Facts:

The case involves a complaint filed by the sister of accused No. 1, alleging forgery in claiming ownership of a property.

The complaint accuses accused No. 1 of creating forged documents, including a will and a deed of confirmation.

Accused No. 4 is implicated for entering into a lease agreement based on the allegedly forged documents.

The property ownership is disputed among legal heirs, leading to civil suits and other legal proceedings.

Issues:

The primary issues include allegations of forgery, fabrication of documents, and the execution of a lease deed based on purportedly fraudulent documents.

Inheritance disputes among legal heirs further complicate the matter.

The complainant alleges a conspiracy involving accused No. 1 and accuses accused No. 4 of colluding in the fraudulent lease agreement.

Held:

The judgment refers to the principles laid down in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors., (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335.

It is emphasized that the High Court, while considering the quashing of proceedings under Section 482 of the CrPC, should examine whether the allegations prima facie constitute an offense.

The Court observes that the complaint mainly revolves around a civil dispute regarding inheritance and property rights.

Accused No. 4's role is limited to entering into a lease agreement, and there is no indication of his awareness of the alleged forgery by accused No. 1.

The judgment highlights that the issues raised in the complaint are better suited for resolution in civil proceedings already initiated by various parties.

The Court concludes that continuing criminal proceedings against accused No. 4 would amount to an abuse of the legal process.

Accordingly, the appeal of accused No. 4 is allowed, and the criminal proceedings against him are quashed and set aside.

The appeals filed by the original complainant against accused Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 are dismissed.

Facts:

Wellman Smith Owen Engineering Corporation, a UK-based company, leased industrial properties in West Bengal.

The assets were later taken over by Wellman Incandescent India Ltd. (Wellman).

Wellman, in financial distress, borrowed funds from IDBI and mortgaged the leased properties.

The company went into liquidation, and WBSIDC, to whom the lease rights were assigned, determined the lease due to non-compliance with lease conditions.

The Official Liquidator appointed during the liquidation proceedings took charge of the assets.

Issues:

Whether WBSIDC had the right to determine the lease due to non-compliance with lease conditions.

Whether SASF, as a mortgagee, could challenge the forfeiture of the lease.

Held:

The Supreme Court, upholding the Calcutta High Court's decision, held:

The lessor's exercise of the right to determine the lease had attained finality.

A mortgagee (SASF) could not claim rights superior to those of the lessee.

The forfeiture of the lease by WBSIDC was in line with the law.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision, and upheld the principle that a mortgagee cannot possess rights superior to the mortgagor, and the lessor's right to determine the lease had legal sanctity.

Facts:

The victim, a painter and artist, had a relationship with the first respondent, her English teacher.

On 05.03.2004, the victim visited the first respondent's house to finalize their marriage proposal.

The parents of the first respondent, respondent Nos. 2 and 3, allegedly shouted at the victim, calling her a call-girl.

Disturbed, the victim returned home and committed suicide on 06.03.2004.

Charge under Section 306/34 IPC was framed against the accused-respondents based on suicide notes and statements recorded during the investigation.

Issues:

Whether the accused-respondents' conduct and utterances constituted abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC.

Held:

The court held that the case did not present a picture of abetment by the respondents.

The suicide committed by the victim could not be attributed to the actions of the respondents.

No goading, solicitation, or insinuation by the respondents to induce the victim to commit suicide was found.

The court emphasized that insulting and abusive conduct, without a reasonable connection to the intention of causing suicide, does not constitute abetment.

Referring to legal precedents, the court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's decision to discharge the accused-respondents from the charge under Section 306/34 IPC.

Facts:

The original partnership deed involved two partners, namely late Smt. Hashmatunnisa Begum and late Sri Jai Narayan Misra.

Late Sri Jai Narayan Misra filed Original Suit No. 580 of 1988, claiming reliefs related to the partnership property.

The suit was decreed on 14.07.1993, after which the original plaintiff passed away.

The legal heirs of the original plaintiff sought execution of the decree against the legal representatives of the deceased partner.

Issues:

Whether the decree obtained against the predecessor of the appellants is executable against the legal representatives (respondents) who were not parties to the partnership deed.

Considering the dissolution of the partnership due to the death of one of the partners, whether the respondents can be held liable under the decree.

Held:

The court, after considering the provisions of Section 42(c) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, and the specific clauses in the partnership deed, held that the partnership itself stands dissolved by operation of law due to the death of one of the partners. The legal representatives (respondents) were not parties to the partnership firm, and they had not derived any benefit from the assets of the partnership. Therefore, the decree obtained by the original plaintiff was not executable against the respondents. The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the decision of the Trial Court and the High Court.

Facts:

The respondent filed an income tax return for A.Y. 2006-07.

Notices under Section 143(2) were sent to the address in the PAN database.

Assessee claimed a change of name and address, communicated via an alleged letter dated 06.12.2005.

The alleged letter was not produced, and the assessee failed to prove its existence.

Assessing Officer completed the assessment under Section 143(3).

The assessee challenged the assessment on the grounds of invalid notice and delay.

Issues:

Validity of the notice under Section 143(2) within the prescribed time.

Sufficiency of communication for change of address.

Held:

The notice under Section 143(2) was sent within the prescribed time. The alleged communication about the address change was not proven, and the assessee failed to provide evidence. Filing Form 18 with the Registrar of Companies was deemed insufficient to notify the Assessing Officer of the address change.

The Court disagreed with the High Court's view that merely filing the return with the new address is enough.

The Court allowed the appeal, quashed the High Court's order, and set aside the CIT (Appeals) and ITAT orders. The matter was remanded to the CIT (Appeals) to consider the appeal on merits, addressing other grounds.

Facts:

Appellant filed criminal appeals against the High Court's decision to quash complaints under various sections of IPC, CrPC, and NI Act.

Complaints alleged offenses including cheating, fraud, and criminal conspiracy related to a land procurement agreement.

High Court quashed complaints based on a subsequent agreement, citing novation of the contract.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in exercising powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash the complaints?

Whether there was novation of the contract based on the subsequent agreement dated 08.11.2012?

Held:

The court held that the power under Section 482 CrPC should be sparingly exercised and not when the case is not clearly made out or when the complaint is an abuse of process. The question of novation and its effects should be determined after a full-fledged trial. Mere filing of a civil suit or complaint under Section 138 of NI Act does not justify quashing criminal proceedings. The High Court erred in allowing the petitions and quashing the complaints. The criminal appeals were allowed, and the High Court's order was set aside, directing the trial court to proceed with the complaints on their merits.

Facts:

The appellant company entered into an agreement for the sale of a property.

The 2nd respondent, a former director, allegedly wrongfully withheld possession after the termination of his directorship.

Dispute arose regarding the company's right to recover possession of the property.

Issues:

Maintainability of an application under Section 630(2) during the pendency of a civil suit.

Timing of an order under Section 630(2) in relation to Section 630(1).

Entitlement of the company to seek possession.

Requirement of the accused's possession as a perquisite of service.

Held:

Maintainability during Civil Suit The court held that the pendency of a civil suit does not bar criminal proceedings under Section 630 if there is no bona fide dispute regarding the company's right over the property. The court referred to Atul Mathur v. Atul Kalra (1989) 4 SCC 514.

Timing of Order under Section 630(2) The court opined that interlocutory relief under Section 630(2) can be granted prior to the conclusion of the trial under Section 630(1) if the company has a prima facie right to possession. The court emphasized the need for a liberal interpretation of Section 630. Reference was made to Baldev Krishna Sahi v. Shipping Corporation of India Limited (1987) 4 SCC 361.

Entitlement of the Company The court clarified that Section 630 does not require the company to have ownership title to the property. The focus is on whether the accused wrongfully withheld possession, even if the property does not belong to the company but a third party. The court referred to Kannankandi Copal Krishna Nair v. Prakash Chunder Juneja (1994) 81 Comp Cas 104.

Requirement of Perquisite of Service The court held that Section 630 does not necessitate that the property should have been allotted as a perquisite of service. It is sufficient if the accused was put into possession as an officer/employee and wrongfully withholds the property after cessation of employment.

Facts:

The case involves IDBI Bank Limited, the Official Liquidator, and others. It centers around winding up petitions, the mandatory advertisement of such petitions, and the validity of an agreement to sell executed by the company in favor of the petitioner.

Issues:

The mandatory requirement of advertising a winding up petition.

Whether the agreement to sell constitutes a fraudulent preference.

Compliance with Sections 293 and 531 of the Companies Act, 1956.

Held:

The court underscores the mandatory nature of advertising a winding up petition, as stipulated in Rules 96, 99, and 24. Rule 101 grants the court discretion to substitute a petitioning creditor if advertisement is not made within the prescribed time.

Emphasis on the court's discretion to direct advertisement to secure the interests of other creditors, especially when the petitioning creditor fails to advertise, and no other creditor or contributory steps forward.

Acknowledgment that the winding up proceedings impact the rights of individuals in general. The court rejects an absolute bar to continuation when the petitioning creditor fails to advertise, especially in cases where unsatisfied creditors are deprived of the opportunity.

Recognition of the relevance of secured creditors who were affected by the lack of adequate advertisement. The court upholds the decision to revive one winding up petition, directing the Company Court to issue appropriate directions for advertisement.

Discussion on Section 531 of the Companies Act, 1956, which deals with the effect of winding up on antecedent transactions, and its conjunction with Section 293 regarding the sale of a public company's property.

Clarification that the sale of immovable property can only be effectuated through a sale deed, and an agreement to sell does not transfer any right, title, or interest in the immovable property.

The court scrutinizes whether the agreement to sell constitutes a fraudulent preference under Section 531. Emphasis on the two conditions - dominant motive to prefer a creditor and the act undertaken within the six-month period preceding the winding up petition.

Rejection of the claim that the agreement to sell is a fraudulent preference due to the non-fulfillment of the six-month condition. The court highlights the comprehensive nature of Section 531, covering indirect transactions.

Facts:

The case involves Barasat Eye Hospital and Kaustabh Mondal under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. The respondent (pre-emptor) sought pre-emption rights, and the dispute centered around the deposit requirement and procedural aspects under Sections 8 and 9 of the Act.

Issues:

Activation of the right of pre-emption: Whether the right is triggered only upon the deposit of the specified amounts?

Inquiry into consideration amount: What is the process and prerequisite for investigating the stated consideration?

Deposit requirement for pre-emption: Is the pre-emptor allowed discretion in depositing amounts, or must the full amount be deposited?

Strict construction of pre-emption right: How should the weak right of pre-emption be construed in legal terms?

Refund of deposit: Under what circumstances can the pre-emptor claim a refund, and what does the phrase "remainder" signify?

Extension of time: Can the respondent be granted an extension of time for depositing the full amount?

Held:

The pre-emptor has two rights: the inherent or primary right for the offer of a thing about to be sold, and the secondary or remedial right to follow the thing sold. The secondary right is a right of substitution, and the pre-emptor must show the superiority of their right over that of the vendee.

Under Section 8(1) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, the right of pre-emption is activated on the deposit of the consideration money and an additional 10%. No deposit means the right is not triggered. Section 8 is clear and explicit.

Section 9(1) comes into play only after the deposit mentioned in Section 8(1) is made. The inquiry into the consideration amount, as envisaged in Section 9, is based on the deposit under Section 8.

The nature of inquiry by the Munsif involves first depositing the amount mentioned in the sale transaction. The phrase "the remainder, if any, being refunded to the applicant" pertains to the refund of any excess amount deposited.

The pre-requisite for exercising the weak right of pre-emption is the deposit of the sale consideration amount and the 10% levy. Full amount deposition is mandatory, and no discretion is given to the pre-emptor.

The respondent did not provide material to substantiate a plea questioning the stated consideration's market value. Allowing a pre-emptor to deposit smaller amounts could lead to speculative litigation.

The requirement to exercise the right within the stipulated time is sacrosanct. No extension of time is permitted, even through Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Once the time period is sacrosanct, the deposit of the full amount within that time is equally crucial. No extension can be granted to the respondent to exercise the right.

The respondent is entitled to the refund of the deposited amount, together with any interest earned, if applicable, as the speculative exercise has continued for fourteen years.