Facts:

Atindra Nath Bhattacharyya, the respondent, faced 16 charges related to financial irregularities while working as Chief Manager of Baghbazar Branch of the State Bank of India.

The inquiry officer found ten charges proved, leading to the imposition of the punishment of removal on January 24, 2003.

Issues:

The Single Bench of the High Court set aside the order of punishment, citing a lack of opportunity for the respondent to show cause regarding the nature and quantum of punishment.

Despite not utilizing the opportunities for a personal hearing, the Division Bench directed the appellant to grant another opportunity to the respondent.

Held:

The Supreme Court found the Division Bench's direction to grant another opportunity not tenable.

Emphasized that once an opportunity had been granted and not availed, the respondent was not entitled to another opportunity on the grounds of compassion.

Serious allegations of financial irregularities played a crucial role in affirming the removal order.

The Court set aside the directions of the Division Bench and allowed the appeal.

Facts:

Dispute arose between the appellants and the respondent over alleged damage to goods stored in the respondent's cold storage.

Appellants disputed the existence of the arbitration clause and objected to the appointment of Sri S.T. Madnani as an arbitrator due to his prior representation of the respondent in another case.

Despite objections, Madnani proceeded with the arbitration, awarding the respondent the claim amount.

Issues:

Validity of the arbitration clause.

Arbitrator's conduct in failing to disclose prior representation of one party in another case.

Held:

The Court addressed the validity of the arbitration clause, noting that the appellants had previously sought the appointment of an independent arbitrator, rejecting the contention of no consensus ad idem.

The crucial issue was the conduct of the arbitrator, Sri S.T. Madnani, who failed to disclose his prior representation of the respondent in another case, violating Section 12(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Citing the V.K. Dewan and Co. case, the Court held that Madnani should not have acted as an arbitrator in fairness.

The Court emphasized the need for justice to be done and seen to be done. Madnani's failure to recuse himself rendered the award unsustainable. The Court set aside the High Court's order, reinstating the District Judge's decision to set aside the award.

The parties were given the liberty to pursue arbitration according to the law, and all contentions on the merits of the claim were left open.

Facts:

The appellant sought specific performance of an agreement to sell land.

The trial court decreed the suit, but the decree for specific performance was declined in the second appeal.

The High Court granted a decree for recovery of the earnest money with interest.

Issues:

The scope of second appeal as per Section 100 of the CPC and Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act.

The validity of the power of attorney to purchase land.

The plaintiff's readiness and willingness to perform the contract.

Held:

The court emphasized the limited scope of second appeals, clarifying that interference is only allowed in case of an error in law or procedure, not on findings of fact.

The High Court's interference based on the absence of a specific power of attorney was found unjustified.

The judgment highlighted the findings of the first appellate court that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform the agreement.

Financial capacity, evidenced by the execution of sale deeds, was considered.

The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the decree for specific performance was restored.

The appellant was granted two months to pay the balance sale consideration, and if not received, the plaintiff could deposit the amount with the executing court.

The appeal was allowed, and no costs were imposed. The court reinstated the decree for specific performance, emphasizing the limitations on the High Court's jurisdiction in second appeals.

Facts:

Multiple accused, including Postman Vengaisamy (A-l), Thalaiyaripandi (A-ll), and others, were tried for offenses under Sections 148, 302, and 506 (Part II) IPC.

Incidents occurred on April 8, 2003, and April 26, 2003, involving alleged attacks on the deceased, Chinnaperiaiyah, and others.

Issues:

Credibility of prosecution witnesses, especially Irulandi (PW-1) and Ramar (PW-2).

Allegations of the accused being armed with weapons and forming an unlawful assembly.

Held:

The court hears arguments from both sides and finds no merit in the appeal.( Paragraph 8)

Irulandi (PW-1) and Ramar (PW-2) testified to being surrounded by accused, led by Thalaiyaripandi (A-ll), armed with swords. Accused attacked the deceased and injured Irulandi (PW-1) and Ramar (PW-2). Defense claims these witnesses are introduced, but the court finds no such inference from cross-examination.( Paragraph 9)

Medical evidence supports the oral testimony. Dr. Jayakumar (PW-13) examined Irulandi (PW-1) and Ramar (PW-2) on the same day. Deceased's postmortem report (Ex.P-28) and medical reports (Ex.P-29, Ex.P-30) of the injured witnesses corroborate events.( Paragraph 10)

Statements of Baskaran (PW-4) and Rathi (PW-5) confirm the incident on April 8, 2003, adding to the credibility of the prosecution's case.( Paragraph 11)

Court rejects the applicability of precedents cited by the defense (Ram Laxman, Najabhai Desurbhai Wagh, and Mahendran) as they are distinguishable from the facts of the present case.( Paragraph 13)

Reiterates the principle that "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" has no application in India. Even if part of a witness's statement is unproved, the entire testimony cannot be rejected.( Paragraph 14)

Conclusion: The court dismisses the appeal, affirming the judgment of conviction and sentence by the High Court. Appellants are granted three months to surrender before the competent court.

Facts:

The dispute involved the nomination of Sajjadah Nashin and Mutawalli of a Dargah founded in 1838.

The founder nominated his son Maulana Naseeruddeen Sahib as his successor.

The Zabta, constituting rules for the nomination, was framed by the third Sajjadah Nashin and Mutawalli, Gulam Sarwar Sahib, in 1932.

The appellant, Peer Gulam Jilani, contested the eligibility of the respondent, Peer Gulam Naseer, citing issues related to familial lineage and interpretation of terms in the Zabta.

Issues:

Whether the respondent was eligible to be nominated as Sajjadah Nashin and Mutawalli.

Interpretation of the terms 'Khandan' and 'Sagir Sinn' in the Zabta.

Held:

The Zabta did not specify hereditary succession but emphasized the selection of a qualified person during the lifetime of the incumbent.

The term 'Khandan' was interpreted broadly to include those in the spiritual sect 'Silsila,' not limited to blood relations.

The respondent, being the daughter's son of the 4th Sajjadah Nashin and Mutawalli, was deemed eligible, as he was part of the 'Khandan.'

The interpretation of the term 'Sagir Sinn' as 'minor age' was upheld, and it was not accepted as meaning 'minor son.'

Rule 1 of the Zabta did not establish hereditary succession or lineal descendant requirements for the Sajjadah Nashin and Mutawalli.

The appellant's contentions were dismissed, and the appeals were rejected.

Facts:

The Respondent Company, a subsidiary of the Marathwada Development Corporation, engaged women workers for stitching garments at their homes.

The Appellant, the Provident Fund Office, issued notices to the Respondent Company, claiming Provident Fund contributions for the women workers.

The Respondent challenged the order in the Bombay High Court, which ruled in their favor.

Issues:

Whether women workers engaged by the Respondent Company should be considered "employees" under Section 2(f) of the EPF Act.

Whether the women workers, despite working off-site and being paid on a piece-rate basis, fall within the definition of "employee."

Held:

The court held that the women workers were indeed covered by the definition of "employee" under Section 2(f) of the EPF Act. The inclusive definition encompassed both direct and indirect engagement in connection with the work of the establishment. The court emphasized that payment on a per-piece basis and working off-site did not negate the employment status. The Provident Fund Office's order was restored, and the Respondent Company was directed to deposit the assessed Provident Fund dues for the women workers within one month.

The Civil Appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms. All pending Applications, if any, are accordingly disposed of.

Facts:

Lucknow Development Authority (LDA) acquired land for the Sitapur Road City Extension Scheme.

Respondents' land was part of the acquisition but sought release under Section 17.

LDA imposed development charges for the release of the respondents' land.

High Court quashed LDA's order, citing lack of evidence of development in the vicinity of the respondents' land.

Issues:

Whether development charges can be imposed under Section 17.

Interpretation of development activities in the context of land acquisition.

Applicability of the proviso to Section 17(1) of the Act.

Whether the High Court's findings on lack of development in the vicinity are correct.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's interpretation was not correct. It emphasized that development should be examined in respect of the entire acquired land, not just the specific area owned by the respondents. The Court accepted LDA's claims of extensive development activities, including road construction, provision of electricity and water, and sewer line installation. The respondents were deemed liable for development charges, and the High Court's decision was set aside.

Facts:

Zorawar Singh owned certain immovable property in New Delhi.

Zorawar Singh executed a Will dated June 16, 1985, and a codicil dated October 21, 1995.

Two suits were filed: one by the respondents claiming declaration and permanent injunction in respect of the Will and codicil, and the other by the appellant claiming natural succession.

Issues:

The applicability of Clause (c) of Section 213(2) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925.

Whether it is necessary to seek probate or letters of administration in the National Capital Region of Delhi.

Held:

The Act is applicable to Wills and codicils made by Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, or Jains, subject to the jurisdiction of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal or within the local limits of the High Courts of Madras or Bombay - {clause (a) of Section 57 of the Act}.

It is also applicable to Wills and codicils made outside those territories and limits in relation to immovable property within those territories - Clause (b) of Section 57.

Clause (c) of Section 57 applies to Wills and codicils made by Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, or Jains on or after January 1, 1927, to which provisions are not applied by clauses (a) and (b).

Sub-section (2) of Section 213 of the Act applies only to Wills made by Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, or Jains falling under clauses (a) or (b) of Section 57, making clause (c) inapplicable.

The judgment cites several cases supporting the view that probate is not necessary for Wills made outside Bengal, Madras, or Bombay concerning properties and parties not located in those territories.

The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court's order, which accepted an intra-court appeal against the rejection of the plaint based on Section 213, was upheld.

The appeal was dismissed, finding no error in the judgment passed by the Delhi High Court.

FACTS:

The appellant, an ex-Havildar in the Indian Army, completed 24 years of service with a two-year extension granted.

During the extended tenure, the appellant suffered a stroke and was discharged after being re-categorized with an 80% disability.

The appellant sought disability pension and ex-gratia compensation.

ISSUES:

Eligibility for ex-gratia compensation based on the conditions stipulated in the policy circular dated December 26, 2011.

Interpretation of Regulations 173 and 173-A of the Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961.

HELD:

The court emphasized the specific conditions for ex-gratia compensation outlined in the policy circular.

The appellant, having been discharged due to a permanent low medical category during the extended service, was entitled to disability pension under Regulation 173-A but did not meet the criteria for ex-gratia compensation.

The deeming fiction under Regulation 173-A was held not to extend to the policy document dated December 26, 2011.

The appeal was dismissed on the grounds that the claim for ex-gratia compensation could not be entertained.