Facts:

 The case involves a charge against the respondent, a trustee in a Deemed University, for allegedly collecting extra amounts from students on the pretext of allowing them to fill examination forms. A complaint also alleged that the respondent demanded money from a complainant failing which the complainant's daughter would not be permitted to appear in the examination.

Issues:

• Whether a "Deemed University" falls within the definition of "University" under Section 2(c)(xi) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
• Whether the respondent's position as a trustee in the Deemed University qualifies him as a "public servant" under the Act.
• Whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case against the respondent.

Held:

Issue 1: The Court held that the term "University" in Section 2(c)(xi) of the Act should not be restricted to the technical definition provided in the University Grants Commission Act, 1956. The Prevention of Corruption Act has a broader purpose of preventing corruption, and it covers individuals who perform public duties, even if they are not traditionally considered public servants. Thus, a "Deemed University" is not excluded from the ambit of the term "University" under Section 2(c)(xi).

Issue 2: The Court noted that the focus of Section 2(c) of the Act is on the public duty performed by an individual, not just their position. The respondent, in his capacity as a trustee, was involved in matters related to admissions, fees, and donations, indicating a public duty. Therefore, the respondent could potentially be considered a "public servant" under the Act.

Issue 3: The Court emphasized that at the stage of Section 227 of the CrPC, the court's jurisdiction is limited, and detailed appreciation of evidence should be reserved for trial. The evidence, including statements and documents, raised a grave suspicion regarding the respondent's involvement. Thus, it was not appropriate to discharge the respondent at this stage, and the trial court should proceed with the case.

The appeal is allowed, setting aside the Gujarat High Court's judgment of February 2, 2018.

Facts:

Applications were invited for the appointment of Sub Inspector of Police (Trainee) by the Kerala Public Service Commission (KPSC). The KPSC published the first Ranked List (RL-I) on 11.09.2013, and subsequent selections were made based on this list. A challenge was made to the unified/consolidated ranked list, leading to legal proceedings.

Issues:

• The validity and applicability of RL-I, the interpretation of Rule 13 of the Kerala Public Service Commission Rules of Procedure, and the subsequent advice and appointments made by KPSC.

Held:

The Full Bench of the Kerala High Court had the competence to finally decide the case under Section 7 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958. The Full Bench analyzed the factual matrix and found that the first Ranked List (RL-I) published on 11.09.2013, ceased to operate on 01.06.2016, in accordance with Rule 13. The interim order passed by the Tribunal on 05.12.2013, did not interdict the operation of RL-I. The final advice from RL-I was made on 11.11.2015, and the last batch of candidates joined training on 01.05.2016, triggering the application of the first proviso to Rule 13.

Therefore, the appellants' claim based on RL-I was not valid for vacancies reported after 01.06.2016. Such vacancies should be filled from candidates in the fresh Ranked List (RL-II published on 26.05.2015 or RL-III published on 14.03.2019).

Facts:

The case involved a dispute between Seth Group and Mittal Group, both parties of a Joint Venture (JV) Company. The JV Company had acquired land including Sector 89, Faridabad, with the intent to develop it. Disputes arose over liabilities and development rights, leading to litigation, including Writ Petitions. A MoS was executed on May 4, 2015, outlining obligations. The Seth Group alleged that the Mittal Group did not fulfill their obligations as per the MoS and court orders, deliberately and intentionally.

Issues:

• Whether the Mittal Group willfully failed to fulfill their obligations under the MoS and court orders, leading to contempt of court proceedings.

Held:

 The court analyzed the clauses of the MoS and the respective obligations of the parties. The Seth Group was found to have complied with their obligations, except for depositing a specific amount (Rs. 25.27 crores) toward liabilities. The Mittal Group failed to fulfill their obligations under clauses 1.2, 5.3, and 8 of the MoS. Specifically, they did not deposit the balance amount for the EDC liability of Rs. 59.05 crores.

The court noted that the Seth Group's liability was limited to their share of the land (Rs. 25.27 crores), and the balance was to be paid by the Mittal Group/JV Company. The Mittal Group's non-compliance affected license renewals and rendered the MoS unworkable. The court provided a two-month extension for the Mittal Group to fulfill their obligations, failing which contempt proceedings would be initiated.

The respondent purchased a "Transit Marine Insurance Policy" to cover the transportation of a helicopter from Langley, Canada to Bhopal, India. The policy specified the transit route, and the helicopter was transported in a knocked-down state to New Delhi. Subsequent damage was reported during inspection and assembly at New Delhi. The respondent claimed coverage under the policy for the reported damages.

Issues:

• Whether the damage occurred during the ordinary course of transit as defined by the policy.
• Whether the unpacking, assembly, and storage of the helicopter at New Delhi fell within the scope of coverage.
• Impact of altering the nature of the cargo on insurance coverage.
• Burden of proof on the respondent to establish loss during transit.

Held:

The insurance cover is tied to the voyage itself and extends from the time the cargo leaves the warehouse until the end of the ordinary course of transit. The expression "in the ordinary course of transit" depends on context and includes interruptions incidental to or in furtherance of transportation.

Unpacking, assembly, and storage of the helicopter at New Delhi terminated the ordinary course of transit. The policy covered only risks associated with transportation, not flight or operation.

Changing the nature of the cargo from knocked-down to ready-to-fly state exposed insurer to unanticipated risks, ending policy coverage.

Burden of proof lies with the insured to show loss during transit within policy terms. A mere assertion is insufficient; proximate cause must be demonstrated.

Decision: The appeals were allowed. The court held that the insurance coverage ended when the cargo was unpacked, assembled, and stored at New Delhi. The nature of the cargo was altered, exposing the insurer to risks beyond the policy's scope. The respondent failed to establish that the reported damages occurred during transit and within policy terms.

Facts:

Appellant's land was acquired in 1973 for the benefit of the respondent company.

Parties reached an agreement to retain a portion of the land and sell the rest, subject to arbitration for price determination.

An arbitrator's award determined the price of the land in 1985.

Respondent sought execution of the award, including directing the appellant to execute a sale deed.

Issues:

• Could the award be independently executed?
• Could the respondent claim execution of the sale deed based on the award?

Held:

The award was only for the determination of the price of the land and not for enforcing the agreement. (Para 30)

The award was merely declaratory of the price of the land, subject to the agreement. The relief for execution of the sale deed based on the award was outside the realm of law.The respondent abandoned its direct claim for execution of the sale deed under the agreement by withdrawing the suit.

Execution of an award can only be for what has been awarded or decreed and not beyond it. The award in this case only declared the price of the land. Going beyond the decree to change the nature of the case was not permissible. The award did not constitute a conclusive contract for execution. (Para 32)

The High Court's judgment was quashed. The appellant was directed to pay specified amounts to the respondent for litigation costs and expenses. (Para 38, 44-46, 48)

Accordingly, this appeal stands allowed in terms of the directions given hereinabove.

Facts:

Appellant filed a release application under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Building Act for eviction of a shop.

Appellant claimed ownership of the shop for personal use and requested the respondent (tenant) to vacate.

The respondent initially agreed but later refused to vacate, prompting the appellant to file the release application.

Appellant stated he intended to renovate the shop for his watch business, citing his experience and family needs.

The respondent contested, claiming dependence on the shop for livelihood and questioning the appellant's intentions.

Issues:

• Whether proper notice for eviction under Section 21(1)(a) was given to the respondent.
• Whether the appellant's claim of hardship and intention for personal use were genuine.

Held:

The High Court's focus on the notice issue overlooks the crucial finding of fact regarding comparative hardship. The notice, coupled with other circumstances, should be considered sufficient proof of service. The appellant's genuine need and bona fide intention were affirmed by the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's decision. The findings of fact regarding comparative hardship and the appellant's genuine need were upheld. The release application was allowed, and the appellant's intention for personal use was recognized.

Plaintiffs filed a civil suit seeking a declaration and injunction based on a will dated 20.05.1991, asserting ownership rights in certain properties. Defendants challenged the genuineness of the will. The Trial Court decided in favor of the plaintiffs on the issue of the will's authenticity, but the High Court reversed that decision, questioning the unusual features of the will.

Issues:

• The authenticity of the will. The High Court found unnatural and unusual features in the document, leading to doubts about its genuineness. The question arose whether these features were sufficient to conclude that the will was not genuine.

Held:

The High Court observed several unnatural circumstances and abnormalities in the document. These included using different sheets of paper, inconsistent signature placement, different pens for signatures, missing signatures on certain pages, blank spaces, incorrect property descriptions, and an unusual recital of a past event as a future happening. The High Court's findings were supported by the evidence on record. The observations and findings of the High Court were upheld by the Supreme Court.

The document exhibited four unusual features: typewritten on different sheets, irregular placement of signatures, different pens for signatures, and missing signatures on some pages. While some individual abnormal features might occur in document preparation, the cumulative presence of these features casts doubt on the document's genuineness.

Beyond abnormalities, the document contained errors, inconsistencies, and even mystical elements, such as mentioning a past event as future and referring to accidents that eventually occurred after the will's date. These factors magnified the doubts about the document.

While the appellants stressed adherence to legal requirements for execution, including testimony of witnesses, the mere compliance with these formalities does not overcome doubts arising from suspicious circumstances. In cases of suspicious documents, compliance with legal formalities might not prove genuineness.

The document failed the basic question from H. Venkatachala Iyengar: whether the testator signed the will. Additionally, the document did not meet the requirements of Section 63(b) of the Indian Succession Act. Given these observations, it wasn't necessary to delve into other shortcomings in the plaintiffs' case.

The court discussed the power of remand by the Appellate Court. It highlighted that remand should not be a routine measure and should be considered only when a re-trial is necessary after reversing a decree on appeal. Remand elongates litigation and should be used judiciously.

Facts:

The case revolves around the promotion criteria for the posts of District and Sessions Judge and Principal Judge, Family Court within the Delhi Higher Judicial Service (DHJS).

The High Court adopted and modified criteria for promotion, which were gradually implemented over time.

The appellant, Sujata Kohli, contended that the criteria and their implementation were unfair and violated her rights.

Issues:

• Challenge to the validity of Rule 27 and its compatibility with the decision in All India Judges Association case.
• Fairness and reasonableness of the promotion criteria set by the High Court.
• Whether the appellant was denied fair consideration for promotion due to the criteria laid down in the impugned resolutions.
• Alleged prejudice suffered by the appellant regarding her ACR gradings.

Held:

Issue 1: Validity of Rule 27 and Compatibility with Previous Decision

The High Court correctly rejected the challenge to Rule 27, as it does not equate judicial officers with executive officers. Rule 27 only applies when no provision or insufficient provision is made in the Rules of 1970.

Reference to the service conditions of members of IAS in the rules is not against the principles laid down in All India Judges Association.

Issue 2: Fairness of Promotion Criteria

The promotion criteria were reasonably set by the High Court to ensure the selection of candidates with adequate merit for higher posts.

The criteria for promotion were evolved systematically and were applied to candidates in the zone of consideration.

Issue 3: Fair Consideration for Promotion

The appellant, being a member of DHJS, should have been aware of the criteria applicable to upward progression.

Merit is a crucial factor for promotion, and seniority alone is not sufficient.

The appellant was conscious of the competitive nature of promotions and the required assessment of merit.

Issue 4: Alleged Prejudice Regarding ACR Gradings

The appellant was aware of her ACR gradings and had the opportunity to challenge them, which she did for one year.

The criteria were implemented gradually and were consistently applied.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed. The High Court's decision regarding the promotion criteria and implementation of Rule 27 was upheld. The appellant's challenges were rejected as the promotion criteria were reasonable and fairly applied.

Facts:

Respondent no. 3, the borrower, had availed financial credit from the bank, and respondent no. 2, the guarantor, offered its immovable property as mortgage.

The borrower defaulted, and the bank filed O.A. No. 11/2008 before the DRT and took symbolic possession of the secured assets.

The guarantor challenged the possession notice, but the DRT rejected the petition.

The secured assets were auctioned, and a sale certificate was issued to the appellant.

The bank filed an application before the DRT for return of original documents, which was rejected due to ongoing issues regarding the mortgage's validity.

Issues:

• Validity of mortgage.
• Ownership of specific land referred to in the sale certificate.

Held:

The guarantor had repeatedly challenged the mortgage's validity in various proceedings, and the concerned forum/Court rejected the same. The guarantor admitted liability and cannot resile from this admission. The auction sale was concluded, and the bank was legally obligated to handover the title deeds or original documents to the appellant. The High Court's order was reversed in this regard. [Para 14]

The sale certificate referred to a specific land, and the Court held that, based on the decree of a competent court, the title document for that land should not be released until the final decision in O.A. No. 11/2008. The Court emphasized the need to respect the decree's finality and pending proceedings related to the land. [Para 16]

The Court modified the DRAT's operative order, allowing the bank's application for return of original documents except for the specific land mentioned above. [Para 20]

Decision: The Court partly allowed the appeal, holding that the guarantor cannot resile from its admission of liability and ordered the return of original documents except for the specific land referred to in the sale certificate. The High Court's decision was reversed in part, and the operative order of the DRAT was modified accordingly. [Para 20]