Facts:

Mohd. Rashid Alam, a constable in District Police Force, was killed while on duty.

The widow of the deceased, being illiterate, submitted a petition to the State, seeking compassionate appointment for the appellant (brother of the deceased).

The appellant was appointed as constable in 1991, providing an undertaking to support the deceased constable's widow and children.

After 15 years of satisfactory service, the State issued a show cause notice stating that the appellant, being a "devar (brother of deceased)," was not eligible for compassionate appointment.

The appellant's services were terminated, leading to an appeal and subsequent legal proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the termination of the appellant's services on the ground of ineligibility for compassionate appointment was justified.

Applicability and interpretation of the compassionate appointment policy.

Held:

The Court, after considering the facts and circumstances, held as follows:

The State was not justified in terminating the appellant's services after 15 years of appointment. The ground for termination did not appear well-founded.

The appellant and the deceased constable's widow had truthfully disclosed their family relations and conditions while seeking compassionate appointment. The appellant had undertaken to support the family.

The Court disapproved of the State's action, emphasizing that the appellant's appointment was a conscious decision by the State to help the family facing financial hardship.

The Court found no justification for the State to raise the eligibility issue after 15 years, especially when the appellant had not committed any fraud or suppression of material facts.

The appellant was entitled to reinstatement with full back wages, seniority, and notional promotions as per rules. The State was directed to pay arrears of back wages within three months, and the appellant was to be reinstated within a month.

The appellant was awarded costs of Rs. 5000/-, payable by the respondent-State.

FACTS:

Appellant (M/S GANGOTRI ENTERPRISES LTD.) was awarded a contract by North Central Railway for "earth work in embankment and cutting including provision of machine crushed/blended material blanketing layer and construction of RCC Box type minor bridges."

Another contract was granted to the appellant for the construction of a New Station Building (G+2) and associated works (Anand Vihar works).

Appellant furnished a Bank/Performance Guarantee for the Anand Vihar works.

The contract related to earthwork faced delays due to various reasons, leading to its termination.

Appellant completed the Anand Vihar works, obtained a completion certificate, and sought the release of the Bank Guarantee.

ISSUES:

• Whether the Bank Guarantee, pertaining to a completed contract (Anand Vihar works), could be encashed for dues related to a terminated contract (earthwork)?

• Could the respondents invoke Clause 62 of the General Conditions of Contract for encashing the Bank Guarantee before the final determination of arbitration proceedings?

HELD:

The Division Bench allowed the appeal and granted an injunction against the encashment of the Bank Guarantee. The key findings include:

The Bank Guarantee was related to the completed Anand Vihar works, and the respondents had no right to encash it for dues from the terminated earthwork contract.

The pending arbitration proceedings for the terminated contract made it inappropriate to encash the Bank Guarantee before determining liabilities.

The respondents had no right under Clause 62 to recover dues until the final determination of liability through arbitration.

The District Judge's initial injunction order, which attained finality, was binding on the parties.

Facts:

The plaintiff filed a suit for possession of a disputed property and mesne profits.

Dispute arose over the ownership of the property after the death of Rajaiah.

Plaintiff claimed title through a sale deed executed by Smt. Gandla Buchamma.

Issues:

Ownership of the property after the death of Rajaiah.

Validity of the sale deed and passing of consideration.

Adoption of defendant no. 3 by Yashoda.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was not required to seek a declaration of title as there was no serious cloud on the title.

Denial for want of knowledge is not a valid denial, and execution of the sale deed was not specifically denied in the written statement.

The Court emphasized that passing of consideration under a sale deed cannot be questioned by a third party.

The High Court's decision to dismiss the suit was set aside, and the judgment and decree of the first appellate court were restored.

The circumstances, appeal is allowed.

Facts:

Three appellants convicted under Sections 302 and 364 read with Section 34 IPC.

Original charge: Section 306 IPC (abetment of suicide).

Alteration of charge during trial: "Alternative Charge" under Section 302 IPC without proper procedure.

Failure to recall or re-summon witnesses for the altered charge and absence of an adjournment.

Issues:

Compliance with procedural requirements for altering charges during the trial.

Whether the alteration of the charge created prejudice to the accused.

Held:

The court held that the alteration of charges during the trial without following the prescribed procedures led to the vitiation of the trial. The failure to recall or re-summon witnesses for the altered charge and the absence of an adjournment violated the mandatory provisions of Sections 216 and 217 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The altered charge should have been treated as an original charge, and the trial should have proceeded accordingly. The court allowed the appeals and reduced the sentence to the period already undergone, directing the release of the appellants forthwith if not required in any other case.

Facts:

The State Printing and Writing Articles Department of Madhya Pradesh placed an order for printing booklets with M/S. Ruchi Printers.

The contract specified a time-bound basis for the supply of booklets.

The order for printing booklets was placed on 16.1.2008.

The booklets were to be supplied on a time-bound basis by 25.2.2008.

Despite extensions, it was made clear that after 31.3.2008, no booklets would be accepted.

Issues:

The time sensitivity of the contract and the unauthorized printing of booklets after the cancellation of the order.

Held:

The High Court was criticized for enforcing a palpably illegal communication of 22.5.2008, which was later recalled on 30.1.2009.

Printing of booklets after 31.3.2008 was deemed wholly unauthorized.

The Division Bench erred in directing the acceptance of booklets printed after the cancellation of the order.

The contract came to an end after the order for printing booklets stood canceled, and there was no justification for printers to continue printing after 31.3.2008.

No communication existed between 31.3.2008 and 22.5.2008 instructing printers to print and supply booklets.

The Division Bench's direction to accept booklets printed till 22.5.2008 was set aside.

Payment for booklets supplied till 31.3.2008, if not made, was ordered to be made forthwith.

Facts:

The appellants challenged a notification issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and subsequent actions, including a declaration and award. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the grounds that the award had already been passed. During the proceedings, the appellants asserted that the land acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act as compensation had not been paid.

Issues:

The validity of the notification under the 1894 Act, the applicability of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, and the question of compensation payment to the appellants.

Held:

The court held that under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, if compensation has not been paid to the landowner after an award under the 1894 Act, the acquisition proceedings stand lapsed. The court rejected the argument that the appellants should have approached the authorities for compensation, emphasizing the responsibility of the Requisitioning Authority to make the payment. As no compensation had been paid to the appellants, the acquisition proceedings, including the award, were set aside as lapsed.

Facts:

The appellants were accused of violations related to contract labor, including not providing overtime slips, not issuing leave books, and deficiencies in canteen facilities. The Court provided opportunities for rectification and considered the responsibilities of the contractor.

Issues:

The responsibility for violations, rectification of defects, and the imposition of penalties under Section 92 of the Factories Act.

Held:

The Court, considering the seriousness of the violations, imposed a penalty of Rs. 50,000 each on the appellants under Section 92 of the Factories Act. The judgment affirmed the decision of the High Court, which had declined the appellants' plea for quashing the proceedings. The penalty was to be deposited before the trial court within four weeks.

Facts:

Respondents 4 to 7 filed a complaint against respondents 1 to 3, alleging misappropriation of funds of the All Kerala Chemists and Druggists Association.

Appellant No. 2 filed a similar complaint against respondents 1 to 3.

The police filed a final report based on the complaint of respondents 4 to 7, charging respondents 1 to 3 with offenses under Sections 406, 408, 409, 477A, and 120B of the IPC.

Issues:

Whether the offenses alleged were of a purely personal nature or involved public policy.

Whether the settlement between the parties justified quashing the criminal proceedings.

Held:

The High Court, in view of the settlement between the parties, quashed the proceedings, considering the offenses as purely personal and not in the interest of justice to continue the prosecution.( Paragraph 5)

The complainants and the accused admitted in a joint petition that there was no misappropriation, and the offenses alleged were purely personal in nature.( Paragraph 8)

The Supreme Court clarified that the power under Section 482 of the CrPC is not limited to offenses compoundable under Section 320 and can be exercised based on settlements between private parties.( Paragraph 15)

The allegations against respondents 1 to 3 involved misappropriation of funds of the Association, making the offenses non-compoundable and not purely personal.( Paragraph 17)

The appeal was allowed, and the impugned order was set aside. The trial court was directed to proceed further with the matter in accordance with the law.( Paragraph 23)

Facts:

Four accused persons prosecuted under various sections of the TADA Act and the Explosive Substances Act.

Prior approval for recording information about the offense under TADA was taken from the Additional Director General of Police instead of the District Superintendent of Police.

Acquittal of two accused (M. Jamal Alvi and Habib Ahmed) and conviction of two accused (Abre Rehmat Ansari @ Qari and Dr. Mohd. Jalees Ansari).

Appeals filed by the State against acquittal and by the convicted persons challenging their conviction.

Issues:

Whether the approval from an authority higher than the District Superintendent of Police is valid under Section 20A(1) of the TADA Act?

Held:

The Supreme Court, relying on precedent, held that only the District Superintendent of Police is competent to give the required approval under Section 20A(1) of the TADA Act. Since the higher authority's approval was taken in this case, the trial was vitiated. The appeals filed by the convict persons were allowed, setting aside their conviction, while the appeals filed by the State were dismissed.