Facts:

The case originated from a conflict of opinion in a smaller bench, leading to its reference to a larger bench. The litigants sought recusal of a judge who had expressed an opinion in a previous judgment, arguing that this may lead to a biased decision.

Issues:

The legitimacy of a judge participating in a larger bench after expressing an opinion in a smaller bench, the grounds for recusal based on legal pre-disposition, and the potential abuse of court through bench hunting.

Held:

The judgment clarified that rendering a decision on an issue of law in a smaller bench does not disqualify a judge from being part of a larger bench when a reference is made. This practice was noted as consistent in various High Courts and the Supreme Court.

Recusal based on legal pre-disposition was deemed unfounded, emphasizing that litigants cannot choose judges based on their previous judgments. Allowing recusal in such circumstances might open the floodgates for forum shopping.

The judgment highlighted the risks of abuse of court through bench hunting if requests for recusal were readily accepted. It underscored the importance of maintaining the Chief Justice's roster-making powers to prevent interference with the judicial system.

The decision-making process and duty of a judge were emphasized, stating that judges should discharge their duties without fear or favor and in a dispassionate manner, as per their oath.

Decision: The judgment concluded by rejecting the request for recusal based on legal pre-disposition, affirming the judge's participation in the larger bench. It emphasized the need to uphold judicial discipline and prevent litigants from influencing the composition of benches.

Facts:

Dispute between Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL) and Go Airlines (India) Limited regarding aviation fuel supply, delayed payments, and interest.

Arbitration invoked by BPCL, and a counter claim filed by Go Airlines regarding the issuance of CENVAT invoices.

Issues:

Whether the counter claim falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement.

Whether the counter claim is arbitrable.

Whether the counter claim is within the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator.

Held:

The High Court set aside the Arbitrator's order, stating that the Arbitrator had jurisdiction to entertain the counter claim related to CENVAT invoices. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision and remitted the case to the Arbitrator for a proper inquiry.

Jurisdiction and Counter Claim (Para 23): The High Court held that rejecting the counter claim solely on the ground of lack of jurisdiction was not justified. The Supreme Court affirmed this, emphasizing the need for the Arbitrator to decide the merits of the counter claim after a proper inquiry.

Observations on CENVAT Credit (Para 25): The Supreme Court clarified that the High Court's observations on the availability of CENVAT credit under the CENVAT Rules, 2004 should not be considered as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.

Facts:

The appellants, the State of Manipur and others, filed an appeal against a judgment and order of the High Court of Manipur, challenging the delay in filing a Regular First Appeal. The delay was attributed to a mistake in filing the appeal before the wrong forum. The High Court declined to condone the delay, citing insufficient explanation.

Issues:

Whether the delay in filing the Regular First Appeal should be condoned.

The status of possession of the disputed land and the concluded execution proceedings.

The strategic importance of the land and the potential injustice if the state's appeal is not considered on merit.

Held:

The Supreme Court, recognizing the bureaucratic delay and the impersonal nature of government functioning, exercised its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India and condoned the delay, subject to the payment of costs by the appellants. The Court directed the restoration of the Regular First Appeal for consideration on its merits.

The issue of possession and the finalization of execution proceedings were made subject to the final decision of the High Court in RFA No. 5 of 2017. The Executing Court was directed to refund a sum of Rs. 15,00,000/- along with accrued interest to the appellant-State of Manipur. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The complainant reported an incident where the respondents-accused had entered his house with weapons, causing injuries to him and others. The Trial Court convicted the respondents for offenses under Sections 326 and 452 of IPC. The High Court partially allowed the appeal, reducing the sentence based on factors like the nature of the offense, it being the first offense for the respondents, and the period of imprisonment already served.

Issues:

Insufficient reasoning by the High Court in sentencing.

Failure to consider the second charge under Section 452 of IPC.

Inadequate analysis of the nature of injuries, weapons used, and other relevant factors.

Held:

The Supreme Court criticized the High Court for limited reasoning and emphasized the importance of detailed analysis in sentencing. The failure to consider the second charge and the short period of imprisonment were identified as reasons for interference.( Para 9)

The Supreme Court outlined three tests for sentencing: crime test, criminal test, and comparative proportionality test, emphasizing their significance in determining an appropriate sentence.( Para 12)

Detailed scrutiny of the facts revealed injuries caused with axes and sticks, but also injuries to the accused. The Court balanced this with the trivial motive and the fact that it was the first offense. Specific sentences were provided for each respondent based on age and nature of the offense.( Para 14-15)

The Court directed rigorous imprisonment and fines for the respondents based on the offenses committed, age, and other factors, emphasizing the need to enhance the sentences to match the gravity of the offense.( Para 17-18)

Facts:

The case involves parties Bijay Kumar Singh and others (Appellants) versus Amit Kumar Chamariya and another (Respondents). The dispute centers around the eviction proceedings initiated under Section 6 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, based on the grounds of non-payment of arrears of rent.

Issues:

Interpretation of the mandatory nature of sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997.

Determination of the outer limit for the extension of time to deposit arrears of rent as per the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 7.

Examination of the consequences arising from the non-deposit of admitted arrears of rent, as contemplated under sub-section (3) of Section 7.

Held:

The Court held that the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 7 are mandatory and must be scrupulously followed by tenants to avoid eviction under Section 6 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997. The outer limit for the extension of time to deposit arrears of rent is determined by the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 7. Failure to deposit admitted arrears of rent within the specified timeframe, along with the absence of an application for dispute determination, will lead to eviction. The deposit of rent, coupled with an application for dispute determination, is a pre-condition for avoiding eviction on the grounds of non-payment of arrears of rent. The appeals are dismissed.

Facts:

The case involves the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai seeking arrears of water tax and water benefit tax from the respondent, who refused payment, contending that water supply had been disconnected.

Issues:

Whether Water Tax and Water Benefit Tax are integral components of Property Tax?

Does the liability to pay such taxes persist irrespective of water supply or meter disconnection?

How does Section 169 empower the standing committee regarding water supply and charges?

Is the demand for arrears barred by limitation?

Held:

Qualitative Distinction: The judgment establishes the qualitative distinction between water tax, water benefit tax, and water charges. Water tax and water benefit tax are deemed components of Property Tax as per Sections 139, 140, and 141 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888.

Empowerment under Section 169: Section 169 is identified as an enabling provision, conferring authority upon the standing committee to formulate rules for water supply and associated charges. The extent of charges leviable is delineated within Section 169.

Compulsory Imposition: The judgment emphasizes that the levy of property tax in the form of water benefit tax is compulsory, contingent upon fulfilling conditions stipulated in Sections 139, 140, and 141 of the Act. The liability arises regardless of water supply or meter disconnection.

Disconnection Impact on Water Charges: In case of water supply or meter disconnection, the corporation cannot recover water charges under Section 169. Water charges can only be recuperated commensurate with the quantity of water actually supplied and consumed.

Nature of Demand Notices: Analysis of the demand notices reveals that they are explicitly for property tax in the form of water benefit tax and sewerage benefit tax, not for water charges under Section 169.

High Court Misinterpretation: The High Court's misinterpretation is highlighted. The demand notices were for property tax, and the liability persists even with water supply or meter disconnection.

Challenge on Limitation: The challenge asserting limitation is restricted to the period preceding January 10, 1994. The demand notices were issued on January 10, 1997, well within the three-year limitation period, thus rejecting the limitation challenge.

Relief from Statutory Interest: Respondents are granted relief from the liability to pay statutory interest for the period spent pursuing the proceedings in good faith, especially during interim orders in their favor.

Quantification of Interest: Interest is quantified at 18% per annum on the outstanding principal tax amount or the prescribed statutory interest, whichever is less, for the period during the pendency of the case.

Commencement of Interest: Interest at the statutory rate commences from the date of the impugned demand notice(s). Specific periods during legal proceedings have different interest calculations.

Facts:

Appellant's father, a resident of Sindh, claimed ownership of 83.11 acres of land, which was verified by the settlement claim officer.

The appellant, after his father's death, sought allotment of the remaining land balance, which was allotted by the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration (CCLA).

Issues:

Whether the Central Government, after transferring land to the State Government, could make allotments to displaced persons post May 24, 1980.

Whether the CCLA, as a delegate of the Central Government, had the authority to make allotments despite the power of allotment being vested with the Managing Officer under Section 17 of the Act.

Held:

The Court examined the authority of the Central Government to make allotments after transferring land to the State Government and whether the CCLA, as a delegatee of the Central Government, could exercise allotment powers.( Para 22)

The transfer of land to the State Government was completed on May 24, 1980, through a circular specifying the administration, management, and disposal of remaining evacuee property. The land transfer was effective from June 1, 1980, subject to certain conditions.( Para 23)

The Court affirmed that the Circular dated May 23, 1980, related to the administration, management, and disposal of compensation pool in accordance with Section 16 of the Act. The Central Government was empowered to constitute authorities or corporations for these purposes.( Para 24)

The argument suggesting that the Central Government retained control and administration of evacuee property was dismissed. The CCLA, as per the Act's scheme, had no power to make allotments as he exercised appellate or revisional jurisdiction. Allotment powers were vested in Managing Officers.( Para 28)

The Court held that the CCLA, as a delegatee of the Central Government, could not deal with land that had been transferred to the State Government. Therefore, the allotment made in favor of the appellant on February 26, 2003, was unsustainable.( Para 29)

Based on the Division Bench judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram Chander, as approved by the Supreme Court in Pala Singh, the Central Government or its delegatee could not allot land after its transfer to the State.( Para 30)

While disagreeing with the High Court's opinion that transferred land was excluded from the compensation pool, the Court clarified that the land transferred to the State remained part of the compensation pool and could be utilized by the State Government after settling displaced persons.( Para 31)

Facts:

The case involves Shri P. Chidambaram, a member of parliament and senior member, who faced charges under several sections, including Section 120B IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The appellant was arrested and had been in custody for about two months.

Issues:

The denial of regular bail to the appellant by the High Court. The prosecution claimed that the appellant had influenced witnesses and posed a risk of further influencing them.

Held:

The court emphasized the necessity of expressing prima facie reasons for granting or refusing bail, highlighting that recording reasons is essential for transparency. However, an elaborate examination of evidence and detailed discussion of the case's merits at the bail stage should be avoided.

The court outlined the factors to be considered when granting bail, including the nature of the accusation, severity of punishment, likelihood of tampering with witnesses, the accused's presence at trial, character of the accused, and public or state interests.

The court criticized the High Court for primarily focusing on the nature of allegations and the merits of the case without considering well-established principles for granting or refusing bail.

The court acknowledged that the appellant was not a "flight risk," and measures like surrendering the passport and issuing a lookout notice could prevent abscondence.

The court discussed allegations of influencing witnesses, noting the lack of direct evidence and specific details. The appellant's conduct during interim protection and the absence of witness interference were highlighted.

The court questioned the lack of contemporaneous materials and specific details in the prosecution's claim of witness tampering, considering it speculative and lacking substance.

The court, considering factors such as age, health, and the absence of a flight risk, held that the appellant was entitled to bail after being in custody for nearly two months.

Facts:

Various civil appeals arising out of Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) were presented before the Supreme Court.

The central issue involved the recovery of unearned increase by BIADA when industrial land allocated to an entity was subsequently transferred.

Specifics of the case involving M/s. Hindustan Coca-Cola Beverages Pvt. Ltd. were discussed, including the original lease to M/s. Orient Beverages Ltd., subsequent transfers, and amalgamation.

Issues:

Whether BIADA is entitled to recover unearned increase on transferred allocated land.

The basis for calculating unearned increase - BIADA value plus development charges or market value/circle rate at the time of transfer.

Held:

The court holds that BIADA is entitled to recover unearned increase, and the calculation should be based on the circle rate or market value of the land at the time of transfer.

Rejecting the argument for recovery based on BIADA value plus development charges, the court emphasizes considering the market value or circle rate for a fair share in the unearned increase.

In the specific case of M/s. Hindustan Coca-Cola Beverages Pvt. Ltd., the court directs the payment of interest on the amount demanded and paid during a certain period.

Another case involving land allotted to M/s. Shankar Saw Mills is remitted back to the Patna High Court for further consideration based on the shareholding structure of the transferee company, M/s. Samras Products Pvt. Ltd.

The court clarifies that while deciding in favor of BIADA, no recovery will be made from respondents in one case due to a previous court order maintaining the status quo. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.