Facts:

The Complainant, an industrial unit, suffered a fire incident and claimed Rs. 54,93,865 under a fire insurance policy.

Three surveyors were appointed successively, with varying assessments of the claim.

The Insurance Company repudiated the claim based on the third surveyor's report, alleging fraud and manipulation.

Issues:

Validity of successive appointments of surveyors.

Acceptance of the first surveyor's report and subsequent repudiation based on the third surveyor's findings.

Held:

The Court scrutinized whether the Insurance Company had valid reasons or identified inherent defects in the first surveyor's report. It emphasized that the right to appoint another surveyor should be exercised for valid reasons or if the report was found to be arbitrary.( Paragraph 20)

The Court observed that there was no valid reason for the Insurance Company to reject the first surveyor's report and no proof of arbitrariness. Successive appointments of surveyors were deemed unjustified, and their purpose appeared to be repudiating the claim.( Paragraph 24)

While dismissing the Insurance Company's appeal, the Court noted that the Commission failed to grant interest on the amount due to the Complainant. Accordingly, interest at 6% per annum was allowed from the date of filing the petition till the payment of the amount.( Paragraph 27)

Facts:

The appellant and respondent were married in 1998, and due to a strained relationship, they lived separately. The appellant filed a suit for dissolution of marriage, which was initially dismissed by the Trial Court, and subsequent appeals were unsuccessful.

Issues:

The dissolution of the marriage and the dismissal of the appellant's appeal by the High Court.

Held:

The matter was referred to mediation by the court, where the parties amicably settled. The appellant agreed to pay a sum of Rs.10,00,000 to the respondent for settlement of claims, including maintenance. Additionally, provisions were made for the daughter's future expenses, and the parties agreed to withdraw or quash all pending cases.

The parties settled the matter amicably during the court-mandated mediation.

The terms of settlement included financial arrangements and withdrawal of pending cases.

The court, invoking its powers under Article 142, dissolved the marriage based on the mutual consent of the parties.

Decision: The marriage was dissolved, and the terms of compromise formed part of the judgment, including financial settlements, withdrawal of pending cases, and provisions for the daughter's future.

Final Result : Disposed

Facts:

The prosecution alleged that ten accused persons, armed with various weapons, attacked the complainant's son and the victim-deceased. After initial investigations, a report against only four accused was submitted, stating that the appellants were not present at the scene. Subsequent investigations also cleared the appellants. The Magistrate directed the release of the appellants, and the trial proceeded against the remaining accused. Later, the complainant filed an application under Section 319, asserting that the appellants were present during the incident.

Issues:

Whether the Magistrate was justified in summoning the appellants under Section 319 based on the complainant's application during the trial.

The impact of earlier discharge orders by the Magistrate on the subsequent summoning under Section 319.

Held:

During the trial, depositions of PW-1 and PW-2 were recorded. Their specific statements against the appellants, attributing a role to them in the incident, constituted evidence. The Magistrate, on application under Section 319, found a prima facie case and summoned the appellants. The High Court confirmed this decision.( Para 6.1)

The orders dated 01.09.2016 and 28.10.2016, regarding the discharge of appellants by the Magistrate, were not orders of discharge in stricto sensu. They pertained to discharging the appellants from custody. Therefore, the Magistrate retained the power to summon the appellants under Section 319, despite earlier discharge orders.( Para 7.10)

Before accepting a closure report, the Magistrate must issue notice to the complainant, allowing an opportunity to submit a protest application. This procedure ensures fairness and gives the complainant a chance to contest the closure report.( Para 8)

The statements of PW-1 and PW-2 during the trial constituted evidence. Even if the complainant was not given an opportunity to protest the non-filing of a charge sheet against the appellants, the trial court could summon them based on emerging evidence during the trial.( Para 9)

Facts:

The case involved appeals filed against the High Court of Karnataka's order dated February 26, 2016, where a series of appeals were disposed of concerning the appellant (assessee) and the Commissioner of Income Tax (Revenue) under Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Issues:

The court was the failure of the High Court to frame specific questions of law as required by Section 260-A(3) of the Act.

Held:

The court, referring to a similar case (Civil Appeal No. 3968 of 2019), emphasized the distinction between questions proposed by the appellant for admission and questions framed by the court. It highlighted that the appeal is heard on merits only on the questions framed by the High Court. The court observed that if the High Court considered the appeal devoid of substantial questions of law, it should have explicitly recorded such findings. In the absence of this, the court concluded that the High Court did not adhere to the mandatory procedure prescribed in Section 260-A of the Act. The court allowed the appeals.

Facts:

The case pertains to the participation of an MP in a Panchayat Samiti's special meeting for a 'No Confidence Motion' against the Pramukh. The dispute arose regarding the interpretation of relevant sections, rules, and articles governing the composition and functioning of the Panchayat Samiti.

Issues:

Whether the MP, being an ex-officio member of the Panchayat Samiti, is entitled to participate and vote in the special meeting for a 'No Confidence Motion' against the Pramukh.

Held:

Constitutional Framework: The judgment begins by elucidating the constitutional framework regarding the composition of Panchayats, emphasizing the freedom of the State legislature to make laws in accordance with Article 243C. (Para 12-15)

Election of Chairperson: It clarifies that the chairperson of the Panchayat Samiti is elected by the elected members, distinguishing them from other persons mentioned in Article 243C(3). (Para 18)

Composition of Panchayat Samiti: Section 107(3) explicitly includes the MP as a member with the right to vote in the Panchayat Samiti meetings. (Para 16)

Regulation and Rules: The judgment delves into the Regulation and Rules, outlining the specific provisions for moving and carrying forward a 'No Confidence Motion.'(Para 21-23)

Quorum Requirement: The court emphasizes the quorum requirement of not less than two-thirds of the "total membership," including ex-officio members. (Para 24-25)

Who Can Vote on 'No Confidence Motion': It dismisses the notion that only directly elected members can vote, asserting that the law allows all members to participate in the process. (Para 26)

Inclusive Nature of Regulation: The judgment defends the inclusivity of the Regulation, expressly permitting all members, including those from Section 107(3), to participate and vote. (Para 28)

Conclusion: The court concludes by reiterating the statutory right of elected representatives, including the MP, to participate in and vote on a 'No Confidence Motion.'(Para 32)

Facts:

The appellant, Kalabai, threw a burning stove on the deceased during a quarrel between the deceased and her husband.

The incident resulted in serious burn injuries to the deceased, leading to her death.

Issues:

The offense committed by the appellant—whether it constituted murder under Section 302 IPC or a lesser offense under Section 304 Part II IPC.

Held:

The appellant argued for a reduction in the offense based on a precedent, Hari Shanker vs. State of Rajasthan (1998) 8 SCC 355, where a similar act was downgraded from murder to Section 304 Part II IPC.

The Court considered the dying declaration of the deceased, stating that the appellant threw a burning stove on her during a quarrel.

The Court noted the absence of evidence indicating any intention or motive to kill on the part of the appellant.

Relying on the precedent, the Court concluded that the facts and circumstances warranted reducing the offense from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC.

The Court partially allowed the appeal, altering the appellant's conviction and reducing the sentence from life imprisonment to rigorous imprisonment for five years.

Facts:

The case involves a jute mill, its closure, and subsequent proceedings under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. The appellant, a trade union, issued a demand notice under Section 8 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code on behalf of approximately 3000 workers for outstanding dues. The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) dismissed the petition, stating that a trade union does not qualify as an operational creditor.

Issues:

Whether a trade union falls within the definition of "person" under Section 3(23) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.

Whether a trade union can be considered an operational creditor for claims related to employment.

Held:

The Court interprets Section 5(20) and 5(21) of the Code, defining operational creditor and operational debt. Rule 6 and Form 5 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016, recognize the possibility of joint applications by workmen. The Court concludes that a trade union, established under the Trade Unions Act, qualifies as a "person" under Section 3(23) and can be an operational creditor for employment-related claims.( Para 4)

Examining the Trade Unions Act, the Court notes that a trade union is established under a statute and can sue and be sued as a body corporate. The general funds of a registered trade union can be spent on the conduct of trade disputes, including claims for wages and other dues.( Para 6)

Citing the Bombay High Court's judgment in Sanjay Sadanand Varrier, the Court emphasizes that a registered trade union can prosecute or defend legal proceedings for the rights of its members. This principle is applicable to petitions filed under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.( Para 8)

The Court, emphasizing the importance of justice and procedural flexibility, rejects the argument that individual petitions by workmen would be less burdensome. It asserts that a registered trade union can represent its members collectively and files a joint petition under Rule 6 and Form 5.( Para 10)

The NCLAT's refusal to consider whether a trade union falls under the definition of "person" is deemed incorrect. The NCLAT's assertion that a trade union is not an operational creditor due to no direct services to the corporate debtor is also rejected. The Court allows the appeal, setting aside the NCLAT's judgment, and remands the matter for expedited consideration on merits.( Para 11)

Facts:

The case involves the transfer of granted lands in violation of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978. The grant included a condition of non-alienation for a duration of 15 years. The appellants acquired the land from the beneficiaries after the expiration of the 15-year period. The Assistant Commissioner nullified the sale deeds, a decision subsequently upheld by the Deputy Commissioner and the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the granted land's transfer, executed by the beneficiaries without prior permission, is illegal under the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Act, even after the lapse of the 15-year period.

Held:

Full Disclosure: The lower courts based their decisions on the absence of actual permission granted by the competent authority, with documents submitted by the appellants found to be forged. However, criminal proceedings are pending on this matter. The lack of full disclosure does not warrant non-suiting the appellant.

Shifting Plea: The appellant consistently argued for prior permission throughout the proceedings. Shifting to a new plea, asserting that no permission is required, is not permissible at this stage. The court emphasizes that such a plea cannot be entertained, especially without proper pleadings.

Legislative Intent: The Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969, and the Act were enacted to protect the interests of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes from exploitation. The objective is to prevent misuse, and therefore, permission for transfer is mandated, irrespective of the time elapsed.

Rule 9 Conditions: Rule 9 of the Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969, outlines more rigorous conditions for transfers within the window of 5 to 15 years. The Deputy Commissioner's satisfaction is a prerequisite, including a credit to the government of 50% of the land's market value.

Post 15 Years Permission: Even after 15 years, the competent authority may consider granting permission, ensuring the interests of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Section 4(2) of the Act is explicit in requiring permission for any transfer, and the court upholds this interpretation.

Absolute Ban on Transfer: Section 4 of the Act, dealing with the prohibition of transfer, is absolute in its terms. It overrides any agreement, contract, or law. The court highlights the clarity of Section 4(2), mandating permission for transfer even after the lapse of 15 years.

Court's Validation: The lower courts and the competent authority acted within their jurisdiction to nullify transactions contrary to Section 4(2) of the Act. The court acknowledges the validity of their actions, given the statutory provisions and the dubious manner of execution.

Facts:

The case involves an appeal to the Supreme Court arising from a dismissal of an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The appellants sought to quash the complaint and criminal proceedings related to offenses under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506 IPC, and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

Issues:

Differentiation between two sets of allegations in the complaint.

Validity of summoning orders for specific offenses against the appellants.

Timing and motive behind the filing of the complaint, especially in relation to divorce proceedings.

Held:

In taking cognizance of an offense, a Magistrate is not required to pass a detailed order. However, when a Magistrate issues process against a person not charged with the offense for which summoned, the summoning order can be challenged.

Two sets of allegations were present: one for offenses under Sections 323, 504, and 506 IPC and another for offenses under Sections 498A IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The appellants not implicated in the first set of allegations could not be summoned for those offenses .

Specific allegations supported by evidence justified summoning the appellant in Crl. Appeal No. 595 of 2019 under Sections 323, 504, and 506 IPC. The court refrained from pronouncing on the veracity of the incident at this stage.

Criminal prosecution can proceed only when a prima facie offense is disclosed. The judicial process should not be a tool for oppression or harassment. The High Court has the authority to quash proceedings if they meet the parameters set by the Supreme Court .

Complaint under Section 498A IPC and Sections 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act filed by the father of the victim during divorce proceedings indicated a motive to harass the accused. The High Court erred in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings.

The divorce decree does not negate examination of criminal offenses committed within the jurisdiction despite divorce being granted. The complaint under Section 498A IPC and Sections 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act was considered retaliatory to the divorce petition.

The High Court's impugned judgment lacked a reference to the allegations, necessitating a detailed factual analysis before applying legal principles. Failure to do so constituted an error.