Facts:

The case involves an acid attack on two Dalit girls in Bihar.

The attackers had been harassing the elder sister, and the attack left both sisters with severe injuries.

The petitioner, a registered NGO, filed a writ petition highlighting the lack of adequate compensation and medical care for acid attack survivors.

Issues:

Inadequacy of compensation and medical care for acid attack victims.

Lack of proper implementation of guidelines and regulations to prevent acid attacks and provide support to victims.

Held:

The court referred to its previous judgment in Laxmi vs. Union of India, which laid down guidelines for regulating the sale of acid, compensating victims, and ensuring their medical treatment and rehabilitation.

The court directed all states and union territories to provide a minimum compensation of Rs. 3 lakhs to acid attack victims, with the possibility of providing more based on the severity of injuries.

In the present case, considering the extensive injuries suffered by the victims and the expenses already incurred on their treatment, the court awarded compensation of Rs. 10 lakhs to the main victim and Rs. 3 lakhs to her sister.

The court emphasized the responsibility of states to ensure the inclusion of acid attack victims' names under the disability list and to provide comprehensive treatment and rehabilitation as per the guidelines established.

Facts:

The appellant, M/S. Steel Authority of India Ltd., discharged excise duty on goods cleared based on invoices indicating the value of the goods at the time of clearance.

Differential duty arose later due to a price variation clause in the contract for sale.

The appellant paid the differential duty immediately upon receiving the enhanced price due to price escalation.

Issues:

Whether interest under Section 11AB is payable on the differential duty.

Determination of the point at which duty "ought to have been paid" in cases of price revision.

Held:

The appellant paid excise duty on the goods cleared based on invoices reflecting the value at the time of clearance. The differential duty arose later due to a price variation clause, and the appellant paid it upon receiving the enhanced price.

Interest under Section 11AB is chargeable where duty has not been levied or paid, or has been short levied or short paid. Duty "ought to have been paid" refers to the time when the price is agreed upon by both the seller and the buyer. In the context of price revision, duty is payable only after the revised price is agreed upon.

Duty is payable on the escalated price in cases of price revision, but the time for payment of differential duty is when the parties agree to the escalation. Therefore, interest on differential duty starts from the date of agreement on the escalated prices.

The excise duty was paid based on the price charged at the time of clearance, and it could not be treated as short paid. Interest is not payable on the principal amount of excise duty in such cases.

Previous judgments holding interest payable did not consider the expression "ought to have been paid" in Section 11AB. The rationale behind imposing interest as compensation for loss of revenue was questioned.

The decision in previous cases requires reconsideration due to the fundamental principle that the value of goods for duty purposes is determined at the time of removal.

Facts:

The case arose from Civil Appeal No. D 35086 of 2013, which raised doubts about the period of limitation for filing a written statement or giving the version of the opponent under Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

Issues:

Whether the law laid down by the Supreme Court.

Held:

The Court reiterates the view expressed in Dr. J.J. Merchant (supra), which mandates that the District Forum can grant a maximum extension of 15 days for the opposite party to file its version, making the total period for filing or giving the version 45 days. This interpretation is essential to adhere to the legislative mandate of disposing of cases within a specified time frame.

The Court emphasizes the chronological precedence of Dr. J.J. Merchant (supra) over Kailash (supra), underscoring that the latter should have respected the former's view as it was decided earlier.

The Court refers to the legal principle that a decision by a larger Bench binds subsequent Benches of lesser or equal strength.

Ultimately, the Court holds that the law laid down in Dr. J.J. Merchant (supra) should prevail, thereby providing clarity on the issue of time limitation for filing a version in consumer protection cases.

Facts:

The dispute arose regarding the calculation of registration fees for stockbrokers under the amended Regulations, specifically Schedule IIIA, introduced effective from October 1, 2006. The appellant, OPG Securities Private Ltd., contested SEBI's demand for registration fees based on turnover beyond the previous year.

Issues:

Whether SEBI's demand for registration fees based on turnover beyond the previous year was justified.

The applicability of Schedule IIIA and its effect on the calculation of registration fees.

Held:

The Court held that SEBI's demand for registration fees beyond the turnover of the previous year was illegal and contrary to the regulations. The Court clarified that the annual turnover of a broker is merely a measure of the levy and not the subject matter of the levy itself. Therefore, SEBI's demand for fees based on turnover beyond the previous year was not justified. The Court also emphasized that Schedule IIIA, upon becoming applicable to the appellant, superseded the provisions of Schedule III for the calculation of registration fees. Hence, SEBI could not levy fees based on Schedule III once Schedule IIIA became applicable to the appellant.

The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned order of the Securities Appellate Tribunal and quashing SEBI's demand for registration fees. It directed SEBI to refund any amount already paid by the appellant, along with interest, and ordered the refund to be made without delay. There was no order as to costs in the case.

Facts:

Adani Agri Fresh Ltd. (M/s. AAFL) entered into a contractual agreement with RMS Fruits and Company (M/s. RMSFC) for the supply of fruits.

M/s. AAFL required M/s. RMSFC to furnish bank guarantees for payment.

M/s. RMSFC failed to honor the payment, prompting M/s. AAFL to invoke the bank guarantees.

M/s. RMSFC sought injunctions against the invocation of bank guarantees through civil suits.

Issues:

Whether injunctions should be granted against the invocation of unconditional bank guarantees.

Whether the circumstances warranted the granting of such injunctions in the present case.

Held:

The court held that injunctions against the invocation of unconditional bank guarantees should only be granted under exceptional circumstances, such as flagrant fraud or irreparable injury. In the present case, the court found no evidence of fraud or irreparable injury. Therefore, the injunctions granted by the lower courts were not justified. The court directed the State Bank of Mysore to honor the bank guarantees. Additionally, the court granted liberty to M/s. RMSFC to amend their plaint to claim dues under the contractual obligations.

The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.

Facts:

The appellant, Sujoy Mitra, was facing trial in a case related to Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code.

The complainant was a citizen of Ireland residing in Dublin.

The trial court permitted the testimony of the complainant (PW5) to be recorded via video conference.

Issues:

The appellant challenged the procedure adopted by the trial court for recording the testimony of PW5.

Held and Decision:

The Supreme Court granted leave for the appeal and considered the challenges raised by the appellant regarding the procedure adopted by the trial court in recording the statement of PW5.

The Court laid down additional procedures and safeguards to be followed while recording PW5's statement through video conferencing, ensuring fairness and compliance with legal requirements.

These procedures included provisions for video conferencing facilitated by the National Informatic Centre (NIC) using "VC Solution" software, nomination of a responsible officer from the Indian Embassy in Ireland to be present during the recording, and ensuring no other person is present in the room during the recording.

The Court rejected the appellant's contention that the recorded video-graphic testimony should be furnished to him, stating it could lead to a cumbersome process and unnecessary duplication of records.

The appeal was disposed of, with instructions for the trial court to fix a hearing date after the video conferencing facilities were set up and synchronized between the trial court and the Indian Embassy in Ireland.

The trial court was directed to forward the order to the Ambassador of the Indian Embassy in Ireland for compliance.

The parameters outlined by the Court were to be followed for recording PW5's testimony afresh, in addition to the procedures and safeguards provided in the impugned order.

Facts:

The case pertains to the interpretation of certain provisions of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) regarding the imposition and execution of sentences, particularly life imprisonment, as well as the power of remission granted to the executive authorities under the Constitution of India.

Issues:

Interpretation of "imprisonment for life" under the IPC.

Consideration of a special category of sentence and exclusion of remission in certain cases.

The authority to exercise the power of remission by the Appropriate Government under the CrPC.

Determination of primacy in the exercise of remission power between the Union Government and State Government.

Clarification on the suo motu exercise of power of remission under the CrPC.

Interpretation of "consultation" vs. "concurrence" in the context of executive powers.

Held:

The court held that "imprisonment for life" under Section 53 read with Section 45 of the IPC means imprisonment for the rest of the convict's life. However, the right to claim remission, commutation, or reprieve as provided under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution remains available.

The principle of establishing a special category of sentence, excluding remission in certain cases, was endorsed by the court.

The Appropriate Government, whether at the Union or State level, can exercise the power of remission under Sections 432 and 433 of the CrPC, even if similar considerations were made earlier by the President or the Governor.

The court clarified that the status of the Appropriate Government depends on the order of sentence passed by the criminal court. In cases where specific executive powers are conferred on the Centre, the Union Government holds primacy as the Appropriate Government for remission.

The court ruled out the suo motu exercise of power of remission under Section 432(1) of the CrPC, stating that it can only be initiated based on an application from the convicted person as provided in Section 432(2).

In situations falling within the jurisdiction of the Central Government under Section 435(1) of the CrPC, the term "consultation" should be construed as "concurrence," giving primacy to the Central Government.

These Writ Petitions and Criminal Appeal are disposed of in terms of the decision in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 48 of 2014.

Facts:

The marriage between the petitioner and respondent was solemnized in April 2010.

The respondent-husband filed a suit for dissolution of marriage in 2015, citing cruelty by the petitioner-wife.

A Settlement Agreement was reached, wherein the respondent agreed to pay Rs. 12,50,000/- towards alimony and maintenance for the petitioner.

The petitioner-wife is suffering from breast cancer and urgently requires funds for medical treatment.

Concern arises regarding the validity of the consent for divorce by mutual consent due to the petitioner's medical condition.

Issues:

Whether the consent for divorce by mutual consent was freely given by the petitioner-wife, considering her medical condition and urgent need for funds for treatment.

Held:

The transfer petition to transfer the matrimonial suit from the Family Court at Bombay to the Family Court at Hyderabad is allowed.

The respondent-husband is directed to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- out of Rs. 12,50,000/- to the petitioner-wife immediately within a week for her treatment and other medical expenses.

After the petitioner-wife is fully cured from her illness or within six months, whichever is earlier, the Family Court at Hyderabad shall take up the case along with any fresh application filed by the parties under Section 13B for divorce by mutual consent.

The court shall dispose of these petitions in accordance with the law after recording its satisfaction and providing an opportunity for both parties to be heard.

Facts:

The Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) allotted Civic Amenity Site No. 2 for a petrol retail outlet.

The High Court set aside the allotment, citing a violation of Section 38A of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976.

The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, which initially upheld the High Court's decision but later reviewed the judgment due to factual inaccuracies.

Issues:

Whether the allotment of Civic Amenity Site No. 2 for a petrol pump violated the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976.

Interpretation of Section 38A of the Act.

Determining the classification of a petrol pump as a civic amenity.

Held:

"In that view of the matter, there is no merit in the writ petitions filed before the High Court. They are, accordingly, dismissed. The civil appeals are allowed as above."

This paragraph signifies that the Supreme Court found no grounds to support the writ petitions challenging the allotment of Civic Amenity Site No. 2 for a petrol pump. Therefore, the writ petitions were dismissed, and the civil appeals were allowed, affirming the legality of the allotment.