( Paragraph 6.2)

Facts:

The case involves the appellant, P. Gopalkrishnan @ Dileep, challenging the non-furnishing of electronic records, specifically the contents of a memory card/pen drive, during the criminal investigation. The appellant contends that such records should be treated as documents within the meaning of the Evidence Act.

Issues:

Whether electronic records, such as those on a memory card/pen drive, qualify as documents under the Evidence Act?

What is the obligation of the investigating officer regarding furnishing documents to the accused under Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?

How to balance the right to a fair trial of the accused with the right to privacy of the victim, especially in cases of sensitive offenses like rape?

The interpretation of ongoing statutes, particularly the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Held:

The classification of an article as a 'document' is based on information inscribed, irrespective of the medium. The definition of 'evidence' in Section 3 of the Evidence Act includes electronic records, supported by Section 65B, Section 29 of IPC, and the General Clauses Act.

The investigating officer is obligated to forward all documents, including electronic records, to the Magistrate under Section 173 Cr.P.C. The Magistrate's duty under Section 207 is to furnish copies to the accused, and the ground of voluminosity cannot be invoked for electronic records.

While balancing the accused's right to a fair trial with the victim's privacy, the court may justify providing inspection of documents rather than copies, especially in cases of rape.

The contents of a memory card/pen drive are deemed documents, and the accused is entitled to receive a cloned copy for an effective defense.

Electronic records are documents based on the information they contain, and various legal precedents support their admissibility.

The Criminal Procedure Code is an ongoing statute, and courts should interpret it to continuously update its wordings for compatibility with contemporary situations.

In balancing fundamental rights, a mechanism is needed to allow the accused to verify the genuineness of electronic records. Conditions may be imposed to prevent misuse.

Accused can seek a second expert opinion from an independent agency like CFSL, ensuring confidentiality. The court must issue suitable directions to balance interests.

The case involves an intra-conflict of fundamental rights—right to a fair trial and the right to privacy of the victim—requiring a balanced approach.

The accused is entitled to copies of statements and documents, but the court must consider the nature of the offense and principles underlying relevant legal provisions.

The court may issue suitable directions to meet the ends of justice, ensuring a multipronged approach to safeguard both parties' interests.

The contents of the memory card/pen drive, being electronic records, must be regarded as documents. The accused should generally be given cloned copies for an effective defense.

Preliminary objections regarding the disclosure of victim identity are addressed, recognizing the accused's right to fair trial mandated by Section 207 of the Code.

Facts:

The Appellant marketed 'Orange Tammy Sugarless Jelly,' manufactured by a separate entity.

Inspection by Respondent No. 2 found 'sugar' in the Jelly, leading to misbranding allegations.

Delay in impleading the Appellant as co-accused under Section 20A.

Issues:

Interpretation of Sections 13(1), 13(2), and 13(3) concerning the procedure for challenging reports related to misbranding.

Comparison of definitions of 'adulterated' and 'misbranded' under Sections 2(ia) and 2(ix).

Analysis of the offence under Section 2(ix)(h).

Examination of Section 20A and its application.

Held:

Interpretation of Sections 13(1), 13(2), and 13(3): The court emphasized the integral role of the prescribed procedure (Sections 11-13) in cases of 'misbranding,' even if 'adulteration' is not alleged. The right to obtain a second opinion from the Central Laboratory under Section 13(2) applies regardless of the specific offence.

Comparison of Definitions (Sections 2(ia) and 2(ix)): Noted an overlap between 'adulterated' and 'misbranded,' providing examples where both offences may coexist. Emphasized the need for compliance with Sections 11-13 in certain situations.

Analysis of Section 2(ix)(h): Clarified that in cases of 'bearing the name of a fictitious individual or company as the manufacturer or producer,' analyzing the food article's contents may not be necessary, as the focus is on deceptive concealment of identity.

Power of Court under Section 20A: Affirmed the distinction between a 'vendor' and 'manufacturer,' explaining the purpose of Section 20A. The court held that the Appellant's impleadment for misbranding need not delve into shared common objects during the trial.