Facts:

The case concerned the constitutional validity of Section 45(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), which imposes conditions for granting bail to individuals accused of money laundering offenses.

Issues:

Whether the conditions set forth in Section 45(1) of the PMLA violated the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

Held:

The court examined the legislative history of Section 45 and its evolution from the Prevention of Money Laundering Bill, 1999, to its enactment in 2002. It noted the change in the scope of bail conditions, extending them to offenses punishable under Part A of the Schedule to the Act.

The court found that Section 45(1) imposed bail conditions unrelated to money laundering offenses and classified offenses arbitrarily based on the term of imprisonment. This classification lacked rationality concerning the objectives of the PMLA.

The court observed disparities in the treatment of offenses under different laws, such as the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. Despite having specific bail provisions, these offenses were subjected to similar conditions under Section 45.

Section 45 was deemed to be a drastic provision that overturned the presumption of innocence, which is fundamental to any accused individual. The court emphasized that before applying such provisions, there must be a compelling state interest in tackling serious crime. The court declared

Section 45(1) unconstitutional as it violated the principles of equality and due process enshrined in Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Consequently, all bail denials based on Section 45 conditions were set aside, and the cases were remanded for reconsideration without these conditions.

Facts:

The case involves the confiscation of gold under the Defence of India Rules, 1962, stemming from a search conducted in 1965.

The 1962 Rules were repealed by the Gold Control Act of 1968, with provisions for pending adjudication proceedings.

A dispute arose regarding the applicable law for adjudicating the confiscation of the seized gold.

Issues:

Whether the Defence of India Rules, 1962, stood repealed by the Gold (Control) Ordinance, 1968.

The interpretation of the provisions regarding the determination of redemption fine under the relevant statutes.

Clarification on the applicability of Section 73 of the Gold Control Act of 1968 to the case at hand.

Held:

The Court held that the Defence of India Rules, 1962, were repealed by the Gold (Control) Ordinance, 1968, despite the subsequent repeal of the Ordinance itself. (Para 44, 45)

Adjudgment of confiscation of the appellant's gold must be made in accordance with the Defence of India Rules, 1962, not the Gold Control Act of 1968. (Para 48)

The redemption fine to be paid in lieu of confiscation of seized gold should be determined based on the market value of gold on the date when the owner chooses to pay the fine, as per Rule 126M(8)(a) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962. (Para 68)

The Court clarified that Section 73 of the Gold Control Act of 1968 does not apply to confiscations adjudged under the Defence of India Rules, 1962, and the redemption fine should be based on the market value of gold at the time of exercising the option to pay the fine. (Para 63-67)

Decision: The Court affirmed the decision of the High Court, ruling that the case was governed by the Defence of India Rules, 1962, and upheld the determination of the redemption fine based on the market value of gold at the time of exercising the option to pay the fine.

Facts:

The appellant, Ratanlal @ Babulal Chunilal Samsuka, claimed to be the adopted son of late Govardhandas Laxmichand Samsuka.

Sundarabai Govardhandas Samsuka, the respondent, contested this claim.

The appellant was raised by Govardhandas since childhood and involved in the family business.

Disputes arose after Govardhandas' death, leading to Sundarabai filing a suit seeking dissolution and accounts of the partnership firm and a declaration regarding the appellant's adoption.

The trial court partly decreed the suit, granting Sundarabai a share in the partnership firm but rejecting the claim that the appellant was not adopted by Govardhandas.

Issues:

Whether the custom of giving married men in adoption in the Jain community is judicially accepted and hence the adoption need not be proved?

Whether the appellant could plead and prove the factum of adoption?

Held:

The court found that the evidence presented by the appellant regarding the alleged custom of adoption in the Jain community was insufficient and did not meet the criteria for establishing a valid custom under the law. (Para. 13)

The burden of proving adoption lies heavily on the party asserting it, especially when there is no documentary evidence. The court emphasized the need for clear and consistent evidence to support an adoption claim, considering its significant implications on succession and property rights. (Para. 20)

After examining the testimonies of witnesses, including the appellant and the priest who allegedly performed the adoption ceremony, the court found contradictions and inconsistencies, undermining the credibility of the appellant's claim. (Para. 22)

The appellant failed to plead and prove the factum of adoption satisfactorily, and the trial court's decision to place the burden of proof on the plaintiff (Sundarabai) was contrary to law. (Para. 24)

Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's judgment, dismissing the appeal with no orders as to costs. (Para. 25)

Facts:

The appellant claimed ownership of a shop in Belgaum and sought possession from the respondent.

The appellant purchased the shop through a registered sale deed, while the respondent claimed adverse possession.

The Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the appellant, upheld by the First Appellate Court.

The High Court allowed the respondent's appeal, directing the appellant to seek remedies under tenancy laws.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in directing the appellant to pursue remedies under tenancy laws instead of claiming possession based on ownership.

Whether the respondent established a tenancy relationship or adverse possession.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision was flawed due to its failure to consider crucial aspects of the case and misinterpretation of evidence and pleadings. Specifically:

The respondent did not raise the defense of being a tenant in their written statement, and no evidence supported such a claim.

The sale deed did not establish a tenancy relationship. Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision and restored the judgments of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court, affirming the appellant's ownership and right to possession of the shop.

Facts:

The appellant, Kuna @ Sanjaya Behera, along with his co-accused, Pravati Behera, was convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, along with Section 34 of the same Code. The conviction was based primarily on the testimony of a single eyewitness, PW1, who alleged that the appellant and the co-accused had murdered Santosh Behera and then suspended his dead body from a nearby shed. The prosecution also alleged a motive for the murder, citing an illicit relationship between the appellant and the co-accused. The defense contested the reliability of PW1's testimony, pointing out inconsistencies and improbabilities. They also argued that there was insufficient evidence to establish the alleged motive for the murder.

Issues:

The credibility and reliability of the testimony of the sole eyewitness, PW1.

Whether there was sufficient evidence to establish the alleged motive for the murder.

Held:

The Supreme Court found that PW1's testimony was not credible due to various inherent improbabilities and inconsistencies. The behavior of PW1 during and after the incident raised doubts about the reliability of his account. Additionally, there was no other tangible evidence to support the prosecution's case against the appellant and his co-accused.

Therefore, the Court concluded that the evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to prove the guilt of the appellant and his co-accused beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, the Court acquitted the appellant and ordered his release, giving him the benefit of the doubt.

Facts:

ECL Finance Ltd. filed a contempt petition against Harikishan Shankarji Gudipati for allegedly not honoring a consent decree.

The contempt petition was admitted by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Bombay, and notice was issued to the respondents.

Respondents filed an intra-court appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, against the admission of the contempt petition.

Issues:

The maintainability of the intra-court appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

Held:

The Court clarified that an appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, is maintainable only against an order imposing punishment for contempt.

Orders declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, initiating proceedings for contempt, dropping proceedings for contempt, or acquitting/exonerating the contemnor are not appealable under Section 19.

The Court rejected the contention that the learned Single Judge had already made up his mind to punish the respondents, clarifying that issuing notice in a contempt petition is only a preliminary stage to consider the case on its merits.

The impugned order passed by the Division Bench was set aside.

The Court requested the learned Single Judge to consolidate the execution petition and contempt proceedings to determine the amount payable by the respondents in terms of the decree.

The parties were encouraged to settle their disputes.

Facts:

Consent agreements were entered into in 1989 for land acquisition, but the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued in 1996.

Consent awards were passed in 1997, based on consent forms obtained in 1989.

Allegation of fraud by the appellants, stating that signatures were obtained on blank consent forms.

Dispute arose over the validity of the consent agreements and the determination of compensation.

Issues:

Validity of consent agreements signed in 1989.

Determination of compensation based on the prevailing market rate in 1997.

Held:

The Court held that it would be unfair to enforce consent agreements from 1989, given the significant delay in issuing the acquisition notification.

Compensation should be determined based on the prevailing market rate in 1997, not the date of the original consent agreements.

The relevant date for compensation calculation is the issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the Act.

The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the reference court's determination of compensation at the rate prevailing in 1997 was restored.

The appellants were awarded costs, to be paid by the respondents. The appeals are allowed.

Facts:

The landlord appealed against the High Court's judgment upholding the tenant's right to purchase land under Section 32G of the Act.

The tenant was in possession of the land since 01.04.1957, and the landlord retired from the Armed Forces on 10.12.1959.

The tenant failed to purchase the land within the specified period, but the High Court held the right to purchase still valid.

Issues:

Whether the tenant's right to purchase the land under Section 32G was valid despite the landlord's failure to terminate the tenancy within the prescribed period.

Applicability of Chapter IIIAA introduced by an amendment in 1964 to the rights of the parties.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its interpretation and application of the law. It was ruled that Chapter IIIAA introduced in 1964 did not apply to the case as the landlord's retirement predated its introduction. Therefore, the tenant's right to purchase the land was not valid, and the landlord had the right to terminate the tenancy under Section 32P of the Act. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

Six FIRs were registered against various Cooperative Housing Societies in Gujarat for alleged offenses under multiple sections of the Indian Penal Code. The accused, members of these societies, filed Criminal Applications in the High Court seeking to quash five of the FIRs, arguing that they were repetitive and identical to the first FIR. The High Court quashed the five FIRs, considering them overlapping with the first FIR. The appellants, feeling aggrieved by this decision, appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the five FIRs.

Whether the FIRs were indeed repetitive and identical to the first FIR.

Whether there was sufficient ground to quash the FIRs at the investigation stage.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision to quash the five FIRs was not justified. The Court disagreed with the reasoning of the High Court and emphasized the need for thorough investigation into each Cooperative Society's affairs. The Court noted that while there were overlapping allegations, they were insufficient to warrant quashing the FIRs at the investigation stage. It was stated that detailed investigation was necessary to determine the nature of the offenses and the involvement of individuals. The Court cited previous judgments to support its position that police investigation should proceed unless there's sheer absurdity in the allegations or the FIR doesn't prima facie disclose a cognizable offense. Consequently, the appeals filed by the appellants were allowed, and the High Court's judgment was set aside.