Facts:

The respondent, an employee of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), served in the National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) during a certain period. He claimed deputation allowance and special allowance for his service in the NDRF. The question was whether personnel from various Central Para Military Forces, including the respondent, were on deputation during their service in the NDRF.

Issues:

• Whether the respondent and similarly situated personnel were on deputation during their service with the NDRF.
• Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in granting relief with nationwide implications.

Held:

The Court analyzed the concept of deputation, emphasizing that it involves the temporary assignment of an employee from one department to another in the public interest. Until September 11, 2009, the respondent remained under the administrative control of the CISF and received pay from them, indicating he was not on deputation. However, from September 11, 2009, when control shifted to the NDRF and pay started coming from it, the personnel were deemed to be on deputation.

The Court criticized the High Court for overstepping its jurisdiction in granting nationwide relief. High Courts have jurisdiction only over their respective states, unlike the Supreme Court which has pan-India jurisdiction. The Supreme Court directed payment of deputation allowance to the respondent from September 11, 2009, to October 7, 2011.The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The case involves a situation where the Governor was intimated about the resignations of certain Members belonging to a political party. The Chief Minister advised the Governor for the removal of some ministers, and notices of disqualification were issued. Subsequently, the Speaker accepted resignations of some ministers. The Chief Minister requested a floor test to resolve the situation. However, no floor test was conducted, and the Legislative Assembly was adjourned.

Issues:

• Whether the Governor's exercise of power to convene a floor test was constitutionally proper
• Whether the convening of a trust vote can be deferred until the Speaker decides on issues of resignation and disqualification.

Held:

The Governor's role is to ensure the stability and accountability of the government to the legislative assembly. The Governor's discretionary powers should maintain a balance of power between the executive and the legislature. [Para 32, 37]

The concept of legislative assembly's control over the government is crucial in a parliamentary democracy. The Governor's power to call a trust vote is not meant to displace elected governments but to intervene cautiously when circumstances suggest a loss of majority. Judicial review is applicable to the Governor's decision. [Para 39, 43, 44]

The Governor's power to call for a floor test should be exercised to ensure that the legislative assembly's authority to determine confidence in the government is upheld. No reason exists for the Governor to delay the ordinary legislative process of a no-confidence motion. The Governor is expected to act impartially. [Para 45, 46]

The Governor's exercise of authority to convene a floor test, given the context of the case, was constitutionally proper. The trust vote is essential to ascertain the government's confidence and legitimacy. The Speaker's authority to decide on resignations and disqualifications remains intact. [Para 47, 48, 49]

The Court cannot mandate a trust vote only in the presence of all Members or postpone it until by-elections occur. The decision to attend the proceedings is up to the individual Members. The Court aims to prevent restraint on their rights and liberties. [Para 50, 51, 54, 55, 56]

Facts:

The 1994 EIA notification mandated prior Environmental Clearance (EC) for the setup and expansion of industrial units in specified categories. The circular of 2002 extended the deadline and allowed for ex post facto ECs. The circular was challenged and quashed by the National Green Tribunal (NGT). The industries in question did not seek ECs as required by the EIA notification and operated without complying with the notification.

Issues:

• Does the 2002 circular allowing for ex post facto ECs align with environmental jurisprudence and the principles of the 1994 EIA notification?
• Does the NGT have jurisdiction to strike down the circular?
• Are the industries in question entitled to the exemption provided in Clause 8 of the explanatory note to the EIA notification?

Held:

The concept of ex post facto ECs contradicts environmental jurisprudence and the 1994 EIA notification. Such clearances would be detrimental to the environment, as they would allow industrial activities to proceed without proper assessment of their impact.(Paragraphs 23, 25)

The NGT has the jurisdiction to enquire into the legitimacy of the circular dated 14 May 2002. The circular's purpose contradicts the objectives of the EIA notification, and it is not protected by Section 3 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.(Paragraphs 20, 21)

The three industries in question did not seek proper clearances before the commencement or expansion of their operations, as required by the EIA notification. None of these industries are entitled to the exemption under Clause 8 of the explanatory note.(Paragraphs 28-32)

The industries must deposit compensation of 10 crores each for operating without proper ECs. The NGT's directions for revocation of ECs and closure of the units are set aside due to the principle of proportionality.(Paragraphs 36, 38, 39)

Facts:

The case revolved around an organization formed to achieve separate statehood for Tamil Nadu. The appellant and other accused allegedly conspired to bomb the State Government building. The bomb was defused before detonation. The prosecution's case relied on confessions, both from the appellant and co-accused, as well as evidence related to the conspiracy and bomb-making materials.

Issues:

• Whether the appellant's confession was obtained voluntarily and adhered to the guidelines set by the court.
• Whether the confession of co-accused is admissible in the absence of a joint trial.

Held:

The court examined the appellant's confession (Ex. P-57) and observed that the requirements for recording confessions under Section 15 of the TADA Act were not followed. The appellant alleged torture and claimed that his statement was not voluntary. The court found discrepancies in the warning given, and the appellant's petitions (Ex. D-1 and D-2) raised doubts. The court held that the confession was not proven to be voluntary and rejected it.

The court considered the admissibility of co-accused confessions (Ex. P-26 and P-27). Since the appellant was absconding and a separate trial was conducted against him, the joint trial requirement of Section 30 of the Evidence Act was not met. The court upheld that for a co-accused confession to be admissible, a joint trial is necessary. Therefore, the co-accused confessions were not admissible against the appellant.

Conclusion : As the appellant's confession was rejected and co-accused confessions were not admissible, the Designated Court's conviction was unsustainable. The appellant was acquitted and his bail bond was canceled.

Facts:

Pawan Kumar Gupta challenged the rejection of his mercy petition by the President of India. He contended that settled principles of considering mercy petitions were not followed. He raised concerns about the determination of his juvenility, alleging that he was a juvenile at the time of the incident. Additionally, he claimed to have suffered injuries due to torture in prison.

Issues:

Whether the rejection of the mercy petition could be subjected to judicial review and if so, on what grounds.

Whether the petitioner's claim of juvenility had been adequately determined.

Whether allegations of torture in prison could be a basis for judicial review of the mercy petition rejection.

Held:

The court held that the power of judicial review over the President's decision in a mercy petition was limited. Such decisions could be challenged on the grounds of lack of application of mind, mala fide intent, consideration of irrelevant factors, exclusion of relevant materials, or arbitrariness. [Para 10]

The petitioner's claim of juvenility was rejected as the plea had been previously considered and rejected by the Juvenile Justice Board, the District & Sessions Judge, and the Delhi High Court. The plea had been conclusively determined by the courts. [Para 12-15]

Allegations of torture in prison were deemed insufficient to warrant judicial review of the executive order rejecting the mercy petition. [Para 16]

The court emphasized that when high constitutional authorities like the President of India have the power to grant mercy, it is presumed they have considered all aspects carefully. The court found no evidence that the President had not considered the mercy petition with an open mind. [Para 20-21]

The writ petition challenging the rejection of the mercy petition was dismissed, applying the principles from previous cases on the limited scope of judicial review over such decisions. [Para 22]

Facts:

In two separate civil appeals, candidates contested elections for seats reserved for backward class citizens in the Mumbai Municipal Corporation. Section 5B of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act required candidates to submit caste validity certificates, failing which, the election would be deemed retrospectively terminated and the candidate disqualified.

Issues:

Whether the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is ousted by the statutory scheme of Section 5B of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act?

Whether the High Court has the authority to pass orders affecting the statutory fiction under Section 5B leading to disqualification?

Whether the interim orders issued by the High Court were within its jurisdiction under Article 226?

Whether the High Court's interim orders allowing candidates to continue were valid in light of the statutory scheme of Section 5B?

Held:

The Court held that the power of judicial review vested in the High Courts under Article 226 overrides any contrary provision in a statute, and this power cannot be taken away or abridged by any statutory provision.

The Court clarified that the High Court can pass orders interdicting the statutory fiction under Section 5B if the fiction had not yet come into operation. It emphasized the wide scope of Article 226 and its power to remedy injustice.

The Court concluded that the High Court's jurisdiction to issue interim orders is not limited to the one-year time frame mentioned in Section 5B. Interim orders can be granted to maintain the status quo and ensure that the relief sought in a writ petition does not become infructuous.

The deeming fiction of retrospective termination of election under Section 5B could not come into operation due to the interim orders passed by the High Court. The Court dismissed the argument that interim orders couldn't continue beyond the prescribed time frame.

The Court answered the formulated points as follows:

Section 5B of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act does not oust the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226.

The High Court can pass orders interdicting the statutory fiction under Section 5B if it hasn't come into operation.

The interim and final orders of the High Court were within its jurisdiction under Article 226.

The interim orders and final judgment of the High Court were valid in light of the statutory scheme of Section 5B.

There is no merit in the appeals. All the appeals are dismissed.

Facts:

The appellants filed MAs seeking directions pertaining to the implementation of the Reservation Act 2018. The respondents argued that these applications were not maintainable since they essentially challenged the subsequent actions of the State government in implementing the Act, rather than seeking clarification or modification of the original judgment.

Issues:

Whether the MAs filed by the appellants were maintainable, considering they appeared to challenge the actions of the State government under the Reservation Act 2018.

Held:

The court held that the MAs were, in substance, a substantive challenge to the State government's actions in implementing the Reservation Act 2018. As the court had already upheld the constitutional validity of the Act in a previous judgment, the present applications were deemed not maintainable. The court emphasized that if the applicants were aggrieved by the State government's actions, they should pursue independent remedies available under the law.

Facts:

The plaintiff filed a suit seeking a declaration that he, his mother, and sisters had equal shares in a land, which defendant No. 5 obtained through a Will. The Will was contested as fraudulent and misrepresented. The trial and the first appellate court rejected the suit, citing existing property partition and valid Will proof. However, the High Court, in a second appeal, decreed in favor of the plaintiff, alleging suspicious circumstances around the Will's execution.

Issues:

Whether the Will's execution was duly proved?

Whether secondary evidence of the lost original Will was admissible?

Whether the High Court's interference with the concurrent findings of lower courts was justified?

Held:

The Will's attesting witness and the scribe's statements confirmed its proper execution. The Will's exclusion of natural heirs didn't render it suspicious. The High Court's intervention was improper as it disregarded the consistent findings of the lower courts. (Para 11, 23, 30, 33)

Section 65 of the Evidence Act permits secondary evidence when the original document is lost. In this case, evidence showed the original Will was lost, and secondary evidence was appropriately admitted. There was no requirement to file an application for permission to lead secondary evidence under Section 65(c). (Para 15, 17, 20)

The High Court, under Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, lacked jurisdiction to overturn findings of fact. The findings of fact could not be interfered with even in the absence of framing substantial questions of law. (Para 11)

Facts:

The Government of Bombay had acquired land for the Government of India before 1964, upon which it constructed godowns and silos for storing food grains. These structures were transferred to the Food Corporation of India (FCI) in 1965 after its establishment. The Brihanmumbai Mahanagar Palika (Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai) demanded property tax from the FCI for these godowns. The FCI claimed exemption from property tax under Article 285 of the Constitution, asserting that the properties were owned by the Central Government.

Issues:

Whether the FCI is eligible for exemption from property tax under Article 285 of the Constitution of India?

Whether the Municipal Corporation's argument based on Section 146 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act is valid?

Held:

The court analyzed the conditions for exemption under Article 285. Exemption from taxes on Central Government properties can only be denied if the property was subject to municipal tax prior to the Constitution's commencement or if a parliamentary law allows property taxation. In this case, the properties in question were constructed after 1964 and were not previously subject to property tax. Therefore, the conditions for exemption denial under Article 285(2) were not satisfied. The Municipal Corporation is not authorized to impose property tax, thus upholding the FCI's exemption claim under Article 285(1). [Para 27-31]

The court rejected the Municipal Corporation's argument based on Section 146 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act. It emphasized that such arguments could not undermine a constitutional provision. The court stated that the claim of primary or secondary responsibility loses relevance when there is an exemption claim based on property owned by the Government of India. Section 146 cannot be interpreted in a way that contradicts the Constitution. [Para 34-36]

The court emphasized that if the Municipal Corporation's claim to levy property tax is not covered by Article 285(2), it cannot use statutory provisions to bypass the exemption granted by Article 285(1). [Para 37]

Additionally, the court clarified that while the FCI is exempt from property tax under Article 285, it may still be liable to pay service charges for services rendered by the Corporation. [Para 45, 47]