Facts:

The case involves an incident where an unlawful assembly attacked individuals, resulting in the death of one person, Kennedy, and injuries to others.

Issues:

The prosecution alleged that the accused were part of the unlawful assembly and acted with common intention, resulting in Kennedy's death.

Held:

The Supreme Court analyzed the evidence and found that the prosecution failed to establish the common object among the accused or their knowledge of the likely commission of murder. Accordingly, the convictions of some accused under Section 302 IPC with the aid of Section 149 IPC were set aside, and they were acquitted of those charges. The court modified the convictions and sentences of some accused based on their individual acts and involvement. Specific modifications and dispositions were made for each accused based on their role in the incident.

Facts:

The appellant, Madan Mohan, filed an application under Section 193 of the Criminal Procedure Code in a Sessions Trial, seeking the summoning of two additional accused persons. The Sessions Judge allowed the application and issued non-bailable warrants against the additional accused. The accused filed a Criminal Revision Petition in the High Court, challenging the order of the Sessions Judge. The High Court partly allowed the revision, setting aside the issuance of non-bailable warrants and directing the accused to surrender before the Trial Court and move for regular bail. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court against the High Court's decision.

Issues:

Whether the complainant should have been impleaded as a party to the criminal revision?

Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to direct the Sessions Judge to "allow" the bail application of the accused?

What is the discretion of the Sessions Judge in deciding bail applications?

Held:

The Single Judge seemed to have passed the impugned order without application of judicial mind... Therefore, he should have been impleaded as respondent along with the State in the revision.

The High Court had no jurisdiction to direct the Sessions Judge to 'allow' the application for grant of bail.

It is the sole discretion of the Sessions Judge to find out while hearing the bail application as to whether any case on facts is made out for grant of bail by the accused or not.

We are, therefore, constrained to set aside the direction given by the High Court to the Sessions Judge to 'consider and allow' the bail application made by respondent Nos. 2 & 3 in Sessions Trial Case No.44/2016 on the same day on which it was moved.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the impugned order is set aside to the extent indicated. The Sessions Judge would now decide any bail application made by Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 on its merits and in accordance with the law.

Facts:

The Institute of Nano Science and Technology, Mohali, issued a notice inviting tenders (NIT) for the construction of its campus.

The NIT specified eligibility criteria for bidders, including completion of similar works meeting certain cost and structure requirements.

Respondent No.1 submitted its bid but was deemed ineligible by expert committees due to non-compliance with the eligibility criteria.

The High Court allowed Respondent No.1's appeal, overturning the decision of the learned Single Judge.

Issues:

Whether the interpretation of tender documents by the tendering authority should be deferred to by the courts, barring evidence of malafides or perversity?

What is the scope of judicial review in tender matters, particularly regarding the interpretation of eligibility criteria in tender documents?

Held:

The Supreme Court, upon review, upheld the importance of deferring to the interpretation of tender documents by the tendering authority, unless evidence of malafides or perversity is present. The Court reinstated the judgment of the learned Single Judge, setting aside the High Court's decision, as it found no malafides or perversity in the expert committee reports.

The Court directed that the tender awarded to Respondent No.1 be set aside, and the tender be awarded to the Appellant, subject to the Appellant matching the offer of Respondent No.1.

The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The appellant, Prem Giri, filed an application for anticipatory bail fearing arrest in connection with various offences under the Indian Penal Code. The High Court of Rajasthan dismissed the bail application without providing adequate reasoning.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's rejection of the anticipatory bail application without proper reasoning was justified.

Whether the case warrants remand to the High Court for fresh consideration of the bail application.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision lacked judicial reasoning and was passed in a casual manner, which is not acceptable in bail applications. Referring to established legal principles, the Court emphasized the need for courts to provide reasons for their decisions, especially in bail matters. The Court highlighted factors that should be considered before granting bail, such as the nature of the accusation, severity of punishment, supporting evidence, and the possibility of tampering with witnesses.

The Court also noted that if previous bail applications had been rejected, the court must justify granting bail in subsequent applications. Consequently, the Supreme Court decided to remand the case back to the High Court for fresh consideration of the bail application.

The Supreme Court clarified that it did not assess the merits of the appellant's case but instructed the High Court to reconsider the bail application based on legal principles and without influence from the Supreme Court's observations on the case's merits. Therefore, the appeal was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the case was remanded to the High Court for a fresh decision on the bail application.

Facts:

Royal Orchid Hotels Ltd. (the petitioner) sought registration of their trademark "Royal Orchid" in class 42.

Kamat Hotels (India) Ltd. (the respondent) challenged the registration, claiming prior use of the mark "Orchid."

The Deputy Registrar refused registration based on evidence showing the respondent as the first user.

The IPAB reversed the decision, allowing registration of the petitioner's trademark.

The High Court, upon review, sided with the Deputy Registrar's decision, considering detailed evidence presented by both parties.

Issues:

Determination of the first user of the mark "Orchid/Royal Orchid."

Assessment of similarity between the marks and potential confusion among customers.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after careful consideration, upheld the decision of the High Court. They found the conclusions reached by the High Court to be reasonable and justified. The Court emphasized that confusion could arise among customers using the hotels due to the similarity between the marks. Therefore, the Special Leave Petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused.

Facts:

The case originated from a ban on mining activities imposed by the Supreme Court in three districts of Karnataka due to rampant illegal mining and ecological concerns.

Lessees, including M/s Sandur Manganese and Iron Ores Ltd. and M/s MSPL Ltd., sought modifications of earlier orders to increase iron ore extraction within permissible limits.

Various stakeholders, including mining associations, the State of Karnataka, and others, presented arguments regarding the cap on iron ore production.

Issues:

Whether the cap on iron ore production should be maintained, modified, or lifted in light of changing circumstances and recommendations by the Central Empowered Committee (CEC).

Whether category C mines, auctioned under a different regime, should be included within the production cap for the districts.

Held:

The Court accepted the recommendations of the CEC to increase the cap for category A and B mines in Bellary, Tumkur, and Chitradurga districts. This decision was based on changes in mineral reserves, infrastructure improvements, and R&R Plans.

The Court decided not to include category C mines within the revised cap, recognizing them as operating under a different legal and business regime. Separate consideration for their production limits in the future was suggested.

Pending proposals for MPAP enhancement were directed to be decided without delay, subject to the revised cap.

The Court emphasized the need for a realistic solution based on current circumstances and projected future developments, including the availability of iron ore reserves and infrastructure improvements.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between The State of Jharkhand & Ors. and M/s Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd.

The matter pertains to the jurisdiction of courts in relation to arbitration proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 31 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, regarding the jurisdiction of courts in arbitration matters.

Held:

The Court clarified the jurisdictional provisions under Section 31 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Interpretation of Section 31(4) was provided, emphasizing exclusive jurisdiction in the court where the first application relating to the matter is filed.

Original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Articles 32 and 131 of the Constitution was discussed, clarifying that it cannot assume original jurisdiction solely based on control over proceedings.

The Court emphasized that the jurisdiction of a court under a statute cannot shift or become flexible due to the interference of a superior court in a different manner.

It was directed that the matter should be listed before the appropriate Bench, and if objections are already filed before the Civil Court, both parties are granted liberty to file respective objections within the stipulated period.

Decision: The Court disposed of the appeal and provided clarifications on the jurisdictional aspects under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Facts:

The appellants/defendants owned a parcel of land, part of which was sold to Madhavan Pillai through a registered sale deed dated April 21, 1975.

Dispute arose over two adjoining sites, numbered 47 and 53, forming part of the land sold to Madhavan Pillai.

Plaintiff claimed ownership and possession of both sites, supported by documents and witness testimony.

Trial court partially decreed the suit, granting injunction for site no. 53 but dismissing the claim for site no. 47.

Both parties appealed to the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the plaintiff had established lawful possession of site no. 47.

Whether the suit for permanent injunction should be decided based on possession rather than ownership.

Whether the defendants' claims regarding the forged documents and denial of witness identity were substantiated.

Held:

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, ruling in favor of the plaintiff's possession of site no. 47 based on the evidence presented during the trial. The Court emphasized that the suit for permanent injunction was based on possession rather than ownership. The plaintiff had established lawful possession through the general power of attorney and witness testimony. The Court declined to delve into the question of ownership based on the registered general power of attorney, as the defendants had filed a separate suit for declaration of ownership, pending appeal. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant, an automobile manufacturer from Japan, initiated legal action against the respondents, seeking to restrain them from using the unregistered trademark "Prius." The appellant claimed to be the prior user of the mark globally, including in Japan, where they first introduced the "Prius" hybrid car in 1997. However, the respondents had been using the mark since 2001 in India and obtained its registration in 2002. Despite the appellant's global goodwill, the Indian market's reception remained contentious. The Single Judge initially restrained the respondents, but the Division Bench overturned this decision. On appeal, the Supreme Court deliberated over the maintainability of the appellant's action for passing off.

Issues:

Whether the appellant established sufficient goodwill, reputation, and market presence for the "Prius" brand in India at the relevant time?

Whether the territoriality principle governs the trademark dispute, requiring the appellant to demonstrate goodwill in each jurisdiction where protection is sought?

What burden of proof should be placed on the claimant regarding actual confusion versus likelihood of confusion in passing off actions?

Held:

The appellant failed to provide adequate evidence of the "Prius" brand's goodwill and reputation in the Indian market. Limited sales and advertising before 2001, coupled with delayed legal action, weakened their claim. The brand had not acquired sufficient goodwill in the Indian market to maintain a successful action for passing off against the registered owner.

The territoriality principle dictates that a claimant must establish goodwill in each jurisdiction where protection is sought. In this case, the appellant did not sufficiently demonstrate the requisite goodwill in India.

The burden of proving actual confusion should not solely rest on the claimant. Likelihood of confusion can serve as a sufficient test, considering the difficulty in providing evidence of actual confusion.

Decision: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the Division Bench's decision to set aside the injunction against the respondents' use of the "Prius" mark.