Contract Law – Injunction – Appellant sought injunction to restrain respondents from executing further documents or creating third-party rights on disputed land – Trial court and High Court granted injunction based on prima facie existence of a concluded contract – Supreme Court examines the evidence, including emails and WhatsApp messages, and finds no concluded contract – Injunction set aside [Paras 1-24].

Prima Facie Case – Concluded Contract – Supreme Court analyzes the evidence of communications between parties – Finds negotiations were ongoing and no mutual agreement was reached – No concluded contract existed to justify injunction – Plaintiff's conduct and delay in filing suit considered [Paras 15-21].

Balance of Convenience – Irreparable Injury – Court holds that balance of convenience favored defendants – Plaintiff delayed in filing suit, allowing third-party rights to arise – Defendants made substantial investments and paid taxes based on agreement with third party – Plaintiff failed to demonstrate irreparable harm [Paras 19-20].

Specific Performance – Judicial Discretion – Grant of specific performance is discretionary – Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case and mutuality of contract – Plaintiff's delay and conduct influenced court’s decision to refuse injunction [Paras 22-23].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – Orders of injunction by lower courts set aside – Matter to be decided on merits in trial – High Court’s directions to expedite suit reiterated [Para 24-25].

Criminal Law – Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – Conviction under Section 18 – Appellant convicted for possessing 1.75 kg of opium – Trial Court sentenced him to 10 years rigorous imprisonment and fine – High Court affirmed conviction – Appeal to Supreme Court raising issues of incomplete link evidence and non-examination of independent witnesses [Paras 1-7].

Link Evidence – Examination of Officers – Appellant argued non-examination of ASI who handled case property broke chain of custody – Supreme Court held non-examination did not affect case as seals were intact and no tampering occurred – Chain of custody was complete [Paras 10-11].

Independent Witnesses – Reliability of Official Witnesses – Appellant contended absence of independent witnesses affected prosecution case – Supreme Court held that evidence of official witnesses cannot be disregarded solely due to their status – Efforts to secure independent witnesses were made but were unsuccessful [Paras 14-15].

Section 50 NDPS Act – Compliance – Appellant claimed violation of Section 50 as ASP was not examined – Supreme Court found ASP was summoned but could not attend due to valid reasons – No violation of statutory provisions found [Paras 12-13].

Previous Rulings – Application of Precedents – Appellant relied on Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab regarding same officer acting as informant and investigator – Supreme Court referred to Varinder Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh to hold that each case must be decided on its individual facts prior to Mohan Lal ruling [Paras 16-17].

Decision – Appeal Dismissed – Conviction and sentence upheld – Appellant to surrender within four weeks to serve remaining sentence – Bail bonds cancelled [Para 17-18].

Constitutional Law – Minority Rights – Article 30 of the Constitution – Appellants challenged provisions of the West Bengal Madrasah Service Commission Act, 2008, arguing they violated minority institutions' rights to administer their educational institutions – High Court declared Sections 8, 10, 11, and 12 of the Act ultra vires – Supreme Court analyzes the provisions and affirms High Court's decision – Held that the provisions interfered with the administration of minority institutions by imposing mandatory selection and appointment processes [Paras 16-21].

Appointment of Teachers – West Bengal Madrasah Service Commission Act, 2008 – Sections 8, 10, 11, and 12 required minority institutions to appoint teachers selected by the Commission – High Court held these provisions violated Article 30 – Supreme Court agrees, noting that while regulations can ensure educational standards, they must not infringe on the institution's right to choose its teachers [Paras 13-15].

Regulatory Measures – Reasonableness – Supreme Court reviews precedent on permissible regulatory measures – Concludes that while the state can impose regulations to ensure the quality of education, such regulations must be reasonable and not infringe on minority rights – Provisions in question found to be excessive and not merely regulatory [Paras 17-19].

Decision – Appeals Allowed – Sections 8, 10, 11, and 12 of the West Bengal Madrasah Service Commission Act, 2008, declared ultra vires – Commission's recommendations not binding on minority institutions – Affirmed High Court's judgment protecting the administration rights of minority institutions under Article 30 [Paras 22-25].

FACTS:

Accusation against the appellant, Mayank N Shah, for presenting fake invoices to a bank, leading to charges under various sections of the IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Accused no. 2 allegedly hatched a conspiracy to cheat the bank by presenting fake documents, and the appellant, accused no. 4, was a salaried employee relatively lower in the hierarchy of the firm owned by accused no. 2.

Accusations include presenting forged motor transport receipts and invoices, leading to a total cheating amount of Rs. 18,57,064.40.

ISSUES:

Whether the appellant, being a salaried employee, had direct involvement in the fraudulent activities or was merely following instructions.

Whether the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellant.

HELD:

The court, after evaluating the evidence, held that the appellant, Mayank N Shah, was aware of the fake and fabricated nature of the invoices presented to the bank and thereby cheated the bank. The conviction was confirmed, but considering the appellant's role as a salaried employee lower in the hierarchy, the sentence was modified. The sentences for various offenses were ordered to run concurrently, and the appellant was required to surrender within four weeks to serve the remaining period of the modified sentence.

REFERRED CASES:

Bharati Telenet Ltd. vs. Subhash Jain & Ors. (2005) 11 SCC 599

Central Bureau of Investigation, Hyderabad vs. K. Narayana Rao (2012) 9 SCC 512

K.R. Purushothaman vs. State of Kerala (2005) 12 SCC 631

State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Udham and Others 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1378

Facts:

The Jharkhand Public Service Commission (JPSC) issued an advertisement on 19.07.2006 for the Jharkhand Eligibility Test (JET).

The test, known as the State Level Eligibility Test (SLET), is conducted to determine the eligibility of candidates for the appointment as lecturers.

The test comprises three papers, and the advertisement indicated that only candidates obtaining 50% marks in Paper I and II would be eligible for Paper III.

Issues:

The main issue revolved around the fixation of minimum marks for Paper III in the eligibility test.

The writ petitioner obtained 50% marks in Papers I and II but did not meet the 60% cut-off fixed by JPSC for Paper III.

The High Court allowed the writ petition, asserting that fixing the qualifying marks amounted to changing the rules mid-selection process.

Held:

The Division Bench held that the moderation committee, constituted as per the UGC scheme, is responsible for deciding the cut-off marks for each subject.

Emphasized that there was no need to fix qualifying marks for Paper III at the advertisement stage.

Disagreed with the High Court's view that the rules were changed mid-process, asserting that no minimum marks for Paper III were specified initially.

Concluded that the High Court erred in holding that JPSC couldn't fix the minimum marks for Paper III.

Civil Appeal No. 9441 of 2019 by JPSC was allowed, and Civil Appeal No. 9442 of 2019 filed by the writ petitioner was dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant, Kanwar Pal Singh, challenged criminal prosecution under various sections, including Section 379 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act.

Allegations included illegal sand mining outside the permitted area based on a complaint by a Mines Department surveyor.

Issues:

Violation of Section 22 of the Mines Regulation Act, which requires a complaint by an authorized person for cognizance, and the interplay of this provision with IPC Section 379.

Whether the police could investigate the violation of Section 4 of the Mines Regulation Act.

Held:

The court clarified that the violation of Section 4 is a cognizable offense, allowing the police to investigate without any bar under the Mines Regulation Act, unlike certain provisions in other statutes (Para. 11).

The court emphasized the distinction between offenses under Section 21 of the Mines Regulation Act and Section 379 of the IPC, rejecting the argument that the actions constituted the "same offense" (Para. 7).

The court highlighted the importance of preventing illegal sand mining due to its adverse effects on the environment and public resources (Para. 69).

The court directed the trial court to independently assess factual allegations and decide the charges in accordance with the law (Para. 12).

Facts:

The appellant, Khaja Bilal Ahmed, faced a detention order based on his alleged involvement in unlawful activities. The order referred to fourteen cases between 2007 and 2016, claiming an antecedent criminal history. The appellant obtained bail in a 2018 criminal case, and the detention order was served while he was in jail. The order was confirmed on November 2, 2018.

Issues:

The appellant contested the detention order, asserting that the grounds provided were stale and irrelevant. The confirmation order's presentation raised doubts about its existence. The detaining authority considered cases that were not relied upon, leading to contradictory claims.

Held:

The order of detention referenced criminal cases from 2007 to 2016 to establish the appellant's antecedent criminal history. The detaining authority's claim that these cases were not relied upon but only referred to for background is contradictory. The Telangana Offenders Act 1986 requires relevant, non-stale material for detention. Reference to past cases lacks a clear causal connection, violating Section 3.( Para 15)

Section 12 of the Telangana Offenders Act 1986 gives the government discretion to confirm a detention order based on the Advisory Board's report. The detenu was in custody from October 25, 2018, to February 27, 2019. The order of confirmation surfaced in an additional affidavit, casting doubt on its existence during the relevant period.( Para 16)

The order of confirmation, dated December 28, 2018, was not served on the detenu until February 27, 2019. Its sudden appearance in a later affidavit raises serious doubts about its authenticity during the detention period.( Para 17–19)

The detention order is set aside due to stale and irrelevant grounds and doubts about the confirmation order's existence. The detaining authority lacked a reasonable basis to conclude that the appellant, upon release on bail, would engage in prejudicial activity. The High Court's decision is overturned, and the order of detention is quashed.( Para 20–21)

FACTS:

DAV Public School maintained three accounts with Indian Bank.

The bank linked the school's account to net banking without authorization, leading to a loss of Rs. 30,00,000/-.

The school did not apply for net banking; the linking was done mistakenly.

The complaint was filed after the detection of unauthorized transactions.

ISSUES:

Whether the bank is liable for the loss incurred due to fraudulent transactions.

The extent of the school's responsibility for the delay in reporting the fraud.

HELD:

The bank was found liable for linking the school's account to net banking without authorization.

The school was not responsible for the loss of Rs. 25,00,000/-; the bank was directed to compensate this amount.

The delay in reporting the fraud contributed to the additional loss of Rs. 5,00,000/-; the school was not held responsible for this part.

The bank was ordered to compensate the school to the tune of Rs. 25,00,000/- transferred until 9.9.2014.

The impugned orders were interfered with to this extent, and the appeal was allowed accordingly.

Facts:

The case involves the appeal of Anokhilal against the State of Madhya Pradesh. The accused was charged with the rape and murder of a minor girl. Legal aid was granted, and an Amicus Curiae was appointed. However, the charges were framed swiftly, leaving limited time for the defense to prepare.

Issues:

The adequacy of legal representation, the expeditious disposal of the trial, and whether the accused received a fair and meaningful legal aid.

Held:

Article 39-A, inserted by the 42nd amendment to the Constitution, emphasizes free legal aid to ensure justice is not denied based on economic or other disabilities. The Right to Free Legal Services is deemed essential for a fair and just procedure.

The Amicus Curiae was appointed on the same day charges were framed, lacking sufficient time for preparation. The trial court's approach, though expediting the process, did not serve the cause of justice.

The trial court should have adjourned to allow the Amicus Curiae adequate time. The expedited trial, concluding within a fortnight, compromised the real and meaningful assistance the appellant was entitled to.

Other issues include the hasty examination of witnesses, early questioning of the accused, and swift conclusion without waiting for crucial reports. The expeditious disposal left glaring gaps in the proceedings.

While expeditious disposal is necessary, it should not compromise fairness. The cause of justice must prevail, and fast-tracking should not lead to burying the cause of justice.

In line with the principles laid down in Bashira, the counsel appointed through Legal Services should have been given sufficient opportunity, and the lack thereof resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

Setting aside the convictions and sentences, the court directs de novo consideration, allowing the appellant's counsel to address various issues.

Norms are established for appointing Amicus Curiae, specifying a minimum of 10 years of practice for advocates, especially in cases involving life or death sentences.