Facts:

The case pertains to the Main (Written) Examination of Civil Judge conducted by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. Out of 1195 candidates, only 9 cleared the exam. Unsuccessful candidates challenged the entire selection process, alleging discriminatory and malafide practices, and sought the quashing of the result.

Issues:

Whether there were discriminatory or malafide practices in the selection process and evaluation method.

The appropriateness of disclosing Main Exam marks before viva-voce.

The validity of the plea for re-evaluation by an Independent Expert Committee.

Held:

Justice Sikri critically examined the selection process and evaluation method, concluding that the procedure was 'uniform.' The method of evaluation, with one evaluator examining and marking one question in all answer scripts, ensured uniformity. Adequate security measures were in place, and no discriminatory or malafide practices occurred.

Considering the strict marking but non-discriminatory nature, the court discusses the remedy of moderation. The court distinguishes the use of scaling and moderation, favoring the latter to remove the effect of examiner variability. It refers to Sanjay Singh's case, where scaling was considered inappropriate for Judicial Services Examinations.

Justice Sikri's report suggests alternatives for awarding grace marks. The court adopts Alternative II, awarding 20 marks in Civil Law–I and 10 marks in Civil Law–II. The court rejects the plea for 50 grace marks, emphasizing the need for reasonableness.

The court acknowledges the need for viva–voce and rejects the alternative plea for re-evaluation by an Independent Expert Committee. It cites the delay in filling vacant posts and the absence of provisions for re-evaluation in the Recruitment Rules.

Regarding the plea to disclose Main Exam marks before viva–voce, the court rejects the practice, stating it may invite bias or favoritism, affecting impartial evaluation during the viva–voce.

The court directs the respondents to award 20 grace marks in Civil Law–I and 10 grace marks in Civil Law–II to all candidates, prepare fresh results of the Main (Written) Examination of Civil Judge, and complete the selection process within a stipulated period.

Facts:

Appellants were appointed on an ad-hoc basis in the Ambedkar Nagar Judgeship.

Initial appointment for a period of three months extended from time to time.

Advertisement for direct recruitment in 2001 led to writ petitions and a subsequent selection process.

Selection process canceled, appellants continued in service on an ad-hoc basis.

Committee recommended regularization in 2012, and the District Judge regularized appellants' services.

Successor District Judge annulled regularization orders in 2014, leading to termination in 2017.

Issues:

Validity of the regularization of ad-hoc appointments.

Cancellation of regularization orders by the successor District Judge.

Violation of principles of natural justice.

Applicability of amended Rules in 2016 with a cut-off date of 31.12.2001.

Held:

The appellants are entitled to regularization under the exception carved out in the Umadevi case.

The cancellation of regularization orders without giving an opportunity of being heard violates principles of natural justice.

The amended Rules in 2016 with a cut-off date of 31.12.2001 should have been considered by the High Court.

The appellants are entitled to reinstatement with continuity in service, but not entitled to back wages.

Facts:

The case involves a matrimonial dispute where the husband, a U.S. citizen practicing as a Dentist, filed for custody of the children after the wife, also a U.S. citizen and a Dentist, refused to return to the U.S. with the children from India.

Issues:

The jurisdiction of Indian courts in guardianship matters, the habitual residence of the children, and the best interests of the children.

Held:

The Family Court held that the Indian Courts lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Guardianship Petition due to the parties being U.S. citizens, and the children residing in India in breach of immigration laws.( Paragraph 4.7)

The High Court, in Habeas Corpus proceedings, directed the wife to return to the U.S. with the children, emphasizing the children's right to be brought up by both parents in the U.S.( Paragraph 5.1)

The parties agreed to the following directions, including joint application for U.S. passports, the wife's return to the U.S., shared parenting, and financial support by the husband.( Paragraph 7)

FACTS:

Written and oral tests conducted for the post of Junior Lecturer in Mathematics.

Results published by the Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission (Appellant).

Last selected candidate (Mr. G.V. Ramakrishna Sagar) chose not to join the post.

Respondent No. 1 filed a claim for appointment after a delay of four years.

Original Application dismissed on grounds of delay by A.P. Administrative Tribunal.

Writ Petition filed by Respondent No. 1 before the High Court.

ISSUES:

Interpretation of Rule 6 (amended) and Rule 7 of Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission Rules.

Validity of the claim for appointment by Respondent No. 1 after the delay.

HELD:

The amended Rule 6 specifies that the list of candidates approved/selected shall be equal to the number of vacancies.

Fallout vacancies due to relinquishment and non-joining shall be notified in the next recruitment.

The waiting list provision for one year has been eliminated after the amendment.

Rule 7 emphasizes that selection must adhere to the existing Rules.

Respondent No. 1, being a non-selected candidate, cannot claim selection based on the unamended Rule 6.

The High Court was not justified in granting relief to Respondent No. 1, ignoring the amended Rule 6.

The appeal is allowed, and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside.

Facts:

The case involved the calculation of Premium FSI charges for a construction project in Chennai. The initial planning permission was granted on 01.07.2009. The government introduced the "Premium FSI Scheme," and the developer submitted a revised plan seeking additional FSI under this scheme on 04.05.2011. The application was returned for defects on 10.02.2012, and after rectification, the government granted approval on 29.05.2012. The dispute arose regarding the calculation of Premium FSI charges based on the guideline value.

Issues:

Whether the Premium FSI charges should be calculated based on the guideline value as of the application date (04.05.2011) or the approval date (29.05.2012).

Held:

The court held that no right accrued to the builder until approval was granted. Regulation 36 mandated approval from the government for Premium FSI, and the crucial date for determining charges was the approval date. The court set aside the Division Bench's decision and allowed the appeal, stating that the charges should be based on the revised guideline value in force from 01.04.2012.

Conclusion: The judgment clarified the importance of the approval date in determining Premium FSI charges, emphasizing that no legal right accrues until the government sanctions the revised plan. The court upheld the authority's right to calculate charges based on the guideline value in force at the time of approval.

Facts:

The prosecution alleged that six heavily armed individuals (A-1 to A-6) killed the victim in broad daylight. The incident occurred between 12 and 12:30 p.m. Eyewitnesses PW-1 and PW-2 were present at the scene, and a written complaint was prepared by PW-1 and scribed by PW-4, leading to the registration of an FIR.

Issues:

The trial court acquitted all accused, but during the appeal in the High Court, three accused (A-1, A-3, and A-6) passed away, and the appeal abated concerning them.

The High Court set aside the trial court's judgment, finding A-2, A-4, and A-5 guilty of offenses under various sections of the IPC.

Held:

The primary question was the reliability of eyewitness statements (PW-1 and PW-2). Both witnesses provided nearly identical accounts with no major contradictions. The complaint was immediately dictated by PW-1 to PW-4, who confirmed its authenticity. The medical evidence corroborated the prosecution's narrative.

Medical evidence supported the eyewitness accounts, with corresponding firearm entry wounds and a time of death aligning with the incident. The injuries mentioned by the doctor were consistent with the weapons carried by the accused. The medical evidence fully supported the eyewitnesses' version.

The court addressed minor variations and contradictions in the statements of PW-1 and PW-2. However, these did not significantly impact the core of their evidence. The strained relationship between the parties was acknowledged, but the immediate recording of the complaint minimized the possibility of false implication.

Facts:

The appeal revolves around the entitlement to disability pension for an Air Force Officer who retired in the natural course, with a disability of less than 20%.

Issues:

Whether disability pension is payable when an Air Force Officer superannuates with less than 20% disability.

The applicability of rounding off principles as per Circular dated 31.1.2001 and the Order dated 10.12.2014 in "Union of India and Ors. Versus Ram Avtar."

Held:

The Court examined Defence Service Regulations Pension Regulations for the Air Force, 1961, specifically Regulations 37(a) and (b). It clarified that disability pension is admissible only if the disability is assessed at 20% or above and is attributable or aggravated by Air Force service.

Referring to Circular dated 31.1.2001, the Court noted Para 8.2, which stipulates that no disability element shall be payable for disabilities less than 20%. Rounding off principles were found applicable only when the disability is more than 20% but less than 80%.

The Court set aside the Armed Forces Tribunal's order, emphasizing that the petitioner was not entitled to disability pension due to the disability being less than 20%. The principles of rounding off did not apply in this case.

The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The complainant, engaged in the business of cement sheets, filed a complaint in January 2009, accusing the appellant of hosting a group that published a defamatory article. The complaint pertained to an offense allegedly committed from July 31, 2008, onwards.

Issues:

The applicability of Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, the intermediary status of the appellant, and whether the appellant could be held liable for defamation.

Held:

The Court clarified the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC concerning defamation offenses, distinguishing cases of complaints from police reports. [Paragraph 43]

The judgment discussed the scope of Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, both before and after its substitution, emphasizing the conditions for immunity of intermediaries. [Paragraphs 59, 61, 63-64]

The Court declined to decide the question of whether the appellant was an intermediary or if Google LLC, the parent company, played that role. It emphasized the need for evidence to determine such matters. [Paragraphs 80, 81, 83]

An overview of defamation laws highlighted the essential elements of the offense under Section 499 of the IPC and the significance of exceptions. [Paragraphs 98, 99, 101]

The Court considered the effect of the substitution of Section 79 of the Act, emphasizing that the complaint was filed before the substitution, and hence, the case fell under the previous provisions. [Paragraphs 133-135]

The question of whether the appellant, as a subsidiary, could be considered an independent body immune from liability was deemed inappropriate for determination under Section 482. [Paragraph 136]

The judgment critiqued the High Court's finding that the appellant failed to act on notices to remove objectionable content, pointing out flaws in the reasoning and highlighting the intermediary's limited liability. [Paragraphs 137-139]

The Court emphasized the role of publication in defamation cases, especially in the context of the internet and intermediary responsibility. [Paragraphs 141, 142]

The Court addressed the appellant's response to the complainant's notice, emphasizing the need for evidence and the inappropriateness of addressing such matters in a Section 482 petition. [Paragraphs 146, 147, 149]

Facts:

Two FIRs filed - one by the petitioner against Respondent No.7, an IPS Officer, for alleged sexual assault and another by Respondent No.7's mother alleging pressure for money by the petitioner's family.

Petitioner sought the transfer of investigation to an independent agency, suspension of Respondent No.7, and protection for herself and her family.

Issues:

Fairness of investigation by Delhi Police due to Respondent No.7's police background.

Alleged attempts to deceive the court and suppression of material facts.

Held:

The investigation into the petitioner's FIR was conducted fairly by a Special Investigation Team.

No need to transfer the investigation to a Central Agency.

Observation of discrepancies in the petitioner's statements regarding an alleged car incident, leading to the issuance of a suo motu contempt notice.

The matter to be considered on its merits, and the charge-sheet to be evaluated by the court.