FACTS:

The appellant-husband filed for dissolution of marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 in India, while the respondent-wife initiated divorce proceedings in a court in Florida, USA, citing irretrievable breakdown of marriage among other reliefs. The appellant sought an anti-suit injunction to prevent the respondent from pursuing the case in the US court.

ISSUES:

Whether the appellant-husband is entitled to an anti-suit injunction against the respondent-wife.

Whether the court in Gurgaon, India, has jurisdiction over the matter.

Whether the proceedings in the US court should be stayed.

HELD:

The court emphasized that anti-suit injunctions are to be granted sparingly and with caution due to their impact on the jurisdiction of another court. The principles governing the grant of such injunctions were outlined, with reference to Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

Discusses the limitations outlined in Section 41(a) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, regarding situations where injunctions cannot be granted.

The court interprets Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and references previous judgments to establish principles for granting anti-suit injunctions, emphasizing the need for comity between courts.

Concludes that there is no evidence to suggest that the appellant-husband would suffer grave injustice if the injunction was not granted. The court found that the proceedings in the US court were not oppressive or vexatious, and thus, declined to interfere with the decision of the High Court. The appeal was dismissed.

Refered Cases:

Harmeeta Singh Vs. Rajat Taneja, (2003) 67 DRJ 58

Modi Entertainment Network Vs. WSG Cricket PTE Ltd., (2003) 4 SCC 341

Oil and Natural Gas Commission Vs. Western Company of North America, (1987) 1 SCC 496

Rakesh Kumar Vs. Ms. Ashima Kumar, AIR 2007 P&H 63

Y. Narasimha Rao Vs. Y. Venkata Lakshmi, (1991) 3 SCC 451

Facts:

The appellant-husband filed a petition seeking dissolution of marriage on grounds of desertion and cruelty.

The Family Court granted the divorce and directed the husband to pay permanent alimony of Rs. 15,00,000/- to the wife, along with litigation expenses.

The husband appealed against the alimony amount to the High Court, which dismissed the appeal.

The husband then appealed to the Supreme Court via a special leave petition.

Issues:

Whether the courts adequately considered the factual and legal aspects concerning the award of permanent alimony.

Whether the absence of reasoning in the lower courts' orders prejudiced the appellant.

Whether the matter should be remanded back to the Family Court for fresh consideration.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the lower courts failed to provide reasoned orders regarding the award of permanent alimony, causing prejudice to the appellant. Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of both the High Court and the Family Court regarding the permanent alimony amount and remanded the case back to the Family Court for fresh consideration.

The Family Court was directed to determine the quantum of permanent alimony afresh, considering the legal principles and evidence presented, within a timeframe of six months.

Additionally, the appellant was instructed to continue paying the monthly maintenance amount until the final determination of the permanent alimony amount. It was clarified that the decision to remand the case did not imply any opinion on the merits of the controversy, and the Family Court was directed to decide the matter strictly in accordance with the law, granting the parties liberty to amend pleadings and present evidence if required. (Para 10-24)

Facts:

The Ministry of Home Affairs, Union of India, formed a committee to address the shortage of police officials in the IPS.

The committee recommended the introduction of the Limited Competitive Examination (LCE) as a method of recruitment to the IPS, in addition to direct recruitment and promotion from State Police Services.

The Union of India partially accepted the committee's recommendations and introduced recruitment through LCE.

Despite conducting examinations and interviews, the results of the LCE held in 2012 had not been declared.

Legal challenges were raised against the introduction of LCE and the subsequent delays in the selection process.

The Union of India ultimately decided to scrap the LCE held in 2012, citing various reasons including a decrease in vacancies, delays in the selection process, pending litigation, and potential seniority disputes.

Issues:

Whether the decision of the Union of India to cancel the recruitment process through LCE is legal and valid.

Held:

The Court held that merely being selected through a recruitment process does not confer an indefeasible right to appointment.

While candidates may have legitimate expectations, the government has the discretion to change policies for valid reasons.

The decision to scrap the LCE was found to be reasonable, not arbitrary, discriminatory, or capricious, and was taken in the public interest.

The Court emphasized the duty of the government to act fairly and justified the decision in light of the reasons provided by the Union of India.

Consequently, all transferred cases were rendered infructuous and disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The plaintiff, Shri Ramchander Ji, filed a civil suit against the defendant, Chandrabhan Singh, seeking eviction from the suit house due to non-payment of rent. The defendant contested the suit, denying the allegations made by the plaintiff. The trial court, as well as subsequent appellate courts, ruled in favor of the plaintiff, granting the eviction of the defendant based on arrears of rent.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 20(4) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings Act and its proviso. Specifically,

Whether the defendant, Chandrabhan Singh, could claim the benefit of Section 20(4) to avoid eviction despite the presence of the proviso.

Held:

The court upheld the eviction decree against the defendant, Chandrabhan Singh, stating that his son, a member of the family as defined under the Act, had built his own house in the same city. Therefore, Chandrabhan Singh could not claim the benefit of Section 20(4) to avoid eviction.

The court emphasized the importance of the proviso to Section 20(4), which disentitles a tenant from claiming the benefit of avoiding eviction if the tenant or any family member has built or acquired a residential building in the same city. The court found no merit in the defendant's argument that the proviso should only apply if the family member was living with him in the tenanted premises.

Accordingly, the appeal by Chandrabhan Singh's legal representatives was dismissed, and they were given three months to vacate the premises, provided they deposited all arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation.

Facts:

The petitioner, IBI Consultancy India Private Limited, and the respondent, DSC Limited, entered into contracts for Toll and Traffic Management Systems projects.

Disputes arose when the respondent failed to release payments to the petitioner, despite several communications.

Legal notices were sent for recovery of outstanding payments and to invoke the arbitration clause.

The High Court determined that the dispute fell under international commercial arbitration and thus, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction under Section 11(9) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issues:

Whether there exists an arbitration agreement between the parties.

Whether the petitioner has made out a case for the appointment of an arbitrator.

Held:

The Court examined the arbitration agreement between the parties and found it to be present. They noted that parties are free to decide the number of arbitrators and the procedure for their appointment, but if they fail to agree, Section 11 of the Act provides for judicial intervention.

Consequently, Justice Amitava Roy was appointed as the sole arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes between the parties. This appointment was contingent upon necessary disclosures under Section 12 of the Act and the arbitrator not being ineligible under Section 12(5) of the Act.

Facts:

The appeal arose from a Writ Petition challenging the Constitutional validity of certain Amendments made to the Salaries, Allowances and Pensions of Members of Parliament Act, 1954.

The provisions in question related to the payment of pension and other facilities to MPs, ex-MPs, and their spouses/companions/dependents (collectively referred to as "ASSOCIATES").

Issues:

Whether the impugned amendments, creating various rights and benefits for ex-MPs and their ASSOCIATES, are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

Whether the absence of an express mandate for pension payments in Article 106 of the Constitution operates as a prohibition for payment of pension to former MPs.

Held:

The Constitution does not mandate the payment of pension to MPs or ex-MPs explicitly. However, it does not prohibit such payments either.

The authority of Parliament to determine the terms and conditions, including pension, for MPs arises from the Constitution's scheme and relevant legislative entries.

The argument that MPs are not entitled to pension as they are not employees of the State is flawed, as various categories of payments labeled as "pensions" exist beyond state employee pensions.

The impugned provisions were not found to be irrational, arbitrary, or against public interest.

The Court held that issues regarding the rationality of benefits provided by the impugned provisions are matters of legislative policy and not justiciable.

The appeal was dismissed, with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The Government of Tamil Nadu issued a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for the acquisition of dry lands to provide house sites to landless poor Adi Dravidars.

The lands of the appellant were part of the acquisition.

The appellant contested the compensation awarded, claiming it was inadequate and did not reflect the true market value of the lands.

Issues:

Whether the compensation awarded for the acquired lands was just and reasonable.

Whether the acquisition served a public purpose as mandated by the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Held:

The Supreme Court emphasized the need for fair and reasonable compensation in land acquisition cases, considering factors such as location, potential for development, and market value.

The court ruled that compensation should reflect the value to the owner who parts with the property.

Public purpose for land acquisition was discussed, emphasizing its importance in serving the general interest of the community.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the compensation awarded by the subordinate judge, which was Rs. 2,500/- per cent.

The appeal filed by the appellant was allowed, and the cross objection was dismissed.

Facts:

The Government of Haryana initiated land acquisition for the construction of a Mini Secretariat in Village Ferozpur Namak, Tehsil Nuh, District Mewat.

Various legal proceedings ensued, including appeals challenging the compensation awarded to the landowners.

Issues:

Whether the compensation awarded for the acquired land was just and fair, considering its potential future value, location, and development prospects.

Whether the deductions made for development charges were reasonable, particularly concerning the existing amenities on the land.

Held:

The compensation must be reasonable, just, and fair, ensuring adequate compensation for the loss of property rights.

Compensation should be based on the value of the land at the time of the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act.

Each case should be assessed based on its unique circumstances, without a fixed formula for compensation calculation.

The market value of similar land in the vicinity, as evidenced by sale deeds, should be considered in determining compensation.

Deductions for development charges should be balanced to ensure they do not exceed reasonable limits, with no hypothetical views in calculation.

The court upheld the High Court's decision to reduce development charges from 60% to 10%, considering existing amenities and the need for further development.

The appeals were dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

Facts:

Mohd. Ali, the appellant, worked as a Casual Labourer in the Agriculture Seed Multiplication Farm Bhagni, Dist. Sirmor, Himachal Pradesh, from 1980 to 1991. He claimed that his dismissal violated Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as he completed 240 days of work in certain calendar years.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's dismissal was in accordance with the provisions of Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Held and Decision:

The Supreme Court analyzed Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and referred to previous judgments to interpret these provisions. The Court concluded that completion of 240 days of work in any calendar year is crucial for determining continuous service. However, it was established that the appellant did not work for 240 days in the 12 months preceding his dismissal, rendering him ineligible for benefits under Section 25F of the Act.

The Court held: "The contention of the appellant herein is not sustainable in the eyes of law since the provisions are very clear qua the calculation of period."

Therefore, the Court upheld the decision of the High Court, dismissing the appellant's appeal.