Facts:

The appellant filed an application for an Agricultural Electricity Service Connection on 06.12.2010, which was initially returned due to a missing signature.

Upon resubmission on 21.03.2011, no action was taken by the respondents.

A writ petition was filed, and the Single Judge directed consideration of the application after necessary conditions were fulfilled.

The Division Bench set aside the Single Judge's order, stating that the 2017 application should be considered if found to be in order.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's application for an agricultural electricity service connection should be considered from the date of initial submission or resubmission.

Whether the non-deposit of the registration fee constitutes a valid reason for rejecting the application.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the application should be considered from the date of resubmission, 21.03.2011, as the defect of non-payment of the registration fee was not communicated by the respondents initially.

The respondents cannot benefit from their lapse in not communicating the defect, and thus the appellant's application cannot be rejected solely on the grounds of non-payment of the registration fee.

The respondents are directed to consider the application from 21.03.2011 and the appellant to resubmit the demand draft.

The respondents are given three months to process the application and notify any further requirements.

Facts:

The case involved the interpretation of sections 84 and 86 of the Electricity Act 2003 concerning the appointment of Chairpersons and Members of Central and State Regulatory Commissions.

Issues:

Whether it is mandatory to appoint a High Court Judge as the Chairperson of the State Commission.

What are the qualifications required for the appointment of Chairpersons and Members of State Commissions.

How should statutory provisions be interpreted in determining the requirements for appointments to regulatory bodies.

Held:

The judgment clarified that Section 84(2) of the Electricity Act 2003 is an enabling provision, and it is not mandatory to appoint a High Court Judge as the Chairperson of the State Commission.

However, it is mandatory to have a person of law as a Member of the Commission, possessing qualifications equivalent to those required for a High Court Judge or a District Judge, due to the adjudicatory functions of the State Commission.

The judgment emphasized that while interpreting statutory provisions, both the golden rule and literal rule of statutory construction must be applied. It's not the court's role to read into the statute something not provided, but the real intention of the legislature can be ascertained by considering the entire scope of the statute.

The functions of the State Commission under Section 86 of the Act were analyzed, concluding that while regulatory functions predominate, there are also limited adjudicatory functions. Therefore, it's not imperative for the Chairperson to be a judicial member.

The judgment dismissed challenges to appointments made to the Tamil Nadu State Commission and the exercise of suo moto powers by the Commission, finding no evidence of financial bias and stating that appointments were made following due process .

Facts:

The petitioner, a member of the Bar, filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, claiming to be a "public spirited person." He raised grievances regarding the constitution of Benches in the Supreme Court and the Allahabad High Court. The petitioner sought various reliefs, including the evolution of a set procedure for constituting benches in the Supreme Court and the establishment of separate divisions within the Court.

Issues:

The appropriateness of the petitioner's allegations against the bench of the Allahabad High Court.

The validity of the petitioner's suggestions regarding the constitution of benches and establishment of separate divisions in the Supreme Court.

The authority of the Chief Justice in constituting benches and allocating cases in both the Supreme Court and the High Courts.

Held:

The Court expressed disapproval of the petitioner's unwarranted allegations against the bench of the Allahabad High Court. It emphasized the exclusive prerogative of the Chief Justice in constituting benches and rejected the petitioner's proposals for specific bench compositions and establishment of separate divisions in the Supreme Court.

The Court upheld the authority of the Chief Justice in allocating work and forming benches in both the Supreme Court and the High Courts.

Finally, the Court dismissed the petition, finding no merit in the petitioner's claims, and cautioned the petitioner to be more responsible in future filings.

Facts:

The dispute arose from a direction issued by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh regarding alleged violations of previous court judgments and interim arrangements.

The respondents alleged that certain policy guidelines dated February 17, 2014, violated the spirit of an earlier judgment dated May 17, 2012, and interim arrangements made by the court.

The appellants challenged the High Court's findings in the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the guidelines framed and notified in accordance with court directions violated previous judgments and interim orders.

Whether the contempt proceedings initiated by the High Court were justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that once guidelines were framed and notified, the interim order to maintain status quo lapsed. The Court emphasized that contempt jurisdiction is limited to instances of willful disobedience of court directions.

The High Court's finding of violations of the earlier judgment and its subsequent contempt proceedings were not justified.

The impugned order dated May 28, 2015, was set aside, and the appeal was allowed.

Civil Appeal No. 9310 of 2016 and SLP (C) No. 1865 of 2016 were disposed of in accordance with the judgment.

Facts:

The appellant, Suvarnamma, filed a claim for compensation after her husband was killed in a motor accident involving a tractor. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal awarded compensation to the appellants, holding both the Insurance Company and the owner of the tractor jointly and severally liable. The Insurance Company challenged this decision before the High Court, which ruled in its favor, exonerating it from liability. Dissatisfied with the High Court's decision, the appellants appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

The liability of the Insurance Company in the motor accident claim.

Held:

The Supreme Court observed that there was no dispute regarding the negligent driving of the tractor at the time of the accident.

The Court noted the testimony of an independent eyewitness supporting the claim that the deceased was a pedestrian walking on the footpath at the time of the accident.

Despite this evidence, the High Court presumed that the deceased was unlawfully traveling on the tractor.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision was erroneous as it was based on presumptions and conjectures rather than reliable evidence.

Since there was no credible evidence to support the claim that the deceased was unlawfully traveling on the tractor, the Court upheld the Tribunal's decision.

The respondents, including the Insurance Company, were directed to jointly and severally pay compensation to the appellants.

The appeal was allowed, affirming the judgment of the Tribunal.

Facts:

The Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited (the appellant) allotted industrial plots to various entrepreneurs (the respondents) with the condition that they must establish their units within two years from the date of taking possession of the plots.

The respondents failed to meet this condition within the stipulated time frame, leading to show-cause notices for cancellation of the plots by the Corporation.

The respondents argued that once the sale deeds were executed, transferring absolute ownership of the plots to them, the Corporation had no authority to cancel the allotments or demand payment of 50% of the prevailing market value.

Issues:

Whether the Corporation had the authority to cancel allotments and demand payment based on the conditions mentioned in the allotment letters after the execution of sale deeds.

Held and Decision:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, emphasizing that once the sale deeds were executed, transferring absolute ownership to the respondents, the Corporation could not insist on the conditions mentioned in the allotment letters. The Court also rejected the Corporation's argument that the doctrine of proportionality did not apply in this case, noting that the Corporation had withdrawn the cancellation action and instead demanded payment of 50% of the prevailing market value, which had no legal basis after the registration of the sale deeds.

In view of the above, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Corporation and upheld the High Court's decision, ordering the Corporation to pay costs.

Facts:

The appellants filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction regarding joint ownership and possession of ancestral property. They alleged fraud in the execution of a registered sale deed by the respondents.

Issues:

Whether the suit was barred by limitation, as contended by the respondents under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the CPC.

Held:

The Supreme Court reinstated the decision of the Trial Court, holding that the issue of limitation was a triable issue and should not lead to the rejection of the plaint at the threshold. The Court emphasized that only the averments in the plaint should be considered at this stage and criticized the High Court for basing its decision on assumptions rather than analyzing the content of the plaint. Therefore, the Court allowed the appeal and restored the order of the Trial Court.

Facts:

The appellant, Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu Public (Law and Order) Revenue Department, issued an order of detention under Section 3(1)(ii) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA Act) against the respondent, Kamala.

The High Court quashed the detention order on the ground that the period of detention was not specified in the order.

Issues:

Whether the absence of specifying the period of detention in the detention order renders it invalid under the COFEPOSA Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the detention order is not rendered invalid or illegal merely because it does not specify the period of detention.

The Court emphasized that the COFEPOSA Act does not require the specifying of the period for which a detenu is to be detained, and the implication of not specifying a period is that the detention is for the maximum period prescribed under the Act.

The Court referred to previous judgments, including T. Devaki v. Government of Tamil Nadu, which overruled Commissioner of Police v. Gurbux Anandram Bhiryani, establishing the legal position that non-specification of the period of detention does not invalidate the detention order.

Consequently, the High Court's judgment quashing the detention order was set aside, and the detention order was revived. However, since the period of detention had already concluded, no further action was required except for clarifying the legal position.

Facts:

The petitioner, Bharatiya Janata Party West Bengal, filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of mandamus.

They requested the West Bengal State Election Commission to issue nomination forms for their candidates for the upcoming panchayat elections and to provide police protection to them.

Instances of violence hindering their candidates from obtaining and filing nomination forms were cited, as reported in various newspapers.

Issues:

Whether the court should intervene in the conduct of the panchayat elections in West Bengal due to reported violence hindering the nomination process.

Whether the writ petition is maintainable in light of the precedents cited by the respondents.

Held:

The court acknowledged the initiation of the election process but expressed concern over reports of violence impeding the nomination process. It emphasized the responsibility of the State Election Commissioner to address grievances related to the election process.

The court disposed of the petition, granting liberty to political parties and candidates, including independents, to approach the State Election Commissioner with their grievances. It instructed the Commissioner to address these grievances promptly and in accordance with the law. The court expressed hope that steps would be taken to ensure fair and free elections, addressing the concerns raised by the petitioner and other candidates.