FACTS:

Lands acquired in 1985, award declared in 1988, and compensation enhanced to Rs. 30/- per square yard by Reference Court.

High Court in 1996 reduced compensation to Rs. 22-20 per square yard.

Petitioners seek parity with Kasna landowners who received Rs. 65/- per square yard in 2016.

Delay of 21 years in filing special leave petitions.

ISSUES:

Condonation of the substantial delay in filing special leave petitions.

Petitioners' entitlement to enhanced compensation and parity.

HELD:

The Court notes the absence of a sufficient cause for the substantial delay of 21 years and an additional delay in refiling the petitions.

Emphasizes the lack of explanation for the delay, stating no grievance was made for about 21 years after the High Court's judgment.

Invokes principles of acquiescence and laches, highlighting the non-existence of a right not exercised for a long time.

Rejects reliance on previous decisions cited by petitioners, emphasizing the unique circumstances and adverse impact on the acquiring body if directed to pay enhanced compensation after a long delay.

Dismisses applications for condonation of delay and consequently dismisses special leave petitions on the ground of limitation.

REFERRED CASES:

Dhiraj Singh vs. State of Haryana reported in (2014) 14 SCC 127

K. Subbarayudu vs. Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) reported in (2017) 12 SCC 840

Market Committee, Hodal vs. Krishan Murari reported in (1996) 1 SCC 311

Facts:

The appellant was convicted for causing the death of his wife and injuries to two children by setting them ablaze after pouring kerosene. The incident occurred in the midnight of April 20, 1999, resulting in extensive burn injuries to the deceased.

Issues:

Validity and reliability of the dying declaration made by the deceased.

Alternative defense versions, including the claim of an accidental fall of a lamp.

Examination of burn injuries suffered by the appellant and the two sons.

Held:

The post-mortem report revealed the cause of death as septicemia shock due to extensive burns (92%). The incident occurred on April 20, 1999, and the victim was admitted to the hospital on April 21, 1999.

The medical officer (PW14) certified the fitness of the deceased for giving a dying declaration. Despite severe burn injuries, the victim was found conscious and mentally fit for recording the statement.

The court emphasized that the absence of the deceased's thumb impression was not fatal, given the burn injuries on her hands. The degree of burn did not undermine the credibility of the dying declaration.

The court noted that the continued consciousness of the patient was certified by the medical officer at the foot of the dying declaration. Both PW7 and PW14 corroborated the patient's fitness for making the dying declaration.

Despite the extensive burn, the court emphasized that the patient's consciousness and mental fitness were crucial for the admissibility of the dying declaration.

The court clarified that a dying declaration, if otherwise credible, can be the sole basis for conviction. The casualness in recording the dying declaration was disapproved, but its validity was upheld.

The non-sending of the kerosene can for forensic examination did not cast reasonable doubt, considering the strength of the dying declaration.

The court rejected alternative versions presented by the defense witnesses, including the claim of an accidental fall of a lamp. The appellant's implication was based on the unambiguous words in the dying declaration.

The court concluded that the burn injuries suffered by the appellant and the two sons were reconcilable with the prosecution's version of homicide committed by the appellant. The appellant was implicated by the dying declaration.

Facts:

The appellant, Mahesh Kumar, was convicted for dowry death under Section 304-B IPC.

Allegations included continuous harassment and cruelty towards the deceased, Omwati, on account of dowry demands.

The trial court convicted Mahesh Kumar and the mother-in-law but acquitted other accused due to lack of specific roles.

High Court affirmed Mahesh Kumar's conviction but reduced the sentence; overturned the conviction of the mother-in-law.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution proved the essential elements of Section 304-B IPC.

Whether there was a proximate link between cruelty/harassment and the death.

The reliability of letters and oral statements as evidence.

Held:

The prosecution failed to prove the demand of dowry or that such demand was raised soon before the death.

The letters produced did not demonstrate a connection between harassment and dowry demand close to the time of death.

The prosecution's reliance on oral statements was insufficient, especially in the absence of examination of available independent witnesses.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside Mahesh Kumar's conviction and releasing him.

Facts:

Request for Proposal (RFP) issued by the appellant for road construction in Meghalaya.

Letter of Award (LOA) sent to the respondent, requesting a signed acknowledgment within seven days.

Respondent accepted the bid proposal and returned the signed LOA.

Contract agreement not signed until a later date.

Appellant decided to withdraw the LOA due to the non-availability of a No Objection Certificate.

Issues:

Whether the LOA constituted a binding contract?

If so, whether the arbitration clause in the draft agreement applied at the LOA stage?

Held:

The court rejected the interpretation that the LOA stage constituted a binding contract. It emphasized the clauses in the RFP, including a Disclaimer, Schedule of Bidding Process, and jurisdiction clause. The court held that an agreement would only be enforceable after specific conditions were met. The clauses cited by the respondent did not change this principle. The arbitration clause in the draft agreement did not apply as no enforceable agreement existed at the LOA stage. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between RAVINDER KAUR GREWAL & ORS. and MANJIT KAUR & ORS., challenging the interpretation of Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The matter pertains to a suit for a declaration of title based on adverse possession.

Issues:

The primary issue before the court is whether a person claiming adverse possession can file a suit for a declaration of title under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Held:

The court criticizes previous decisions, including Gurudwara Sahab v. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala, for incorrectly opining that a plaintiff cannot seek a declaration of title based on adverse possession. The court overrules these decisions. (Para 31, 32, 39, 43,)

Adverse possession, as a common law concept, is discussed, emphasizing its statutory period of 12 years. The court rejects the notion that adverse possession can only be used as a defense and not as a basis for a plaintiff's claim. (Paras 46-50)

The conclusion reached by the High Court, based on an inferential process related to the language in Column No.3 of Schedule of the Act, is deemed impermissible. The court asserts that there is no bar for the perfection of title by way of adverse possession, whether a person is suing as the plaintiff or being sued as a defendant. (Paras 51, 53-55)

The court clarifies that possession is the root of title, and adverse possession requires continuity, publicity, and hostility to the true owner's title. Trespasser's long possession is not synonymous with adverse possession. (Paras 56-60)

1.5 The decisions in Gurudwara Sahab v. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala and related cases are overruled. The court asserts that the plea of acquisition of title by adverse possession can be taken by a plaintiff under Article 65, and there is no bar under the Limitation Act, 1963, to sue on this basis. (Paras 61, 62)

The court highlights the importance of distinguishing possession types, such as de facto, de jure, constructive possession, and the relevance of personal law in construing the nature of possession. It emphasizes that adverse possession is heritable and can involve tacking by two or more persons. (Paras 56-60)

Decision: The court concludes that the plea of acquisition of title by adverse possession can be taken by a plaintiff under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, and there is no bar under the Limitation Act, 1963, to sue on this basis in case of infringement of any rights of a plaintiff. The matters are directed to be placed for consideration on merits before the appropriate bench.

Facts:

The respondent No. 2 sought permission to conduct prosecution under Section 302 of the CrPC for offenses under Sections 498A, 406, and 34 IPC.

The Magistrate initially declined permission without providing reasons.

The High Court, upon considering relevant judgments, allowed the respondent No. 2 to prosecute the appellants-accused.

Issues:

Whether the Magistrate has the discretion to grant permission to the victim to conduct prosecution.

The role of the Public Prosecutor in criminal proceedings.

The right of the victim to participate in criminal proceedings.

Held:

The Magistrate is not bound to grant permission at mere asking, but the victim has a right to assist the Court in a trial before the Magistrate. The Magistrate may consider the victim's ability to assist the Court and whether the trial involves complexities beyond the victim's handling.( Para 5)

The High Court's order granting permission was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Magistrate. The Magistrate should reconsider whether the complainant should be granted permission to prosecute the offenses under Sections 498A, 406 read with Section 34 IPC.( Para 15)

The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The complainant alleged that all accused entered the victim's under-construction house armed with deadly weapons and collectively attacked the victim, leading to his death. Two witnesses, PW-7 and PW-8, also sustained injuries. The trial court convicted six accused, and one accused (A-1) passed away during the trial. A-2 and A-7 did not appeal, but A-3, A-4, A-5, and A-6 approached the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the non-inclusion of Section 141 IPC in framing charges renders the trial illegal, particularly in invoking Section 149 IPC.

A-4 and A-6's contention that the absence of charges under Section 141 IPC nullifies the existence of an unlawful assembly.

A-5's plea of mistaken identity.

Held:

The Court dismissed A-4 and A-6's contention, affirming that the absence of charges under Section 141 IPC does not render the trial illegal. The necessary ingredients of an unlawful assembly, as outlined in Section 141 IPC, sufficed for invoking Section 149 IPC (Para 21).

The Court found that the collective intent of the accused was evident, and the absence of charges under Section 141 IPC did not negate the existence of an unlawful assembly. The actions and punishment for an unlawful assembly are addressed in subsequent provisions after Section 141 IPC (Para 22).

A-5's plea of mistaken identity was rejected. Minor discrepancies in testimonies were deemed natural, given the sudden and violent nature of the incident. The court observed a broad consistency in the witnesses' accounts (Para 30).

Decision: All four appeals by A-3, A-4, A-5, and A-6 were dismissed, affirming the convictions imposed by the trial court.

Facts:

Land dispute between complainant and accused.

Incident occurred on 07.06.2002, resulting in the death of the deceased.

Trial court convicted all four accused.

High Court altered the conviction and acquitted respondents nos. 3 and 4.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in altering the conviction and acquitting respondents nos. 3 and 4.

Allegations of suppression of evidence by the prosecution.

Held:

Serious doubts arose due to the failure of the prosecution to investigate the FIR lodged by the accused and present their injury reports.

Burden lies on the prosecution to prove allegations beyond reasonable doubt.

The accused only needs to create doubt about the prosecution's case.

Fair investigation and trial are essential for a just decision.

Failure to act fairly and present relevant materials prejudiced the prosecution.

The benefit of doubt must follow unless the prosecution proves its case beyond reasonable doubt.

The appeals were dismissed, upholding the High Court's order, and there was no interference with the acquittal of accused nos. 3 and 4.

Facts:

The case involves the conviction of appellants for offenses related to the murder of Pitambar Singh.

The prosecution alleged a conspiracy among the accused, leading to the murder.

Eyewitness testimonies formed a significant part of the evidence against the accused.

The recovery of bloodstained articles, including sticks and tabbal, was a key aspect of the prosecution's case.

Issues:

Delay in recording eyewitness statements.

Credibility of eyewitness testimonies and allegations of fabrication.

Lack of evidence linking bloodstained articles to the deceased.

Failure to prove the conspiracy charge.

Held:

The Court expressed skepticism about the delay in recording eyewitness statements, questioning the prosecution's explanation and finding inconsistencies in the story. ( Paragraph 6)

Highlighted the importance of evidence relating to the recovery of bloodstained articles and cited previous cases where mismatches in bloodstains led to reversals of convictions. (Paragraph 8)

Emphasized that if the recovery of bloodstained articles is proved beyond reasonable doubt, and the investigation is untainted, the prosecution may establish human origin of blood, even if blood groups are not matched. ( Paragraph 13)

Expressed doubt about the prosecution's positive material indicating that the stained blood was of human origin and of the same blood group as that of the accused. ( Paragraph 14)

Noted the absence of conspiracy and questioned the genesis of the prosecution's case, leading to suspicion. ( Paragraph 15)

The appeals were allowed, and the appellants were directed to be released. The benefit of the judgment was extended to other accused in the same case who had not appealed. The Court expressed suspicion about the genesis of the prosecution's case and concluded that reliance on eyewitness testimonies and recovery evidence was not justified. (Paragraph 16)