Facts:

The appellants leased their property to the Government, which was requisitioned, derequisitioned, and again requisitioned. The Estate Officer issued an eviction notice under ss. 4(1) and 4(2)(b)(ii) of the Public Premises Act, treating the appellants as unauthorized occupants. The High Court upheld the notice.

Issues:

Whether there is a bona fide dispute on the ownership of the property, and if so, does the Estate Officer have jurisdiction to invoke eviction powers under the Public Premises Act?

Held:

The appellants raised a bona fide dispute on ownership. The Estate Officer lacks jurisdiction to use summary eviction powers when a genuine dispute exists. Union of India admitted the dispute and initially expressed intent to pursue dispossession through a civil suit.

Quashing the resumption notice by the High Court meant Union of India couldn't resort to any summary remedy for eviction. The Civil Court is the proper venue for deciding ownership disputes, not summary proceedings under the Public Premises Act.

The principle of merger doesn't apply as the superior court didn't delve into the merits decided by the subordinate court. The order of the subordinate court holds unless the superior court specifically addresses the merits.

The court referred to Express Newspapers case, holding that A.P. Sen J.'s view is the majority view, binding under Art. 141. The appellants genuinely disputed ownership, and the Estate Officer lacked jurisdiction under the Public Premises Act.

Facts:

Appellants and two others were prosecuted for offenses under Sections 323, 324, 452, 504, and 506 IPC.

Acquitted by the Judicial Magistrate, Mathura, but the State appealed.

Appellate Court convicted appellants, sentencing them to rigorous imprisonment and fines.

Appellants filed a criminal revision before the High Court, which was dismissed ex parte.

Issues:

Validity of High Court's dismissal of the revision without assigning reasons.

Held:

The High Court failed to apply its judicial mind while dismissing the revision, lacking justification for interference. (Para 11)

The expectation was for the High Court to consider factual and legal aspects before passing appropriate orders, which was not fulfilled. (Para 12)

The impugned order lacked reasoning, making it improper for disposal in such manner. (Para 12)

Decision:

The appeal was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the case was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration of the revision petition within six months. (Para 14)

FACTS:

A First Information Report (FIR) was lodged regarding the fatal assault on the cousin of the Informant on 23.02.1997.

The trial involved 17 accused persons, including the present appellants, charged with offences under various sections of the IPC.

The prosecution witnesses provided inconsistent testimonies, and the appellants were not named in the initial reporting by PW-2.

The Trial Court found all accused guilty, leading to an appeal in the High Court.

ISSUES:

Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt.

Whether the appellants were named in the initial reporting and subsequent testimonies.

HELD:

The judgement highlights the statements of prosecution witnesses, including PW-2, PW-3, and PW-4, presenting their accounts of the incident.( Para 5)

The Court acknowledges the principle of vicarious liability but emphasizes the need for clarity in establishing a person's membership in an unlawful assembly.( Para 10)

Noting the absence of the appellants storming inside the house, the Court questions the sufficiency of evidence to establish their involvement in the crime.( Para 11)

The Court observes the lack of naming appellants in the FIR by PW-2 and the absence of attributing specific overt acts to them in his subsequent testimony. PW-3 and PW-4 did not name the appellants, raising doubts about their involvement.Considering the factual aspects, the Court concludes that guilt is not established beyond reasonable doubt, granting the benefit of doubt to the appellants.The appeals are allowed, and the appellants are acquitted of all charges. They are to be set at liberty unless required for any other offence. ( Para 12)

Facts:

Appellant institution, Dayal Nursing College, Gwalior, claimed to be running B.Sc (Nursing) since 2006.

Recognition for B.Sc (Nursing) and M.Sc (Nursing) courses for the academic session 2018-19 denied by Madhya Pradesh Nurses Registration Council (SNRC).

Writ Petition filed, disposed of on 13.11.2018, directing SNRC inspection and recognition decision by 20th November 2018.

Appeal filed challenging the order, seeking recognition for academic session 2018-19.

Issues:

Did the appellant institution apply to SNRC within the last date (22nd December 2018) for recognition?

If applied, was the application complete in all respects?

Did the appellant institution provide necessary documents along with the application form?

Did the institution have its own Parent Hospital, a prerequisite for recognition?

Was the appeal seeking recognition for B.Sc (Nursing) or M.Sc (Nursing) or both?

Held:

The appellant failed to prove the completion of the online application form with required particulars.

No proof provided that necessary documents were filed along with the application form.

The affiliation certificate for M.Sc (Nursing) granted on 02.02.2019, after the last date for application submission.

Lack of affiliation certificate at the time of application submission makes the institution ineligible.

The institution did not have its own Parent Hospital, violating the Indian Nursing Council's communication dated 16.04.2018.

The appeal is devoid of merit; the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court stands.

Facts:

The case revolves around a dispute over the construction of a common wall between two houses. The appellant, Nandlal Baviskar, was convicted under Section 302 IPC for murdering Lakhichand, the deceased. The altercation arose from frequent quarrels between the appellant and Dilip Waman Baviskar, due to expenses related to the construction of the common wall.

Issues:

Whether the act falls under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, indicating a sudden fight in the heat of passion, justifying modification of the appellant's conviction under Section 304 Part II IPC.

Held:

To fall under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, the act must be without premeditation, in a sudden fight, without the offender taking undue advantage, and not acting in a cruel or unusual manner. Disproportionate retaliation or undue advantage would disqualify the application of this exception.( Para 12)

The scope of Exception 4 was reiterated, emphasizing the need for the act to be committed in a sudden fight without premeditation and without undue advantage. The fight must be with the person killed.( Para 13)

The court analyzed the facts, emphasizing the proximity of the two incidents, the exchange of abuse, and the subsequent stick blow by the deceased's brother. The court concluded that the act was part of the same sudden quarrel, falling within Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC.( Para 14)

Despite the use of a dangerous weapon (gupti), the appellant inflicted a single injury in the heat of passion. The court held that the case falls under Exception 4, and the conviction under Section 302 IPC is liable to be modified under Section 304 Part II IPC.( Para 15)

The appeal was partly allowed, modifying the appellant's conviction to Section 304 Part II IPC, and the appellant was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for twelve years.( Para 16)

Facts:

The dispute involves a 4/5th share in the land measuring 643 Bighas and 4 Biswas in village Umedpura.

The land was subjected to ceiling proceedings under the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972, and the Prescribed Authority passed an order on 17.10.1978.

Two civil suits (C.S. No. 24-C/1979 and C.S. No. 62-C/1979) were filed by different sets of persons claiming interest in the land.

The plaintiffs in both suits challenged the order dated 17.10.1978, seeking a declaration that it is null and void.

Issues:

Whether the civil suits challenging the order of the Prescribed Authority under the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972, are barred by Section 26(b) of the Act?

Held:

The High Court was justified in holding that both civil suits were barred by Section 26 of the Act. Section 26(a) and (b) expressly bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain suits related to the transfer of land affecting the government's right to surplus area and to settle matters under the Act. (Para 17)

Section 26(b) specifically bars filing a civil suit to examine the legality of the order passed by the Prescribed Authority under the Act. The Civil Court's jurisdiction is expressly taken away, and the remedy for the plaintiffs lies in filing appeal/revision under Section 18 of the Act. (Para 20)

The High Court's decision to dismiss the suits as barred by Section 26 of the Act is affirmed. The appeals lack merit and are accordingly dismissed.( Para 21)

Facts:

The complaint was filed by Ms. Deepti Singh on behalf of herself and her two minor children against the Kerala Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. (KTDC) for an alleged deficiency of service.

The deceased, Satyendra Pratap Singh, drowned in the swimming pool of Hotel Samudra at Kovalam during a family holiday.

The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) found a deficiency of service, attributing the cause to the lifeguard's dual role as a bartender, leading to distraction and a delayed response.

Issues:

Whether there was a breach of the duty of care owed by the hotel, particularly due to the lifeguard's additional role as a bartender.

The adequacy of compensation awarded by the NCDRC for the death of the deceased.

Held:

The court upheld the NCDRC's finding of a deficiency of service, emphasizing that a dedicated lifeguard is essential for ensuring the safety of the pool and guests.

The court considered factors such as the deceased's income, future prospects, and the loss suffered by the family in upholding the awarded compensation of Rs. 62,50,000.

Modification was made regarding the payment of interest, directing that the awarded amount shall carry interest at the rate of 9% per month from the date of the institution of the consumer complaint till the date of payment.

Civil Appeal No. 6038 of 2015 was dismissed, and Civil Appeal No. 8000 of 2016 was allowed to the extent indicated in the judgment.

No order as to costs was issued.

Facts:

The appellant issued seven cheques of Rs. 3 lakhs each in favor of the complainant, which were subsequently dishonored. The Trial Court dismissed the complaints, but the High Court reversed this decision, convicting the appellant under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Issues:

The dishonor of the cheques, the presumption under sections 118 and 139, and the appellant's attempt to rebut this presumption.

Held:

The appellate court, while recognizing the general restrictions on upsetting a judgment of acquittal, noted that a different approach is warranted in matters related to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The accused has the burden to establish a probable defense to rebut the presumption, and the appellate court is entitled to examine the evidence to determine if the preponderance favors the accused.

The appellant could not deny his signature on the cheques, and all basic elements of Section 138 and related sections were evident. The Trial Court had drawn the requisite presumption. The onus shifted to the appellant to establish a probable defense.

Despite drawing the presumption under Section 139, the Trial Court questioned the lack of evidence regarding the source of funds for the loan and the examination of relevant witnesses. This approach was inconsistent with legal principles.

The appellant's defense that he had a monetary transaction with another party was not substantiated with adequate evidence. The suggestion that his signatures were on a blank stamp paper was deemed remote and uncertain.

The Trial Court's decision suffered from perversity and a fundamental error of approach. The observations made by the Trial Court were not in conformity with the presumption existing in favor of the complainant under Sections 118 and 139.

The findings of the High Court convicting the appellant under Section 138 were confirmed. Monetary penalties were maintained, but the sentence of imprisonment was modified. The appellant was directed to pay a fine of double the amount of each cheque within two months, with imprisonment for one year in case of default.

Facts:

The High Court allowed the petition filed by respondent Nos. 2 to 17, quashing FIR I-CR No. 67 of 2017 in part, specifically in relation to offences under Sections 392, 395, and 397 IPC. The appellant challenged this decision.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the FIR at a preliminary stage.

Whether the FIR disclosed prima facie allegations of the concerned offences.

Held:

The Division Bench, after hearing both parties, concluded that the High Court erred in allowing the petition and quashing the FIR partly. Instead, the court should have directed the Investigating Officer (IO) to conduct a proper investigation based on the FIR and file a charge sheet accordingly. The FIR had prima facie allegations of the concerned offences, and quashing it prematurely was not justified.

The High Court's order quashing the FIR was based on the belief that even if the prosecution's case was true, the essential elements for offences under Sections 392, 395, and 397 IPC were not established. The High Court should have allowed the investigation to proceed.( Paragraph 7)

The Division Bench found that the High Court erred in entertaining the petition and allowing it in part. No proper investigation by the IO had concluded, and the impugned order intervened prematurely, resulting in quashing the FIR concerning serious offences.( Paragraph 8-9)

The court criticized the High Court's approach, emphasizing that quashing the FIR for more serious offences without allowing proper investigation was improper.( Paragraph 10-11)

The court set aside the impugned order and directed the IO to conduct a full and proper investigation into the allegations made in the original FIR. The IO was to file an additional charge sheet for any other offences found during the investigation within three months.( Paragraph 14)