Facts:

The prosecution established harassment under Section 498-A, alleging dowry demand as the motive. The deceased was subjected to harassment to coerce her and her parents to meet an unlawful monetary demand.

Issues:

Whether the proved cruelty under Section 498-A, along with the suicide within seven years of marriage, warrants a conviction under Section 306 with the aid of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act.

Whether the prosecution sufficiently demonstrated that the accused's actions directly led to the deceased's suicide.

Held:

The evidence of PW-10, the deceased's father, corroborated by PW-13, substantiates the harassment for an unlawful demand under Section 498-A.( Para 11)

Mere guilt under Section 498-A and death within seven years doesn't automatically lead to Section 306 conviction. The prosecution must establish a direct link between the accused's act and the suicide.( Para 27)

The prosecution failed to prove that the cruelty left the deceased with no choice but suicide. No evidence showed immediate cruelty prior to the suicide, and a two-month gap existed between the last visit and the suicide.( Paras 33-34)

Unlike previous cases, the charge didn't specify that the deceased was driven to suicide due to harassment. Conviction under Section 498-A is maintained, but the conviction under Section 306 is set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the Section 306 charge.( Paras 35-37)

Facts:

The case involves the prosecution of the Municipal Commissioner and Chief Officer of the City Municipal Council by the Karnataka State Pollution Control Board for offenses under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974.

Issues:

Whether City Municipal Councils can be considered a Department of the Government.

The liability of Municipal Commissioners and Chief Officers under the Water Act.

The interpretation of Sections 47, 48, and 49 of the Water Act.

Held:

The Water Act, 1974, enacted by Parliament, aims to prevent and control water pollution. It establishes Boards for these purposes and confers powers on them. (Para 7)

Section 48 of the Water Act is applicable when offenses are committed by any Department of Government. City Municipal Councils, created under the Karnataka Municipalities Act, are considered bodies corporate, distinct from government departments. (Paras 11, 15)

Municipal Councils, including City Municipal Councils, are created by State enactments and are controlled by the Government, receiving financial assistance. However, they are not considered Departments of the Government. (Para 14, 18)

The Scheme of the Water Act indicates separate representation for the Government, local authorities, and companies or corporations owned, controlled, or managed by the State Government. Municipalities, including City Municipal Councils, do not qualify as Departments of the Government. (Paras 15)

Article 243P of the Constitution defines "Municipality" as an institution of self-Government. City Municipal Councils cannot be treated as Departments of the State Government. They are entrusted with Municipal functions, including ensuring a clean environment and controlling pollution. (Paras 16, 18)

Section 47 of the Water Act pertains to offenses by companies, defining "company" broadly as "any body corporate." City Municipal Councils fall under this definition. (Paras 19, 20)

Section 47 can be applied to offenses by body corporates like City Municipal Councils. The Karnataka State Pollution Control Board's complaint under Section 49 for the prosecution of Municipal Commissioners and Chief Officers is deemed appropriate. (Paras 29, 31)

Facts:

The case revolves around an agreement to sell a disputed property in 1986 between the original vendor and original vendees. Subsequently, in 1987, the original vendees executed agreements to sell different portions of the property to the respondents in this case. Legal proceedings ensued, involving withdrawal of suits, impleadment applications, and amendments seeking execution of the 1986 agreement.

Issues:

Privity of contract between the appellants (original vendors) and respondent No.1 (vendees in 1987 agreement).

Assignability of contracts without the consent of the promisee.

Validity and enforceability of the 1987 agreements.

The impact of withdrawal of the suit for specific performance of the 1986 agreement.

Held:

The court observed that there was no privity of contract between the appellants and respondent No.1. To seek specific performance, respondent No.1 had to sue as 'representatives-in-interest' under Section 15(b) of the Specific Relief Act.

The term 'representative-in-interest' includes the assignee of a contractual interest, but assignability requires the consent of the other party. Section 15(b) clarifies conditions for specific performance by an assignee.

Contracts may involve intertwined rights and obligations. Promisors cannot contract out their responsibility to a stranger without the promisee's consent, especially in contracts of a personal nature.

The 1986 agreement, while not expressly barring assignability, required consideration of the context and the parties' intentions regarding assignability.

The 1986 agreement was a contract combining mutual rights and obligations. The 1987 agreements were not a simple assignment but involved assuming obligations akin to a development agreement.

Respondent No.1 could seek specific performance only by proving appellants' knowledge and consent. The court emphasized that the 1987 agreements were contingent and unenforceable after the cancellation of the 1986 agreement.

Consent for assignment was not established, and the 1987 agreements were void. Respondent No.1 could not seek specific performance against the appellants.

The original vendees' rights under the 1986 agreement lapsed due to non-payment. The withdrawal of the specific performance suit indicated an abandonment of rights.

The court acknowledged collusion to frustrate the 1987 agreements and directed compensation for the loss of opportunity and inconvenience suffered by the respondents.

Facts:

Appellant, a resident of village Saini, objects to the attempted takeover of a 'common-pond' by private entity Sharp.

Appellant claims the water bodies were vested in Gram Sabhas per Section 117 of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950.

Appellant alleges environmental clearances not obtained, and statutory authorities neglected to assess the project's impact.

Disputed land's status contested due to the repeal of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, by the UP Revenue Code, 2006.

Issues:

Legality of the allotment of water bodies to private industrialists.

Repeal of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, and its impact on the disputed land.

Held:

The repeal of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, and vesting of ponds in the State by the UP Revenue Code, 2006, does not change the nature of land or defeat local rights.

Schemes extinguishing water bodies, as per the 2016 Government Order, are violative of Constitutional principles and struck down.

Allotment of water bodies to Respondent No. 6 and any similar third party declared illegal and quashed.

The court directs restoration, maintenance, and protection of subject-water bodies in village Saini, removing obstructions from the catchment area within three months.

Facts:

Genpact India Private Limited disputed the assessment order related to Section 115QA of the Income Tax Act, denying liability. The High Court disposed of the writ petition, citing the availability of an alternative remedy under Section 246A.

Issues:

Whether determination under Section 115QA falls under Section 246(1)(a)?

Is an appeal maintainable against the determination of liability under Section 115QA?

Is a writ petition under Article 226 maintainable when an alternative remedy exists under Section 246A?

Held:

Scope of Sections 246(1)(a) and 246A(1)(a):

The expression "denies his liability to be assessed" in Section 246(1)(a) encompasses cases where the assessee denies liability under the Act. It is not confined to issues arising solely from assessment proceedings under Section 143 or 144.

Section 115QA falls within the ambit of the first contingency in Section 246(1)(a), involving determination of liability or quantification of the distributed income. The scope of such expression should not be restricted to issues related to Sections 143 or 144.

Appeal against Determination under Section 115QA:

An appeal is maintainable against the determination of liability under Section 115QA. The issues may extend beyond the company's liability to include questions of extent and computation. Denying an appeal would deprive the assessee of regular channels of challenges available under the Act.

Maintainability of Writ Petition under Article 226:

The High Court rightly refused to entertain the writ petition. Preliminary objections were not conclusively disposed of, and the matter was still open. The High Court's consideration of the alternate remedy issue was not incorrect, as the preliminary objection had not been conclusively addressed.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed. The Court upholds the High Court's decision, stating that an appeal is maintainable against the determination of liability under Section 115QA, and the High Court rightly refused to entertain the writ petition.

Facts:

The trustees settled a plot of land in 1921 for the construction of a choultry.

The choultry was found inadequate during religious festivals, leading to a Deed of Settlement in 1926.

Bagyammal was entrusted to construct an additional choultry, specifically for pilgrims visiting the Devasthanam.

Clear terms in the deed restrained encumbrance, mandated public use, and maintenance by Bagyammal and her successors.

Issues:

Whether the Deed of Settlement dated 4 June 1926 constitutes a 'specific endowment' under Section 6(19) of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act 1959.

Held:

The definition of 'specific endowment' in Section 6(19) is attracted as the property was endowed for a religious charity in the temple. The Deed's terms show a clear intention for public use, restraining encumbrance. The Trial Court's conclusion was in error, and the High Court correctly reversed it. The appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

The case involved the interception of one 'A' carrying 8 Kgs. of gold of foreign origin valued at Rs. 2.71 crores by the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Kolkata Zonal Unit. 'A' indicated his engagement with the detenus, who were later apprehended. Bail was rejected, and they were remanded to judicial custody.

Issues:

The Detaining Authority passed detention orders against individuals already in judicial custody. The High Court quashed the detention orders, challenging the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority.

Held:

The Detaining Authority, while passing the detention orders, was aware of the detainees' custody, the possibility of their release on bail, and the likelihood of their involvement in prejudicial activities. The Supreme Court held that even if a person is in judicial custody, they can be detained under relevant acts, provided there is a proper application of mind by the Detaining Authority.

The detenus were indeed granted bail on the same day the High Court quashed the detention orders. The court justified the Detaining Authority's apprehension about the possibility of release on bail. The court pointed out procedural discrepancies in the forwarding of 'A's retraction petition, asserting that the Detaining Authority was not aware of it when passing the detention orders.

Writ petitions challenging the detention orders were dismissed based on the judgment in Criminal Appeal. The court emphasized the error of the High Court in interfering with the Detaining Authority's subjective satisfaction.

Facts:

Ownership of land by 'S.'

'S' had two sons, 'J' and 'P.'

Appellant's father predeceased 'J' and 'S.'

After 'S's death, 'J' and 'P' partitioned the property.

The suit property came into the exclusive share of 'J.'

'J' executed a registered sale deed in favor of his grandsons.

Appellant sought a share in the property.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, being the daughter of a predeceased son, has a claim to the ancestral property.

The validity of the partition and the registered sale deed.

Held:

Considering the factual matrix, the court noted that 'S' inherited ancestral property, and the appellant's father predeceased him in 1957. As per Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, during 'J's lifetime, the appellant's father could not have succeeded to the property. The court held that the appellant, being the daughter, couldn't claim any right higher than that of her father.

The court affirmed the view that the grandchild is excluded from heirs in Class-I. After the partition in 1967 and the registered sale deed in 1979, which were unchallenged, the suit property became the exclusive share of 'J.' The court upheld the decision that the appellant couldn't claim a higher right than her father.

Facts:

The respondents were appointed after a public advertisement and selected through interviews, working since 1997-8.

Initial contractual appointments extended over time.

Posts for Entomologists were created on 14 July 2008, and respondents were working against seven out of twelve sanctioned posts.

The Tribunal considered the outbreak of dengue as a reason for the initial engagement.

Issues:

Regularization and monetary benefits for the appointed Entomologists.

Dispute regarding the starting date for granting monetary benefits.

Held:

The court declined to entertain the appeal on regularization.

Monetary benefits granted from the date of the Central Administrative Tribunal's judgment, i.e., from 1 October 2015.

Respondents entitled to notional pay fixation and continuity of service.

Compliance ordered within two months from the date of the order.

The appeal is disposed of with the specified modifications.