Facts:

Chanchali Nayak, the deceased, was a mother and an agricultural laborer who died in a road accident on 29th September 1991.

The accident occurred due to a head-on collision between a bus and a truck, leading to the death of Chanchali Nayak.

Issues:

The adequacy of the compensation awarded for the loss suffered by the deceased's family.

Held:

The court analyzed the income and contributions of the deceased, finding the compensation awarded by the tribunal to be inadequate. It recalculated the deceased's monthly income considering both her agricultural labor work and household contributions. Additionally, the court adjusted the multiplier used for calculating loss of dependency and awarded additional compensation for loss of estate and funeral expenses based on relevant legal precedents. Consequently, the court enhanced the total compensation payable to the claimants and held the respondents jointly and severally liable for the payment.

Facts:

The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, seeking to prevent the exhibition of the film "Padmavati" in other countries without proper certification from the CBFC and requested the CBI to register an FIR against the filmmakers for various offenses.

Issues:

Whether the pleadings in the petition were proper.

Whether commenting or adjudicating on the film before the CBFC's decision would prejudice the matter.

Whether the petitioner's allegations were scurrilous and abusive of the public interest litigation system.

Held:

The Court dismissed the petition, emphasizing the need for proper procedure and respect for freedom of expression. The Court found the pleadings in the petition improper and struck off certain portions. It held that pre-judging the film's content before CBFC certification would be inappropriate. The Court cautioned against abusing the public interest litigation system and making scurrilous allegations. Costs were not imposed on the petitioner, who represented themselves, but they were cautioned to be more careful in the future.

Facts:

Punjab National Bank (PNB) provided a loan to M/s India Iron & Steel Corporation Limited, secured against their assets.

PNB initiated proceedings under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act when the borrower defaulted on the loan.

Agarwal Tracom Pvt. Ltd. (the appellant) participated in the public auction of the mortgaged assets and emerged as the highest bidder.

Disputes arose between PNB, the appellant, and the borrower regarding payment and removal of scrap material from the factory premises.

PNB forfeited the appellant's deposit, leading to the appellant filing a writ petition in the High Court of Delhi challenging the forfeiture.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's challenge to PNB's forfeiture of the deposit falls within the purview of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act.

Held:

The Court held that the action of PNB in forfeiting the appellant's deposit constituted a measure under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act. Therefore, the appellant had the right to challenge this action under Section 17 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT), rather than through a writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was granted liberty to file an application before the DRT within 45 days to challenge PNB's action. The DRT was directed to decide the matter on its merits without being influenced by the observations made in the judgment.

Facts:

The case involves a bunch of interlocutory applications for clarification, impleadment, direction, intervention, and appropriate orders following a previous order passed by the court on 23-08-2017. This previous order outlined directions for the verification process of law degrees submitted by advocates participating in State Bar Council elections.

Issues:

The progress and challenges faced in the verification process of law degrees, the inclusion of advocates in the electoral list, and ensuring fairness in the electoral process.

Held:

The court modifies its previous order and directs the enrollment of advocates who have submitted their application forms along with law degrees for verification, except those whose degrees have been found false or fake. The electoral list is to be published by 30-11-2017, and the proceedings by the State Bar Councils are to be concluded by 15-02-2018. The court provisionally permits advocates whose cases are pending verification to participate in the elections. The result of the elections is subject to the final result of the petition. The universities are directed to expedite the process of verification of law degrees and complete it by 31-03-2018. All interlocutory applications are disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The case involved appeals from the assessee, M/S Modipon Ltd., and Paharpur Cooling Towers Ltd., for various assessment years.

The main issue was whether the assessee could claim deductions under Section 43B for excise duty paid in advance in the PLA.

The assessee had consistently followed this practice, which was accepted by the Revenue until the assessment years under dispute.

Issues:

Whether advance deposit of excise duty in the PLA constitutes actual payment of duty under Section 43B of the Income Tax Act.

Whether the consistent practice followed by the assessee and accepted by the Revenue should be upheld.

Held:

The Court analyzed the statutory provisions, legislative intent, and precedents cited by both parties. It concluded that the advance deposit of excise duty in the PLA should be considered as actual payment of duty under Section 43B. The Court highlighted the stringent procedures under the Central Excise Rules governing the deposit in the PLA, emphasizing that the amount deposited is irretrievably lost to the assessee. The Court also considered the purpose of Section 43B and the need to prevent deductions on an accrual basis without actual payment of tax. It affirmed the decisions of the High Courts, holding that the assessee is entitled to claim deductions for excise duty paid in advance in the PLA.

The Court's decision was in line with precedents such as C.I.T. v. Pandavapura Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd., (1992) 198 ITR 690 (Kar.) and C.I.T. v. Nizam Sugar Factory Ltd., (2002) 253 ITR 68 (AP), where deposits subject to control and restrictions were not considered taxable income. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed, and the orders of the High Courts were affirmed.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute regarding the admissibility of the defense of negligence by insurers in claim proceedings under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

The issue arose from a reference made by a coordinate bench of the Supreme Court following a disagreement with the reasoning and conclusion of a previous judgment.

The primary question before the court was whether insurers could raise the defense of negligence in proceedings under Section 163A of the Act.

Issues:

Whether insurers can raise the defense of negligence in claim proceedings under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

The true scope and meaning of the provisions contained in Section 170 of the Act.

Held:

The Court held that in a proceeding under Section 163A of the Act, it is not open for the insurer to raise any defense of negligence on the part of the victim. This interpretation is based on the legislative intent behind Section 163A to provide final compensation without establishing fault liability .

The Court emphasized that compensation under Section 163A is based on a structured formula and does not require proof of negligence, unlike Section 140 which deals with interim compensation and allows for the defense of negligence by insurers.

The decision is consistent with previous judgments such as Deepal Girishbhai Soni v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala, which affirmed the principle of no-fault liability and the legislative purpose behind the enactment of Section 163A .

Additionally, the Court ordered the release of 50% of the compensation amount presently lying in deposit in the trial court to the claimant(s) pending the final disposal of the appeal .

Facts:The plaintiff claimed ownership of a piece of land based on a registered sale deed, while the defendant argued adverse possession. The Trial Court dismissed the plaintiff's suit, citing failure to properly prove the sale deed, adverse possession by the defendant, and provisions of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act. The First Appellate Court affirmed the Trial Court's decision on the sale deed but reversed its findings on adverse possession and the application of the Cooperative Societies Act. The plaintiff appealed to the High Court, which decreed possession in their favor based on the duly proven sale deed. The defendant then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the sale deed was adequately proven, considering the absence of attesting witnesses.

Held:

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the sale deed did not require attesting witnesses like a gift deed and that Section 68 of the Evidence Act did not apply to sale deeds governed by Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Court dismissed the defendant's appeal, stating that the plaintiff had successfully proved the sale deed, giving them a better title to the land than the defendant's claim of adverse possession.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute regarding the interpretation and application of Instruction No. 3 of 2011 issued by the Income Tax Department, which provides guidelines for filing appeals in revenue matters, particularly concerning the tax impact threshold for filing appeals before the High Court.

Issues:

Whether Instruction No. 3 of 2011 should be applied prospectively or retrospectively to pending appeals before the High Courts.

Whether the National Litigation Policy supports the retrospective application of the said Instruction.

Whether the circular/instruction should be applied uniformly across all pending cases to ensure consistency and adherence to litigation policy objectives.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Instruction No. 3 of 2011 should be applied retrospectively to pending appeals before the High Courts, subject to two caveats outlined in the Surya Herbal Ltd. case. The Court emphasized the need for consistency and adherence to the National Litigation Policy, which aims to reduce government litigation and prioritize cases with significant tax impact.

The decision was based on a comprehensive analysis of the National Litigation Policy, relevant circulars, and precedents, including the views expressed by various High Courts and previous Supreme Court judgments. The Court's decision aimed to streamline the litigation process, ensure fairness, and conserve judicial resources. The appeals of the Revenue are, thus, dismissed.

Facts:

The Medical Council of India appealed against an order of the High Court of Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, which quashed decisions made by the Central Government regarding the approval of G.C.R.G. Memorial Trust to admit students for the academic session 2017-2018.

Issues:

Whether the High Court acted appropriately in quashing the Central Government's decisions without allowing sufficient time for a response from concerned parties.

Whether the institution should be held accountable for manipulating the legal system to its advantage.

Held:

The Supreme Court stayed the operation of the High Court's order and directed that students admitted by the institution should be debarred from continuing the course.

The Court ordered the institution to compensate the students who had been admitted, refund their fees, and pay a penalty for its actions.

The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of judicial propriety and discipline, criticizing the High Court for deviating from settled legal principles and granting unwarranted relief to the institution.

The appeal was allowed, costs were assessed, and the institution's request for permission for the academic session 2018-2019 was rejected.