Facts:

The case involves a family dispute, leading to a violent incident during a Panchayat. Accused No. 1 (Guru @ Gurubaran) was convicted of causing fatal injuries to the deceased with a sickle, while Accused No. 2 (Durai @ Durairajan) was alleged to have caused non-lethal injuries with an iron pipe. Armed confrontation occurred during the Panchayat, and the victims suffered injuries from various weapons.

Issues:

Whether the accused can claim the benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) based on the sudden quarrel and heat of passion.

Assessment of the applicability of Section 34 or Section 149 IPC, determining individual liability for injuries.

Held:

The court held that Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC was not applicable since the accused came armed, indicating a lack of intention for a peaceful resolution. The manner of the attack, using weapons, did not support the claim of a sudden quarrel in the heat of passion.

Accused No. 1's conviction under Section 302 IPC was upheld, given the dangerous nature of the act resulting in the victim's death. The sentence of imprisonment for life was maintained.

Accused No. 2's conviction was altered from Section 302 IPC to Section 324 IPC, considering the non-lethal nature of the injuries caused by the iron pipe. The sentence was reduced to the period already undergone, approximately 11 years.

Accused Nos. 3, 5, and 9 were found guilty of the offenses attributed to them, and their convictions under relevant sections were upheld.

Facts:

The appellant faced charges related to granting bail in a criminal case and closing the evidence prematurely in an NDPS case.

The public prosecutor did not oppose bail in the first charge, and the prosecutor failed to produce witnesses in the second charge.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's actions amounted to misconduct or a lack of integrity.

The appropriate criteria for initiating disciplinary proceedings against judicial officers.

Held:

The court found that the Additional Public Prosecutor did not oppose the bail, and the appellant's failure to take notice of the High Court's order was negligence, not misconduct. The subsequent correction of the mistake by the appellant demonstrated a commitment to rectify errors.(Paragraph 11)

In the NDPS case, the court observed that the Public Prosecutor had noted his inability to produce witnesses. The court questioned the lack of action against the prosecutor and emphasized the duty of the prosecution to produce witnesses. The closure of evidence by the appellant was not misconduct but a response to the prosecutor's inability.(Paragraph 14)

Decision: The court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and quashed all orders against the appellant. The appellant was directed to be given all consequential benefits by 31-12-2019.(Paragraph 16)

Facts:

Haji Elahi Baksh executed a waqf deed in 1936, dedicating properties to the waqf.

The waqf deed provided for joint mutawalli-ship and succession from the family line of the waqif.

Disputes arose regarding the appointment of mutawalli after the death of the original joint mutawallis.

Issues:

Whether a person from the waqif's family line could succeed to the vacant post of joint mutawalli after the death of any of the two original joint mutawallis?

If the first issue is answered in the affirmative, whether joint mutawalli-ship can be held by the appellant herein, though he is Kammu Mia's daughter's son?

Held:

The court referred to Section 205A of the Principles of Mahomedan Law and held that, in the absence of a direction in the waqfnama, joint mutawalli-ship passes to the survivor(s) after the death of one mutawalli.

The court interpreted the waqf deed and concluded that the waqif intended that after the death of any original joint mutawalli, the survivor should nominate a person from the waqif's family line to succeed the deceased.

It was held that descendants through the female line are not categorically excluded from mutawalli-ship, and interpretation depends on the terms of the waqf deed.

Section 63 of the Waqfs Act, 1995, empowers the Board to appoint a mutawalli in case of a vacancy.

The court directed Respondent No. 1 to appoint a competent person from Kammu Mia's descendants as joint mutawalli. The successor shall then have the right to nominate further successors as per the waqf deed.

Facts:

On September 13, 1983, the suit property was granted under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, with a non-alienation clause of 15 years.

On April 23, 1990, the predecessor-in-title mortgaged the property to the plaintiff for Rs.20,000, agreeing to repay the loan within a year.

On May 15, 1990, an agreement to sell the property for Rs.46,000 was executed in favor of the plaintiff, despite the statutory prohibition on alienation for 15 years.

Issues:

The legality of the agreement to sell, considering the statutory bar on property alienation for 15 years under Section 61 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961.

Held:

The court established that the transaction between the predecessor-in-title and the plaintiff constituted a transfer of property, falling under the purview of Section 61.

Section 61 prohibits the transfer of land within 15 years from the date of the grant, as specified in the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961.

Both the plaintiff and the predecessor-in-title were deemed equally responsible for violating the statutory provisions.

The claim of the plaintiff, relying solely on the agreement to sell dated May 15, 1990, was found to be in direct conflict with Section 61.

The court invoked the maxims "ex turpi causa non oritur actio" and "in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis et possidentis."

The trial court's decision to dismiss the suit, considering the illegality of the agreement, was upheld.

Decision: The appeals were allowed, resulting in the quashing of the judgments of the High Court and Fast Track Court. The trial court's order dismissing the suit was affirmed.

FACTS:

Syed Obaidullah Baghdadi Shah created a wakf with a deed specifying the appointment of the original mutawalli and the succession to "putro poutradi krome" (sons and grandsons).

Upon the death of the original mutawalli, disputes arose regarding the succession, involving the last mutawalli's wife (Nazira Khatoon) and daughters.

The last mutawalli attempted to transfer mutawalliship through a trust deed in favor of his wife.

The Wakf Board initially appointed Nazira Khatoon as mutawalli, but later canceled the appointment based on the original wakf deed's terms.

ISSUES:

Validity of transferring mutawalliship through a trust deed.

Interpretation of "putro poutradi krome" in the wakf deed regarding eligibility for mutawalliship, particularly for female descendants.

HELD:

Transfer of Mutawalliship through Trust Deed: The court, citing Mohammedan law, ruled that a mutawalli lacks the general power to transfer the office unless explicitly authorized by the wakf deed. The transfer through a trust deed was held beyond the mutawalli's powers and against the principles of Mohammedan law.

Interpretation of "Putro Poutradi Krome": The term "putro poutradi krome" was interpreted to mean sons and grandsons, excluding female descendants. The original wakf deed did not contemplate female descendants holding the office of mutawalli.

DECISION: The court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming the cancellation of Nazira Khatoon's appointment as the permanent mutawalli. The male lineal descendant (Respondent No. 1) was deemed entitled to the office based on the wakf deed's terms.

REFERRED CASES:

Abdul Latheef vs. K.P. Abdurahiman, (2014) 1 KLJ 329

Ahmed G.H. Ariff and others vs. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Calcutta, (1969) 2 SCC 471

Badagara Jumayath Palli Dharas Committee vs. Peedikayalakath Ummerkutty Haji, AIR 2002 Ker 56

Facts:

Pramod Kumar Sahoo was appointed as a Primary School Teacher under the Rehabilitation Assistance Scheme in 1988.

Dispute arose regarding the appropriate pay scale for Sahoo, who had an intermediate qualification when appointed.

The Orissa Revised Scales of Pay (Amendment) Rules, 1990, introduced separate pay scales for Trained Matric Teachers and non-Trained Matric Teachers.

Counsel for the appellant conceded before the Tribunal that teachers with intermediate qualifications are entitled to the pay scale available to Trained Matric Teachers.

Issues:

Validity of the concession made by the counsel.

Correct classification based on educational qualifications for determining pay scales.

Held:

The concession given by the learned State Counsel before the Tribunal was a concession in law and contrary to the statutory rules. Such concession is not binding on the State for the reason that there cannot be any estoppel against law. The rules provide for a specific Grade of Pay; therefore, the concession given by the learned State Counsel before the Tribunal is not binding on the appellant.( Paragraph 11)

The Trained Matric Teacher is the one who has been trained for the purposes of teaching. In the absence of such training, the respondent cannot be said to be a Trained Matric Teacher entitled to the pay scale meant for such teachers. The classification based upon educational qualification for grant of a higher pay scale to a trained person or a person possessing higher qualification is a valid classification.( Paragraph 12)

Therefore, we find that the order passed by the Tribunal as affirmed by the High Court is not sustainable in law. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The Original Application filed by the respondent is dismissed.( Paragraph 14)

Facts:

The case involves a challenge against the Rules framed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh regarding admission to the B. Ed. Course.

The appellant, a minority institution, contended that the impugned G.O.Ms were unconstitutional and violated their fundamental rights, particularly Article 30(1) of the Constitution.

The government imposed conditions, such as using Secondary School Certificates (SSC) as the basis for determining minority status, to address the reported issue of students obtaining religious conversion certificates overnight.

Issues:

Whether the impugned G.O.Ms violate the constitutional rights of minority institutions under Article 30(1).

Whether the government's conditions, including the use of SSC for determining minority status, are reasonable and constitutionally valid.

Held:

The court held that:

The impugned G.O.Ms do not violate Article 30(1) of the Constitution.

The conditions imposed by the government, including the use of SSC for determining minority status, are reasonable and aimed at preventing misuse of certificates for admissions.

The right of minority institutions is not absolute and is subject to reasonable restrictions for ensuring educational standards and maintaining excellence.

The G.O.Ms grant autonomy to Minority Educational Institutions to fill up 85% of their seats with meritorious minority students.

The G.O.Ms ensure that vacant seats are not wasted and are filled up by meritorious and deserving candidates.

The court dismissed the appeals and writ petition as being devoid of merit.

All pending applications, if any, were accordingly disposed of.

Facts:

The case involved the appointment of teachers in a linguistic minority institution that was not approved by the District Inspector of Schools due to the absence of a recommendation by the School Service Commission as mandated by Rule 28 of the Management Rules, 1969. The institution claimed its linguistic minority status under Article 30 of the Constitution.

Issues:

The primary issue was the conflict between the institution's linguistic minority status and the requirement of Rule 28. The case also involved the determination of linguistic minority status, the applicability of Article 350B, and the validity of the institution's claim.

Held:

Upon examining the Management Rules, 1969, the Court noted that no additional rules had been framed for institutions governed by Article 30. The absence of such rules supported the institution's claim to linguistic minority status.( Para 1 - 12)

The institution had applied for recognition as a minority institution, and despite the purported application of Rule 8(3), it did not waive its right to be treated as a linguistic minority institution. The special constitution demonstrated the institution's commitment to its minority character.( Para 13 - 15)

If the institution is indeed a minority institution, Rule 28 cannot apply, as it would violate the institution's right under Article 30 to administer itself with teachers of its choice.( Para 23)

The authorities under the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act, 1963, did not empower them to recognize a minority institution. The institution was started by the Sikh community for imparting education in their mother tongue and religion.( Para 24)

The institution was not estopped from claiming its minority status, and the fundamental right under Article 30 could not be waived.( Para 26)

Article 350B did not preclude a linguistic minority from claiming protection under Article 30(1) in the absence of a Special Officer's Report.( Para 29)

The linguistic minority status should be determined state-wise. The medium of instruction was irrelevant to establishing the institution's founding by a linguistic minority for education purposes.( Para 30 - 31)

Facts:

The case involved the execution of a share purchase agreement in 2009 between MCX, MCX–E, and a Financial Services Company. Subsequently, a 'Letter of Undertaking' was issued, leading to a dispute. A suit for specific performance was filed, and an injunction order was passed. In 2016, a winding-up petition was filed against LF under Section 433(e) of the Companies Act, 1956, which was later transferred to the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT).

Issues:

The application of the Limitation Act to winding-up petitions, the trigger point for limitation, and the relevance of commercial insolvency in such proceedings.

Held:

The court emphasized that a suit for recovery cannot impact the remedy of a winding-up proceeding. Time begins to run, and limitation can only be extended as provided in the Limitation Act. The Financial Services Company filed a suit in 2013 but filed the winding-up petition in 2016, making it time-barred due to the lapse of the three-year period.

The court clarified that the trigger point for limitation in a winding-up petition is the date of default in payment of the debt. Commercial solvency is considered at a later stage in the proceedings. The cause of action for limitation does not include commercial insolvency.

The court referred to Softsule (P) Ltd., Re, stating that a winding-up petition is not a legitimate means for enforcing a bona fide disputed debt. The ultimatum triggering the cause of action arose in January 2013, and the statutory notice in November 2015 did not mention commercial insolvency. The company's substratum disappearance or commercial insolvency was not pleaded.

The winding-up petition, filed in 2016, was beyond the three-year limitation period mentioned in Article 137 of the Limitation Act. As a result, it was deemed time-barred, and the judgments of the NCLT and NCLAT were set aside.