Facts:

Respondent No. 1, Dr. Surendra Kumar Singh, a lecturer and head of department, challenged the promotion process for the post of Principal in Polytechnic colleges. The challenge was based on the requirement of a Ph.D. degree as an essential qualification according to the 'Pay Scales, Service conditions and Qualifications for the Teachers and other Academic Staff in Technical Institutions (Diploma) Regulations, 2010' (2010 AICTE Regulations) and the legality of the 'Chhattisgarh Technical Education (Teaching cadre-Polytechnic) (Gazetted) Service Recruitment Rules, 2014' (2014 Chhattisgarh Rules) that allowed candidates without a Ph.D. to be appointed as Principals.

Issues:

Whether a Ph.D. degree is mandatory for appointment to the post of 'Principal' under the 2010 AICTE Regulations?

Whether the 2016 AICTE Notification retrospectively 'clarifies' eligibility conditions for the appointment of 'Principal'?

Whether retrospective changes in qualificatory requirements can affect the existing appointments?

Whether the alleged conflict of interest involving one of the appellants influences the decision?

Held:

Issue 1 - The Court interpreted the AICTE criteria and emphasized the use of the term "or," which indicated that 'Ph.D. in Engineering' was optional and discretionary. The eligibility criteria allowed adopting institutions/State Governments to specify either of the two criteria. The Court rejected the interpretation that converted "or" into "and."

Issue 2 - The Court concluded that the 2016 AICTE Notification did not change the existing eligibility conditions but was only a clarification. It reiterated the substance of the 2010 AICTE Regulations and did not alter the position of law.

Issue 3 - The Court emphasized that retrospective changes should not affect the appointments made on the basis of a possible understanding of eligibility conditions. Existing appointments should remain undisturbed, and the principle of non-retroactivity should be upheld.

Issue 4 - The Court found that the alleged conflict of interest involving one of the appellants did not imply undue influence over the rule-making process.

Decision: The appeals were allowed. The High Court's judgment was set aside, and Dr. Surendra Kumar Singh's writ petition challenging the promotion of the appellants was dismissed. The appellants' appointments as Principals were upheld.

Facts:

The appellant, Dr. Hira Lal, served as a Touring Veterinary Officer (TVO) in Bihar. During his active service, he was accused in a criminal case related to the Fodder Scam, resulting in his suspension in 2002. He superannuated in 2008. The state withheld 10% of his pension and full gratuity based on Circulars and a Government Resolution due to pending criminal proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the State of Bihar had the right to withhold 10% pension and full gratuity of the appellant under Circulars and a Government Resolution due to pending criminal proceedings.

Held:

The court examined the relevant statutory provisions, circulars, and resolutions. Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules permitted withholding or withdrawing pension if the pensioner was found guilty of grave misconduct in departmental or judicial proceedings or caused pecuniary loss to the government. However, the Circulars issued by the state in 1974 and 1980 were deemed to be administrative instructions without the force of law. The court held that the right to receive pension is a property right protected by Article 300A of the Constitution. It emphasized that executive instructions cannot override this constitutional protection.

The court referred to earlier judgments that established pension as a vested right even after the repeal of Article 31(1) of the Constitution. The court ruled that the State of Bihar was unjustified in withholding the pension and gratuity. It directed the state to release 10% of the withheld pension amount from the date of superannuation till a certain point and 90% of the gratuity within a specific period. The remaining 10% of the gratuity was to be released subject to the outcome of the pending criminal proceedings against the appellant.

The judgement referred to "State of Jharkhand and Ors. vs. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava and Ors., (2013) 12 SCC 210" and "D.S. Nakara and Ors. vs. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305" to establish the legal principles related to pension as a vested right and the protection of pension as property under Article 300A of the Constitution.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute regarding the calculation of entertainment duty for an amusement park in Maharashtra. The amusement park charged admission fees for entry and various entertainment activities within its premises.

Issues:

Whether the reduced rate of entertainment duty specified in Section 3(2) of the Act applies to the amusement park's admission charges.

How Section 3(5)(a) of the Act, which outlines different rates of entertainment duty for amusement parks, interacts with other provisions.

Held:

The court interpreted the relevant sections of the Bombay Entertainments Duty Act, 1923, and arrived at the following conclusions:

Interpretation of Section 3(2) The court examined Section 3(2) of the Act, which provides for a reduced rate of entertainment duty for specific categories of payments for admission. The court clarified that this provision applies to distinct categories of payments, such as subscriptions to societies, season tickets, or series of entertainments over a period.

Applicability of Section 3(5)(a) The court analyzed Section 3(5)(a) of the Act, which determines different rates of entertainment duty for amusement parks. The court emphasized that this section prevails over Sections 3(1)(b) and 3(2) and dictates the applicable rates of duty for various periods after the amusement park's commencement.

Decision The court concluded that the amusement park did not meet the specific categories mentioned in Section 3(2) for the reduced rate of entertainment duty. Thus, the park was not entitled to a 50% rebate as provided in Section 3(2). The court held that Section 3(5)(a) governs the rates of duty for amusement parks and that only one benefit, either under Section 3(2) or Section 3(5)(a), can be claimed. The court set aside the High Court's interpretation and ruled that the entertainment duty payable followed Section 3(5)(a) of the Act.

Facts:

The case revolves around the matter of granting Permanent Commissions (PCs) to women SSC officers in the Indian Army. The initial process under the Women Special Entry Scheme (Officers) [WSES] was replaced by Short Service Commission (SSC) with an outer period of fourteen years. A writ petition was filed seeking directions for the grant of PC to women SSC officers. The High Court ruled that SSC women officers who had opted for PC were entitled to it on par with male SSC officers. The Union Government, during the appeal, issued a communication granting PC to SSC women officers in ten arms of Army services.

Issues:

Whether the policy decision of the Union Government dated February 25, 2019, granting PCs to SSC women officers in the Indian Army, enforces the fundamental rights of women officers.

Whether the distinction drawn between women officers with different years of service is valid.

Whether the absolute bar on women seeking criteria or command appointments is sustainable.

Whether the application of Article 33 in limiting fundamental rights for Armed Forces is valid.

Held:

Issue 1: The policy decision of the Union Government dated February 25, 2019, is interpreted as enforcing the fundamental right of women officers to seek access to public appointments and equality of opportunity, as per Articles 15(1) and 16(1) of the Constitution. (Para 50, 52)

Issue 2: The distinction drawn between women officers with different years of service (less than fourteen years, between fourteen and twenty years, and above twenty years) is deemed fallacious. Women SSC officers, regardless of years of service, should be entitled to consideration for grant of PCs. (Para 52, 59, 60)

Issue 3: The absolute bar on women seeking criteria or command appointments is not sustainable and goes against the principle of equality under Article 14. Blanket exclusion of women from such appointments lacks justification. (Para 67, 68)

Issue 4: Article 33 empowers Parliament to limit or abrogate fundamental rights for the Armed Forces to ensure proper discharge of duties and discipline. Such restriction must be through a law enacted for the purpose. (Para 44)

Facts:

The Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board introduced bidding parameters, including a criterion for the number of households based on census data. However, this criterion was not formally incorporated into the regulations and was not communicated to the bidders. Bidders with the highest composite scores were initially disqualified for exceeding the 100% limit. Adani Gas Limited challenged the grant of authorization in various geographical areas.

Issues:

The legality of the bidding criteria introduced through the Board Note and the fairness of the disqualification of bidders exceeding the 100% limit based on criteria that were not formally part of the regulations.

Held:

The introduced bidding criteria were not part of the official regulations and were not properly notified to bidders.

The introduced criteria cannot be treated as absolute norms to disqualify bids.

Disqualifying bidders based on a criterion that was not formally incorporated would be arbitrary and unconstitutional (Article 14).

The Board Note was a guideline, and the Board had the right to evaluate the reasonableness of bids exceeding the 100% limit.

Disqualifying bidders solely on exceeding the 100% limit without proper evaluation would be inconsistent with the regulations.

The procedure of calling the highest bidders to justify their bids' reasonableness was justified and fair.

Principles of natural justice were not breached by calling only the highest bidders for justification.

The Board's decision to disqualify or accept bids was based on a proper assessment of reasonableness.

The Chairperson's view regarding the binding nature of the Board Note and the need for hearing other bidders was disagreed with.

The Member Technical's perspective was upheld, and the appeals were dismissed.

FACTS:

The petitioner filed a writ petition challenging the rejection of his mercy petition by the President of India. The petitioner raised concerns related to the RTI Act, non-consideration of materials, torture, mental illness, and illegal solitary confinement.

ISSUES:

The extent of judicial review permissible under Article 32 for orders passed under Article 72.

Whether relevant materials were considered by the authorities in the decision-making process.

The validity of allegations of torture, mental illness, and illegal solitary confinement.

HELD:

The Court held that the scope of judicial review under Article 32 for orders passed under Article 72 is limited. The Court's role is to examine cases where the order was passed without the application of mind, on extraneous or irrelevant considerations, or with arbitrariness. In this case:

The Court observed that relevant materials, including case records, judgments, medical reports, and more, were forwarded to the Ministry of Home Affairs. Recommendations by the Lieutenant Governor and Home Minister were made after perusing the file, discrediting claims of non-application of mind.

The Court noted that the alleged suffering of the petitioner in prison cannot be a basis for judicial review of the executive order under Article 72.

The Court highlighted that the petitioner was kept in protective custody for security and his well-being, not in illegal solitary confinement.

The Court affirmed that all relevant materials, including the petitioner's medical report and Social Investigation Report, were considered by the President. The Court found no grounds for exercising judicial review over the order rejecting the mercy petition.

REFERRED CASES:

Bikas Chatterjee vs. Union of India and Others (2004) 7 SCC 634

Devender Pal Singh Bhullar vs. State of (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 6 SCC 195

Epuru Sudhakar and Another vs. Govt. of A.P. and Others, (2006) 8 SCC 161

Maru Ram v. Union of India and Others, (1981) 1 SCC 107

Mukesh and Another vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Others (2017) 6 SCC 1

Narayan Dutt and Others vs. State of Punjab and Another (2011) 4 SCC 353

Satpal vs. State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 170

Shatrughan Chauhan and Another vs. Union of India and Others (2014) 3 SCC 1

Sunil Batra vs. Delhi Administration and Others (1978) 4 SCC 494

Facts:

The appellant, Laxmibai, was disqualified as a member of the Gram Panchayat due to her failure to submit election expenses within the stipulated time. The appellant explained that her delay was caused by health issues, but this explanation was not accepted, leading to her disqualification for five years.

Issues:

Whether the Election Commission's power to disqualify under Section 14B of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959, should consider the proportionality of the disqualification period.

Whether the provisions of Article 243-O of the Constitution of India and the relevant Acts provided an alternative remedy for challenging panchayat election disputes.

Held:

Proportionality of Disqualification Period: The court ruled that while ensuring purity and transparency in the election process, the Election Commission's power to disqualify a candidate must be exercised judiciously. The period of disqualification should be proportionate to the default committed. Disqualifying a candidate for five years requires cogent reasons, as this affects the collective will of the voters.

Constitutional Validity of Article 243-O and Alternative Remedy: The court upheld the constitutional provision of Article 243-O, which prohibits challenging panchayat elections except through an election petition presented to the appropriate authority as per the relevant Acts. The court emphasized that the alternate remedy provided by the statute should be followed, and the High Court should refrain from interfering in election matters after the results are declared.

DECISION: The court held that disqualification under Section 14B of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959, should match the severity of the default. A five-year disqualification must be supported by substantial reasons. The court endorsed the constitutionality of Article 243-O, barring challenges to panchayat elections outside of election petitions. The court set aside the disqualification order, directing the Collector to reassess the period proportionately. Subsequent elections would be contingent on the Collector's final decision.

Facts:

The appellant was initially appointed as a part-time Gallery Attendant in 1995, and later in 2002, as a full-time Gallery Attendant. However, his services were terminated in 2004 due to a government policy. The appellant challenged this termination through legal proceedings, including writ petitions and appeals, invoking relevant sections, acts, rules, and constitutional provisions. The proceedings also considered the appellant's qualifications, his interim reinstatement, and representations to the authorities.

Issues:

The validity of the termination of the appellant's services based on government policies.

Interpretation of rules and resolutions regarding the eligibility, recruitment, and regularization of employees, specifically in the context of the appellant's appointment.

The appellant's entitlement to continuity of service and related benefits.

Held:

After a thorough examination of the facts, legal provisions, and precedents, the Supreme Court held that the appellant's reinstatement was warranted with continuity of service. The Court ruled that the Division Bench's judgment, which allowed the appellant's reinstatement but without back wages for a specific period, was appropriate. The Court reasoned that the appellant's initial appointment and subsequent service could not be invalidated retroactively based on later rules and resolutions. The Court emphasized the significance of the Division Bench's earlier order, which directed the appellant's reinstatement.

The judgment referred to the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. vs. Umadevi & Ors. (2006) 4 SCC 1 to discuss the implications of government resolutions and rules in the context of employee regularization.

The appeal is accordingly allowed.

Facts:

The appellant, a charitable trust, entered into a lease deed with the respondent for developing its land. Disputes arose, and the respondent invoked an arbitration clause within the lease deed, seeking arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. However, the lease deed was insufficiently stamped and was subject to issues of compliance with stamp duty.

Issues:

Whether an arbitration clause within an insufficiently stamped lease deed can be relied upon for enforcing arbitration proceedings.

Whether the lease deed, given its insufficiency in stamp duty, can be considered valid and admissible for arbitration proceedings.

Held:

The court considered the provisions of Sections 33 and 34 of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957, and the precedent case of SMS Tea Estates Private Limited vs. Chandmari Tea Company Private Limited (2011) 14 SCC 66. The court held that when an arbitration agreement is contained within an unregistered but compulsorily registerable and insufficiently stamped instrument, the court cannot act upon the document or the arbitration clause. The court emphasized that the instrument must be duly stamped before it can be admitted in evidence or acted upon.

The court noted that the lease deed containing the arbitration clause was insufficiently stamped, and despite the Registrar's directive to pay the deficit stamp duty and penalty, the respondents failed to comply. Thus, the court concluded that the High Court's reliance on the insufficiently stamped lease deed for appointing an arbitrator was erroneous.

Additionally, the court observed that the respondent's claims regarding the timing of registering the lease deed contradicted the terms of the deed itself and found that the respondents' actions were inconsistent and unsupported.

In conclusion, the court allowed the appeal, quashed the High Court's order, and rejected the respondents' application under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act.