FACTS:

Sadhusharan Yadav defaulted on a loan and his mortgaged land was sold in an auction.

Respondent-writ petitioners, claiming to be bona fide purchasers of the land, filed an application to set aside the sale under Section 28 of the Act.

The application was filed within the stipulated time but without the required deposit.

The Certificate Officer allowed the deposit to be made after the specified time.

ISSUES:

Whether an application under Section 28 of the Act can be entertained without the required deposit?

Can the Certificate Officer extend the time for deposit?

HELD:

The interpretation of Section 28 of the Act is crucial. The section requires that the application for setting aside a sale, made within thirty days from the sale date, must be accompanied by the specified deposit. The word "deposit" implies that the deposit is to be made before or simultaneously with the application, within the thirty-day period. There's no authority to extend this time limit.( Para 6)

Section 28 is a concession for the defaulter, and strict compliance is necessary. The sale cannot be set aside unless the entire specified amount is deposited within thirty days. Allowing deposits after the thirty-day period would defeat the purpose of the provision.( Para 7)

The High Court allowed the writ petition on the premise of the Certificate Officer's discretion, which we find invalid. The authority lacks power to extend the deposit time. The judgment of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench is erroneous.( Para 8)

The appeal is allowed, and the impugned order is set aside. The application under Section 28 stands rejected. The respondent-writ petitioners are entitled to a refund of their deposit.( Para 9)

Facts:

The respondent, a Chief Manager at a bank branch, reported irregularities and corruption in the branch, along with allegations of sexual harassment by a Zonal Manager. Subsequently, she was transferred to a different branch.

Issues:

Whether the transfer of the respondent was valid and in accordance with administrative and service exigencies?

Whether the allegations of irregularities and sexual harassment were adequately addressed by the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) of the bank?

Whether the constitution of the ICC was fair and in line with the provisions of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, 2013?

Held:

Transfer is an exigency of service and is generally not interfered with by courts unless malafides, statutory violations, or incompetency is proven. Administrative circulars guide the implementation of the transfer policy, but they may not always create a vested right.

The respondent made multiple complaints about irregularities and corruption in the bank branch, as well as allegations of sexual harassment. These were not addressed adequately by the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) due to issues with its composition.

The composition of the ICC was flawed as it did not have an independent member, as required by law. One of the ICC members was a panel lawyer of the bank, which compromised its impartiality.

Facts:

The property in question was originally owned by a Portuguese national and was subsequently declared as evacuee property. The appellants claimed tenancy rights over the property, asserting their possession under the Custodian of Evacuee Property. The respondents contested this claim, seeking tenancy recognition under the Goa, Daman and Diu Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964, which was extended to evacuee properties through the Amending Act 19 of 1989.

Issues:

Whether the 2nd respondent's claim of tenancy was supported by valid evidence.

Whether the 2nd respondent's claim falls within the purview of the Amending Act 19 of 1989.

Whether the provisions of the Evacuee Property Act and the Tenancy Act are applicable to the present case.

Held:

The court held that the claim made by the 2nd respondent lacked sufficient valid evidence to establish tenancy. The court emphasized that the Amending Act 19 of 1989 only applied tenancy provisions to relationships between tenants and the Custodian, which the 2nd respondent had not claimed. Additionally, the court referred to Section 32 of the Evacuee Property Act, stating that any transfer or transaction involving evacuee property requires prior approval from the Custodian.

The court further explained that for the 2nd respondent to establish deemed tenancy under Section 4 of the Tenancy Act, they needed to prove possession during a specific time frame, which they failed to do. Moreover, even if the 2nd respondent claimed sub-tenancy or transfer from the appellants' predecessors, who were tenants from the Custodian, it required prior Custodian approval as per Section 32.

The primary authority's decision was criticized for granting tenancy based on an alleged oral settlement, which the appellants disputed. The appellate and revisional authorities also failed to consider relevant aspects, and the High Court upheld the decision without proper examination.

Consequently, the court allowed the appeals, set aside the impugned orders, and dismissed the 2nd respondent's application for tenancy rights.

Facts:

The plaintiffs assigned telecasting rights of 16 films to certain parties for a period of 9 years through assignment deeds dated 23.12.1994. In 1995, they learned about a dispute involving the films. Legal actions were taken by various parties. The plaintiffs issued a public notice in 2003 asserting their rights, and defendant No. 1 claimed to have acquired the rights from defendant No. 2 through an assignment deed dated 21.03.1997. The plaintiffs then filed a suit for declaration and injunction in 2003.

Issues:

Whether the plaintiff's suit is barred by limitation due to the timing of the filing of the suit.

Held:

The trial court held that the cause of action for the suit arose in 1995 when the plaintiffs became aware of the dispute, and they waited for eight years before filing the suit. The High Court, on the other hand, reversed this decision, stating that the suit was not barred by limitation. The High Court considered the fact that the plaintiffs' cause of action arose only after their assignment period ended. Therefore, the suit was filed within a reasonable time.

Decision: The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, emphasizing that the cause of action to file a suit accrues when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe a right. Since the plaintiffs had assigned their rights for a specific period, they could not claim those rights during that time. The Court held that the suit was filed within a reasonable time and dismissed the appeal.

Facts:

The respondent, Mukesh Poonamchand Shah, an employee of LIC, was convicted of various criminal offenses, including those under the Prevention of Corruption Act and the Indian Penal Code. He was initially penalized through a disciplinary inquiry by LIC and later was convicted in a criminal case.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's issuance of a notice to show cause under Regulation 39(4) of the 1960 Regulations, based on the respondent's criminal conviction, is valid despite an earlier disciplinary penalty.

Whether the High Court's direction to withhold a final decision on the notice pending the criminal appeal is legally justified.

Held:

The Court upheld that the notice to show cause issued by LIC based on the respondent's criminal conviction was valid under Regulation 39(4) of the 1960 Regulations.

The Court reasoned that a prior disciplinary penalty for misconduct does not prevent LIC from issuing a separate notice under Regulation 39(4) based on the criminal conviction.

The Court cited precedents like Dy Director of Collegiate Education (Admn) vs. S Nagoor Meera, K C Sareen vs. CBI, and State of Haryana vs. Balwant Singh to support the view that disciplinary action can be taken based on criminal conviction even if the sentence is suspended during an appeal.

The Court clarified that the conviction itself was not stayed pending the appeal; only the sentence was suspended.

The Court concluded that the appellant's issuance of the notice was within its jurisdiction, and the High Court's direction to withhold a final decision during the criminal appeal lacked a valid legal basis.

REFERRED CASES:

Dy Director of Collegiate Education (Admn) vs. S Nagoor Meera, (1995) 3 SCC 377

K.C. Sareen vs. CBI. (2001) 6 SCC 584

Lt Governor, Delhi vs. HC Narinder Singh, (2004) 13 SCC 342

State of Haryana vs. Balwant Singh, (2003) 3 SCC 362

 Facts:

The case involves a challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 43B(f) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as inserted by the Finance Act, 2001. The provision pertains to the deduction for liability under the leave encashment scheme.

Issues:

• Whether the newly inserted Clause (f) to Section 43B of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is constitutionally valid?
• Whether the absence of objects and reasons behind the enactment of Clause (f) renders it invalid?

Held:

The Court held that Section 43B(f) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is constitutionally valid. The provision is not an embargo upon the autonomy of the assessee in adopting a particular method of accounting, nor does it deprive the assessee of any lawful deduction. It only operates as an additional condition for the availment of deduction concerning specified heads. The insertion of Clause (f) was to regulate deductions by putting them under a special provision. The Court emphasized that the presumption in favor of constitutionality applies while testing the validity of a provision.

The Court rejected the argument that the absence of objects and reasons behind the enactment of Clause (f) renders it invalid. The presence or absence of objects and reasons does not impact the constitutional validity of a provision, as long as the literal features of the provision enable the Court to comprehend its true meaning with sufficient clarity.

Conclusion: The Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 43B(f) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and clarified that the absence of objects and reasons behind the enactment of a provision does not impact its validity, as long as the literal features of the provision enable the Court to comprehend its true meaning with sufficient clarity. 

Facts:

The plaintiffs claimed ownership of certain land and alleged that the defendant managed the property as a manager, while the defendant asserted his status as a tenant. The trial court found that the defendant's oral evidence and witnesses had rebutted the presumption of truth attached to revenue records. The first appellate court, however, favored the defendant, stating that the plaintiffs had failed to prove the defendant's role as a manager.

Issues:

Whether the presumption of truth attached to revenue records can be rebutted by oral evidence.

Whether the defendant's position as a tenant or manager is proven.

Held:

The Supreme Court emphasized that the presumption of truth attached to revenue records can be rebutted only if entries were made fraudulently, surreptitiously, or without following the prescribed procedure. The Court also highlighted the importance of documentary evidence over oral evidence when dealing with the presumption of truth in revenue records.

The Court held that the High Court erred in allowing the defendant's appeal based on oral evidence to rebut the statutory presumption. The onus of proving the defendant's relationship as a tenant was on the defendant, who failed to provide reliable documentary evidence. Thus, the judgment and decree of the first appellate court were affirmed in favor of the defendant. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The Kerala State Electricity Board issued a tariff notification that segregated Self-Financing Educational Institutions (SFEIs) from State-run and State-aided private educational institutions, subjecting SFEIs to a higher category of tariff. The validity of this tariff order was challenged.

Issues:

Whether the tariff order gave undue preference to State-run and State-aided institutions?

Whether the tariff notification breached the principles of natural justice due to the absence of reasons?

Whether SFEIs were correctly categorized under the "commercial" heading for tariff purposes?

The meaning of the term "purpose" in the context of the Electricity Act, 2003.

Held:

Issue 1: Undue Preference The court held that the tariff notification did not show undue preference to State-run and State-aided institutions. The differentiation in tariff rates was based on factors like load factor, power factor, voltage, consumption, geographical position, nature of supply, and purpose for which supply is required. (Para 7)

Issue 2: Principles of Natural Justice The court ruled that the absence of reasons in the tariff notification did not breach principles of natural justice. Since SFEIs did not raise objections during the tariff proposal stage, the Commission's role was quasi-legislative. The requirement for disclosing reasons arises only when a dispute is generated, and there was no dispute in this case. (Para 10-11)

Issue 3: Categorization under "Commercial" Heading The court explained that while educational institutions might not perform functions similar to traditional commercial entities, for tariff purposes, entities from diverse fields can be grouped under a common umbrella. The heading "commercial" does not solely depend on the nature of activities. (Para 14)

Issue 4: Meaning of "Purpose" The court interpreted the term "purpose" as the reason for which something is done or exists. SFEIs were included under the "commercial" heading based on the purpose they served, which distinguished them from State-run institutions. The distinction in purpose justifies different tariff rates. (Para 16-18)

The court concluded that the tariff order was valid, and SFEIs being categorized as commercial entities for tariff purposes was not erroneous. The differentiation in tariff rates was justified based on the distinction in purpose and nature of the institutions. The judgment of the Single Judge was restored. (Para 19)

Facts:

The appellant, Motamarri Appanna Veerraju alias Mav Raju, filed a criminal appeal challenging the judgment and orders of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta. The appellant's bail application was filed in August 2018 in connection with multiple offenses, including those under IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act. The High Court granted interim protection to the appellant through successive interim orders.

Issues:

The delay in disposing of the appellant's bail application, the appropriateness of the conditions of interim bail, and the impact of the rejection of bail for a co-accused.

Held:

The court expressed displeasure at the delay in the High Court's handling of the bail application and highlighted the need for expeditious disposal of bail applications. The court decided to dispose of the main bail application filed by the appellant and modify the conditions of the interim bail. The modified conditions included a specified bail bond amount, travel restrictions, limitations on entering a particular district, surrendering the passport, and maintaining regular contact with the Investigating Officer. The court emphasized that the rejection of bail for a co-accused should not necessarily affect the appellant's bail, considering the unique circumstances of the case.

The court referred to a Special Leave Petition (SLP) filed by a co-accused (SLP (Crl.) No. 10310 of 2019) that had been dismissed by the court on 09.12.2019. The court cited this case to clarify that the rejection of the co-accused's bail application wouldn't automatically impact the appellant's situation.