Facts:

The case concerns the interpretation of certain provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, specifically focusing on the interplay between sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 24 and the proviso appended to sub-section (2).

Issues:

The determination of whether the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 24 extends its applicability to sub-section 24(1)(b) or if it is limited solely to sub-section 24(2).

Held:

The court established that sections 24(1) and 24(2) of the Act operate in distinct realms. The proviso to sub-section (2) functions as an exception to the main provision and is not applicable to sub-section 24(1)(b) .

It was clarified that the proviso appended to sub-section (2) of Section 24 serves the purpose of ensuring compensation to all landholders and preserving land acquisition proceedings. Consequently, it is construed as a proviso to sub-section (2) and not to sub-section 24(1)(b) .

Decision: The court concluded that the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, should be treated as part of sub-section (2) and not sub-section 24(1)(b), based on its intended purpose and legislative intent.

Facts:

The dispute involved two cases filed by the respondents under Section 8 of The Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, against the appellant, concerning possession of a portion of land in Banjara Hills, Hyderabad.

The cases, referred to as LGC No.41/1998 and LGC No.50/2004, were filed with similar claims but resulted in conflicting decisions by the Special Court.

The High Court allowed the respondents' writ petition, leading to the appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Unsatisfactory trial leading to conflicting decisions.

Failure to club related cases.

Lack of impleading relevant State authorities.

Inadequate consideration of procedural matters.

Misapplication of jurisdiction under Article 227.

Held:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals in part and remanded both cases to the Special Court for fresh disposal on merits. The court directed the clubbing of the cases, addition of relevant State authorities as non-applicants, and afforded the parties an opportunity to amend pleadings and submit additional evidence.

The Supreme Court clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case but identified procedural and substantive flaws in the trial process, necessitating a fresh examination of the issues. The Special Court was instructed to render factual and legal findings in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Act and without reference to previous judgments.

Facts:

The case involved a writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution by the Commission for Judicial Accountability and Reforms (CJAR) on November 8, 2017. The petition raised concerns about an FIR alleging criminal conspiracy and illegal gratification to influence a pending case before the Supreme Court. Another similar writ petition, filed by Kamini Jaiswal, a member of CJAR, was filed on November 9, 2017. Both petitions sought the same relief and were represented by the same set of counsels. The Court, in response to these petitions, had to address issues related to the allocation of benches, forum hunting, and allegations against the judiciary.

Issues:

Whether the Chief Justice of India has the administrative authority to constitute benches.

Whether the filing of two successive petitions with similar reliefs amounts to forum hunting.

Whether requests for recusal of judges are justified.

Held:

The Constitution Bench had previously ruled that the Chief Justice of India is the master of the roster, and any order contrary to this principle is ineffective and not binding. Therefore, the Chief Justice has the authority to constitute benches, as done in this case.( Para 15)

Articles 142 and 144 of the Constitution were deemed not applicable in the present case. The decision of the Constitution Bench, which affirmed the Chief Justice's authority, prevails. The Chief Justice's administrative decision in constituting the bench is binding.( Para 16)

The filing of two successive petitions with similar reliefs was considered a misconceived venture and forum hunting. There was no urgency to file the second petition, and it aimed to manipulate the system, which brought disrepute to the judiciary.( Para 17)

There was a contradiction in the petitioner's plea regarding the involvement of the Chief Justice of India in hearing the matter. The Court emphasized the need to uphold the Chief Justice's authority in assigning cases.( Para 18)

Even when there are allegations against the Chief Justice, it is within his authority to assign cases appropriately. The attempt to avoid the Chief Justice's involvement amounted to forum hunting and was deprecated.( Para 19)

The petitions were considered misconceived as they presupposed that the investigation involved higher judiciary officials, which was not the case. Making unfounded allegations tarnished the judiciary's reputation.( Para 22)

Allegations of conflict of interest and requests for recusal were strongly condemned as attempts at forum hunting and interference with the administration of justice.( Para 23)

The Constitution Bench affirmed the Chief Justice's authority in roster making, and judicial orders cannot override this principle. Attempts to manipulate bench assignments were deemed unethical and unwarranted.( Para 30)

Requests for recusal without reasonable grounds were considered contemptuous and detrimental to the judicial system's integrity. Upholding the dignity of the judiciary was emphasized.( Para 31)

Facts:

The accused, Anil Kumar Yadav, filed a bail application in a case involving charges under Sections 302 and 308 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The Sessions Court granted bail to the accused. Subsequently, the High Court canceled the bail, leading to an appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the Sessions Court's grant of bail was justified?

Whether the High Court's decision to cancel the bail was appropriate?

Held:

The Sessions Court considered both the framing of charges and the grant of bail through a common order. However, the considerations for framing charges and granting bail are different. The court opined that it's not desirable to combine these considerations into one order.

While considering the grant of bail, the court should avoid delving into the details of evidence. Instead, it should focus on whether there is a prima facie case against the accused. An exhaustive exploration of the merits of the case should be avoided.

Relevant considerations for granting bail include the seriousness of the offense, the nature of evidence, the likelihood of the accused fleeing, impact on witnesses and society, and the possibility of tampering with evidence.

Mere incarceration duration may not justify bail, especially in serious crimes like murder.

The trial court was at a crucial stage, yet to record the testimony of material witnesses. To ensure a fair trial, the accused should not be enlarged on bail.

The liberty of the accused is a relevant consideration, but it's equally important to consider the impact of their release on witnesses and society.

Decision: The High Court was right in canceling the bail granted by the Sessions Court. The Sessions Court's grant of bail suffered from serious infirmities and was based on irrelevant considerations.

Facts:The appellant, Indian Oil Corporation Limited, imports crude oil into Bihar and converts it into petroleum products. When these products enter the local area of Patna, Entry Tax is paid. The appellant sells some products to other oil marketing companies (OMCs) like BPCL and HPCL from its Patna branch.

Issues:

The appellant's claim for set off of VAT against Entry Tax paid upon sales to OMCs.

The interpretation of Section 3(2) of the Bihar Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas for Consumption, Use, or Sale Therein Act, 1993 is central to the dispute.

Held:The five conditions necessary for the claim of set off under Section 3(2). These conditions include the liability to pay tax under the VAT Act, incurring tax liability at specified rates, and the reduction of tax liability to the extent of tax paid under the Act.

Confirms the fulfillment of Condition (i) as the appellant is a registered dealer liable to pay tax under the VAT Act.

Discusses the non-fulfillment of Condition (ii), stating that the appellant, though an importer of scheduled goods, is not liable to pay VAT as per Bihar's notification.

onfirms the non-fulfillment of Condition (iii) due to the absence of a VAT levy on the appellant.

Elaborates on Condition (iv), highlighting the requirement for the sale of imported scheduled goods by the appellant, which is not met when sales are made to BPCL and HPCL.

Addresses Condition (v), emphasizing that the set off is person-specific, not goods-specific, which the appellant fails to meet.

Dismisses the appellant's argument of discriminatory treatment, clarifying that differential treatment between VAT set off and Entry Tax does not constitute clear and hostile discrimination.

Directs the appellant to approach the Appellate Tribunal with relevant documents to challenge the demand notices issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes.

Decision:The Court rules against the appellant's claim for set off of VAT against Entry Tax and provides an opportunity to challenge the demand notices concerning Entry Tax payments.

Facts:

The selection process for District & Sessions Judges in the Kerala Higher Judicial Service in 2015 involved a written examination and a viva-voce (interview). The appellant challenged the fixing of minimum marks for the viva-voce after the completion of the selection process, arguing that it amounted to changing the rules after the game was played.

Issues:

Whether the introduction of minimum marks for the viva-voce after the completion of the selection process is permissible under the existing rules and regulations.

Held:

The Court held that the introduction of minimum marks for the viva-voce after the completion of the selection process was impermissible, as it amounted to changing the rules of the game after it was played. The Court referred to the case of K. Manjusree v. State of Andhra Pradesh, where a similar situation had arisen, and the Supreme Court had ruled against such changes. The Court also noted the case of Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court, which had questioned the correctness of the decision in K. Manjusree. Given this difference of opinion, the Court decided to refer the matter to a larger bench for further consideration and clarification. Therefore, the Court ordered that the case be heard along with Tej Prakash Pathak to resolve the issue.

Facts:

The case involved the interpretation of Articles 16(4), 16(4A), and 16(4B) of the Constitution of India, alongside consideration of precedents such as Indra Sawhney vs. Union of India, E.V. Chinnaiah vs. State of A.P., and M. Nagaraj vs. Union of India.

Issues:

Whether the test of backwardness should be applied to SC/ST categories and the application of the creamy layer principle in situations of competing claims within the same races, communities, groups, or parts thereof of SC/ST notified by the President under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution of India.

Held:

The court decided that due to the complexity of the questions involved, the case should be heard by a Bench in accordance with the constitutional mandate under Article 145(3) of the Constitution of India. The files were ordered to be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India immediately for appropriate action. Additionally, the court stated that the question of interim relief should also be considered by the Constitution Bench, and parties were permitted to mention the urgency before the Chief Justice of India.

Decision: The decision involved referring the case to a Bench in accordance with Article 145(3) of the Constitution of India and allowing parties to seek interim relief from the Chief Justice of India.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute over the auction settlement of a plot of land in Powai, Mumbai, by MHADA.

The Respondent had a pre-existing right to settlement with MHADA, but the Appellant was the highest bidder in response to an advertisement.

Various legal proceedings were initiated by both parties challenging the actions of MHADA and each other.

Issues:

Whether the Respondent's claim for settlement without open advertisement was legally justified.

Whether political influence affected the negotiations and decisions made by MHADA.

Whether the bid of the Appellant was valid despite a court order favoring the Respondent.

Whether changes in land usage regulations warranted a fresh tender process.

Held:

The Respondent's claim for settlement without open advertisement was unfounded in law.

The negotiations by MHADA with the Respondent appeared to have been influenced by political factors.

The bid of the Appellant was provisionally accepted, but no final allotment was made due to a court order in favor of the Respondent.

Changes in permissible land usage from commercial to residential mandated a fresh tender process.

The value of the property had significantly increased since the initial advertisement due to changes in regulations and market conditions.

The Respondent was not entitled to interest on its deposit, which was to be refunded, while the Appellant was entitled to interest on its deposit up to a certain date.

The appeals lacked merit and were dismissed.

Facts:

The case involved the interpretation of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1958 concerning the disqualification of individuals who have encroached upon government land or public property from being members of a Panchayat. Various judgments of the High Court of Bombay presented conflicting interpretations of whether family members of the original encroacher could also be disqualified under the Act.

Issues:

The crucial issue was whether family members of the original encroacher could be disqualified under the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1958, based on the interpretation of the relevant provision.

Held:

The court attempted to reconcile the conflicting interpretations provided by different judgments of the High Court. It emphasized that the crucial factor for disqualification under the Act is whether the person continues to occupy the encroached land, regardless of whether they were the original encroacher or a family member. The court highlighted that encroachment is a continuous act, and if someone continues to occupy the encroached land, they should be considered an encroacher and subject to disqualification.

The court also noted that it is ultimately up to the legislature to clarify and specify the extent of conflicting interests and the scope of disqualification under the Act. If the legislature wishes to prevent individuals with conflicting interests from being members of the Panchayat, they should amend the law accordingly.

In conclusion, the court set aside the impugned judgments and disposed of the appeals, emphasizing the need for legislative clarification on the matter.