Facts:

The appellant, S. Sreesanth, faced allegations of spot-fixing in an IPL match, leading to a one-man Commission's investigation. The Disciplinary Committee of the BCCI imposed a life ban after considering evidence, including telephone conversations.

Issues:

Violation of principles of natural justice by the Disciplinary Committee.

Burden of proof and standard of proof under Article 3.1 of the Anti-Corruption Code.

Effect of the appellant's discharge from the criminal case on the disciplinary proceedings.

Propriety of imposing a life-time ban under Article 6 of the Anti-Corruption Code.

Constitution of the Disciplinary Committee and its alleged vitiating factors.

Held:

Violation of Natural Justice: The appellant received transcripts of telephone conversations before the show-cause notice, and there was no violation of natural justice by the Disciplinary Committee. The Commissioner's initial report without the appellant's statement was justified due to the appellant being in police custody.(Para 23, 25)

Burden of Proof and Standard: Article 3.1 places the initial burden on the Disciplinary Committee, and the appellant must explain allegations. The Committee's conclusion, based on evidence and telephone conversations, is not subject to judicial review unless perverse or baseless.(Para 30, 34, 35)

Effect of Criminal Case Discharge: The scope of inquiry in criminal and disciplinary proceedings differs. The discharge order in the criminal case doesn't affect the BCCI's disciplinary proceedings under the Anti-Corruption Code.(Para 38, 39, 40)

Imposition of Life-time Ban: While zero tolerance to corruption is upheld, relevant factors must be considered in imposing sanctions under Article 6. The Disciplinary Committee failed to consider aggravating and mitigating factors, leading to an unjust life-time ban.(Para 52, 57)

Constitution of Disciplinary Committee: No legal impediment in the participation of Shri Srinivasan in the Disciplinary Committee, and the appellant cannot challenge the constitution at this stage.(Para 41)

Decision: Partly allowing the appeal, the Court sets aside the life-time ban. The Disciplinary Committee must reconsider the quantum of punishment, allowing the appellant to present his stance on the sanction.(Para 58, 59, 61)

Facts:

The appellant challenged the order of the Trial Court seeking to summon certain individuals in a murder case.

The High Court upheld the Trial Court's order.

The Supreme Court is considering the appeal, focusing on the discretionary power under Section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Issues:

Interpretation and application of Section 319 Cr.P.C.

Whether the individuals in question are the main perpetrators of the crime.

Held:

The provisions of Section 319 Cr.P.C. are to ensure that the real culprit does not go unpunished. The power is discretionary and requires stronger evidence than mere probability of complicity.

The Trial Court and the High Court failed to consider certain facts, emphasizing the need for re-examination with reference to applicable principles.

The Court allows the appeal in part, setting aside the impugned orders, and restores the applications under Section 319 Cr.P.C. for reconsideration by the Trial Court.

The Court clarifies that it has not pronounced on the merits of the case, and the Trial Court should reconsider the prosecution's prayer uninfluenced by any observation in the judgment.

Facts:

The respondent, a Constable since 1987, faced charges of being inebriated and misbehaving with the public in 2006.

A medical report confirmed intoxication, leading to a charge sheet in 2007.

After a disciplinary inquiry, the officer found the misconduct charge substantiated.

The Superintendent of Police issued an order of dismissal in May 2007.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in converting the dismissal into compulsory retirement based on the respondent's past conduct and years of service?

Held:

The charge against the respondent involved serious misconduct of drunkenness and misbehavior with the public.

The fact of intoxication was duly proved in the medical report.

Considering the gravity of the charges and the respondent's position in the police service, the High Court had no justification to interfere with the dismissal order.

The Division Bench erred in allowing the Special Appeal and converting the dismissal to compulsory retirement.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's decision and maintaining the order of dismissal.

Facts:

The respondents, members of trade unions, were casual workers in the Border Roads Organization (BRO).

They sought regularization, claiming to have worked for a considerable period on a project for the construction of roads in Uttarakhand for the Char Dham Yatra.

The Single Judge allowed the writ petition, directing the Union of India (UOI) to regularize their services.

The Division Bench affirmed and modified the Single Judge's order, issuing further mandamus for the UOI to frame a scheme for the regularization and provide specific facilities to the workers.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in allowing the writ petition and issuing directions for regularization and framing a scheme.

Whether the Court has the authority to frame a scheme, or it is the prerogative of the Government.

Held:

The Supreme Court referred to the precedent in Union of India v. Vartak Labour Union, where it was held that casual employment terminates when discontinued, and engagement beyond the original period doesn't entitle workers to absorption into regular service.

The Court held that it is not the function of the Court to frame a scheme; it is the sole prerogative of the Government.

The High Court's approach was criticized, emphasizing that, in exceptional cases, the Court may issue directions to consider framing a scheme, but not beyond that.

The Court noted that the UOI has already framed a welfare scheme for casual workers, providing specific benefits.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's order, and the writ petition by the respondents was dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant filed a petition for divorce and child custody in the United States. Despite an interim order from the U.S. Court, the appellant returned to India and filed a custody petition in the Family Court, concealing her U.S. petition. The U.S. Court granted temporary custody to the wife/mother. The husband/father objected to the jurisdiction of the Family Court, leading to a High Court appeal and a writ petition seeking Habeas Corpus.

Issues:

Whether the Family Court in India had jurisdiction over the custody matter.

What factors should be considered in determining the best interest of the minor children.

Whether the High Court's decision favoring the return of the children to the U.S. was justified.

Held:

The High Court rightly rejected the application for custody filed in India, as the children were not ordinary residents of India as per Section 9(1) of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. The U.S. Court's orders must be respected, and the appellant must participate in those proceedings.

The best interest of the child is paramount, considering factors such as maturity, mental stability, education, moral character, financial sufficiency, and the parent-child relationship. The children, being U.S. citizens, should return to the U.S. for their welfare, as decided by the U.S. Court.

The principles of comity of courts, orders of foreign courts, citizenship, and the welfare of the children favor the husband/father. The High Court's decision directing the return of the children to the U.S. is justified, ensuring it does not harm the children physically, mentally, or psychologically.

The judicial resolution of custody disputes may permanently affect legal relationships, but negotiated resolutions are preferable, especially considering the potential for reconciliation between the parties. The appellant is directed to return to the U.S. with the children within six weeks.

Facts:

The appellants leased their property to the Government, which was requisitioned, derequisitioned, and again requisitioned. The Estate Officer issued an eviction notice under ss. 4(1) and 4(2)(b)(ii) of the Public Premises Act, treating the appellants as unauthorized occupants. The High Court upheld the notice.

Issues:

Whether there is a bona fide dispute on the ownership of the property, and if so, does the Estate Officer have jurisdiction to invoke eviction powers under the Public Premises Act?

Held:

The appellants raised a bona fide dispute on ownership. The Estate Officer lacks jurisdiction to use summary eviction powers when a genuine dispute exists. Union of India admitted the dispute and initially expressed intent to pursue dispossession through a civil suit.

Quashing the resumption notice by the High Court meant Union of India couldn't resort to any summary remedy for eviction. The Civil Court is the proper venue for deciding ownership disputes, not summary proceedings under the Public Premises Act.

The principle of merger doesn't apply as the superior court didn't delve into the merits decided by the subordinate court. The order of the subordinate court holds unless the superior court specifically addresses the merits.

The court referred to Express Newspapers case, holding that A.P. Sen J.'s view is the majority view, binding under Art. 141. The appellants genuinely disputed ownership, and the Estate Officer lacked jurisdiction under the Public Premises Act.

Facts:

Appellants and two others were prosecuted for offenses under Sections 323, 324, 452, 504, and 506 IPC.

Acquitted by the Judicial Magistrate, Mathura, but the State appealed.

Appellate Court convicted appellants, sentencing them to rigorous imprisonment and fines.

Appellants filed a criminal revision before the High Court, which was dismissed ex parte.

Issues:

Validity of High Court's dismissal of the revision without assigning reasons.

Held:

The High Court failed to apply its judicial mind while dismissing the revision, lacking justification for interference. (Para 11)

The expectation was for the High Court to consider factual and legal aspects before passing appropriate orders, which was not fulfilled. (Para 12)

The impugned order lacked reasoning, making it improper for disposal in such manner. (Para 12)

Decision:

The appeal was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the case was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration of the revision petition within six months. (Para 14)

FACTS:

A First Information Report (FIR) was lodged regarding the fatal assault on the cousin of the Informant on 23.02.1997.

The trial involved 17 accused persons, including the present appellants, charged with offences under various sections of the IPC.

The prosecution witnesses provided inconsistent testimonies, and the appellants were not named in the initial reporting by PW-2.

The Trial Court found all accused guilty, leading to an appeal in the High Court.

ISSUES:

Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt.

Whether the appellants were named in the initial reporting and subsequent testimonies.

HELD:

The judgement highlights the statements of prosecution witnesses, including PW-2, PW-3, and PW-4, presenting their accounts of the incident.( Para 5)

The Court acknowledges the principle of vicarious liability but emphasizes the need for clarity in establishing a person's membership in an unlawful assembly.( Para 10)

Noting the absence of the appellants storming inside the house, the Court questions the sufficiency of evidence to establish their involvement in the crime.( Para 11)

The Court observes the lack of naming appellants in the FIR by PW-2 and the absence of attributing specific overt acts to them in his subsequent testimony. PW-3 and PW-4 did not name the appellants, raising doubts about their involvement.Considering the factual aspects, the Court concludes that guilt is not established beyond reasonable doubt, granting the benefit of doubt to the appellants.The appeals are allowed, and the appellants are acquitted of all charges. They are to be set at liberty unless required for any other offence. ( Para 12)

Facts:

Beniram Gond, a member of a notified Scheduled Tribe, executed a sale deed of agricultural land in 1964 in favor of Dhaniram, a non-tribal.

Section 170B of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, was inserted in 1980, allowing reversion of land transferred fraudulently from a tribal member.

Legal proceedings initiated by Beniram's son under Section 170B resulted in the Collector's order reverting the land to Beniram.

Issues:

Validity of the order under Section 170B challenged by Dhaniram, leading to a writ petition dismissed by the High Court in 1987.

Subsequent suit by Dhaniram challenging the Collector's order, barred by Section 257 (L-1) introduced in 1995.

Held:

The High Court erred in allowing the suit challenging the Collector's order when a prior challenge was decided in 1987. The civil court cannot arrive at a conclusion contrary to the High Court's final judgment.

The appeal is allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the Trial Court's decision to dismiss the suit.