Mangat Ram had four sons, and his family tree branched into different lineages. The appellant, Bhagwat Sharan, claimed to be the grandson of Umrao Lal, one of the sons. The case revolved around the joint family's property, including houses and agricultural land. The appellant argued that the properties were part of a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF), while the respondents contested this claim.

Issues:

• Whether the properties mentioned were joint family properties or self-acquired properties.
• Whether the plaintiff's acceptance of a will in a previous suit estops him from challenging the validity of the will.
• Whether the agricultural lands were part of the HUF property.

Held:
The burden lies on the person alleging the existence of an HUF to prove the same. The mere fact that separated coparceners chose to live together or act jointly for business does not imply joint family status. Proof of joint property does not lead to the presumption that the property is joint family property; the burden of proof lies with the claimant.

Admission is not conclusive evidence and can be challenged if not acted upon to one's detriment. The plaintiff's acceptance of benefits under a will precludes him from challenging the validity of the same will later.

As for agricultural land, the plaintiff failed to prove that they were receiving proceeds from its income, and various transfers of the land were not challenged in time.

The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The assessment proceedings for NDTV involved allegations of creating a network of shell companies to transfer untaxed income abroad and then back to India, thus avoiding taxation. The revenue relied on complaints made by minority shareholders suggesting such misconduct.

Issues:

• Whether there were sufficient reasons to believe that NDTV's undisclosed income escaped assessment.
• Whether NDTV made a full and true disclosure of relevant material facts.
• Whether the second proviso to Section 147 was applicable in this case.

Held:

Issue 1 - Invocation of Powers under Section 147: The Court held that information discovered during proceedings for subsequent assessment years could form tangible material to invoke powers under Section 147. At the notice issuance stage, the assessing officer only requires a prima facie view. The material disclosed for subsequent years sufficed to establish such a view. Thus, there were grounds to believe that income escaped assessment (Paragraph 23).

Issue 2 - Disclosure of Material Facts: The Court determined that NDTV fully and truly disclosed all necessary material facts for assessment. The assessing officer had knowledge of all entities, transactions, and relevant details. Therefore, NDTV did not withhold material information from the revenue (Paragraphs 26, 28, 29).

Issue 3 - Applicability of Second Proviso to Section 147: The Court found the notice silent about the second proviso to Section 147, which relates to the extended 16-year period. Mention of the second proviso was introduced only when rejecting objections. The Court ruled that the revenue couldn't surprise NDTV by invoking the second proviso at a later stage, thereby disallowing its benefit (Paragraphs 38, 43,).

Accordingly the appeal allowed.

Facts:

The respondent, an employee of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), served in the National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) during a certain period. He claimed deputation allowance and special allowance for his service in the NDRF. The question was whether personnel from various Central Para Military Forces, including the respondent, were on deputation during their service in the NDRF.

Issues:

• Whether the respondent and similarly situated personnel were on deputation during their service with the NDRF.
• Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in granting relief with nationwide implications.

Held:

The Court analyzed the concept of deputation, emphasizing that it involves the temporary assignment of an employee from one department to another in the public interest. Until September 11, 2009, the respondent remained under the administrative control of the CISF and received pay from them, indicating he was not on deputation. However, from September 11, 2009, when control shifted to the NDRF and pay started coming from it, the personnel were deemed to be on deputation.

The Court criticized the High Court for overstepping its jurisdiction in granting nationwide relief. High Courts have jurisdiction only over their respective states, unlike the Supreme Court which has pan-India jurisdiction. The Supreme Court directed payment of deputation allowance to the respondent from September 11, 2009, to October 7, 2011.The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The case involves a situation where the Governor was intimated about the resignations of certain Members belonging to a political party. The Chief Minister advised the Governor for the removal of some ministers, and notices of disqualification were issued. Subsequently, the Speaker accepted resignations of some ministers. The Chief Minister requested a floor test to resolve the situation. However, no floor test was conducted, and the Legislative Assembly was adjourned.

Issues:

• Whether the Governor's exercise of power to convene a floor test was constitutionally proper
• Whether the convening of a trust vote can be deferred until the Speaker decides on issues of resignation and disqualification.

Held:

The Governor's role is to ensure the stability and accountability of the government to the legislative assembly. The Governor's discretionary powers should maintain a balance of power between the executive and the legislature. [Para 32, 37]

The concept of legislative assembly's control over the government is crucial in a parliamentary democracy. The Governor's power to call a trust vote is not meant to displace elected governments but to intervene cautiously when circumstances suggest a loss of majority. Judicial review is applicable to the Governor's decision. [Para 39, 43, 44]

The Governor's power to call for a floor test should be exercised to ensure that the legislative assembly's authority to determine confidence in the government is upheld. No reason exists for the Governor to delay the ordinary legislative process of a no-confidence motion. The Governor is expected to act impartially. [Para 45, 46]

The Governor's exercise of authority to convene a floor test, given the context of the case, was constitutionally proper. The trust vote is essential to ascertain the government's confidence and legitimacy. The Speaker's authority to decide on resignations and disqualifications remains intact. [Para 47, 48, 49]

The Court cannot mandate a trust vote only in the presence of all Members or postpone it until by-elections occur. The decision to attend the proceedings is up to the individual Members. The Court aims to prevent restraint on their rights and liberties. [Para 50, 51, 54, 55, 56]

Facts:

The case revolved around an organization formed to achieve separate statehood for Tamil Nadu. The appellant and other accused allegedly conspired to bomb the State Government building. The bomb was defused before detonation. The prosecution's case relied on confessions, both from the appellant and co-accused, as well as evidence related to the conspiracy and bomb-making materials.

Issues:

• Whether the appellant's confession was obtained voluntarily and adhered to the guidelines set by the court.
• Whether the confession of co-accused is admissible in the absence of a joint trial.

Held:

The court examined the appellant's confession (Ex. P-57) and observed that the requirements for recording confessions under Section 15 of the TADA Act were not followed. The appellant alleged torture and claimed that his statement was not voluntary. The court found discrepancies in the warning given, and the appellant's petitions (Ex. D-1 and D-2) raised doubts. The court held that the confession was not proven to be voluntary and rejected it.

The court considered the admissibility of co-accused confessions (Ex. P-26 and P-27). Since the appellant was absconding and a separate trial was conducted against him, the joint trial requirement of Section 30 of the Evidence Act was not met. The court upheld that for a co-accused confession to be admissible, a joint trial is necessary. Therefore, the co-accused confessions were not admissible against the appellant.

Conclusion : As the appellant's confession was rejected and co-accused confessions were not admissible, the Designated Court's conviction was unsustainable. The appellant was acquitted and his bail bond was canceled.

Facts:

The 1994 EIA notification mandated prior Environmental Clearance (EC) for the setup and expansion of industrial units in specified categories. The circular of 2002 extended the deadline and allowed for ex post facto ECs. The circular was challenged and quashed by the National Green Tribunal (NGT). The industries in question did not seek ECs as required by the EIA notification and operated without complying with the notification.

Issues:

• Does the 2002 circular allowing for ex post facto ECs align with environmental jurisprudence and the principles of the 1994 EIA notification?
• Does the NGT have jurisdiction to strike down the circular?
• Are the industries in question entitled to the exemption provided in Clause 8 of the explanatory note to the EIA notification?

Held:

The concept of ex post facto ECs contradicts environmental jurisprudence and the 1994 EIA notification. Such clearances would be detrimental to the environment, as they would allow industrial activities to proceed without proper assessment of their impact.(Paragraphs 23, 25)

The NGT has the jurisdiction to enquire into the legitimacy of the circular dated 14 May 2002. The circular's purpose contradicts the objectives of the EIA notification, and it is not protected by Section 3 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.(Paragraphs 20, 21)

The three industries in question did not seek proper clearances before the commencement or expansion of their operations, as required by the EIA notification. None of these industries are entitled to the exemption under Clause 8 of the explanatory note.(Paragraphs 28-32)

The industries must deposit compensation of 10 crores each for operating without proper ECs. The NGT's directions for revocation of ECs and closure of the units are set aside due to the principle of proportionality.(Paragraphs 36, 38, 39)

Facts:

Pawan Kumar Gupta challenged the rejection of his mercy petition by the President of India. He contended that settled principles of considering mercy petitions were not followed. He raised concerns about the determination of his juvenility, alleging that he was a juvenile at the time of the incident. Additionally, he claimed to have suffered injuries due to torture in prison.

Issues:

Whether the rejection of the mercy petition could be subjected to judicial review and if so, on what grounds.

Whether the petitioner's claim of juvenility had been adequately determined.

Whether allegations of torture in prison could be a basis for judicial review of the mercy petition rejection.

Held:

The court held that the power of judicial review over the President's decision in a mercy petition was limited. Such decisions could be challenged on the grounds of lack of application of mind, mala fide intent, consideration of irrelevant factors, exclusion of relevant materials, or arbitrariness. [Para 10]

The petitioner's claim of juvenility was rejected as the plea had been previously considered and rejected by the Juvenile Justice Board, the District & Sessions Judge, and the Delhi High Court. The plea had been conclusively determined by the courts. [Para 12-15]

Allegations of torture in prison were deemed insufficient to warrant judicial review of the executive order rejecting the mercy petition. [Para 16]

The court emphasized that when high constitutional authorities like the President of India have the power to grant mercy, it is presumed they have considered all aspects carefully. The court found no evidence that the President had not considered the mercy petition with an open mind. [Para 20-21]

The writ petition challenging the rejection of the mercy petition was dismissed, applying the principles from previous cases on the limited scope of judicial review over such decisions. [Para 22]

Facts:

The Government of Bombay had acquired land for the Government of India before 1964, upon which it constructed godowns and silos for storing food grains. These structures were transferred to the Food Corporation of India (FCI) in 1965 after its establishment. The Brihanmumbai Mahanagar Palika (Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai) demanded property tax from the FCI for these godowns. The FCI claimed exemption from property tax under Article 285 of the Constitution, asserting that the properties were owned by the Central Government.

Issues:

Whether the FCI is eligible for exemption from property tax under Article 285 of the Constitution of India?

Whether the Municipal Corporation's argument based on Section 146 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act is valid?

Held:

The court analyzed the conditions for exemption under Article 285. Exemption from taxes on Central Government properties can only be denied if the property was subject to municipal tax prior to the Constitution's commencement or if a parliamentary law allows property taxation. In this case, the properties in question were constructed after 1964 and were not previously subject to property tax. Therefore, the conditions for exemption denial under Article 285(2) were not satisfied. The Municipal Corporation is not authorized to impose property tax, thus upholding the FCI's exemption claim under Article 285(1). [Para 27-31]

The court rejected the Municipal Corporation's argument based on Section 146 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act. It emphasized that such arguments could not undermine a constitutional provision. The court stated that the claim of primary or secondary responsibility loses relevance when there is an exemption claim based on property owned by the Government of India. Section 146 cannot be interpreted in a way that contradicts the Constitution. [Para 34-36]

The court emphasized that if the Municipal Corporation's claim to levy property tax is not covered by Article 285(2), it cannot use statutory provisions to bypass the exemption granted by Article 285(1). [Para 37]

Additionally, the court clarified that while the FCI is exempt from property tax under Article 285, it may still be liable to pay service charges for services rendered by the Corporation. [Para 45, 47]

Facts:

Bhajan Singh owned the suit land. He executed a registered Will in favor of the appellants. Bhajan Singh resided with the appellants.

Bhajan Singh's wife and daughters started living with his brother after a divorce. A Family Settlement was entered into allocating the suit property to the daughters.

The trial court decreed the suit filed by the appellants based on the registered Will.

After Bhajan Singh's death, the daughters filed a suit challenging the earlier decree.

Issues:

Whether the decree obtained through the registered Will required registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act?

Whether the decree was based on pre-existing rights?

Whether fraud was involved in obtaining the decree?

Held:

The trial court and the First Appellate Court held the decree valid. However, the High Court held it required registration.

The Supreme Court analyzed the applicability of Section 17 of the Registration Act and cited case law. It concluded that a court decree does not require registration.

The court addressed the fraud argument and concluded that there was no fraud involved, as the decree was based on pre-existing rights and claims acknowledged by Bhajan Singh.

The court emphasized that the suit was filed based on pre-existing rights, the defendants' position was admitted by Bhajan Singh, and the decree did not require registration.

Decision: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, confirming the judgment of the High Court. Costs were awarded to the respondents.