Land Acquisition – Re-determination of Compensation – Section 28-A – Maintainability of second application based on High Court award – Doctrine of merger – Beneficial interpretation – Held: Second application under Section 28-A based on appellate court award is maintainable – “Court” includes High Court and Supreme Court – Earlier acceptance of compensation not a bar – Object is parity among similarly placed landowners – Ramsingbhai held per incuriam – Appeals allowed [Paras 14, 25–28]

Interpretation of “Court” – Section 3(d) read with Section 28-A – Whether confined to Reference Court – Held: Though Section 3(d) defines Court as principal civil court of original jurisdiction, for purposes of Section 28-A, appellate courts are included – Restrictive interpretation defeats object of Act – Award of appellate court replaces reference court award due to merger [Paras 13–15]

Doctrine of Merger – Applicability in land acquisition compensation – Held: Once appellate court passes award, earlier award merges and ceases to exist – Only one operative award survives – Re-determination must be based on final appellate decree [Paras 16, 26]

Beneficial Legislation – Equality in compensation – Section 28-A – Held: Provision intended to remove inequality among landowners who did not seek reference – Must be interpreted liberally to extend benefit of higher compensation awarded at any stage, including appellate stage [Paras 12, 26]

Second Application under Section 28-A – Bar of “one application” rule – Scope – Held: Restriction applies only to multiple awards of Reference Court – Does not bar application based on subsequent appellate award – Distinction clarified [Para 19, 25]

Collector’s Duty – Pendency of appeals – Held: Collector must await final outcome of appeals before deciding Section 28-A applications – Failure leads to incongruity and injustice [Paras 21, 27]

Precedents – Conflict of judgments – Held: Ramsingbhai Jerambhai (2018) 16 SCC 445 is per incuriam for not considering Pradeep Kumari (1995) 2 SCC 736 – Banwari (2024) followed – Correct position: appellate awards can form basis of Section 28-A claim [Paras 23–24]

Decision: Impugned judgment of Karnataka High Court set aside – Order rejecting second Section 28-A application quashed – Respondents directed to re-determine compensation based on High Court award dated 22.07.2013 within eight weeks – Appeals allowed.

Civil Law – Execution – Objection by Third Party – Order XXI Rules 99–101 CPC – Specific Performance Decree – Appellants obtained a decree for specific performance and initiated execution – Third parties resisted delivery of possession claiming independent title through registered sale deeds of 1990 executed by a GPA holder claiming through an alleged oral gift – Executing Court dismissed the objection – Appellate Court allowed it directing appellants to file a separate suit – High Court affirmed – Held: Appeal dismissed – Appellants' conduct disentitles them from relief [Paras 1–55].

Res Judicata – Dismissal for Default – Not a Bar Under Section 11 CPC – Section 11 CPC postulates that the matter must have been "heard and finally decided" – Dismissal of a suit for default, not being a decision on merits, cannot ordinarily constitute a final adjudication so as to attract the strict application of Section 11 CPC – Appellate Court's finding that dismissal of O.S. Nos. 892 and 893 of 1990 for default operated as res judicata is erroneous – Issue-A answered in favour of the appellants [Paras 29–31].

Nemo Debet Bis Vexari – Abuse of Process – Conduct of Litigant – Though dismissal for default does not constitute res judicata under Section 11, the maxim nemo debet bis vexari si constet curiae quod sit pro una et eadem causa prevents a litigant who had an opportunity of proving a fact in support of his claim and chose not to rely on it from putting it before another tribunal – The appellants instituted suits for cancellation of the very sale deeds under which the respondents claimed title, allowed them to be dismissed for default, and allowed restoration proceedings to similarly lapse – They cannot now seek the same relief collaterally through execution – Permitting such a course would amount to abuse of the process of the court [Paras 32–47].

Conduct of Appellants – Equitable Discretion – Prior to the 2018 Amendment, specific performance was discretionary and governed by equitable principles – Appellants were fully aware of the respondents' claim and chose not to implead them or their vendors in the specific performance suit – They then abandoned the challenge to the sale deeds in O.S. Nos. 892 and 893 of 1990, including restoration proceedings – Repeated non-prosecution manifests deliberate avoidance of direct proceedings while attempting to secure orders through proceedings to which the respondents were not parties – A party playing fast and loose with the court cannot be permitted to reap the benefit of the decree through execution [Paras 37–48].

Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC – Policy Against Relitigation – Where a plaintiff institutes a suit and abandons it without permission to file a fresh suit, he is precluded from instituting fresh proceedings in respect of the same subject matter – This bar is founded on public policy and does not depend upon Section 11 – It is contrary to public policy to permit the appellants to reap the benefits of the specific performance decree through execution against the respondents 1 to 3 having failed to pursue the earlier cancellation suits [Paras 49–50].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Impugned judgment of the High Court upheld, but for reasons other than those assigned therein – Appellants' conduct amounts to abuse of process – No order as to costs.

Taxation – Electricity Duty – Exemption – Withdrawal – Section 5A of Bombay Electricity Duty Act, 1958 – Captive Power Generators – State Government granted exemption from electricity duty to industries generating power through captive plants by notifications from 1994, which was modified and substantially withdrawn by notifications dated 01.04.2000 and 04.04.2001, citing budgetary constraints and augmentation of revenue – Exemption was restored from 01.05.2005 by notification dated 16.06.2005 – Respondents challenged the intervening withdrawal and the High Court quashed the notifications as arbitrary, discriminatory, and unsupported by reasons – Held: High Court orders quashed – Notifications upheld subject to one year transitional notice period [Paras 1–24].

Exemption – Nature – Defeasible Right – Power to Withdraw – An exemption granted under a fiscal statute is a concession by the State relieving the beneficiary from an obligation otherwise payable – The recipient has no legally enforceable right to insist upon continuation of exemption indefinitely – The right to enjoy exemption is a defeasible right in the sense that it may be taken away in exercise of the very power under which it was granted – The exemption from payment of electricity duty was neither prematurely withdrawn nor withdrawn with retrospective effect [Paras 13, 16–17].

Article 14 – Judicial Review – Fiscal Policy – Courts must defer to legislative and executive judgment in matters of social and economic policy and must not interfere unless the exercise of power appears to be palpably arbitrary, discriminatory, or actuated by extraneous considerations – Courts do not evaluate the wisdom, sufficiency, or effectiveness of economic policy – Augmentation of public revenue and addressing budgetary constraints constitute valid public interest grounds for withdrawal of exemption and cannot be regarded as extraneous or unreasonable – Respondents failed to demonstrate manifest arbitrariness or irrelevant consideration [Paras 13, 18–20].

Promissory Estoppel and Legitimate Expectation – Inapplicable – Where the government makes a representation through a notification, the beneficiary must know that such notification is liable to be amended or rescinded in public interest – Doctrine of promissory estoppel does not prevent the State from changing its stand where supervening public equity exists, provided the Court is satisfied that such public interest exists – Decision to withdraw and modify the exemption having been taken in public interest, doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation have no application [Paras 14–15, 20].

Reasonable Notice Period – Transitional Protection – While the State possesses the power to withdraw or modify a statutory exemption, the manner of exercise of such power must satisfy reasonableness and fairness – Persons who have structured their commercial and industrial activities on the basis of a concession should not be subjected to abrupt policy reversals leaving them without reasonable time to adjust – Government should resile from its stand by giving reasonable notice where such course is feasible – Captive power generators had enjoyed exemption since 1994 and would have organised their financial and operational arrangements accordingly – Sudden withdrawal without transitional period imposes immediate additional fiscal burden – Held: A period of one year from the respective dates of the notifications constitutes reasonable notice, and the impugned notifications shall operate only after expiry of such period [Paras 21–23].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court judgments dated 05.10.2009 and 07.11.2009 quashed and set aside – State Government's power to withdraw or modify exemption under Section 5A upheld – Notifications dated 01.04.2000 and 04.04.2001 held operative only after expiry of one year from their respective dates – No order as to costs.

Electricity Law – Tariff Determination – State Electricity Regulatory Commission – Generation Based Incentive – Scope of Regulatory Power – The APERC factored in the GBI received by wind power GENCOs from MNRE while revising tariff under Regulation 20 of the 2015 Tariff Regulations – APTEL reversed, holding APERC had no power to amend tariff orders in the absence of infringement of the Regulations and that Regulation 20 only required the Commission to "consider" without mandating deduction – Held: Civil Appeal dismissed – APERC does possess power to take GBI into consideration while determining tariff, but the GBI is intended to be disbursed to GENCOs over and above the tariff and cannot be deducted therefrom [Paras 1, 28, 43–47].

Regulatory Power – Exclusive Province – Section 62 and Section 86 – Electricity Act, 2003 is a complete and comprehensive code – Tariff determination is the exclusive province of the Regulatory Commissions – There is no unallocated regulatory residue outside their jurisdiction – A Parliamentary allocation and grant under Article 282 does not ipso facto exclude the regulatory mechanism or denude the Commission of its tariff determination power – The Commission's authority to consider a Union Government incentive flows directly from the Electricity Act and Regulations and is not excluded by the mere existence of the grant – Argument that GBI voted on by Parliament as a generator incentive cannot be converted into a consumer incentive is rejected [Paras 15–28].

Article 114(2) – Appropriation Bill – Destination of Grant – The prohibition in Article 114(2) is against proposing an amendment to the Appropriation Bill that would vary the amount or alter the destination of a grant – GBI was duly credited in favour of the GENCOs; the grant reached its intended destination – Regulatory consideration of GBI in tariff determination does not intercept or redirect the payment to a different beneficiary – SERC merely determines the tariff payable by the DISCOM to the GENCO and does not alter the destination of the grant [Paras 25–27].

Regulation 20 – "Shall Take into Consideration" – Contextual and Purposive Treatment – Regulation 20 obligates the Commission to take into consideration any incentive or subsidy offered by the Central or State Government if availed by the GENCO while determining tariff – The use of "shall" denotes a statutory obligation to consider the impact of such incentive in the process of tariff determination – However, "taking into account" does not mechanically translate into either a mandatory deduction or automatic pass-through – It requires contextual and purposive treatment – Where a scheme is designed as a generator-focused incentive integrally linked to national and international renewable energy policy and not as a consumer subsidy, the Commission must respect and give effect to that purpose [Paras 22–23, 43].

Regulatory Commissions – Collaborative Enterprise – Regulation as Enterprise – Regulatory Commissions under the Electricity Act are not expected to act in silos – They must work in tandem with other duty bearers including the Central Government, State Governments, MNRE, and statutory policy makers to subserve the purpose of the Act – Regulatory power must be exercised as a collaborative enterprise and must not be exercised in a manner that ignores the purpose and object of a policy or grant by other stakeholders – Domain regulators may be positively influenced by national and international authorities and policy makers on the same subject – Constitutional Courts interpreting statutes within a regulator's domain must bear in mind the need to enable the regulator to exercise comprehensive jurisdiction [Paras 29–42].

Energy Security – Renewable Energy – International Obligations – The GBI Scheme was designed to incentivise actual renewable energy generation, attract investment in the wind energy sector, and advance India's commitment under the Paris Agreement and Nationally Determined Contributions to transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy – Section 61(h) of the Electricity Act obligates the Regulator to determine tariff keeping in mind promotion of generation of electricity from renewable sources – Tariff fixation must balance energy security, consumer interests, developer stability, and environmental concerns including global warming [Paras 30–36].

Decision: Civil Appeal dismissed – APERC's deduction of GBI from tariff set aside – GBI is intended to be disbursed to GENCOs over and above the tariff as determined by the Commission – Both principles declared: (i) Regulatory Commissions have plenary power over tariff determination and may consider Union Government grants; (ii) this power must be exercised as a collaborative enterprise consistent with the purpose of the policy or grant.

Tender Law – Judicial Review – Scope and Limits – Quality and Cost Based System (QCBS) – High Court's Interference with LOA and Executed Contract Set Aside – GPPC floated a public tender in January 2025 for operation and maintenance of a 702.86 MW gas-based combined cycle power plant for five years on a QCBS basis, assigning 70% weightage to technical evaluation and 30% to price – Appellant was declared the successful bidder with a higher combined score – Writ petitioner challenged the process before the High Court – During pendency, the consultant re-evaluated the marks and reduced the appellant's technical score by 2 marks, resulting in a tie in technical scores at 93 each – High Court, solely on the basis of a minuscule difference in the combined score (95.09989831 vs. 95.0978453), quashed the LOA and the formal contract and directed award to the writ petitioner – Held: High Court exceeded the first principle of judicial restraint in contractual matters – When the difference is marginal and no mala fide or arbitrariness is found, a constitutional court should not substitute its decision for that of the owner – LOA and contract upheld [Paras 17–18, 26–30].

Judicial Review – Contractual Matters – Principle of Restraint – "Fair Play in the Joints" – The decision-making process of an owner in accepting or rejecting a bid should not be interfered with unless it is mala fide, intended to favour someone, or is so arbitrary or irrational that no responsible authority acting reasonably could have reached it – The threshold of mala fides, intention to favour, or perversity must be met before a constitutional court interferes – Courts must not use a magnifying glass to make every small mistake appear a big blunder – Technical evaluation or comparison by the court is impermissible – Tender document itself reserved with GPPC the right to accept any bid or reject all bids, underscoring that the final choice vests in the owner and not the court – Constitutional courts do not exercise ex-ante jurisdiction to pre-empt executive actions [Paras 19–22, 25–26].

Tendering Process – Owner's Needs – Delay Caused by Litigation – Court's Responsibility – It is not uncommon that when judicial review proceedings are invoked, the entire focus of the court shifts to choosing the most eligible party, losing sight of the needs and requirements of the owner – GPPC floated the tender in January 2025 and the LOA was granted on 09.06.2025, after which more than a year had elapsed – Judicial review must balance justice with flexibility and exercise nuanced discretion between multiple outcomes and binary choices, keeping in mind the larger public interest and avoiding unnecessary loss to the public exchequer [Paras 24, 22].

Sea Water System Experience – Clause 4 of 20.02(B) – Findings of High Court Upheld – As regards the appellant's claim for additional 5 marks under clause 4 of 20.02(B) towards operation and maintenance of sea water system experience, the findings of the High Court are based on true and correct facts and reasonable interpretation of the tender document – No justification to interfere – Civil Appeal arising out of Special Civil Application No. 12328 of 2025 dismissed [Para 28].

Decision: Civil Appeal arising out of Special Civil Application No. 7289 of 2025 allowed – Judgment and order of the High Court set aside – LOA dated 09.06.2025 and the formal contract dated 01.07.2025 in favour of the appellant upheld – GPPC permitted to have the contract performed without hindrance – Civil Appeal arising out of Special Civil Application No. 12328 of 2025 dismissed – No order as to costs.

Bail — Dowry Death — Cancellation — Sections 103(1) and 80, BNS, 2023 — Accused-husband released on bail by High Court citing prolonged custody and slow trial progress — Supreme Court finds the impugned order wholly unsustainable as the High Court failed to consider the post-mortem report disclosing multiple grievous injuries on the deceased, the statutory presumption under Section 114 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, and the gravity of the offence — Held: In serious crimes like dowry death, courts must exercise bail discretion with heightened care and not in a mechanical manner — Bail cancelled — Accused directed to surrender [Paras 12–19].

Dowry Death — Bail Discretion — Judicial Approach — Concern expressed over the mechanical approach of High Courts in granting bail in dowry death cases — Death of young bride within one and a half years of marriage under suspicious circumstances with multiple injuries demands heightened judicial vigilance — A superficial application of bail parameters undermines the gravity of the offence and weakens public faith in the judiciary — Courts duty-bound to undertake deeper scrutiny before granting bail in such cases [Paras 13–15].

Bail — Fresh Application — Change of Circumstances — Accused's previous bail application rejected by High Court — Fresh application filed within seven months on the sole ground of prolonged custody and slow trial — High Court granted bail without discussing material on record, ignoring multiple injuries noted in post-mortem report and statutory presumption of guilt — Held: Pendency of trial and period of custody alone cannot justify bail in a case of this gravity — Impugned order set aside [Paras 9, 12, 18].

Dowry Death — Social Evil — Judicial Responsibility — Dowry deaths represent a profound disgrace and severe violation of human rights — Despite legal prohibitions, practice continues to claim innocent lives — Judiciary must reflect seriousness and avoid normalising such crimes through casual bail orders — Social message emanating from judicial orders in such cases cannot be overstated [Para 15].

Trial — Completion — Directions — Trial Court directed to complete trial within six months — Accused given one week to surrender before jail authorities, failing which trial court to issue non-bailable warrant of arrest [Paras 21–22].

Decision: Appeal allowed — Bail granted by the High Court cancelled — Respondent No. 2 directed to surrender before jail authorities within one week — Failing surrender, trial court to issue non-bailable warrant — Trial court to complete trial within six months — Connected State petition disposed of in terms of the order in the complainant's appeal.

Constitutional Law — Legislative Competence — Tolls on National Highways — Entry 23 and Entry 96 List I vs. Entry 59 List II, Seventh Schedule — Pith and Substance Doctrine — Question arose whether toll collected for use of National Highways by the National Highways Authority of India falls within Entry 59 List II (State List) or within the Union List — Held: Applying the doctrine of pith and substance, any toll which is essentially a charge or fee collected for the use of a National Highway by the National Highways Authority of India is squarely covered within the Union List under Entry 23 read with Entry 96 of List I — Consequently, expression "Tolls" in Entry 59 List II must be restricted to those tolls or charges which are not collected by the Union Government in terms of List I — No interference warranted with the High Court's judgment — SLP dismissed [Order].

Decision: Delay condoned — Special Leave Petition dismissed — Pending applications disposed of.

Land Acquisition – National Highways Act, 1956 – Solatium and Interest – Review – Escalation of Financial Burden Not a Valid Ground – Section 3-J of the NH Act, inserted in 1997, excluded the application of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in toto to acquisitions under the NH Act, thereby denying solatium and interest to land-losers during the period 1997 to 2015 – This Court in Tarsem Singh-I declared Section 3-J unconstitutional to the extent it denied solatium and interest, and held landowners entitled to benefits under Sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and proviso to Section 28 of the 1894 Act – In Tarsem Singh-II, NHAI's application for prospective operation was dismissed – In the present Review Petition, NHAI contended that the financial liability was not Rs. 100 crores as recorded but approximately Rs. 29,000 crores due to a clerical error – Held: A mere escalation in projected liability, howsoever significant, does not constitute a valid ground for review – The constitutional guarantee of just compensation cannot be rendered contingent upon the magnitude of financial burden – Review Petition dismissed on merits [Paras 6–8].

Land Acquisition – NH Act – Cut-Off Date – Entitlement to Solatium and Interest – Balancing Equities of Delay – While landowners are entitled to solatium, interest, and interest on solatium as part of compensation for lands acquired under the NH Act during the period 1997 to 2015, not all claims can be treated uniformly – Where claims regarding quantum or components of compensation were alive on or after 28.03.2008 (the date of the Punjab and Haryana High Court judgment in Golden Iron and Steel), landowners are entitled to claim such benefits – However, where such claims are raised after inordinate delay post 28.03.2008, no interest on either component shall be payable for the period of delay, and entitlement to interest and interest on solatium shall run only from the date such claims were actually raised – Where claims stood conclusively decided prior to 28.03.2008 with no further appeal or proceedings pending, such landowners cannot seek reopening or review for the purpose of claiming solatium or interest – Held: A balance must be struck between the substantive entitlement of landowners and the equities operating against their delay, in a manner analogous to denial of interest for the period of delay in belated land acquisition enhancement appeals [Paras 10–14].

Finality of Judgments – Stale Claims – Subsequent Change in Law – No Entitlement to Reopen – Once a judgment or order has attained finality and is not subject to further challenge before a prescribed forum, a subsequent change in judicial interpretation does not entail reversal of such decision inter se the parties – Overturning of a principle of law cannot sustain even a formal review of an original decision once it has attained finality – Landowners whose claims stood concluded prior to 28.03.2008 are not entitled to seek reopening on the basis of Tarsem Singh-I or Tarsem Singh-II – Clarified that NHAI and Union of India are not entitled to seek refund or recovery of solatium or interest already paid [Paras 12, 17].

Decision: Review Petition disposed of – Review on ground of enhanced financial liability rejected – Limited clarification issued on cut-off date and conditions for entitlement to solatium, interest, and interest on solatium under the NH Act – Tagged Special Leave Petitions allowed – Impugned orders of High Courts of Bombay and Chhattisgarh set aside – Matters remanded to respective High Courts for recomputation strictly in accordance with directions issued.

Building Bye-Laws — Unauthorised Construction — Municipal Corporation Liability — Collusion and Connivance — Petitioner constructed a G+1 floor building without any sanctioned plan — Municipal Corporation failed to notice construction and passed demolition order only after completion of structure — Court observes that an entire one-and-a-half-storied building getting constructed without detection indicates an alarming state of affairs which could not have occurred without collusion and connivance of Municipal Authorities — State Government directed to conduct thorough inquiry into why entire structures are completed without due sanction and without any corrective measures being taken — Commissioner of Greater Chennai Corporation directed to file personally affirmed affidavit — Respondent Corporation disclosed that the site was within limits of Madhavaram Municipality at the relevant time and outside Chennai Corporation jurisdiction [Paras 1–3].

Unauthorised Construction — State Government Order Granting Relief to Violators — Additional Secretary (Technical), Housing and Urban Development Department, Tamil Nadu, by order dated 22.03.2024, directed that no coercive action be taken against persons who had violated building norms — Court expresses inability to comprehend how such relief could have been granted when blatant violation was evident and High Court had directed strict compliance with law — State of Tamil Nadu directed to file affidavit disclosing identity of officer(s) responsible for passing said order and furnishing explanation for its issuance [Paras 4–5].

Building Bye-Laws — Pan-India Directions — Misuse of Residential Areas for Commercial Purposes — Court takes judicial notice of widespread and blatant violations of building bye-laws and land-use regulations across the country — Constructions frequently undertaken in prohibited areas and, upon completion, put to uses other than those for which sanction was granted — Residential colonies being converted into commercial areas by unauthorised use, causing prejudice to bona fide residents and serious environmental and civic consequences — Held: Issue requires examination on a pan-India basis — All Municipal Corporations and Municipalities of capital cities of all States and Union Territories impleaded as party respondents — Directed to conduct comprehensive inquiry within their entire jurisdictions, including residential colonies, group housing societies, and 'islands' falling within or surrounded by Corporation/Municipality areas — Detailed list of areas demarcated for residential use but misused for non-residential purposes to be filed by way of personally affirmed affidavits by Commissioners — State of Tamil Nadu through Chief Secretary also impleaded — Mr. Ajit Kumar Sinha, Senior Counsel, appointed as Amicus Curiae — Affidavits to be filed and served on Amicus Curiae by 15.05.2026 — Matter listed on 20.05.2026 [Paras 6–16].

Decision: Miscellaneous Application disposed of with directions — State of Tamil Nadu directed to file affidavit explaining order dated 22.03.2024 within four weeks — All Municipal Corporations and Municipalities of capital cities of all States and Union Territories impleaded and directed to file comprehensive inquiry reports — Mr. Ajit Kumar Sinha appointed Amicus Curiae — Matter listed on 20.05.2026 [Paras 5, 9–16].