Facts:

The case involves IDBI Bank Limited, the Official Liquidator, and others. It centers around winding up petitions, the mandatory advertisement of such petitions, and the validity of an agreement to sell executed by the company in favor of the petitioner.

Issues:

The mandatory requirement of advertising a winding up petition.

Whether the agreement to sell constitutes a fraudulent preference.

Compliance with Sections 293 and 531 of the Companies Act, 1956.

Held:

The court underscores the mandatory nature of advertising a winding up petition, as stipulated in Rules 96, 99, and 24. Rule 101 grants the court discretion to substitute a petitioning creditor if advertisement is not made within the prescribed time.

Emphasis on the court's discretion to direct advertisement to secure the interests of other creditors, especially when the petitioning creditor fails to advertise, and no other creditor or contributory steps forward.

Acknowledgment that the winding up proceedings impact the rights of individuals in general. The court rejects an absolute bar to continuation when the petitioning creditor fails to advertise, especially in cases where unsatisfied creditors are deprived of the opportunity.

Recognition of the relevance of secured creditors who were affected by the lack of adequate advertisement. The court upholds the decision to revive one winding up petition, directing the Company Court to issue appropriate directions for advertisement.

Discussion on Section 531 of the Companies Act, 1956, which deals with the effect of winding up on antecedent transactions, and its conjunction with Section 293 regarding the sale of a public company's property.

Clarification that the sale of immovable property can only be effectuated through a sale deed, and an agreement to sell does not transfer any right, title, or interest in the immovable property.

The court scrutinizes whether the agreement to sell constitutes a fraudulent preference under Section 531. Emphasis on the two conditions - dominant motive to prefer a creditor and the act undertaken within the six-month period preceding the winding up petition.

Rejection of the claim that the agreement to sell is a fraudulent preference due to the non-fulfillment of the six-month condition. The court highlights the comprehensive nature of Section 531, covering indirect transactions.

Facts:

The prosecutrix, a small child, alleged sexual harassment in a school managed by the appellant.

Photos introduced by the child's parents implicated a person with spectacles as the accused.

Inconsistencies in the statements of the child and the anger of her father against the school management, including the appellant.

Issues:

Whether a prima facie case against the appellant for the alleged offenses is established.

Validity of the order summoning the appellant under Section 319 of the CrPC.

Held:

The court found no prima facie case against the appellant, noting inconsistencies and suggestive roles in the child's statements.

The anger of the child's father against the school management was deemed insufficient to implicate the appellant for the offenses.

The order summoning the appellant under Section 319 of the CrPC was declared not legal.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was not to stand trial for the mentioned offenses.

FACTS:

The appellant, who runs a hotel in Madurai, filed a suit for damages against the respondents for various acts, including obstruction of property and damage to the hotel. The Trial Court decreed the suit, but the High Court set aside the decree, holding that the suit was not maintainable under the Tamil Nadu Property (Prevention of Damage and Loss) Act, 1992.

ISSUES:

Whether the suit for damages is maintainable under the Act, and whether the Act excludes the jurisdiction of the civil court.

HELD:

The court relies on the principles laid down in Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1968) to determine whether the Act provides an adequate final remedy comparable to what the civil court would normally do in a suit.( Para 6.1)

The judgment emphasizes that Section 7 of the Act recognizes the possibility of a civil suit being filed subsequent to criminal proceedings under the Act, and this acknowledgment does not stand to reason if the Act excludes the concurrent jurisdiction of the civil court.( Para 13)

The court interprets Section 14 of the Act, the savings provision, to conclude that the Act is in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other law in force. It preserves the right of an aggrieved person to approach the civil court for relief in addition to the remedies provided by the Act.( Para 14)

The court draws parallels with the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, emphasizing that Section 3 of that Act, similar to Section 14 of the present Act, does not supplant the jurisdiction of the civil court but permits an aggrieved person to approach the civil court for relief if desired.( Para 15)

The court concludes that even the summary remedy of claiming compensation under Section 10 of the Act, read with the Rules, does not preclude the filing of a suit for damages. The Act does not oust the jurisdiction of the civil court either expressly or by necessary implication.( Para 16)

The appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside, and the matter is remitted to the High Court for deciding the first appeal on merits.( Para 17)

REFERRED CASES:

Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1968 (3) SCR 662

Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha, (1995) 6 SCC 651

State of Karnataka v. Vishwabharathi House Building Coop. Society, (2003) 2 SCC 412

Facts:

Land owned by appellants subject to government acquisition.

Award passed on 01.10.2003; compensation awarded.

Review Award on 14.07.2004 reduced compensation, citing illegal structures.

Appellants unaware of the Review Award, received Supplementary Award on 27.10.2004.

Writ petitions challenging Review Award dismissed by Delhi High Court.

Issues:

Can an Award under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 be reviewed under any provisions of the Act?

Validity of the Review Award reducing compensation.

Held:

No provision for review under Land Acquisition Act.Section 13A allows correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes, not a review.Review Award beyond the permissible six-month correction period.( Paragraph 8)

Review Award not justified under Section 13A.Deduction for illegal structures involves a review, not correction.( Paragraph 9)

Section 12 makes the Collector's Award final on filing. Award dated 01.10.2003 attained finality and could not be reviewed.( Paragraph 11)

Power of review must be expressly conferred by statute. In the absence of statutory provision, review application impermissible.( Paragraph 12)

Citing Kalabharati Advertising vs. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania (2010) 9 SCC 437. Power to review not inherent; must be derived from statute.( Paragraph 13)

Law summarized: In the absence of statutory provision for review, entertaining an application for review is impermissible.(Paragraph 14)

Decision: Appeals allowed, quashing the Review Award and High Court's judgment. Compensation awarded in the original Award and Supplementary Award upheld. No costs awarded.

Facts:

The ONGC Labour Union appealed against the High Court's decision quashing a notification issued by the Government of India under Section 10(1) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. The ONGC management did not involve recognized labour unions in the writ petitions filed before the High Courts, denying them the opportunity to participate in the proceedings.

Issues:

Denial of opportunity to recognized labour unions in the High Court.

Incorrect premises and inferences drawn by the High Court.

Reliance on a previous judgment related to a different notification.

Lack of information about the constitution of sub-committees and their recommendations.

Held:

The denial of opportunity to the appellant and recognized labour unions violated principles of natural justice. The High Court lacked access to the previous exercise by the Central Government, leading to incorrect premises and wrong inferences (Para 11).

The High Court primarily relied on a previous verdict related to a 1976 notification, and the relevant materials for the 1994 notification were not produced (Para 14).

The importance of considering the detailed study/discussion by the sub-committees preceding the 1994 notification was emphasized, and stakeholders, including labour unions, should be heard (Para 16).

The Supreme Court ordered the restoration of the Writ Petition in the High Court for fresh consideration. The ONGC Labour Union and other recognized labour unions were directed to be impleaded in the proceedings. The High Court was instructed to decide the matter expeditiously (Para 17).

Facts:

The case involves appointments against Class II or IV posts in the Health Department in the Government of Bihar. A Committee Report characterized the appointments as irregular, illegal, and based on forged letters. Subsequently, termination orders were issued against candidates who secured employment with forged documents. A writ petition challenged the Committee Report, leading to the quashing of the report and a direction to reinstate the employees.

Issues:

The legality of appointments against Class II or IV posts in the Health Department. The Committee Report deemed the appointments irregular, while the writ petition sought reinstatement of terminated employees.

Held:

Nature of Service Benefits (Para 35-36): The court emphasized that rights to salary, pension, and other service benefits are entirely statutory in nature in public service. These rights stem from a valid and legal appointment to the post. Once the appointment is found to be illegal and non-existent in the eye of the law, no statutory entitlement for salary or consequential rights of pension and other monetary benefits can arise.

Illegal Appointments (Para 44): The court categorically stated that the appointments were not irregular but illegal. They were made without sanctioned posts, without advertising for eligible candidates, and without any recruitment process. Such appointments were considered backdoor entries, acts of nepotism, and favoritism.

Appointing Authority (Para 30, 31): Identification of the Director of Health Services as the appointing authority for non-gazetted appointments in the Health Department was emphasized. Certain circulars and orders clarified the authority for appointments, and the court noted that several appointments did not adhere to these procedures.

Delegation of Powers (Para 32): Discussion on the delegation of powers highlighted instances where authorities made appointments without the requisite competence, leading to non-compliance with the established procedures.

Committee Examination (Para 38): A five-member Committee examined the appointments and found 91 candidates to be cases of irregular appointment, yet they continued in service. The court held that none of the candidates could prove that they were appointed through a proper process, such as by advertisement and giving an opportunity to all eligible candidates.

Legal Precedents (Para 44, 45): The court referred to legal precedents, including Uma Devi's case and Rita Mishra's case, to support its findings on the nature of appointments.

Decision: The court allowed the appeals by the State and dismissed the appeals by the candidates. The order dated July 12, 2011, or similar orders passed by the High Court, were set aside. The court emphasized that no statutory entitlement for salary or other benefits could arise from illegal appointments.

Facts:

The appellant owns an apple orchard and supplies apple cartons, trays, and packing materials to other growers on a cash and credit basis.

In 2011, the respondent purchased apple crops from various growers through the appellant's agent and procured packing material on credit.

After settlement, a cheque issued by the respondent for the outstanding amount was dishonored due to insufficient funds.

The appellant, after legal notice, filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Issues:

• Discrepancies in the number of cartons and packing materials led to a dispute over the cheque amount.

• The trial court and the high court acquitted the respondent, citing the alleged discrepancies and failure to prove the exact amount due.

Held:

Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act establish a statutory presumption of consideration for a cheque.

The onus shifts to the accused to rebut this presumption by establishing a probable defense.

The respondent failed to rebut the presumption as:

The appellant's agent affirmed the settlement and issuance of the cheque.

The respondent did not deny issuing the cheque, challenge the signatures, or provide evidence of loss or theft.

Mere discrepancies in the appellant's statements regarding cartons do not invalidate the cheque.

The trial court and high court erred in treating the case as a civil matter and dismissing it on alleged discrepancies.

Reference to Bir Singh vs. Mukesh Kumar, Kumar Exports vs. Sharma Carpets, and Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel vs. State of Gujarat supports the presumption of consideration.

The appeal is allowed, the respondent is held guilty under Section 138, and a fine is imposed.

Facts:

The case involved a FIR filed by a power-of-attorney holder regarding alleged attempts of extortion and fraudulent activities related to agricultural land. The investigation was conducted, a charge-sheet was filed, and the Magistrate took cognizance, issuing summons to the accused.

Issues:

Whether the Magistrate possessed the authority to order further investigation post the filing of a charge-sheet and after cognizance is taken.

Held:

The court highlighted the expansive nature of the Magistrate's power under Section 156(3) of the CrPC, emphasizing the Magistrate's responsibility to ensure a fair and just police investigation, as mandated by Article 21 of the Constitution. This power includes the authority to order further investigation even after a police report is submitted.

The introduction of Section 173(8) grants the police the power to continue investigations after a report has been forwarded to the Magistrate until the trial commences.

Overruling previous judgments, the court rejected a restrictive view of the Magistrate's powers post the issuance of process or the accused appearing before the Magistrate.

The discretion to order further investigation lies with the Magistrate, who must exercise it based on the facts of each case and in accordance with the law.

In the specific case, the court observed that the facts alleged for further investigation were akin to a cross-FIR. However, considering doubts raised by the Commissioner of Revenue, the court directed the police to register an FIR and investigate specific facts mentioned in a communication.

Facts:

Dismissal of a workman with another industrial dispute pending.

Application under Section 33(2)(b) seeking permission for dismissal.

Labour Court dismissal of the application, upheld by the Single Judge of the High Court.

Division Bench of the High Court set aside previous orders, stating Section 33(2)(b) does not allow the introduction of new evidence.

Issues:

Interpretation of the scope of Section 33(2)(b) concerning the dismissal of a workman.

Examination of the relationship between Section 33(2)(b) and the self-contained mechanism provided by Section 10 read with Sections 11(3) and 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act.

Clarification on whether Section 33(2)(b) permits an expanded procedure for adjudicating the legality, propriety, justifiability, or sustainability of punitive actions against a workman.

Held:

The Industrial Disputes Act provides a self-contained mechanism for adjudicating industrial disputes related to the dismissal of a workman.

Section 33(2)(b) is distinct and not meant for adjudicating the legality or justifiability of punitive actions; its purpose is to prevent adverse alterations during pending conciliation or dispute proceedings.

Section 33(2)(b) contemplates a summary inquiry into the conduct of a proper domestic enquiry, focusing on principles of natural justice.

The Labour Court/Tribunal, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b), should not evaluate the proportionality of punishment, as this falls under Section 11A of the Act.

Two-phase scope for enquiry under Section 33(2)(b): Prima facie assessment based on domestic enquiry records and, if defects are found, allowing parties to present evidence.

Orders under Section 33(2)(b) have no binding effect in Section 10(1)(c) or (d) proceedings; both are independent.

Criticism of lower courts for misunderstanding the scope of Section 33(2)(b).

Remittance to the Labour Court for a fresh decision and directions for dispute settlement through mediation.

Decision: Partly allowing the appeal, the Court remits the matter to the Labour Court for a fresh decision within the limit and scope of Section 33(2)(b). The parties are directed to settle the dispute through mediation, and proceedings before the Labour Court are stayed until the mediation process concludes.