FACTS:

Nirval Singh, the respondent, sought compassionate appointment after the death of his father who was working with the appellants.

The policy for compassionate appointment dated 21.11.2002 was in force when the application was submitted.

The respondent did not receive compassionate appointment as the implementation of the policy was kept in abeyance for the consideration of a new policy.

ISSUES:

The delay in approaching the courts for redressal after a period of 7 years.

The change in policy from the earlier one to the new one.

The options offered to the respondent under the new policy, which he declined.

HELD:

Addresses the delay in approaching the courts and the change in policy. The Court held that the delay of 7 years extinguished the objective of providing immediate amelioration to the family. The abolishment of the earlier policy and the introduction of the new one meant that the application had to be considered under the new policy. The respondent failed to avail the options offered under the new policy.( Paragraph 7 )

Concludes the decision by stating that the offer of solatium could be the only remedy available at this stage. The Court directed the payment of Rs. 5 lakhs to the respondent within two months, considering the revised policy.( Paragraph 9 )

Facts:

The Respondent applied for the allotment of a flat under the Self-Financing Housing Scheme.

The Board allotted a flat, and after various proceedings, the matter reached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court passed an order on 19.09.2012, conclusively determining the rights and obligations of the parties.

Subsequently, the Respondent initiated execution proceedings to enforce the Supreme Court's order.

Issues:

Whether a Revision Petition under Section 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is maintainable before the National Commission against an Order passed by the State Commission in execution proceedings?

Held:

The nature of execution proceedings is independent and different from the nature of proceedings for adjudication of a consumer complaint.

Execution proceedings cannot be considered a continuation of the original consumer dispute.

Revision Petition is not maintainable under Section 21(b) against an Order passed by the State Commission in execution proceedings.

The National Commission erroneously entertained the Revision Petition, which was not maintainable.

The Delhi High Court rightly set aside the Order passed by the National Commission on the ground that a Revision Petition was not maintainable against the Order passed by the State Commission in execution proceedings.

Facts:

The Appellants sought permission under Order XLI Rule 27, CPC to introduce additional evidence before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. The evidence, comprising two documents, came into existence after the filing of the appeal before the State Commission. The State Commission rejected the application, deeming the documents "not necessary." The matter reached the National Commission, which affirmed the State Commission's decision.

Issues:

Whether the Appellants should be allowed to introduce additional evidence at the appellate stage.

Whether the rejection by the State Commission was justified.

Held:

The court observed that under Order XLI Rule 27, CPC, a party can produce additional evidence at the appellate stage if it establishes the evidence's unavailability despite due diligence when the decree was passed. The two documents were crucial to the Appellants' case, showing their inability to obtain the Occupancy Certificate due to unauthorized structures.

The State Commission's rejection was deemed an error as it merely stated the documents were "not necessary" without a reasoned explanation. The National Commission's affirmation of this decision was set aside. The Civil Appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the State Commission to consider the additional documents and decide the appeal on its merits expeditiously.

Facts:

The father filed a habeas corpus petition seeking custody of a minor child from the appellants, who were the uncle and aunt of the minor child. The High Court, upon hearing the case, directed the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, instructing the appellants to hand over the custody of the minor child to the father.

Issues:

Whether the writ of habeas corpus is maintainable in child custody matters?

Who has the legal right to claim custody under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act?

What considerations should be paramount in determining child custody, especially in extraordinary circumstances?

Held:

The writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy for securing the liberty of the subject or restoring the custody of a minor to their guardian when wrongfully deprived. In child custody matters, the writ is maintainable only when the detention of a minor by someone not entitled to legal custody is proven. The ordinary remedy lies under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act or the Guardians and Wards Act. Exceptional cases may warrant the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction through a habeas corpus petition.

The appellants, being the sisters and brother of the child's mother, lack legal authority for custody. As per Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, the father is the natural guardian with the legal right to claim custody. The father, being the only natural guardian alive, has neither abandoned nor neglected the child. The child went into the appellants' custody due to the illness of both parents. The circumstances were unavoidable, and the father's right to custody under Section 6 is not disputed.

While legal rights of parents are governed by special statutes, the paramount consideration is the welfare of the child. The father, having recovered from illness, is fit to take care of the child. The appellants having taken care of the child for some time does not confer a legal right to custody. The child, being 1½ years old, cannot express preferences at this stage. Granting custody to the father ensures both child and father enjoy their rightful love and affection.

Although initially taking the child from the appellants may cause some problems, it is believed to normalize over time. Until the child settles down in the father's house, the appellants are granted visitation rights. The High Court's judgment is affirmed with these directions. This appeal is accordingly disposed of.

Facts:

On April 28, 2008, the appellant-State invited recommendations for the promotion to the OAS Class-II cadre. The recruitment process was governed by the 1978 Rules and Regulations. The State decided to put the 2008 recruitment on hold until the completion of the recruitment process for 2001-2005. The restructuring of the Orissa Administrative Service took place in February 2009, abolishing the existing OAS Class-II posts and creating the Orissa Revenue Service Group 'B' cadre.

Issues:

Whether the contesting Respondents have a vested right for selection or promotion to OAS Class-II posts based on their forwarded names?

Did the contesting Respondents challenge the abolition of OAS Class-II posts and the creation of corresponding Orissa Revenue Service Group 'B' posts?

Can the contesting Respondents claim lien over the abolished OAS Class-II posts?

Held:

Contesting Respondents cannot claim a vested right for selection or promotion to OAS Class-II posts merely based on their forwarded names. The recruitment process did not proceed in accordance with the relevant regulations. The dismissal of the Special Leave Petition (S.L.P.) in limine does not imply a declaration of law or a binding precedent.

The contesting Respondents did not challenge the abolition of OAS Class-II posts or the creation of corresponding Orissa Revenue Service Group 'B' posts. Some participated in the proceedings for recruitment to the newly created cadre. Their appointments to Orissa Revenue Service Group 'B' posts were made prior to the repeal of the old rules and regulations.

Dismissal of the S.L.P. in limine does not constitute a declaration of law. The Division Bench's direction to appoint the contesting Respondents in the abolished cadre contradicts the law and is set aside.

FACTS:

Writ petitioners (C&V Teachers) argue their conversion to TGT under Rule 9(5) of 2012 Rules makes them eligible for promotion to Elementary School Headmaster.

The State contests, asserting the writ petitioners lack the requisite qualifications for TGT under the 2012 Rules.

ISSUES:

Whether C&V Teachers, converted to TGT under Rule 9(5), are entitled to promotion as Elementary School Headmasters.

The qualification discrepancy between writ petitioners and the requirements for TGT under 2012 Rules.

HELD:

The High Court's interpretation of Rule 9(5) simplistically assumed C&V Teachers become part of the TGT Cadre, entitling them to promotion as Elementary School Headmasters. The Court reviews this stance.( Para 15)

The 1998 Rules established a promotion path for C&V Teachers to the post of Master, equivalent to TGT. The Court scrutinizes the qualifications and positions under both the 1998 and 2012 Rules.( Para 16)

The Court emphasizes that TGTs, as per 2012 Rules, include Masters appointed before the notification. The post of Master under 1998 Rules aligns with TGT under 2012 Rules, making it a promotion post for C&V Teachers.( Para 18)

The conversion of C&V Teachers to TGT is seen as a facilitation of service conditions under 2012 Rules, not an upgrade to the TGT Cadre. The Court stresses that such conversion is for administrative convenience, not to confer membership in the TGT Cadre.( Para 20)

The Court concludes that the purpose of the Rules is to ensure better education through Trained Graduate Teachers. Interpreting the rules in a way that aligns with the educational goals is favored over an interpretation leading to anomalous results.( Para 22)

The High Court's order is set aside, and the appeal is allowed. The Court holds that C&V Teachers, despite conversion to TGT notionally, do not become part of the TGT Cadre as per the cumulative reading of the 2012 Rules.( Para 23)

FACTS:

Smt. Randhir Kaur gifted a property to Doaba Public School through a registered Gift Deed.

An oral exchange of land occurred in 1988, purportedly between the Principal of the school and the President of the Doaba Education Society.

The exchanged land included the portion originally donated by Smt. Randhir Kaur.

The Respondents executed a Lease Deed, making the school a Lessee and the Principal the owner of the suit property.

Legal proceedings ensued challenging the exchange and seeking restoration of ownership to the school.

ISSUES:

Validity of the oral exchange and subsequent transactions.

Ownership rights over the suit property.

HELD:

The Court held that the exchange was collusive, unauthorized, and illegal. The purported reason for the exchange, benefiting students in a remote village, was a mere ruse. The school continued to operate from the original property, and the exchange was an attempt to transfer valuable land to the Principal. The Court quashed the exchange, set aside the related documents, and directed the restoration of ownership to the Doaba Public School. Costs of Rs. 1 lac were awarded to the Appellants. The Appeals are allowed.

Facts:

Appellants challenged the High Court's orders allowing candidates with research and development experience in drugs to be considered for the post.

Dispute arose over the interpretation of essential and desirable qualifications mentioned in the advertisements dated 04.01.2012 and 31.03.2015.

Issues:

Whether candidates with research and development experience can be considered eligible for the post of Assistant Commissioner (Drugs) and Drug Inspectors.

The interpretation of essential and desirable qualifications as per the advertisements.

Held:

The essential qualifications for the post are at the discretion of the employer, and the court cannot reinterpret them.

Desirable qualifications do not automatically confer eligibility; they are preferences.

Research experience in a research and development laboratory does not equate to essential eligibility for the post.

The experience of testing in a research and development laboratory is different from the testing carried out in the manufacturing process.

The preference clause means additional weightage for candidates with research experience, not automatic eligibility.

The Court set aside the High Court's orders and allowed the appeals.

Facts:

The appellant, Ganesan, was declared entitled to Ambalam right in his village by the Joint Commissioner of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Board. The third respondent filed an appeal under Section 69 of the Act, accompanied by a delay condonation application for a delay of 266 days. The Commissioner condoned the delay. The appellant challenged the order condoning the delay through a writ petition.

Issues:

The applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in appeal proceedings before the Commissioner, and whether the Commissioner could be considered a court under the statutory scheme of the Act, 1959.

Held:

The court held that the Commissioner, while hearing an appeal under Section 69 of the Act, is not a court as defined in Section 6(7). The Commissioner is an appointed authority entrusted with various functions, including hearing appeals.( Paragraph 15)

Section 70 of the Act further provides that any party aggrieved by the Commissioner's order under Section 69 can file a suit in the court. The Commissioner is not considered a court under the statutory scheme.( Paragraph 16-17)

The judgment clarifies that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act applies only to suits, appeals, and applications to be filed in a court and not before statutory authorities like the Commissioner.( Paragraph 54)

The court decided that Section 29(2) cannot be invoked concerning filing suits, appeals, and applications before statutory authorities. Consequently, the Commissioner cannot condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.( Paragraph 55)

The court emphasized that a special or local law can determine the applicability of any provision of the Limitation Act, including Section 5. The Act, 1959, does not indicate an intention to apply Section 5.( Paragraph 56)

Section 115 of the Act, dealing with limitation, only provides for the computation of limitation, excluding the time for obtaining a certified copy. The judgment concluded that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable as per the scheme of the Act, 1959.( Paragraph 63)