Facts:

The respondent filed a suit for specific performance against the appellant in 1986.

In 2014, a third party, respondent No. 3, sought impleadment as Plaintiff No. 3 in the suit, claiming an assignment of rights.

The appellant opposed this impleadment, citing inordinate delay and prejudice to its defense rights.

Issues:

Whether the order allowing the impleadment application constitutes a 'judgment' or an 'interlocutory order'?

Whether the impleadment application filed after 27 years of the suit filing should be allowed?

What principles govern impleadment and amendment applications in suits for specific performance?

Held:

The court held that the order allowing the impleadment application after 27 years was a 'judgment' within the meaning of Letters Patent Appeal, as it affected the vital rights of the parties, particularly the appellant's defense rights.

The court emphasized the need for impleadment applications to be filed within a reasonable time, especially in commercial litigation. While acknowledging the wide discretion in allowing amendments, the court noted that amendments causing prejudice or affecting substantial rights of defense should not be permitted. Thus, the impugned judgment was set aside, and the Chamber Summons filed for impleadment was dismissed.

Facts:

The appellants, partners in M/s. G.D. & Sons, owned a Cinema building known as "Alpana Cinema" in Model Town, New Delhi.

The valuation of the Alpana Cinema property was contested under the Wealth Tax Act for the assessment years 1970-71 to 1974-75.

The Wealth Tax Officer initially adopted the land and building method for valuation but later made a reference to the Departmental Valuer for assessment.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) accepted the income capitalization method proposed by the appellants.

The Revenue challenged the ITAT's decision in the High Court, which upheld the Wealth Tax Officer's valuation method.

Issues:

Whether the income capitalization method or the land and building method should be used for valuing the Alpana Cinema property under the Wealth Tax Act.

Whether the Wealth Tax Officer has the discretion to choose between valuation methods under Section 7(2)(a) of the Act.

Held:

The Court held that the Wealth Tax Officer has discretion in choosing the valuation method, as Section 7(2)(a) of the Wealth Tax Act is enabling and not mandatory. The Court emphasized that the primary method for valuation under Section 7(1) is based on the market price, while Section 7(2)(a) provides an alternative method for businesses.

Referring to past judgments, including Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Calcutta v. Tungabadra Industries Ltd., Calcutta, the Court reiterated that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal's decision is not binding on the High Court if it finds no error in the ITAT's decision. In the present case, the High Court found no fault in the Wealth Tax Officer's decision to adopt the land and building method. Additionally, the Court rejected the appellants' argument that the method favorable to them should be adopted, clarifying that such a rule applies only in cases of ambiguity in the taxing statute. Ultimately, the Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the High Court's decision.

Facts:

The establishment of the District Mineral Foundation (DMF) was mandated by the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957.

Notifications were issued by the Ministry of Mines and Ministry of Coal regarding contributions to the DMF.

The validity of these notifications, particularly regarding their retrospective effect, was challenged.

Issues:

Whether the notifications establishing DMFs could have retrospective effect.

The validity of contributions to the DMF.

Held:

The intention of Parliament was for State Governments to establish the DMF with effect from January 12, 2015, as mandated by Section 9B of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (Para 18).

The establishment of DMFs did not adversely affect anyone's vested rights, and thus, there is no objection to the operation of the notifications from January 12, 2015 (Para 19).

Delegated legislation is typically prospective, and retrospective effect is not permissible unless expressly authorized by the parent statute. There is no such authorization in this case (Para 21).

The liability to contribute to the DMF arose from the notification issued on September 17, 2015 (Para 37).

Contributions for coal, lignite, and sand for stowing were required from October 20, 2015, or from the date of establishment of the DMF in the concerned State, whichever is later (Para 42).

Subsequent notifications attempting retroactive substitution are deemed ultra vires the rule-making power of the Central Government (Para 44).

Decision: The establishment of DMFs should be considered operational from the date of their publication. Contributions to the DMF are required from the dates specified in the relevant notifications. Retroactive substitution of notifications is invalid.

Facts:

The petitioners, Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors., filed a writ petition seeking the issuance of appropriate directions to enable female devotees aged 10 to 50 to enter the Lord Ayyappa Temple at Sabarimala, Kerala. They challenged the exclusion of women based on certain customs and usage, and also contested the constitutionality of clause (b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965.

Issues:

Whether the practice of excluding women based on biological factors amounts to "discrimination," thereby violating Articles 14, 15, 17, and not protected by 'morality' as used in Articles 25, 26.

Whether such exclusion constitutes an "essential religious practice" under Article 25 and whether the religious institution can assert such a claim under the right to manage its own affairs in the matter of religion.

Whether the Ayyappa Temple has a denominational character and if so, whether it is permissible for a religious denomination managed by a statutory board and financed out of the Consolidated Fund of Kerala and Tamil Nadu to indulge in practices violating constitutional principles/morality.

Whether clause (b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965 permits 'religious denomination' to ban the entry of women between the ages of 10 to 50 years and if it violates Articles 14, 15(3) of the Constitution by restricting entry of women on the ground of sex.

Whether clause (b) of the Rules, 1965 is ultra vires the Act, 1965 and if treated to be intra vires, whether it will be violative of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution.

Held:

The court, considering the significant issues involved, referred the matter to the Chief Justice to constitute an appropriate larger bench to address the aforementioned issues.

Facts:

The appellant, Bharat Deep Sethi, contested an interim order by the High Court directing him to pay Rs. 1,25,000/- per month to the respondent-landlord, Sonia Takkar. The appellant was a tenant under an unregistered lease deed occupying a shop in Delhi. The respondent claimed ownership of the property and filed a suit for eviction, which the Rent Controller initially ruled in her favor.

Issues:

The amount of rent to be paid by the appellant-tenant, with both parties disputing the appropriate sum.

The appellant sought leave to defend against eviction, contesting the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship.

Held:

The Supreme Court modified the interim order, directing the appellant to pay Rs. 40,000/- per month from June 2017 towards use and occupation, with arrears to be paid within four weeks. The matter was remitted back to the High Court for fresh consideration, allowing the appellant an opportunity to raise all contentions/issues.

The High Court was requested to expedite the proceedings and dispose of the matter preferably within three months. No coercive steps were to be taken by the respondent-landlord until the matter was finally disposed of by the High Court.

Facts:

The respondent, Karnataka Soaps & Detergents Ltd., manufactures agarbathi perfumes (odoriferous compounds) in its Bangalore unit, which are then transferred to its Mysore unit for application to agarbathis.

The respondent ceased paying excise duty on the perfumery compound after a circular was issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs (the Board) clarifying non-excisability of certain odoriferous compounds.

The Revenue issued show-cause notices demanding excise duty, penalty, and interest for the period 2001-2002 to 2006-2007, contending that the circular did not exempt the respondent from paying excise duty on the perfumery compound.

The respondent contested the notices, relying on the Board's circular and arguing that the compound was not marketable as per the circular's criteria.

Issues:

Whether the Board's circular exempts the respondent from paying excise duty on the perfumery compound.

Whether actual marketing of the perfumery compound is necessary for the levy of excise duty.

Held:

The Court held that the Board's circular did not exempt the perfumery compound manufactured by the respondent from excise duty, as it applied to a different category of compounds.

Actual marketing of the perfumery compound is not necessary for the levy of excise duty. Marketability is the decisive test for dutiability, and the compound's capability of being sold in the open market suffices. The compound was found to be marketable, as evidenced by its sale to M/s. Tibetan Handicrafts Centre Bylkuppe, Mysore District.

Facts:

The respondent filed a civil suit against the appellant seeking eviction from a commercial premises and recovery of unpaid rent.

The appellant argued that the disputes should be resolved through arbitration as per the terms of the lease deed, which contained an arbitration clause.

The Trial Court and the High Court ruled in favor of the respondent, stating that the civil suit was maintainable despite the existence of an arbitration clause in the lease deed.

Issues:

Whether disputes arising from a lease deed with an arbitration clause are subject to arbitration or can be adjudicated in civil courts.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts, stating that the civil suit was maintainable. The Court emphasized that even if certain premises were exempted from the Delhi Rent Act, it didn't automatically make them subject to arbitration. The rights of the parties would still be governed by the Transfer of Property Act, and civil suits would be triable by civil courts. The appeal was dismissed, and the civil court was directed to proceed with the trial of the suit expeditiously.

This conclusion is supported by the rulings in Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. v. Navrang Studios & Another, 1981(1) SCC 523 and Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Ltd. & Ors., (2011) 5 SCC 532, which affirmed the jurisdiction of civil courts in disputes involving lease agreements, despite the presence of arbitration clauses.

Facts:

Ms. Indira Jaising filed a writ petition challenging the practice of designating Senior Advocates, alleging it to be arbitrary and violative of constitutional provisions.

Issues:

Whether the practice of designating Senior Advocates is arbitrary and unconstitutional.

Held:

The court held that while the practice of designating Senior Advocates is constitutional, it must be based on reasonable parameters. [Para 23]

The court outlined criteria such as ability, standing at the bar, and special knowledge or experience in law for designation as a Senior Advocate. [Para 23]

More transparency and uniform guidelines in the designation process were deemed necessary. [Para 23]

Norms and guidelines for the designation of Senior Advocates by the Supreme Court and all High Courts were laid down, including the establishment of a Permanent Committee for designation and scrutiny of credentials. [Para 35]

The court emphasized adherence to established norms and cautioned against actions that could bring the designation process into disrepute. [Para 28]

It sought to ensure that the designation of Senior Advocates is based on merit, fairness, and transparency, with periodic review and potential modifications to the guidelines based on experience. [Para 36]

Facts:

The appellant, an employee of the respondent Transport Corporation, was dismissed from service due to his involvement in a murder case.

He was subsequently acquitted by the High Court and sought reinstatement with back wages for the period of his dismissal.

The High Court, both in a single judge's decision and a division bench's decision, declined to award back wages to the appellant.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court challenging the denial of back wages.

Issues:

Whether the appellant is entitled to claim back wages for the period of his dismissal from service?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the appellant was not entitled to claim back wages for the period of his dismissal. The Court emphasized that an employee is not automatically entitled to back wages upon reinstatement unless specifically directed by the order of reinstatement. The appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate his unemployment during the period of dismissal, and the issue regarding back wages was not raised before an Industrial or Labour Tribunal where evidence could be adduced. Consequently, the Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts, dismissing the appeal and affirming the denial of back wages to the appellant.