Facts:

The appellant, a charitable trust, entered into a lease deed with the respondent for developing its land. Disputes arose, and the respondent invoked an arbitration clause within the lease deed, seeking arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. However, the lease deed was insufficiently stamped and was subject to issues of compliance with stamp duty.

Issues:

Whether an arbitration clause within an insufficiently stamped lease deed can be relied upon for enforcing arbitration proceedings.

Whether the lease deed, given its insufficiency in stamp duty, can be considered valid and admissible for arbitration proceedings.

Held:

The court considered the provisions of Sections 33 and 34 of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957, and the precedent case of SMS Tea Estates Private Limited vs. Chandmari Tea Company Private Limited (2011) 14 SCC 66. The court held that when an arbitration agreement is contained within an unregistered but compulsorily registerable and insufficiently stamped instrument, the court cannot act upon the document or the arbitration clause. The court emphasized that the instrument must be duly stamped before it can be admitted in evidence or acted upon.

The court noted that the lease deed containing the arbitration clause was insufficiently stamped, and despite the Registrar's directive to pay the deficit stamp duty and penalty, the respondents failed to comply. Thus, the court concluded that the High Court's reliance on the insufficiently stamped lease deed for appointing an arbitrator was erroneous.

Additionally, the court observed that the respondent's claims regarding the timing of registering the lease deed contradicted the terms of the deed itself and found that the respondents' actions were inconsistent and unsupported.

In conclusion, the court allowed the appeal, quashed the High Court's order, and rejected the respondents' application under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act.

Facts:

The appellant, Laxmibai, was disqualified as a member of the Gram Panchayat due to her failure to submit election expenses within the stipulated time. The appellant explained that her delay was caused by health issues, but this explanation was not accepted, leading to her disqualification for five years.

Issues:

Whether the Election Commission's power to disqualify under Section 14B of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959, should consider the proportionality of the disqualification period.

Whether the provisions of Article 243-O of the Constitution of India and the relevant Acts provided an alternative remedy for challenging panchayat election disputes.

Held:

Proportionality of Disqualification Period: The court ruled that while ensuring purity and transparency in the election process, the Election Commission's power to disqualify a candidate must be exercised judiciously. The period of disqualification should be proportionate to the default committed. Disqualifying a candidate for five years requires cogent reasons, as this affects the collective will of the voters.

Constitutional Validity of Article 243-O and Alternative Remedy: The court upheld the constitutional provision of Article 243-O, which prohibits challenging panchayat elections except through an election petition presented to the appropriate authority as per the relevant Acts. The court emphasized that the alternate remedy provided by the statute should be followed, and the High Court should refrain from interfering in election matters after the results are declared.

DECISION: The court held that disqualification under Section 14B of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959, should match the severity of the default. A five-year disqualification must be supported by substantial reasons. The court endorsed the constitutionality of Article 243-O, barring challenges to panchayat elections outside of election petitions. The court set aside the disqualification order, directing the Collector to reassess the period proportionately. Subsequent elections would be contingent on the Collector's final decision.

Facts:

The appellant was initially appointed as a part-time Gallery Attendant in 1995, and later in 2002, as a full-time Gallery Attendant. However, his services were terminated in 2004 due to a government policy. The appellant challenged this termination through legal proceedings, including writ petitions and appeals, invoking relevant sections, acts, rules, and constitutional provisions. The proceedings also considered the appellant's qualifications, his interim reinstatement, and representations to the authorities.

Issues:

The validity of the termination of the appellant's services based on government policies.

Interpretation of rules and resolutions regarding the eligibility, recruitment, and regularization of employees, specifically in the context of the appellant's appointment.

The appellant's entitlement to continuity of service and related benefits.

Held:

After a thorough examination of the facts, legal provisions, and precedents, the Supreme Court held that the appellant's reinstatement was warranted with continuity of service. The Court ruled that the Division Bench's judgment, which allowed the appellant's reinstatement but without back wages for a specific period, was appropriate. The Court reasoned that the appellant's initial appointment and subsequent service could not be invalidated retroactively based on later rules and resolutions. The Court emphasized the significance of the Division Bench's earlier order, which directed the appellant's reinstatement.

The judgment referred to the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. vs. Umadevi & Ors. (2006) 4 SCC 1 to discuss the implications of government resolutions and rules in the context of employee regularization.

The appeal is accordingly allowed.

FACTS:

The petitioner filed a writ petition challenging the rejection of his mercy petition by the President of India. The petitioner raised concerns related to the RTI Act, non-consideration of materials, torture, mental illness, and illegal solitary confinement.

ISSUES:

The extent of judicial review permissible under Article 32 for orders passed under Article 72.

Whether relevant materials were considered by the authorities in the decision-making process.

The validity of allegations of torture, mental illness, and illegal solitary confinement.

HELD:

The Court held that the scope of judicial review under Article 32 for orders passed under Article 72 is limited. The Court's role is to examine cases where the order was passed without the application of mind, on extraneous or irrelevant considerations, or with arbitrariness. In this case:

The Court observed that relevant materials, including case records, judgments, medical reports, and more, were forwarded to the Ministry of Home Affairs. Recommendations by the Lieutenant Governor and Home Minister were made after perusing the file, discrediting claims of non-application of mind.

The Court noted that the alleged suffering of the petitioner in prison cannot be a basis for judicial review of the executive order under Article 72.

The Court highlighted that the petitioner was kept in protective custody for security and his well-being, not in illegal solitary confinement.

The Court affirmed that all relevant materials, including the petitioner's medical report and Social Investigation Report, were considered by the President. The Court found no grounds for exercising judicial review over the order rejecting the mercy petition.

REFERRED CASES:

Bikas Chatterjee vs. Union of India and Others (2004) 7 SCC 634

Devender Pal Singh Bhullar vs. State of (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 6 SCC 195

Epuru Sudhakar and Another vs. Govt. of A.P. and Others, (2006) 8 SCC 161

Maru Ram v. Union of India and Others, (1981) 1 SCC 107

Mukesh and Another vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Others (2017) 6 SCC 1

Narayan Dutt and Others vs. State of Punjab and Another (2011) 4 SCC 353

Satpal vs. State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 170

Shatrughan Chauhan and Another vs. Union of India and Others (2014) 3 SCC 1

Sunil Batra vs. Delhi Administration and Others (1978) 4 SCC 494

Facts:

M/s. Kushang Apparel Ltd. imported CTV kits and filed six Bills of Entries on 9th February 2001. The goods were permitted to be kept in a warehouse for one year as per Section 59 of the Customs Act, 1962.

The warehouse-keeper issued notices for recovery of dues as the importer didn't clear the goods or pay warehouse rent after the bond period expired.

Auctions were held multiple times to sell the goods but weren't successful. Valuation decreased over auctions.

Tender sale was conducted later, and the goods' valuation was reduced to Rs.30 lakhs. The highest bid was Rs.41,44,555/-, and goods were permitted for release on furnishing bank guarantee and payment of charges.

Issues:

Whether the calculation of customs duty should be based on the date of deemed removal of goods from the warehouse or on the date of sale when the importer failed to seek clearance of the goods.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the customs duty is to be determined by backward calculation considering the sale proceeds of unclaimed/uncleared goods as the cum-duty price. The custom duty has to be calculated on the sale price and not on the duty payable on the date of deemed expiration of the permitted period of the warehouse. The circular issued by the Central Board of Excise & Customs is binding on the Revenue in this regard.

Consequently, the court directed the customs duty to be calculated as per the circular and applied in accordance with the priority specified in Section 150(2) of the Customs Act, 1962. If the bank guarantee has been invoked, the amount shall be handed over to the respondent after adjustments within three months from the date of judgment. The appeal is disposed.

Facts:

The plaintiffs-respondents filed a partition suit through their power of attorney holder. The appellants objected to the admissibility of the power of attorney documents, Exts. 4 and 5, on the grounds of insufficient stamp duty. They claimed that the documents should be treated as conveyances due to the transfer of possession, and therefore, subject to stamp duty.

Issues:

Whether the power of attorney documents should be treated as conveyances under the Act, and if so, whether they were sufficiently stamped. This revolved around the transfer of possession and its implications.

Held:

The court referred to relevant case laws, including Ram Rattan (Dead) by LRs. vs. Bajrang Lal & Ors., Omprakash vs. Laxminarayan & Ors., and others, to discuss the admissibility of documents and objections related to stamp duty.

The court held that the objection raised by the appellant concerning the insufficiency of stamp duty on the power of attorney documents was a question of fact that needed to be determined based on evidence. The court emphasized that this determination should not be solely based on the recitals in the documents themselves, but rather through evidence presented during the proceedings.

The judgment concluded that the trial court and the High Court had not sufficiently examined the matter and had not properly considered the evidence. Therefore, the court set aside their orders and remitted the case back to the trial court. The trial court was directed to decide the objection regarding admissibility of the power of attorney documents, taking into account the evidence presented by both parties.

Facts:

The appellant challenged a circular issued by the government concerning the "Vishesh Krishi Upaj Yojna," claiming it contradicted the Foreign Trade Policy (FTP) 2004-2009. The dispute centered around the eligibility criteria for obtaining duty credit entitlement under the scheme. The appellant argued that the circular was against the policy notified in 2006-07 and that it was not within the government's authority to modify the scheme through a circular.

Issues:

Whether the circular issued by the government regarding the "Vishesh Krishi Upaj Yojna" was contrary to the Foreign Trade Policy.

Whether the circular amounted to an amendment or modification of the scheme itself.

Whether the government had the authority to clarify the provisions of the scheme through a circular.

Held:

The court held that the circular issued by the government was not an amendment or modification of the scheme but a clarification of its provisions. It emphasized the government's right to issue clarifications through circulars to prevent misuse of scheme benefits. The court also cited relevant sections of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992, to support its conclusion. The court upheld the government's right to clarify the scheme's provisions and dismissed the appeals, stating that the circular was issued within the government's authority.

Facts:

The appellant, Popatrao Vyankatrao Patil, participated in a public auction for sand block excavation from the Krishna river. Being the highest bidder, he won the tender for a specific sand block. However, due to opposition from villagers and proximity to a school, he couldn't obtain possession of the sand block and, consequently, couldn't excavate sand. The appellant requested a refund of the amount he deposited for the auction, which was denied.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in refusing to entertain the appellant's writ petition on the grounds of involving questions of fact.

Whether the denial of the refund was justified considering the appellant's failure to obtain possession and excavate sand.

Held:

The Supreme Court acknowledged that while it's not a hard and fast rule, the High Court can entertain writ petitions involving disputed questions of fact, especially if they don't require extensive evidence. The Court cited legal precedents and held that the High Court's plenary power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 isn't limited by the Constitution and can be exercised in exceptional circumstances.

In this case, the Court noted that there were hardly any disputed questions of fact. Reports and evidence confirmed that the appellant didn't receive possession of the sand block and hadn't excavated any sand. The Court deemed the denial of refund arbitrary and unreasonable, especially considering the authorities' failure to deliver possession.

The Court emphasized the State's responsibility to act as a model litigant and avoid using technical or unjust contentions to obstruct justice. It further directed the respondents to refund the entire amount received from the appellant along with interest at a rate of 6% per annum from the first refund request until realization. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The appellants, represented by Monu Kumar and 32 others, filed a joint complaint alleging deficiency of service by the respondent, Metromax Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., with respect to a Buyer's agreement. Seeking permission to file a joint complaint under Section 12(1)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), they moved a separate application. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) admitted the case and issued notice to the respondent. The impugned order, however, rejected the application for permission and subsequently dismissed the complaint.

Issues:

Whether the admission of the complaint and issuance of notice inherently imply the grant of permission to file a joint complaint under Section 12(1)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986?

Held:

In the application for permission to file a joint complaint, a specific request was made, and after considering the arguments of both sides, the NCDRC admitted the complaint and issued notice. Although the order did not expressly state the grant of permission, the Court inferred that the permission to file a joint complaint was inherent in the order of admission. As the application seeking permission was moved and an admission order was passed after taking it into account, the rejection of the application by the impugned order was deemed inappropriate. The Court concluded that the grant of permission should be read into the order of admission.

The impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the NCDRC with directions to reevaluate the case and adjudicate the complaint on its merits. The civil appeal was allowed with this directive.