Facts:

Banjara Magasvargiya Shikshan Prasarak Mandal ran a Primary Ashram School named Prabodhankar Thakare Prathmik Ashram Shala.

Due to irregularities, the school's recognition was withdrawn, and students were directed to be absorbed in nearby Ashram Schools.

A Resolution dated 02.01.2012 was passed, transferring the closed Ashram School to Sant Dnyaneshwar Shikshan Sanstha, Islampur, 400 kms away.

Issues:

Legality of the transfer of a closed Ashram School.

Compliance with government guidelines and procedures for such transfers.

Violation of distance limitations for transfer specified in Government Resolution dated 01.08.2007.

Held:

The High Court rightly quashed the Resolution dated 02.01.2012, noting the transfer lacked proper procedure and violated guidelines.

The government treated Ashram School recognition as a business license, and the transfer lacked transparency.

The High Court's criticism of the State Government's handling of the transfer was justified.

The appeals were dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision.

Facts:

The Assessing Officer issued a show cause notice to the respondent-assessee, questioning the genuineness of money received through share capital and premium from various companies. The assessee claimed that the entire share capital was received through normal banking channels, supported by account payee cheques/demand drafts. The AO conducted independent inquiries in Mumbai, Kolkata, and Guwahati, revealing discrepancies in the identity and credit-worthiness of investor companies.

Issues:

Whether the assessee fulfilled the legal obligation to prove the genuineness of the transaction, identity of creditors, and credit-worthiness of investors.

Whether the independent inquiries conducted by the Assessing Officer were justified in doubting the authenticity of the transactions.

Held:

The court interprets Section 68 broadly, emphasizing the initial onus on the assessee to prove by credible evidence the genuineness of the transaction, identity of creditors, and credit-worthiness of investors.

The Assessing Officer's independent and detailed enquiry justified skepticism, revealing non-existent investor companies and lack of credit-worthiness. The court upholds the AO's decision to add back the amounts to the assessee's income.

Decision: The court allows the appeal, affirming the Assessing Officer's decision to add back the amounts to the assessee's income. The judgment reinforces the importance of meeting the burden of proof under Section 68.

Facts:

The appellant, an 18-year-old student from an affluent background, met with a motor accident, resulting in a 40% disability. The initial compensation awarded was Rs. 8,48,000/- with 7% interest. The High Court later granted additional lumpsum damages of Rs. 50,000/-. In a review petition, the compensation was further enhanced by Rs. 24,000/- along with corresponding interest.

Issues:

The assessment of loss of future earning for a student not currently employed. The court also addressed the need for reforms in the compensation mechanism for road accident victims.

Held:

In cases where the victim is a student, the focus should be on career prospects and likely future earnings. The assessment depends on various factors, including family background, career choice, and available facilities.(Para 23)

The appellant, being a student at the time of the accident, belonged to a family of lawyers. His future earning potential was influenced by his family background and the prestigious school he attended. The loss of future earning was fixed at Rs. 5,000/- per month, and a multiplier of 18 was applied, resulting in Rs. 10,80,000/-. The appellant volunteered to donate this amount to a road safety organization.(Para 17, 24)

The court emphasized the need for a mechanism to ensure quick resolution of motor accident claims. It suggested the establishment of a Motor Accident Mediation Authority (MAMA) in every district.(Para 27)

Recommendations included the enactment of a Mediation Act, setting up MAMA, and the implementation of the Modified Claims Tribunal Agreed Procedure. NALSA was directed to set up a Motor Accident Mediation Cell. The government was urged to consider schemes for annuity certificates.(Para 39)

The appeals are disposed of(Para 40)

Facts:

The applicants approached the National Green Tribunal (NGT) contending that ecologically sensitive land allotted for a Software Technology Park by the Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board (KIADB) was causing environmental concerns. Allegations included encroachment on Rajakaluves (Storm Water Drains) and obtaining No Objection Certificates (NOC) by concealing material facts. The Tribunal constituted a committee to inspect the projects and imposed penalties on the project proponents.

Issues:

Maintainability of the application under Sections 14(1) and 14(3) of the National Green Tribunal Act.

Whether the application is barred by limitation.

The scope of appeal under Section 22 of the NGT Act.

Held:

Jurisdiction of the Tribunal (Para 39-46): The NGT Act provides jurisdiction under Sections 14, 15, and 16. Section 14 covers civil cases with substantial environmental questions arising from specified enactments. Section 15(1)(c) provides independent jurisdiction for restorative measures in environmental matters. The Tribunal's broad powers under Section 15(1)(c) are crucial for environmental protection. The legislative intent favors a broader interpretation to serve environmental interests.

Limitation (Para 47-48): The application was filed under Section 15, not Section 14, allowing a 5-year limitation period. The Tribunal rightly had jurisdiction, and the limitation was validly within this period. Section 18 recognizes the right to file applications under both Sections 14 and 15.

Factual Review and Scope of Appeal (Para 49-53): Section 22 allows an appeal on substantial questions of law as per Section 100 of the CPC. However, the appellants sought a factual review, impermissible under Section 22. The Tribunal's findings were based on documents, pleadings, Committee reports, and Expert Members' notes, making the directions and penalties valid and sustainable.

Facts:

Appellant (open category) and first respondent (Scheduled Caste) selected for the post of Town Planner on July 1, 1992.

Appellant promoted as Deputy Director of Town Planning (DDTP) on November 1, 2003.

First respondent promoted as DDTP on August 3, 2006.

Dispute arises in the promotional cadre of Joint Director of Town Planning (JDTP).

Issues:

Appellant claims 'catch-up' rule should govern, giving him seniority over the first respondent.

First respondent promoted as Director of Town Planning (DTP) on April 30, 2016.

Challenge to the applicability of Government Resolutions (GR) dated October 20, 1997, and March 20, 2003.

Held:

Preliminary objection rejected; the challenge to the Supreme Court not barred after the High Court's review decision.

GR dated October 20, 1997, and March 20, 2003, govern seniority between backward class and non-backward class candidates.

GR dated March 20, 2003, not abrogated by the 2004 Act; legislative intent not to override consequential seniority.

Challenge to the GR not entertained at this stage; lack of specific challenge before the Tribunal.

Eligibility must be considered on the vacancy occurrence date; appellant did not fulfill eligibility for DTP post on April 30, 2016.

Seniority and eligibility are distinct concepts; seniority cannot prevail if a senior lacks eligibility for promotion.

Appellant failed to challenge the first respondent's JDTP appointment; cannot challenge based on subsequent circular invalidation.

Judgment of the High Court does not warrant interference.

Decision: Civil Appeal Nos 2468-2470 of 2019 dismissed. Civil Appeal Nos 2471-2473 of 2019 also dismissed. Miscellaneous Applications (MAs) 2983-2985 of 2019 in Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 33086-33088 of 2017 disposed of in terms of the lead appeals.

Facts:

The FIR, which implicated the accused in offenses under Sections 307 and 34 and other related sections, was quashed by the High Court based on a compromise between the complainant and the accused.

The High Court's decision to quash the FIR did not take into account the non-compoundable nature of the alleged offenses, as per Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The seriousness of the charges, their social impact, and the antecedents of the accused were not adequately considered.

Issues:

The High Court's quashing of the FIR solely on the basis of a compromise raised concerns about the sustainability of such a decision.

The relevance and applicability of the decision in Shiji's case were questioned, as the High Court seemed to have misapplied the precedent to the facts of the current case.

Held:

The power under Section 482 of the Code to quash criminal proceedings for non-compoundable offenses can only be exercised when the offenses overwhelmingly have a civil character, such as those arising from commercial transactions or matrimonial disputes. However, this power should not be invoked in cases involving heinous and serious offenses with a significant impact on society.

Offenses under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act were categorized as heinous and serious, not private in nature, and impacting society at large. The quashing of criminal proceedings for such offenses solely based on a compromise was deemed inappropriate.

The High Court failed to consider the gravity of the offenses and the conduct of the accused while mechanically quashing the FIR based on a settlement. The antecedents of the accused were also overlooked.

Decision: The judgment and order of the High Court, quashing the criminal proceedings for offenses under Sections 307 and 34 IPC, were deemed unsustainable. The FIR, investigation, and criminal proceedings against the accused were directed to proceed.

In a separate Criminal Appeal (No. 350/2019), where the High Court quashed proceedings for offenses under Sections 323, 294, 308, and 34 IPC, the decision was similarly set aside. The FIR, investigation, and criminal proceedings against the accused were directed to continue.

Facts:

The case, involving M/S. Vijay Industries and the Commissioner of Income Tax, centers around the deduction claimed under section 80HH. The dispute arises from the conflicting interpretations of whether the deduction should be based on gross profits and gains or after factoring in depreciation and other elements.

Issues:

Whether the deduction under section 80HH is to be calculated on gross profits and gains, or if it should consider factors such as depreciation and unabsorbed depreciation. Additionally, the application of section 80AB is in question.

Held:

Assessment Years 1979-1980 and 1980-1981 are under consideration. Section 80HH explicitly specifies a deduction of 20% of 'profits and gains,' indicating it applies to gross profits and gains before computation under Sections 30 to 43D of the Act. Section 80AB, having a prospective effect from April 1, 1981, does not apply to the mentioned assessment years.

The court delves into the scheme of the Income Tax Act, highlighting the distinction between 'income' and 'profits and gains' under Chapter IV. It emphasizes the computation of income under the head 'profits and gains' from business or profession, as outlined in Sections 28 to 43D.( Paragraph 18)

Exploring Chapter VI-A of the Act, the court notes that certain deductions are provided as incentives. Section 80A specifies deductions from gross total income, with Sections 80C to 80U containing different subject matters and specific percentages for deductions.( Paragraph 19)

Facts:

The case involved a challenge to the selection of two Lieutenant Generals as Army Commanders. The appellants contested that the appointments were solely based on seniority, without a comparative evaluation of officers fulfilling the eligibility criteria.

Issues:

Whether the appointments of the third and fourth respondents as Army Commanders were based exclusively on seniority, in violation of the norms governing selection posts.

Held:

The judgment emphasizes that while seniority is a relevant consideration, the post of Army Commander remains a selection post. The appointing authority is not restricted to considering seniority alone but can take into account a range of relevant factors.

The submission that the appointments were based solely on seniority is refuted. The rejection of the statutory complaint does not imply a disregard for merit or a comparative evaluation.

The Chief of Army Staff (COAS) considered the service profile of seven officers and recommended the appointments, adhering to the prescribed criteria. The Defence Minister was informed of officers fulfilling eligibility conditions.

The appointments were duly approved by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC), and there was no violation of norms governing selection posts.

No breach of the Government of India (Transaction of Business) Rules, 1961, occurred. The ACC was apprised of material facts before approval.

The policy decision of 1992, indicating the suggestion of two senior eligible officers for each Army Commander vacancy, was deemed directory and did not prejudice the appellant.

The appellant and the third and fourth respondents have retired, rendering the appeal moot. The grievance is addressed on merits with no substance found.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, affirming the validity of the appointments of the third and fourth respondents as Army Commanders.

Facts:

The Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) were dismissed in limine without reasons. The issue at hand revolves around the maintainability of the review petitions filed subsequently. There was a perceived conflict in the views expressed in Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm case and Kunhayammed case, prompting a referral to a larger bench.

Issues:

The conflicting views in Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm case and Kunhayammed case.

The maintainability of review petitions after the dismissal of SLPs without reasons.

Held:

The Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm case was explained in the judgment in Kunhayammed case, and there is no conflict between the two. Kunhayammed case lays down the correct law and does not necessitate a reference to a larger bench. (Para 25)

The conclusions in Kunhayammed case are affirmed and reiterated, clarifying that an order refusing special leave to appeal does not attract the doctrine of merger. It does not substitute the order under challenge, and findings in the order bind the parties and subsequent proceedings by way of judicial discipline. (Para 27)

Following Kunhayammed case, the timing of filing a review petition (before or after the dismissal of SLP) does not affect its maintainability. (Para 27)

Civil Appeal No. 2432 of 2019, dismissed without reasons, should have had the review petition decided on merits. The order of November 12, 2008, is set aside, and the matter is remanded back to the High Court. (Para 28)

Civil Appeal No. 2433 of 2019, dismissed without a speaking order, allows the review petition filed after the dismissal of SLP. The matter is referred to the regular Board to decide on the merits. (Para 28)