Facts:

Interlocutory Applications (IAs) were filed following an order passed by the Supreme Court on 14th December 2017 in the case of Ajayinder Sangwan vs. Bar Council of Delhi.

These applications sought various reliefs including clarification, impleadment, direction, intervention, and modification concerning the conduct of elections by different State Bar Councils.

Issues:

The court were diverse, including concerns raised by the Advocate General for the State of Tamil Nadu regarding the conduct of elections, requests for modification of election schedules, and requests for inclusion in electoral rolls.

Held:

The court dismissed the applications seeking clarification and intervention regarding the conduct of elections in Tamil Nadu and Puducherry, as a committee had already been constituted to oversee the elections.

The court pre-poned the date of election for the Bar Council of Kerala from 25th March 2018 to 18th March 2018, considering the festival day falling on the original date.

Applications seeking permission for advocates from Maharashtra and Goa to cast votes in New Delhi were rejected due to the finalization of the election schedule.

The request to reschedule the election date for the Bar Council of Rajasthan was denied, as there were insufficient grounds to do so.

An application for inclusion in the electoral list for the Bar Council of Delhi was rejected due to non-compliance with document submission requirements.

The court rejected a request to direct the Bar Council of India to hold elections for the State Bar Council of Telangana, as the council had not yet come into existence.

Facts:

The respondent, M/s. Andhra Sugars Ltd., availed credit on input services, including service tax paid on transportation charges up to the place of customers.

The Revenue contended that outward transportation beyond the place of removal was not eligible for input service credit.

Issues:

Whether outward transportation of goods beyond the place of removal qualifies as an "input service" under Rule 2(l) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.

Interpretation of the term "place of removal" as defined in Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, for determining the eligibility of Cenvat Credit for service tax paid on transportation.

Held:

The court held that outward transportation from the factory to the premises of customers qualifies as an input service for availing Cenvat Credit.

The eligibility for such credit depends on the definition of "place of removal," which may include the factory premises of the assessee or the customer's place if the goods are directly dispatched to the customer from the place of removal.

The court relied on Circular No. 97/8/2007-ST issued by the CBEC, which clarified the conditions for availing credit based on the place of sale. The court dismissed the appeals, finding no merit in the contention of the Revenue.

Facts:

The writ petitions were filed originally to challenge a notification issued by the Union of India and to ensure compliance with a previous Supreme Court judgment. However, during the proceedings, the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act, 2017, was passed, prompting the petitioners to amend their petitions to include challenges against this amendment act.

Issues:

Whether the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act is within the legislative powers of the State and whether it addresses the prevention of cruelty to animals.

Whether the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act can be considered part of the cultural heritage of Tamil Nadu and thus protected under Article 29 of the Constitution.

Whether the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act is aimed at ensuring the survival and well-being of native breed of bulls and whether it relates to Article 48 of the Constitution.

Whether the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution by being unreasonable and contrary to fundamental rights.

Whether the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act conflicts with previous Supreme Court judgments and whether it addresses the issues raised in those judgments.

Held:

The court held that the case involves substantial questions relating to the interpretation of the Constitution of India, necessitating a Constitution Bench of 5 learned Judges to authoritatively decide the matter.

The questions referred to the Bench include whether the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act falls within the legislative powers of the State, whether it perpetuates cruelty to animals, its cultural significance, its relation to native breeds of bulls and constitutional articles, and its compliance with previous judgments.

The court directed the papers to be placed before the Chief Justice to constitute a Bench of 5 Hon'ble Judges for further proceedings.

Facts:

The appeal before the Supreme Court was against an order of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal dated July 31, 2017, wherein the appeal was dismissed as not maintainable due to being filed after the expiration of the limitation period.

Issues:

Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, can be invoked to extend the limitation period prescribed under Section 421(3) of the Companies Act, 2013?

Held:

The court held that Section 421(3) of the Companies Act provides a specific limitation period, and the provision for an additional 45 days is only applicable if sufficient cause is shown for the delay within the initial 45-day period. This provision is peremptory in nature, and no further extension beyond the second 45-day period is permissible.

The court relied on precedents and held that the language of Section 421(3) of the Companies Act is similar to that of Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003, and thus, Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked to extend the limitation period.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the appeal, finding no reason to interfere with the judgment of the Appellate Tribunal.

Facts:

Narinder Sharma died in a motor accident on September 14, 2013.

The accident involved a vehicle insured by Reliance General Insurance Company Ltd.

Sharma's dependents filed a compensation claim before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT), which awarded compensation with interest.

The Tribunal factored in a 30% component for the loss of future prospects.

The appellant challenged the award of future prospects before the High Court, which upheld the Tribunal's decision.

Issues:

Whether the Tribunal's award of future prospects was justified.

Calculation of compensation for loss of future prospects in cases of self-employment.

Held:

The Supreme Court referred to its judgment in National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi and established principles for calculating compensation in cases of self-employment. Since Sharma was 42 years old at the time of his death, an addition of 25% for future prospects was warranted instead of the 30% awarded by the Tribunal. The Court recalculated the compensation based on this principle and quantified it accordingly.

Additionally, the Court directed the appellant to deposit 75% of the awarded amount within six weeks and the remaining balance within eight weeks for disbursal to the claimants.

The appeal was disposed of accordingly, with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The respondent, Ultratech Cement Ltd., availed Cenvat Credit of service tax paid on outward transportation of goods from their premises to the customer's premises. The Commissioner of Central Excise issued a show cause notice alleging the inadmissibility of this credit, leading to subsequent appeals and legal proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the service of a Goods Transport Agency used for the transportation of goods from the factory to the customer's premises could be considered as an input service under Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Cenvat Credit on goods transport agency service availed for the transport of goods from the place of removal to the buyer's premises was not admissible to the respondent. This decision was based on the amended definition of "input service" under Rule 2(l), which limited the credit only up to the place of removal.

The Court emphasized that the Board's circular, which clarified the definition of "place of removal," applied to the unamended regime and could not be applied post-amendment.

Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the judgment of the High Court was set aside, restoring the Order-in-Original dated August 22, 2011.

Facts:

The case involved a partition suit filed by a son of a deceased coparcener (GS) against his widow, two daughters (the appellants), and other family members.

Issues:

Whether the rights of daughters in coparcenary property, as per the amended Section 6, are preserved if a preliminary decree has been passed in a partition suit?

How does the amended Section 6 affect the division of joint family property among the heirs?

Held:

The Amendment Act, 2005, amending Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, unequivocally grants daughters equal rights as sons in coparcenary properties.

The court clarified that the rights of daughters in coparcenary property are not extinguished by a preliminary decree in a partition suit; final partition occurs only with the passing of a final decree.

The daughters' rights crystallized in 2005 when Section 6 was amended, and the preliminary decree needed to be amended to reflect this change in the law.

As per the amended law, the daughters (appellants) were entitled to a share in the joint family property, along with the sons and widow of the deceased coparcener. The court outlined the distribution of shares among the family members based on their entitlements.

Decision: The court ruled in favor of the appellants, affirming their right to a share in the joint family property as per the amended Section 6.

Facts:

On 05.05.2004, officers of Customs, Air Intelligence Unit, at Chhatrapati Shivaji International Airport, Mumbai intercepted the respondent, Leen Martin, a passenger of European origin, due to suspicious behavior.

A search revealed the presence of a narcotic substance, hashish, concealed in the respondent's suitcase.

The respondent was charged under various sections of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act).

The trial court convicted the respondent, but the High Court acquitted him due to inconsistencies and contradictions in the evidence.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution adequately proved the presence of panch witnesses during the seizure procedure.

Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution was reliable and consistent.

Whether the acquittal by the High Court was justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's acquittal of the respondent was justified based on the following reasons:

The prosecution failed to establish the presence of panch witnesses during the seizure procedure.

The evidence of independent witnesses contradicted the statement of the Intelligence Officer, undermining the reliability of the prosecution's case.

The statement of the respondent under Section 67 of the NDPS Act was retracted, further weakening the prosecution's case.

Reliance solely on the statement of the official witness was deemed imprudent, especially considering the infirmities in the evidence.

The High Court correctly acquitted the respondent, taking into account the inconsistencies and contradictions in the evidence.

Therefore, the Supreme Court found no reason to interfere with the High Court's decision and dismissed the appeal by the Union of India.

Facts:

WG. CDR. Ashwini Kumar Handa (Retd.), the appellant, served in the Indian Air Force and was granted study leave for two years.

He signed a Service Guarantee Certificate agreeing to serve for nine years upon returning from study leave.

Before completing the nine-year service period, the appellant applied for premature retirement on health grounds, which was accepted.

The authorities deducted the pay and allowances received during study leave from the appellant's post-retirement dues, citing breach of contract.

The appellant challenged this deduction before the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT), which dismissed his plea.

The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing for a proportionate deduction of pay and allowances and alleging discrimination compared to other cases.

Issues:

Whether the recovery of full pay and allowances from the appellant for the study leave period was justified.

Whether the appellant was entitled to a proportionate deduction based on his service after returning from study leave.

Whether the appellant's claim of discrimination was valid.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the recovery of pay and allowances from the appellant was justified under the terms of the Service Guarantee Certificate and Army Instructions 13/78.

The Court emphasized that the appellant was obligated to serve for nine years after returning from study leave and that the recovery was based on this contractual obligation. The Court rejected the appellant's argument for a proportionate deduction, stating that the recovery was not of damages but of pay and allowances given during the study leave period.

The Court also dismissed the appellant's claim of discrimination, noting the lack of foundational facts and proper pleadings. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.