Facts:

Dispute over ownership and possession of a portion of a house in Nagpur, Maharashtra.

House initially owned jointly, later sold to the appellants, who requested the respondent to vacate.

Civil suit filed by appellants for declaration of title and possession.

Trial Court dismissed suit, finding respondent had perfected title through adverse possession.

First Appellate Court reversed Trial Court's decision, decreeing in favor of appellants.

High Court set aside First Appellate Court's decision, restoring Trial Court's judgment.

Appellants appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether respondent's possession constituted adverse possession conferring ownership rights.

Whether High Court's decision was legally sustainable.

Held:

There is no assertion on the part of the original defendant to claim ownership over the suit property or its part to the exclusion of the whole world including its true owners.

Second, it is not pleaded as to when and in what manner such assertion began.

Third, it is also not pleaded as to whether the assertion of ownership right was against the public at large or it was against its true owners.

Lastly, the burden being on Ajabrao (original defendant) to plead and prove the adverse possession, he failed to discharge the burden by any documentary evidence.

The appellants, on becoming the owners, withdrew the permission, which they had a right being the owners on the strength of registered sale deed dated 11.10.1985, Ajabrao's possession in the part of suit house became unauthorized.

Decision: Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's decision and restoring the judgment of the First Appellate Court. The appellants' suit was decreed in their favor, affirming their title over the suit house and ordering Ajabrao to vacate the occupied portion.

Facts:

The appellants, direct recruits appointed as ETOs based on the J&K Combined Competitive Examination, challenged the retrospective promotion granted to the private respondents, promotee ETOs, from dates predating the appellants' appointments.

The private respondents were promoted as ETOs on the recommendation of the Public Service Commission, with retrospective promotion from various dates between 01.05.2002 and 01.01.2004.

Dispute arose regarding whether promotees could be granted retrospective promotion and seniority from dates anterior to their appointments when they hadn't served in the higher post.

Issues:

Whether retrospective promotions to promotee ETOs, placing them senior to direct recruits, are permissible under the relevant rules.

Whether service rendered by promotees in lower posts could equate to service in the higher post for the purpose of retrospective promotions.

Held:

The Court held that the rules governing promotions and seniority mandate that a person can be promoted retrospectively only if they have actually worked in the higher post during the relevant period.

Retrospective promotion from dates when individuals were not even appointed in the cadre violates established principles and rules, and can potentially infringe upon constitutional provisions.

The concept of probation entails actual work against the post, which must precede formal promotion. Thus, retrospective promotion without prior service in the higher post is untenable.

Relying on precedents and the interpretation of relevant rules, the Court concluded that the promotees were not entitled to retrospective promotion as they had not served in the higher post before their regular appointments.

The judgment of the Division Bench granting retrospective promotion to the promotees was set aside, and the decision of the learned Single Judge was restored, disallowing retrospective promotion to the promotees.

The decision aligns with established legal principles and safeguards against arbitrary retrospective promotions, ensuring fairness and adherence to the law. The appeals are accordingly allowed.

Facts:

The appellant, Vishnu Bhagwan Agrawal, had jute stock insured, which was destroyed by fire.

Disputes arose regarding the value of the stock and the coverage amount under the insurance policy.

Arbitration proceedings were initiated, leading to conflicting opinions from two arbitrators and subsequent referral to an Umpire.

The Umpire concluded that the insurance policy was effectively increased based on the appellant's communication with the insurance company and determined the value of the stock based on its purchase price.

Issues:

Whether the Umpire's award was valid and in accordance with the law.

Whether the insurance policy terms could be changed through conduct rather than a written agreement.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Umpire's decision was reasonable and based on the evidence presented. The Court found no legal error or misconduct apparent in the award. Therefore, the judgments of the lower courts were set aside, and the Umpire's award was upheld. The insurance company was directed to fulfill its obligations within three months. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The case revolves around the State Electricity Regulatory Commission's (SERC) exercise of inherent powers to extend the control period for a respondent company, Solar Semiconductor Power Company (India) Private Limited, under the Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission (Conduct of Business) Regulations, 2004. The dispute arises from the Commission's attempt to vary the terms of a power purchase agreement (PPA) between Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited (GUVNL) and the respondent company.

Issues:

Whether the Commission has the inherent power to extend control periods and vary contractual terms under the Electricity Act, 2003, and related regulations.

Additionally, the case raises questions regarding the Commission's authority to regulate tariffs and ensure consumer protection in the electricity sector.

Held:

The Court clarifies that the Commission has the authority to determine tariffs and regulate electricity procurement under specific provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003.

Regulations 80 to 82 of the Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission (Conduct of Business) Regulations, 2004, outline the Commission's inherent powers, which are limited to regulating its own procedures and preventing abuse of process.

The Court emphasizes that the Commission's inherent powers are not equivalent to those of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and can only be exercised where statutory provisions are silent.

While Regulation 81 allows the Commission to adopt procedures at variance with its regulations under special circumstances, any such deviation must be in conformity with the Electricity Act, 2003.

Regulation 82 grants the Commission powers to deal with matters not covered by regulations but does not authorize actions that conflict with statutory provisions.

The Court underscores the importance of consumer protection in electricity tariff determinations and highlights the procedural requirements for amending tariffs under the Electricity Act, 2003.

The Court concludes that the Commission cannot extend control periods or vary contractual terms beyond what is stipulated in the PPA, as doing so would exceed its statutory mandate.

Parties are granted liberty to pursue review under Section 94(1)(t) of the Electricity Act, 2003, for any errors or new information that may affect the Commission's previous decisions.

The judgment reaffirms the principles of upholding contractual obligations and ensuring fairness in regulatory proceedings within the electricity sector.

Facts:

The incident involved the assault and eventual death of the deceased, Hariya, who was attacked by a group of individuals while traveling on his cycle.

Witness testimonies, the FIR lodged by the deceased, and his dying declaration formed part of the prosecution's case.

The trial court acquitted all five accused, including Pooranlal and Gaya Prasad, due to failure in proving the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

Issues:

The justification of setting aside the acquittal of Pooranlal and Gaya Prasad by the High Court and convicting them under Section 304 Part II read with Section 34 IPC.

Held:

The Supreme Court found no merit in the appeal filed by Pooranlal and Gaya Prasad. The court upheld the High Court's judgment, stating that the findings were based on a proper appreciation of evidence.

The evidence presented, including the FIR and dying declaration, established the guilt of the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the conviction of Pooranlal and Gaya Prasad.

Gaya Prasad was ordered to surrender and complete his remaining jail sentence, while the jail sentence already undergone by Pooranlal was to be verified.

Facts:

The appellant participated in a public auction conducted by the State of Madhya Pradesh for the sale of government nazul plots. After winning the bid, the State imposed additional conditions which were not part of the original terms.

Issues:

Whether the appellant breached the contract, the validity of the additional conditions imposed by the State, and the legality of forfeiting the appellant's security deposit.

Held:

The court ruled that the appellant did not commit any breach of the terms and conditions of the original public notice. It was the State that committed breaches, and thus, had no right to forfeit the security deposit.( Para 19)

The court highlighted previous cases where specific clauses in contracts empowered one party to forfeit earnest money in the event of non-performance. Such clauses were absent in this case, leading to the conclusion that the State had no right to forfeit.( Para 36)

It was noted that the State did not suffer any monetary loss as a result of the appellant's actions. On the contrary, the State earned more money from the subsequent re-auction of the plot, strengthening the argument against forfeiture.( Para 41)

The court criticized the State's conduct, emphasizing the need for fair and honest dealings, particularly when the State interacts with individual citizens.( Para 42)

The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgments of the lower courts. It decreed the appellant's suit, ordering the State to refund the security deposit along with interest. Costs were also awarded to the appellant.( Para 46)

Facts: The case involves the assessment of tax liability on the business income of companies incorporated in the US, specifically Mis. E-Funds IT Solution Inc. The Revenue contends that this income should be taxable in India due to the existence of a Permanent Establishment (PE) in India.

Issues:

Whether the activities of the US companies in India constitute a Permanent Establishment (PE) as per the provisions of the Income Tax Act and the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA).

Whether the burden of proof lies on the Revenue to establish the existence of a PE in India for the foreign assessee.

Whether the outsourcing of work to India by the US companies gives rise to a fixed place PE or a service PE.

Held:

The judgment confirms that under Article 7(1) of the DTAA, the business income of companies incorporated in the US is taxable only in the US unless they have a Permanent Establishment (PE) in India. No specific finding in the assessment order or appellate orders established the existence of a fixed place of business in India put at the disposal of these companies. (Para 10, 11)

The burden of proving the existence of a PE in India lies initially on the Revenue. (Para 10)

The activities of the Indian company were limited to providing support services, which did not amount to the creation of a fixed place PE. Similarly, the conditions for a service PE were not met as none of the customers of the US companies were located in India or received services in India. (Para 16, 17)

The Revenue failed to establish that the Indian company acted as an agent of the US companies, as required for an agency PE. (Para 21)

The arm's length principle has been satisfied in the case, mitigating further profits attributable to a potential PE in India. (Para 21)

Decision: The judgment dismisses the appeals, affirming that the business income of the US companies is not taxable in India due to the absence of a Permanent Establishment (PE).

Facts:

The case involved an appeal before the Supreme Court against an order of the Recovery officer under the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (RDB Act). The appeal was filed beyond the prescribed period of 30 days, and the question before the Court was whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 could be invoked to condone the delay.

Issues:

Whether the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply to proceedings under Section 30(1) of the RDB Act.

Whether the Tribunal has the power to condone delay in preferring an appeal beyond the prescribed period under Section 30(1) of the RDB Act.

Held:

The Court held that the proceedings under the RDB Act are before a statutory Tribunal and not a court, and therefore, the Tribunal does not have inherent power to condone delay unless expressly conferred by the statute. (Para 11)

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies only to proceedings before a court and does not extend to proceedings before a Tribunal, unless expressly provided for by the statute. (Para 12)

Section 24 of the RDB Act applies only to original applications made under Section 19 of the Act and does not extend to appeals under Section 30(1) of the Act. (Para 12)

The legislative intent for the exclusion of extension of time by the Tribunal in preferring an appeal under Section 30 of the Act was express. (Para 14)

Therefore, the prescribed period of 30 days under Section 30(1) of the RDB Act for preferring an appeal against the order of the Recovery officer cannot be condoned by application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. (Para 14)

The appeals were dismissed on these grounds. (Para 16)

Facts:

The case involves the requisition and acquisition of land for the development of Calcutta. The property was requisitioned in 1979, and this requisition continued for 14 years. A Single Judge of the High Court, through an order dated 10.03.1993, directed the authorities to acquire the properties within 6 months. However, there was a delay in initiating land acquisition proceedings. Subsequently, a notification under section 4(1)(a) for acquisition of premises was issued. The Division Bench of the High Court held that the requisition under section 3(1) had lapsed, deeming the acquisition illegal.

Issues:

Whether the requisition of the property automatically lapsed upon the expiration of the specified time in the earlier court order?

What is the effect of the statutory power to acquire the land in light of the court's previous order?

Is the principle of res judicata applicable in this case?

Held:

The requisition of the property did not automatically lapse upon the expiration of the specified time in the earlier court order.

Requisition continues until an order of release is passed under section 6, and possession is delivered.

The statutory power to acquire the land was not stifled by the earlier court order.

The High Court's decision to quash the acquisition was deemed erroneous.

The Court set aside the Division Bench's order and restored the Single Bench's order.

The principle of res judicata is not applicable in this case as statutory action was not stifled by the earlier court order. The appeal is allowed.