Facts:

The appellant, engaged in the manufacture of cotton and man-made fabrics, filed writ petitions seeking direction that excise duty is not payable for yarn processed further in its composite mills in the manufacture of fabrics. The High Court granted interim reliefs, modifying them later. The appellant executed bonds and furnished a bank guarantee for the differential duty. The Assistant Collector informed the appellant that Section 11A was not applicable. A Show Cause Notice was issued, demanding payment, which the appellant contested, asserting the mandatory nature of the notice.

Issues:

The applicability of Section 11A to the case involving provisional assessment under Rule 9B of the Central Excise Rules.

Held:

The appellant's claim that Section 11A is not applicable to provisional assessment cases is dismissed. Rule 9B governs provisional assessment, and the appellant cannot deny submitting to this process voluntarily.

The appellant's voluntary execution of bonds and submission to provisional assessment under Rule 9B is upheld. The High Court's order did not absolve the appellant from these obligations.

Section 11A applies to cases of recovery of duties not levied or not paid or short-levied or short-paid. However, the present case falls within the dispensation of Rule 9B, dealing with provisional assessment.

The order dated 10/12.03.1993 did not release the appellant from its voluntary submission to provisional assessment. Authorities proceeded in accordance with the law during the relevant period.

The appellant cannot now deny the provisional assessment process it voluntarily entered, as doing so would give undue advantage and favor, contrary to the High Court's order.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, upholding the liability of the appellant for excise duty based on the provisional assessment under Rule 9B of the Central Excise Rules.

Facts:

The appellants challenged the seniority list finalized on 28th November, 2014.

Advertisement issued on 29th November, 2004, for 241 posts of Junior Engineer (Civil/Mechanical).

Selection process completed based on merit, but appointments made in a manner deviating from the merit list.

State Government approval on 3rd May, 2005, for appointments based on a roster from the Government order dated 31st August, 2001.

Writ petitioners appointed earlier in time but lower in merit.

Issues:

Conflict between Regulation 23, emphasizing seniority based on substantive appointment date, and Regulations 16, 17, and 20, prescribing appointment based on merit list.

Appointments made in contravention of statutory regulations.

Held:

The method of giving appointment to the senior most person of each category is a fortuitous circumstance, and appointments made in contravention of statutory regulations cannot defeat the rights of the appellants. Seniority has to be fixed as per the merit of the candidates determined by the Selection Committee.( Para 17)

Regulation 6 contemplates reservation in accordance with the orders of the Government, and the Government order dated 31st August, 2001, applies to determine reservation and seniority. The seniority list has not been prepared in accordance with the roster circulated on 31st August, 2001.( Para 18)

The Uttarakhand Government Servant Seniority Service Rules, 2002, are not applicable to the Nigam, as they were adopted in 2011 and framed under the proviso to Article 309, not applicable to a creation under a Statute.( Para 19)

FACTS:

The appellant, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), challenged the Madras High Court's order refusing certain directions to the Tamil Nadu State Election Commission regarding local body elections.

DMK alleged that the ruling party, AIADMK, unconstitutionally delayed elections, altered constituencies, and refused rotation for political advantage.

The Tamil Nadu Delimitation Commission was constituted, conducting delimitation exercises and formulating proposals.

The State government increased districts from 31 to 39, restructuring talukas.

The State Election Commission announced an election program, and DMK filed applications challenging the process.

ISSUES:

Validity of delimitation exercise and election process.

Alleged unconstitutional actions by AIADMK.

Compliance with constitutional mandates for local body elections.

HELD:

The Court emphasized the constitutional mandate for delimitation of wards and reservations for Scheduled Castes and Tribes, crucial for effective local body elections. The increase in districts without fresh delimitation jeopardized the Constitutional requirements.( Paragraph 13)

The Court rejected the argument that the proceedings amounted to "calling in question an election," asserting that they aimed at facilitating fair elections and correcting procedural issues. Quoting Election Commission of India vs. Ashok Kumar and Others, the Court stated that judicial intervention is justified to smoothen the progress of election proceedings.( Paragraph 14)

The Court allowed the applications partially, directing the authorities to hold elections for all Panchayats, except those in the nine reconstituted districts. It mandated delimitation of the new districts within four months before conducting elections.( Paragraph 15)

Acknowledging the agreement of the Advocate General of Tamil Nadu to proceed with elections as directed, the Court disposed of the appeals related to the 2011 Census issue.( Paragraph 16)

Facts:

The case involves a challenge to the High Court's decision stating that the duties, including education cess, higher education cess, and National Calamity Contingent Duty (NCCD), are not part of the exemption notification.

Issues:

The appellant contends that NCCD, education cess, and secondary and higher education cess form part of the excise duty, challenging the High Court's decision.

Held:

The notification dated 9.9.2003, which granted exemption under Section 5A of the Central Excise Act, 1944, did not reference the Finance Act, 2001 (imposing NCCD), and the Finance Acts of 2004 and 2007 were not in effect at that time.

The notification could not have contemplated the inclusion of education cess and secondary and higher education cess imposed by the Finance Acts of 2004 and 2007 in the nature of the duty of excise.

In the absence of a specific notification exempting these additional duties in the nature of education cess and secondary and higher education cess, they cannot be considered exempted.

The High Court correctly relied on the precedent set by the three-Judge Bench in Modi Rubber Limited, followed by another three-Judge Bench in Rita Textiles Private Limited.

Decision: The appeals are dismissed, upholding the Judgment and order of the High Court.

Facts:

An advertisement was issued in 2008 for the post of Instructors in Government Industrial Training Institutes in Uttar Pradesh.

Appellant applied for the post of Instructor in Fitter, providing educational qualifications from Model Industrial Training Institute (MITI), Haldwani.

The State rejected the appellant's candidature, stating he did not possess the required two years course from the National Council for Training in Vocational Trades (NCVT).

Appellant relied on Circulars issued by the Ministry of Labour & Rehabilitation, Government of India, and the State Government, declaring equivalency of his qualifications to the prescribed standards.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's qualifications met the eligibility criteria prescribed in the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Training Institutes (Instructors) Service Rules, 2003?

The validity of Circulars issued by the Government declaring the appellant's qualifications equivalent.

Held:

The eligibility condition is possession of a certificate in the respective trade from NCVT. The Circulars issued by the Government of India and the State Government deemed appellant's qualifications equivalent to the National Trade Certificate. The State's stand that the appellant lacked educational qualifications is untenable.( Paragraph 9)

The Circulars issued earlier by the State Government confirmed the equivalence of the appellant's qualifications to the conventional pattern of Craftsmen Training Scheme. The State's rejection of the appellant's candidature on educational grounds is not sustained.( Paragraph 10)

Since the rejection was solely based on the appellant not possessing the required educational qualification, the State Government is directed to take proper steps for his appointment within two months.( Paragraph 11)

Facts:

The case involves the quashing of a charge-sheet under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The High Court partially allowed the petition, questioning the authorization to register the crime and the eligibility of the informant to be the investigating officer. The accused raised objections such as the absence of a preliminary inquiry, lack of sanction before prosecution, and delay in completing the investigation.

Issues:

Validity of authorization to register the crime.

Eligibility of the informant to be the investigating officer.

Absence of a preliminary inquiry before the registration of the crime.

Lack of sanction before prosecution.

Delay in completing the investigation.

Held:

Authorization Validity: The authorizing Officer had properly discharged duties conferred by the State Government. The authorization in favor of the Investigating Officer was deemed valid and binding, as it was an act in public interest. The High Court lacked jurisdiction to determine the employment nature of the authorizing Officer in a Section 482 petition.

Preliminary Inquiry: The court emphasized that the scope and necessity of a preliminary inquiry before lodging an FIR depend on the facts of each case. In this case, a preliminary inquiry was not mandatory, as relevant information was available, disclosing a cognizable offense. The FIR was deemed valid.

Lack of Sanction: The argument of no sanction before filing the report was dismissed. The court stated that sanction could be produced during the trial, especially after the retirement of the Accused Officer. Lack of sanction was not considered a ground for quashing proceedings.

Irregularity in Investigation: Even if the investigation was not conducted by an officer of the requisite rank, it was deemed an irregularity. However, unless such irregularity caused prejudice, conviction would not be vitiated.

Applicability of Amended Provisions: The court clarified that amended provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act were not applicable in the present case, as the FIR was registered before the amendment came into force.

FACTS:

An FIR was lodged on March 28, 2005, regarding the discovery of a decomposed body.

The deceased, Surjit Kaur, had inherited land, leading to conflicts with her son Avtar Singh and his family.

The prosecution relied on evidence like the recovery of a telephone diary, extra-judicial confessions, and witness statements.

ISSUES:

The murder of Surjit Kaur, the chain of events leading to the crime, and the reliability of the evidence presented.

HELD:

The High Court and the trial court found the appellants guilty based on the chain of circumstances presented by the prosecution.

The Court emphasized the non-attendance of the appellants at the cremation and post-death events as indicative of their involvement.

The disfigurement of the deceased's face by acid, the recovery of a bottle of acid, and an extra-judicial confession contributed to the conviction.

The postmortem report revealed fractures consistent with the confession of one of the accused.

The Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the guilt of the appellants and ordering their surrender to complete the remaining sentence.

REFERRED CASES:

Ajay Singh vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 12 SCC 341

Devi Lal vs. State of Rajasthan, 2019 SCC OnLine 39

Madan Gopal Kakkad vs. Naval Dubey, (1992) 3 SCC 204

Piara Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1977) 4 SCC 452

Ram Lal vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1730

S. Arul Raja vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2010) 8 SCC 233

Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116

FACTS:

The first respondent applied for voluntary retirement on 14 February 1990.

The appellant denied the first respondent's application for voluntary retirement on 25 May 1990, citing incomplete twenty years of service.

The first respondent resigned on 7 July 1990, and the denial of voluntary retirement was not challenged.

The first respondent sought pensionary benefits, claiming completion of twenty years of service.

ISSUES:

Whether the denial of voluntary retirement is illegal as the first respondent completed twenty years of service?

Whether the first respondent, having resigned, is entitled to pensionary benefits?

HELD:

The court overrules the approach in Asger Ibrahim Amin, emphasizing the distinction between resignation and voluntary retirement. The decision to resign and seek voluntary retirement has different legal consequences.( Para 12)

The court dismisses the argument that the denial of voluntary retirement renders it illegal. Even if denied, the first respondent resigned, subjecting himself to the legal consequences of resignation.( Para 13)

The court finds no evidence of the first respondent challenging the denial of voluntary retirement between 25 May 1990 and 7 July 1990. Denial cannot be invoked after resignation.( Para 14)

The court declares the issue of completing twenty years of service irrelevant. Rule 26 of the CCS Pension Rules mandates forfeiture of past service upon resignation, making the first respondent ineligible for pensionary benefits.( Para 15)

REFERENCED CASES:

Asger Ibrahim Amin vs. LIC, (2016) 13 SCC 797

RBI vs. Cecil Dennis Solomon (2004) 9 SCC 461

Senior Divisional Manager, LIC vs. Shree Lal Meena, (2015) 17 SCC 43

Sheelkumar Jain vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (2011) 12 SCC 197

Facts:

A murder case involving the death of the appellant's nephew.

The deceased was allegedly assaulted by several individuals, leading to severe injuries and death.

The High Court granted bail to the first respondent and four other accused.

Issues:

Validity of the High Court's exercise of power in granting bail.

Prima facie view of the accused's involvement in a serious crime.

Adequacy of reasons provided by the High Court in the bail order.

Held:

The court analyzed the bail application considering various factors, including the nature of the offense, severity of punishment, prima facie evidence, and potential threats to witnesses. The court held:

The court emphasized the need for a judicious exercise of discretion while granting bail and outlined factors guiding the decision, such as the nature of the accusation, severity of punishment, and apprehension of witnesses being influenced.( Para 11)

The court clarified that at the bail stage, it is not required to delve into a detailed analysis of evidence but must assess whether there is a prima facie ground to believe the accused committed the offense.( Para 12)

Reiterated the principles laid down in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar vs. Ashis Chatterjee, emphasizing the importance of considering relevant factors in bail applications.( Para 14)

Acknowledged the principles consistently followed in subsequent cases like Ash Mohammad vs. Shiv Raj Singh, Ranjit Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, Neeru Yadav vs. State of U.P., Virupakshappa Gouda vs. State of Karnataka, and State of Orissa vs. Mahimananda Mishra.( Para 15)

Examined the post-mortem report and the charge sheet, highlighting injuries and allegations against the accused. The court found a prima facie case for setting aside the bail granted by the High Court.( Para 16-20)

Criticized the High Court's lack of detailed analysis and non-application of mind in granting bail. Emphasized that the order should have considered material facts and the seriousness of the crime.( Para 22)

Quoted Santosh Hegde's observation that an order devoid of reasons suffers from non-application of mind.( Para 23)

Addressed the need for specific reasons when bail is granted after a previous rejection and discussed the importance of open justice.( Para 24-26)

Ordered the cancellation of bail bonds, directing the accused to be taken into custody. Clarified that the judgment does not express an opinion on the case's merits at trial.( Para 28)