Facts:

The case involves a woman (Rupali Devi) who left her matrimonial home due to alleged acts of cruelty by her husband and his relatives. The question before the court is whether the courts at the place where the wife seeks shelter (parental home) after leaving the matrimonial home have jurisdiction to entertain complaints under Section 498A.

Issues:

The determination of the territorial jurisdiction of courts when a woman leaves her matrimonial home due to cruelty and seeks shelter elsewhere. The court must interpret the provisions of Section 498A and relevant sections of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Held:

The court analyzes the opinions in previous cases and notes a division in views regarding the jurisdiction of courts when cruelty is committed in the matrimonial home, and the wife seeks shelter in the parental home.

The court refers to Sections 177, 178, and 179 of the Criminal Procedure Code, emphasizing the exception to the ordinary rule provided by Section 178, allowing courts in another local area to take cognizance.

The introduction and purpose behind Section 498A are discussed, highlighting its intent to combat cruelty against wives and harassment leading to suicide.

"Cruelty" is defined as both physical and mental, with a focus on the mental distress and trauma that may continue even after the wife leaves the matrimonial home.

The court holds that the consequences of cruelty at the matrimonial home result in repeated offenses at the parental home, falling under Section 179 of the Cr.P.C.

It is concluded that courts at the place where the wife seeks shelter after leaving the matrimonial home due to cruelty have jurisdiction to entertain complaints under Section 498A.

Facts:

15 persons were tried for the murder of Babusingh on the night of 13/14th September 1992.

Trial court acquitted 8 persons and convicted 7, including Gajrajsingh, Bhagwansingh, and Peer Singh.

The main issue is the presence of the three appellants at the crime scene.

Issues:

Lack of evidence against the three appellants.

Discrepancies in witness statements, especially by PW-5.

Held:

The "Dehati Nalishi" recorded at the spot did not name the three appellants, creating doubt about their presence.

PW-5, a crucial witness, did not name the appellants in the initial statement under Section 161 CrPC.

Discrepancies in statements and doubts raised about the presence of the accused.

Benefit of doubt given to the accused-appellants.

Appeals allowed, and the conviction of the appellants set aside.

Facts:

The case involves cross appeals in the nature of Civil Appeal No. 6600 of 2015 and C.A. No. 1954 of 2019.

The appellant is the insurance company, and the central issue is whether the age of the deceased or the age of the dependents should be the basis for calculating the multiplier in the case of a bachelor's death.

Issues:

The determination of the multiplier in the case of a motor accident resulting in the death of a bachelor.

The question is whether the age of the deceased or the age of the dependents should be considered for calculating the multiplier.

Held:

The court affirms that in the case of a bachelor's death, it is the age of the deceased that should be the basis for calculating the multiplier.

The focus for determining the claim is on the deceased and what contribution he would have made to the dependents if alive.

The judgment emphasizes the importance of applying a uniform settled principle to avoid confusion and litigation.

The court dismisses the appeal filed by the insurance company, finding it without merit.

Regarding the claimants, no interference is called for as they have already been granted more than a reasonable amount for future prospects.

Both appeals are dismissed, and the parties are left to bear their own costs.

Facts:

The appellant-assessee, involved in the manufacture of goods falling under Chapter 24 of the Schedule of The Central Excise Act, 1944, charged customers invoices for the price of goods plus Dharmada, a charitable donation.

The Superintendent of Central Excise issued show cause notices and demanded duty on Dharmada, claiming it as part of the price for the sale of manufactured goods.

The Adjudicating Authority initially held that Dharmada was not part of the trading receipts and dropped the demand for excise duty.

Another show cause notice was issued by the Commissioner of Central Excise, Aurangabad, calling for penalty and interest.

The Commissioner (Appeals) held that Dharmada was liable to be included as part of the assessable value.

The Central Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) partly allowed the appeal, but upheld the inclusion of Dharmada in the assessable value.

Issues: Whether Dharmada collected by the appellant, being an optional payment made by the buyer, can be regarded as part of the transaction value for the sale of goods.

Held and Decision:

The nature of the transaction involves the sale of goods, and the consideration is the price paid for the goods.

Excise duty is charged on the transaction value, which includes the amount paid as price for the goods.

The term "transaction value" is defined to mean the price actually paid or payable for the goods when sold, excluding amounts like excise duty and other taxes.

Dharmada, being a voluntary donation earmarked for charity and credited as such, does not constitute consideration for the transfer of goods.

The Court relied on precedent (Bijli Cotton Mills) stating that amounts received for Dharmada and earmarked for charitable purposes are not regarded as income of the assessee but are held under an obligation to spend the same for charitable purposes.

The Court distinguished the case from Tata Iron & Steel, where a surcharge was added as an element of price, unlike Dharmada, which is meant for charity.

The Dharmada collected, being an optional payment made by the buyer, cannot be regarded as part of the transaction value for the sale of goods.

FACTS:

The appellant applied for an electricity connection in December 1996 and submitted a required test report in March 2005.

The respondent argued that the delay in granting the connection was due to the appellant's failure to submit the test report promptly.

A criminal complaint was lodged by the appellant, leading to a High Court order on 14 August 2015, directing the grant of the electricity connection on 4 September 2015.

ISSUES:

Whether the delay in granting the electricity connection was solely attributable to the appellant's failure to submit the test report promptly.

Whether the compensation awarded by the NCDRC was adequate.

HELD:

The court acknowledged the initial delay caused by the appellant in submitting the test report.

The court found no cogent explanation for the decade-long delay by the respondent after the test report submission.

A criminal writ petition was instituted, leading to a High Court order directing the grant of the electricity connection.

The court enhanced the compensation awarded by the NCDRC to Rs. 5,00,000, considering the appellant's hardship and inconvenience.

The enhanced compensation was ordered to be paid within four weeks, and in default, it would carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum.

The civil appeal was allowed in these terms with no costs.

Facts:

Respondent No. 1, a school teacher, faced termination for objectionable behavior with girl students. Criminal proceedings were initiated, leading to two FIRs and subsequent police investigation.

Issues:

The key issues revolved around the termination process, the Inquiry Committee's findings, and the delayed decisions of the Nominee of Respondent No. 1 and the State Awardee Teacher due to concerns about contempt of court.

Held:

The Court emphasized the seriousness of the allegations, noting that two FIRs were filed, investigations conducted, and chargesheets filed, supporting prima facie evidence of the accusations.( Para 14)

The Court referred to the need for a sensitive approach in cases of sexual harassment, emphasizing the broader probabilities and the obligation to rely on the victim's statement when credible.( Para 15)

Highlighted that the Management had not acted hastily and had followed due process, including intimation to the Department and constitution of an Inquiry Committee. The termination decision was justified based on the Committee's findings.( Para 16)

The Tribunal and High Court's failure to appreciate the matter correctly was noted, and the appeal was allowed, setting aside the decisions of the lower courts and affirming the order of termination.( Para 17)

Facts:

The appellant, PR. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX-6, filed an appeal under Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, challenging the dismissal of the Revenue's appeal by the High Court. The appeal pertained to the notice issued by the Assessing Officer under Section 148 and the subsequent assessment order. The respondent, NOKIA INDIA PVT. LTD., raised objections, contending that the notice was based on a mere change of opinion and, therefore, was bad in law. The ITAT upheld the respondent's appeal, and the High Court dismissed the Revenue's appeal on the grounds of not involving any substantial question of law.

Issues:

The appeal include the legality of the notice issued under Section 148, whether it was based on a change of opinion, and if the High Court was justified in dismissing the appeal on the ground of not involving any substantial question of law.

Held:

The High Court erred in dismissing the appeal in limine, as there are substantial questions of law involved.

The questions for consideration include the justification of the notice issued under Section 148 and whether it was legally sustainable, considering the requirements of Section 148.

The ITAT's findings on the legality of the notice and the merits of the case need to be reconsidered.

The appeal is allowed, and the impugned order is set aside. The case is remanded to the High Court for a fresh decision on merits, addressing the substantial questions of law raised.

Facts:

The Competent Authority under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (MISA) directed the detention of 'R' on 5.11.1974, prior to the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA), coming into force on 13.12.1974. On 19.12.1974, the Competent Authority under COFEPOSA directed further detention. The detenu's son filed a writ of habeas corpus on 29.4.1975. Proclamation of Emergency on 25.6.1975, subsequent amendments to COFEPOSA, and the enforcement of SAFEMA on 25.1.1976 were critical developments. Emergency was lifted on 21.3.1977, leading to the revocation of detention orders on 22.3.1977.

Issues:

The applicability of SAFEMA to the case of 'R' concerning the detention orders under COFEPOSA during the Emergency period.

Held:

The order of detention under Section 3(1) of COFEPOSA could be made to prevent activities prejudicial to foreign exchange. The maximum period of detention varied based on declarations under Section 9 and Section 12A of COFEPOSA.

Section 2 of SAFEMA applied to persons with orders of detention under COFEPOSA, subject to the proviso in Section 2(2)(b). The substantive provision would not apply if the order was revoked during specified periods outlined in the proviso.

Part (i) of the proviso to Section 2(2)(b) dealt with cases where Section 9 or Section 12A of COFEPOSA did not apply. In this case, neither Section 9 nor Section 12A applied, making SAFEMA applicable.

The order of detention was not revoked under any proviso conditions nor set aside by a competent court. SAFEMA provisions applied, as per Part (i) of the proviso.

The High Court rightly observed that the detention "had run right through the duration or continuance of the emergency." The failure to agitate the matter on merits during the pendency of the writ petition was noted.

The representation dated 17.01.1975, rejection communicated on 11.02.1975, and the absence of grievances regarding communication of grounds or identical grounds weakened challenges to the detention order under COFEPOSA.

The Competent Authority and the Appellate Tribunal under SAFEMA found the properties mentioned in the schedules illegally acquired and forfeited. The Writ Petition deserved to be rejected.

Facts:

The appellant was enrolled in the Corps of Signals of the Indian Army as a Radio Mechanic on 18 February 1971.

On 18 August 1981, he was discharged from military service under Army Rule 13(3) on account of being placed in a low medical category.

The appellant claimed to suffer from a Chronic Duodenal Ulcer due to his participation in Operation Cactus Lilly in 1971.

The appellant moved the Armed Forces Tribunal for the grant of war injury pension, which was declined based on the view that the disability was not attributable to participation in action.

The appellant sought disability pension for the period between 1996 and 2014.

Issues:

Whether the appellant should be granted disability pension between 1996 and 2014?

Held:

On 26 November 2018, the Court allowed the appeal for consideration of disability pension between 1996 and 2014.

The chart submitted by the respondents indicated varying assessments of disability over the years, leading to the denial of disability pension from 24 March 1995.

With effect from 30 January 2014, the appellant's disability was assessed at 20% on a permanent basis for life by the Military Hospital, Danapur Cantt.

The Court found the denial of disability pension for the period between 24 March 1995 and 30 January 2014 misconceived, considering the previous order passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal rounding off the disability element.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant directed to be granted arrears on account of disability pension between 24 March 1995 and 30 January 2014 in accordance with applicable rates.