Facts:

The case involves a challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 13(2) of the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011.

The appellant contested an order of the Rent Control Tribunal and appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

The primary issue revolved around the legislative competence of the Chhattisgarh State Legislature in enacting Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act.

Whether Section 13(2) providing for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court from orders passed by the Rent Control Tribunal is within the legislative powers of the State.

Held:

The State Legislature lacked legislative competence to enact Section 13(2) of the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011. Therefore, Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act is declared ultra vires the Constitution of India, null and void, and of no effect. (Para 89) [1127-E]

The analysis of legislative powers under Article 246 highlighted that while the State Legislature can enact laws related to land tenures, including the relation of landlord and tenant, it cannot legislate to confer appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court. Entry 64 of the State List and Entry 46 of the Concurrent List expressly debar the State Legislature from legislating with respect to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. (Para 54) [1121-B-C]

The Supreme Court, established under Article 124, does not have a provision for direct appeal from an order of a Tribunal constituted under state law. Articles 262(2) and 348 further demonstrate that matters pertaining to the Supreme Court fall exclusively within the legislative domain of the Union Parliament. (Para 41) [1118-F-G]

Article 323B(3)(d) does not empower a State Legislature to expand the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by enacting a provision for further statutory appeal to the Supreme Court from an order of an Appellate Tribunal. (Para 55) [1121-D]

Section 13(2) providing for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court is not ancillary or incidental to the power of the Chhattisgarh State Legislature to enact a Rent Control Act. It overtly transgresses the limits of its legislative power. (Para 49) [1120-C]

While Article 136 of the Constitution grants discretionary power to the Supreme Court to interfere in appropriate cases, Section 13(2) mandates the Supreme Court to consider an appeal, which goes beyond the legislative competence of the State. (Para 57) [1121-E]

The second proviso to Article 200, which requires the Governor to reserve a bill for Presidential consideration if it derogates from the powers of the High Court, is not attracted in the case of Section 13(2) since it does not derogate from any power of the High Court. (Para 68) [1123-B-F]

The power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is supervisory and not appellate. The High Court's interference is restricted to cases of patent error of law, perversity, arbitrariness, lack of jurisdiction, and usurpation of powers. The writ jurisdiction cannot be converted into an alternative appellate forum. (Para 86) [1126-G-H; 1127-A-C]

Facts:

The appellant, a judicial officer of the rank of Additional District and Sessions Judge, challenged his compulsory retirement order dated 03.05.2016 under Rule 56(C) of the U. P. Fundamental Rules. The order was based on charges related to his acquittal of an accused in a criminal case and subsequent vigilance inquiries. The appellant's service records, including Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs), were scrutinized at various levels.

Issues:

Whether the order of compulsory retirement was justified based on the judicial officer's acquittal in a criminal case.

Whether the judicial officer's service records and punishment of censure warranted compulsory retirement.

Held:

The Court held that the vigilance inquiries and scrutiny of service records, including the punishment of censure, were conducted properly. The adverse remarks and the appellant's disposal of work were considered, and the Full Court's decision to recommend compulsory retirement was deemed justifiable.( Paragraphs 8 and 9)

The Court emphasized the limited scope of judicial review in cases of compulsory retirement, restricting interference to instances of arbitrariness, capriciousness, malafides, or overlooking relevant materials. It underscored that principles of natural justice have no application in such cases.( Paragraph 11)

The judgment stressed the high standards of integrity expected from judicial officers, highlighting their role as pillars of the justice system. It asserted the necessity for strict judgment standards in assessing judicial conduct.( Paragraph 13)

In conclusion, the Court found no grounds for interference with the order of compulsory retirement, thereby dismissing the appeal.( Paragraph 14)

Facts:

The prosecution case revolves around the appellant receiving a phone call from the second respondent, her daughter's husband, reporting the alleged suicide of the victim-deceased. Upon reaching the scene, the appellant discovered the deceased's body, which had been bathed and buried by the second respondent and his relatives. Subsequently, injury marks were observed on the body. A chargesheet was filed against a friend of the second respondent, and during the trial, the appellant moved an application under Section 319 to summon the second respondent based on her substantive evidence.

Issues:

The summoning order for the second respondent. The trial court had allowed the application under Section 319, but the High Court set aside this order.

Held:

During the appellant's cross-examination, she provided details about the harassment her daughter faced from the second respondent. The trial court, after a careful evaluation of evidentiary material, summoned the second respondent, considering the incident's occurrence within the matrimonial home. The High Court's interference was deemed unjustified, as the evidence met the threshold required for summoning under Section 319.

The trial court's order was based on the principles outlined in the Constitution Bench's decision in Hardeep Singh, and reasons were provided, including the reliance on Section 114 of the Evidence Act. The High Court's dismissal of the order on the pretext of exploring the cause of death was criticized. Section 319 empowers the court to proceed against a person appearing guilty based on emerging evidence during the trial.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the trial court's order for summoning the second respondent was valid, while the High Court's interference was unsustainable.

Facts:

Appellant, a tanker driver, met with a severe accident resulting in the loss of one leg and permanent disability.

Filed a claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act against the Truck Owner and the Insurance Company.

Dispute over the assessment of functional disability and compensation.

Issues:

Assessment of the appellant's functional disability.

Determination of compensation amount under Section 4 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Reimbursement of medical expenses.

Held:

The Court affirmed the High Court's decision to assess the appellant's income at Rs. 4,000/- p.m.

The functional disability of the appellant was assessed at 100%, considering the permanent incapacity to work as a driver.

Relevant factor used was 201.66 as per Schedule IV to the Act.

Compensation payable to the appellant determined as Rs. 4,83,984/- under Section 4 of the Act.

Awarded a lump sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- towards hospitalization and medical expenses.

Directed the Insurance Company to pay the enhanced compensation with interest at 6% p.a., calculated from one month after the accident until the date of payment, within 4 weeks.

The Civil Appeal stands allowed.

Facts:

Two FIRs filed - one by the petitioner against Respondent No.7, an IPS Officer, for alleged sexual assault and another by Respondent No.7's mother alleging pressure for money by the petitioner's family.

Petitioner sought the transfer of investigation to an independent agency, suspension of Respondent No.7, and protection for herself and her family.

Issues:

Fairness of investigation by Delhi Police due to Respondent No.7's police background.

Alleged attempts to deceive the court and suppression of material facts.

Held:

The investigation into the petitioner's FIR was conducted fairly by a Special Investigation Team.

No need to transfer the investigation to a Central Agency.

Observation of discrepancies in the petitioner's statements regarding an alleged car incident, leading to the issuance of a suo motu contempt notice.

The matter to be considered on its merits, and the charge-sheet to be evaluated by the court.

Facts:

The case involves appeals against orders in applications under Section 151 read with Order VII Rule 10 CPC and Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, where parties sought the return of petitions filed under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The critical issue was the maintainability of such appeals.

Issues:

Whether appeals filed in this case fall within the scope of Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, 1996.

Determination of the juridical seat of the arbitral proceedings – New Delhi or Faridabad.

Held:

Maintainability of Appeals (Para 15-22): The court emphasized that Section 37(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 explicitly limits the grounds on which appeals can be filed. Appeals are restricted to orders falling under sub-clauses (a), (b), and (c) of Section 37(1). The crucial point highlighted was that the refusal to set aside an arbitral award must be under Section 34, following an adjudication on the grounds specified in that section. In the present case, there was no adjudication under Section 34. The appeals, having arisen from orders related to jurisdiction and return of the petition, did not fall within the purview of Section 37 and were deemed not maintainable.

3.2 Juridical Seat of Arbitral Proceedings (Para 2.5-2.17): The court delved into the concept of the 'juridical seat' of arbitral proceedings, emphasizing its significance in regulating arbitral proceedings. It pointed out that once a seat is designated by agreement, it operates akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. The analysis involved a detailed interpretation of Sections 20, 31(4), and 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, along with a comparison with the UNCITRAL Model Law. The court clarified that the determination of the 'seat' is crucial, as it vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Courts at that location for arbitral proceedings.

Express Designation and Venue (Para 2.13-2.14): The court outlined that an express designation of a 'venue,' coupled with a lack of designation of any alternative place as the 'seat,' indicates that the stated 'venue' is the juridical seat of arbitral proceedings. The use of terms like "arbitration proceedings shall be held" reinforces this interpretation. In an international context, the application of supranational rules governing arbitration further supports the designation of the 'venue' as the 'seat.'

Application to the Present Case (Para 2.15-2.17): The court applied these principles to the arbitration clause in the present case. Notably, Clause 67.3(ii) specified that disputes with a foreign contractor would be resolved under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The court concluded that the clause designates either New Delhi or Faridabad as the 'seat' based on the application of supranational rules. Importantly, even when the proceedings were held in New Delhi, the court determined that both parties had chosen New Delhi as the 'seat,' giving the Courts at New Delhi exclusive jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings.

4. DECISION: The impugned judgment was set aside, affirming that New Delhi was the 'seat' of arbitration, and the Section 34 petition was ordered to be presented in the Courts in New Delhi, as initially determined by the Special Commercial Court at Gurugram.

Facts:

The appellants are the heirs of Aranganathan, who died in a motor accident.

The appellants filed a claim petition seeking compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

The Tribunal awarded compensation, which was partly modified by the High Court in appeal.

The deceased was a businessman with income from various sources, including business and agricultural land.

Issues:

Determination of the deceased's annual income for the purpose of calculating compensation.

Whether the High Court erred in not considering certain contractual work and solvency certificates in computing the deceased's income.

Whether depreciation costs on fixed assets should be added to the income.

Calculation of monthly income of the deceased.

Held:

The income tax return is a statutory document, and the High Court's reliance on it to determine annual income is justified.

The method adopted by the Tribunal in determining agricultural income is not sustainable; the High Court's approach is correct.

Depreciation on fixed assets cannot be added to the income for computing compensation.

Additional amount added to the annual income based on a prepaid license fee reflected in a balance sheet.

The total compensation payable to the appellants is Rs. 42,29,534 with interest at 9% per annum from the date of filing till the date of payment.

Partial allowance of the appeals with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The appellant, engaged in the manufacture of cotton and man-made fabrics, filed writ petitions seeking direction that excise duty is not payable for yarn processed further in its composite mills in the manufacture of fabrics. The High Court granted interim reliefs, modifying them later. The appellant executed bonds and furnished a bank guarantee for the differential duty. The Assistant Collector informed the appellant that Section 11A was not applicable. A Show Cause Notice was issued, demanding payment, which the appellant contested, asserting the mandatory nature of the notice.

Issues:

The applicability of Section 11A to the case involving provisional assessment under Rule 9B of the Central Excise Rules.

Held:

The appellant's claim that Section 11A is not applicable to provisional assessment cases is dismissed. Rule 9B governs provisional assessment, and the appellant cannot deny submitting to this process voluntarily.

The appellant's voluntary execution of bonds and submission to provisional assessment under Rule 9B is upheld. The High Court's order did not absolve the appellant from these obligations.

Section 11A applies to cases of recovery of duties not levied or not paid or short-levied or short-paid. However, the present case falls within the dispensation of Rule 9B, dealing with provisional assessment.

The order dated 10/12.03.1993 did not release the appellant from its voluntary submission to provisional assessment. Authorities proceeded in accordance with the law during the relevant period.

The appellant cannot now deny the provisional assessment process it voluntarily entered, as doing so would give undue advantage and favor, contrary to the High Court's order.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, upholding the liability of the appellant for excise duty based on the provisional assessment under Rule 9B of the Central Excise Rules.

Facts:

Employees of Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) were contributors to the Self Contributory, Post Retirement and Death in Service Benefits Scheme, 1991.

Scheme was introduced on 01.04.1990, with voluntary and optional participation for employees in service from the effective date.

The Scheme was managed by a Trust, with trustees nominated by the Chairman of ONGC and representatives nominated by the Central Working Committee (CWC) of Association of Scientific and Technical Officers.

Issues:

Whether there exists a relationship of consumer and service provider between the claimants (employees) and ONGC?

Claimants alleged loss due to delayed processing of claims by LIC.

Held:

The Court determined that there is virtually no privity of contract for providing service between ONGC and the claimants.

Emphasized that the Scheme was voluntary, contributors were ONGC employees, and the service was managed by a Trust nominated by ONGC.

Concluded there is no relationship of consumer and service provider between claimants and ONGC.

Partly allowed the appeals, setting aside the consumer dispute redressal commissions' orders on the relationship.

Directed ONGC to pay amounts payable (excluding costs) to claimants within 8 weeks.