Facts:

The appellant, Madhusudan Bhanuprasad Pandya, engaged in the business of manufacturing cement pipes through M/s General Cement Pipe Company Limited. The dispute involved the rejection of the appellant's application for exemption under Section 20 of the Urban Land Act, the declaration of certain land as excess vacant land, and the subsequent possession by the government.

Issues:

The legality of possession, the repeal of the Urban Land Act by the Repealing Act of 1999, and the implications of the saving provisions under the Repealing Act.

The appellant contested the possession and argued that the proceedings lapsed upon the repeal of the Act.

Held:

In analyzing the facts and issues, the Court held that the possession of the land was taken over before the repeal of the Urban Land Act on 31 March 1999. The Court considered the saving provisions under Section 3(1) of the Repealing Act and emphasized that the appellant did not challenge the order of vesting or the consequences under the Act of 1976.

The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the judgment of the High Court. It concluded that, given the events and pleadings, there was no reason to interfere with the High Court's decision.

Facts:

The case involves an appeal by Manoharan against the State represented by the Inspector of Police, Variety Hall Police Station, Coimbatore. The appellant was charged under various sections of the IPC, including 302, 376(2)(f), 376(2)(g), and 201, in connection with the gang rape of a ten-year-old girl leading to the murder of two children. The trial court and High Court had found the crime to be of the "rarest of rare" category.

Issues:

The severity of the crime, the assessment of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the appropriateness of the death sentence imposed by the lower courts.

Held:

The court, consisting of Justices R.F Nariman and Sanjiv Khanna, noted that the trial court and High Court correctly applied a balance between aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The crime, involving the rape of a minor girl and the murder of two children, was deemed cold-blooded with no remorse shown by the appellant.

The court emphasized the heinous nature of the crime and the unlikelihood that the appellant, if set free, would not be capable of committing such a crime again. The appellant's confessional statement, even though later retracted, did not demonstrate genuine remorse.

As a result, the court confirmed the death sentence and dismissed the appeals.

Facts:

Shashi Bhusan Prasad, a Constable in the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), faced both criminal and departmental proceedings.

Criminal case: Charges under the Arms Act related to providing a firearm used in a murder.

Departmental proceedings: Gross misconduct in discharge of duties, involving handing over an unlicensed firearm.

Appellant acquitted in the criminal case but dismissed from service based on the departmental inquiry.

Appeal filed against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court of Orissa.

Issues:

Whether the acquittal in the criminal case absolves the appellant from disciplinary liability.

Whether the charges in the criminal and departmental cases are based on the same set of facts and evidence.

Held:

Affirms the distinction between criminal and departmental proceedings.Emphasizes that the charges in the two proceedings were on different sets of facts and evidence.Acquittal in the criminal case does not affect disciplinary liability.( Paragraph 17)

Reiterates that criminal and departmental proceedings serve different objectives.Notes the difference in burden of proof and standard of evidence in the two proceedings.Acquittal by a criminal court does not ipso facto absolve the delinquent from disciplinary jurisdiction.( Paragraph 19)

States that no error in the procedure or violation of natural justice was raised.Courts cannot interfere in disciplinary proceedings unless there is a violation of the scheme of rules.( Paragraph 23)

Facts:

The dispute involves the office of mutawalli at the Andrott Jumah mosque.

The respondents, claiming descent from Saint Ubaidulla, assert a customary right to the mutawalli office.

Appellants argue that the mosque's construction was by the island's inhabitants, and selection should be by local residents.

Issues:

Whether the Pattakal family has a customary right to the office of mutawalli.

Whether the local residents have the right to select the mutawalli.

Held:

Ordinarily, the High Court's revisional jurisdiction does not permit interference with findings of fact. However, correction is allowed if the lower court's findings are grossly erroneous. The High Court rightly noted historical facts, and the Tribunal failed to apply the appropriate standard of proof. No exceeding of revisional jurisdiction.

Partition deeds do not deal with the right of the mosque's management. The respondents claim a customary, not proprietary, right to the mutawalli office.

Historical materials, including the Gazette, support Ubaidulla as the first mutawalli. The Gazette is an official record, and its contents are relevant. The appellants failed to present contrary historical opinions.

The Muslim law does not inherently recognize succession to the mutawalli office, but exceptions, including custom, exist. Respondents demonstrated a customary right with clear evidence. The burden of proof is higher for a public waqf.

The committee's existence and the compromise decree are discussed. The compromise decree, being without court leave and violating Wakf Act provisions, is declared void. No breach in respondents' customary right.

The mutawalli has no property right, and the respondents' customary right is subject to the Waqf Act. The respondents established a reasonable customary right to the mutawalli office.

Facts:

Minor girl went missing, leading to the registration of a case.

Threatening calls demanding ransom were made to the girl's father.

Dead body found later; appellants arrested and charged.

Conviction based on circumstantial evidence, including calls, recovery of items, and witness account.

Issues:

Sufficiency of circumstantial evidence.

Clarity on ownership of mobile numbers in threatening calls.

Connection between recovered items and accused.

Timeline of the dead body's discovery.

Held:

Reiterates the principles for cases based on circumstantial evidence.Emphasizes the need for a complete and conclusive chain of evidence.Quotes legal standards from Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra.( Paragraph14)

Raises doubts regarding the ownership of mobile numbers in threatening calls. Highlights the prosecution's failure to establish a clear link between the calls and the accused.(Paragraph 16(a))

Points out the lack of forensic analysis or handwriting expert testimony to connect the drawing book to the threatening letter.( Paragraph16(b))

Questions the alignment of the timeline of the dead body's discovery with the alleged actions of the accused.( Paragraph 17)

Concludes that the prosecution failed to establish a complete and conclusive case against the appellants.Grants the appellants the benefit of the doubt.Acquits the appellants of all charges.( Paragraph18)

Facts:

The State of Rampur merged into the Union of India in 1947, and the ruler signed a Merger Agreement in 1949, entitling him to full ownership of private properties. The Constitution of India came into effect in 1950. The ruler died intestate, and a certificate declared the eldest son as the sole successor to his private properties.

Issues:

The nature of the ruler's properties - whether they were private properties governed by personal laws or attached to the 'Gaddi' of the State of Rampur, subject to the rule of male primogeniture.

Held:

Definition of Ruler: The court clarified that the definition of a "ruler" in Article 366(22) of the Constitution pertains to a former prince recognized as a ruler, having no territory or sovereignty. The rulers, after the merger, were rulers only in name, with no subjects or territory. (Para 12)

Nature of Gaddi and Private Property: The court distinguished between 'Gaddi' or rulership and private property, emphasizing that they have different connotations. The properties declared as private by the ruler should be treated as personal properties, not attached to the Gaddi.(Para 37-39)

Applicability of Personal Laws: The court rejected the argument that the rule of primogeniture should apply, highlighting that the rulers enjoyed rights under the Constitution, and succession to personal properties would be governed by personal laws. The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, applied, given that the ruler was a Shia. (Para 40-42)

Amendments to the Suit and Decree: The plaintiff amended the suit due to the death of some defendants, and the court accepted the worked-out shares of legal heirs as per the amended plaint. A decree was passed based on the determined shares outlined in para 9-F of the plaint. I.A. No. 3 of 2014 is dismissed. (Para 46-49)

All other applications are disposed of. (Para 50)

Facts:

Appellants and Respondent No. 2 involved in a partition suit (OS No. 92 of 2012).

Appellant No. 2 filed a criminal complaint (Criminal Complaint No. 518 of 2012) against the de facto complainant.

Criminal proceedings (PRC No. 2 of 2018) initiated against the Appellants for offenses under Sections 307, 323, 427, 447, and 506(2) read with Section 34 of IPC.

Appellants filed a petition (Criminal Petition No. 9225 of 2018) under Section 482 of CrPC in the High Court to quash the proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 to quash the criminal proceedings.

Whether the allegations in the complaint and charge-sheet constitute offenses.

Held:

The High Court rightly refused to quash the criminal complaint, citing that inherent powers under Section 482 should be exercised sparingly and only in rare cases.

The power to quash should not be used to stifle legitimate prosecution, and the High Court can intervene if there is a manifest error by the Magistrate.

The judgment emphasizes that the High Court, in exercising Section 482, should not act as a trial court but only be prima facie satisfied about the existence of sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused.

The Court agrees with the High Court's decision, stating that the allegations in the complaint, coupled with statements recorded by the Magistrate, have the necessary ingredients of offenses under relevant sections of IPC.

The appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

The plaintiff, a private limited company, purchased agricultural properties in Village Yakootpur, Pargana, and Tehsil Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar under sale deeds dated 17.10.1998.

The plaintiff filed a suit for cancellation of a sale deed dated 15.06.2006, alleging illegal sale of the disputed property by the first defendant to the second defendant.

The second defendant challenged the suit's maintainability, invoking Section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950.

Issues:

Whether the suit for cancellation of the sale deed is maintainable in the Civil Court, considering Section 331 of the Act.

Held:

The Court emphasized that Section 331 of the Act does not deprive a party of the right to approach a competent Civil Court for cancellation of a document, especially when the title of the recorded tenure holder is not under a cloud.

It clarified that the Revenue Court lacks jurisdiction to grant relief for cancellation of a deed based on fraud and misrepresentation.

Citing precedent cases, including Smt. Bismillah vs. Janeshwar Prasad and Ors (1990) 1 SCC 207, the Court held that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court should be strictly construed.

The plaintiff's suit for cancellation of the sale deed was deemed maintainable in the Civil Court, and the second defendant's challenge was rejected.

The Court dismissed the appeal, and no order as to costs was issued.

Facts:

Appellant purchased a vehicle through an auction conducted by ICICI Bank.

Vehicle was insured by the first respondent, with the policy mentioning the third respondent as the insured.

Appellant filed an insurance claim after the vehicle was stolen; claim was rejected by the insurer.

Dispute arose regarding the ownership transfer and insurance liability.

Issues:

Whether the insurer can repudiate the claim based on the ownership details mentioned in the registration certificate.

The impact of the transfer of ownership on the insurance policy.

Held:

The court clarified that Chapter XI of the Motor Vehicles Act primarily concerns third-party risks.

The court distinguished cases related to liability to third parties from insurance claims.

Emphasized that the insurer accepted the premium, issued the policy, and was informed about the ownership transfer.

Insurer cannot repudiate the claim based on an unsustainable basis.

Appellant awarded the claimed amount with interest at 9% per annum.

The appeal was allowed, and no costs were awarded.