Facts:

The case revolves around the promotion criteria for the posts of District and Sessions Judge and Principal Judge, Family Court within the Delhi Higher Judicial Service (DHJS).

The High Court adopted and modified criteria for promotion, which were gradually implemented over time.

The appellant, Sujata Kohli, contended that the criteria and their implementation were unfair and violated her rights.

Issues:

• Challenge to the validity of Rule 27 and its compatibility with the decision in All India Judges Association case.
• Fairness and reasonableness of the promotion criteria set by the High Court.
• Whether the appellant was denied fair consideration for promotion due to the criteria laid down in the impugned resolutions.
• Alleged prejudice suffered by the appellant regarding her ACR gradings.

Held:

Issue 1: Validity of Rule 27 and Compatibility with Previous Decision

The High Court correctly rejected the challenge to Rule 27, as it does not equate judicial officers with executive officers. Rule 27 only applies when no provision or insufficient provision is made in the Rules of 1970.

Reference to the service conditions of members of IAS in the rules is not against the principles laid down in All India Judges Association.

Issue 2: Fairness of Promotion Criteria

The promotion criteria were reasonably set by the High Court to ensure the selection of candidates with adequate merit for higher posts.

The criteria for promotion were evolved systematically and were applied to candidates in the zone of consideration.

Issue 3: Fair Consideration for Promotion

The appellant, being a member of DHJS, should have been aware of the criteria applicable to upward progression.

Merit is a crucial factor for promotion, and seniority alone is not sufficient.

The appellant was conscious of the competitive nature of promotions and the required assessment of merit.

Issue 4: Alleged Prejudice Regarding ACR Gradings

The appellant was aware of her ACR gradings and had the opportunity to challenge them, which she did for one year.

The criteria were implemented gradually and were consistently applied.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed. The High Court's decision regarding the promotion criteria and implementation of Rule 27 was upheld. The appellant's challenges were rejected as the promotion criteria were reasonable and fairly applied.

Facts:

Respondent no. 3, the borrower, had availed financial credit from the bank, and respondent no. 2, the guarantor, offered its immovable property as mortgage.

The borrower defaulted, and the bank filed O.A. No. 11/2008 before the DRT and took symbolic possession of the secured assets.

The guarantor challenged the possession notice, but the DRT rejected the petition.

The secured assets were auctioned, and a sale certificate was issued to the appellant.

The bank filed an application before the DRT for return of original documents, which was rejected due to ongoing issues regarding the mortgage's validity.

Issues:

• Validity of mortgage.
• Ownership of specific land referred to in the sale certificate.

Held:

The guarantor had repeatedly challenged the mortgage's validity in various proceedings, and the concerned forum/Court rejected the same. The guarantor admitted liability and cannot resile from this admission. The auction sale was concluded, and the bank was legally obligated to handover the title deeds or original documents to the appellant. The High Court's order was reversed in this regard. [Para 14]

The sale certificate referred to a specific land, and the Court held that, based on the decree of a competent court, the title document for that land should not be released until the final decision in O.A. No. 11/2008. The Court emphasized the need to respect the decree's finality and pending proceedings related to the land. [Para 16]

The Court modified the DRAT's operative order, allowing the bank's application for return of original documents except for the specific land mentioned above. [Para 20]

Decision: The Court partly allowed the appeal, holding that the guarantor cannot resile from its admission of liability and ordered the return of original documents except for the specific land referred to in the sale certificate. The High Court's decision was reversed in part, and the operative order of the DRAT was modified accordingly. [Para 20]

The respondent, a company incorporated in the UAE, provided remittance services and established liaison offices in India. These offices were primarily engaged in downloading remittance information and printing cheques/drafts for delivery to beneficiaries in India based on instructions from NRI remitters. The RBI granted permission for these offices to engage in specific activities.

Issues:

• Whether the activities of the liaison offices qualified as a Permanent Establishment (PE) under the DTAA,
• Whether the income earned from these activities was subject to taxation in India.

Held:

The RBI's permission and the specific conditions imposed on the activities of the liaison offices demonstrated that their activities were of a preparatory or auxiliary nature. These activities were circumscribed by the RBI's permission, and they did not involve primary business activities or establishment of business connections. Thus, the liaison offices did not qualify as a PE under the DTAA. As a result, no income as specified in Section 2(24) of the Income Tax Act was earned by the liaison office in India.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming that the respondent's liaison offices did not qualify as a Permanent Establishment (PE) under the DTAA, and no income was earned by the liaison office in India as specified in the Income Tax Act.

FACTS:

Yum! Restaurants (Marketing) Private Limited (YRMPL), a fully-owned subsidiary of Yum! Restaurants (India) Private Limited (YRIPL), was incorporated to undertake Advertising, Marketing, and Promotion (AMP) activities for YRIPL and its franchisees. YRMPL received contributions from both members (franchisees) and non-members (Pepsi Foods Ltd.). YRMPL claimed tax exemption based on the doctrine of mutuality.

ISSUES:

• Whether YRMPL qualifies as a mutual concern, thereby exempting its transactions from tax liability under the doctrine of mutuality.

HELD:

The doctrine of mutuality has three conditions/tests: common identity, completeness of identity, and impossibility of profits. YRMPL failed to meet these conditions:

Common Identity – YRMPL accepted contributions from both members (franchisees) and non-members (Pepsi Foods Ltd.), violating the principle of common identity. The transaction lost its mutual character when non-members contributed to the fund.

Completeness of Identity – YRMPL's receipt of money from non-members (Pepsi Foods Ltd.) without allowing them to participate as beneficiaries in the surplus violated the completeness of identity requirement.

Test of Non-profiteering and Obedience to Mandate – YRMPL's acceptance of contributions from Pepsi Foods Ltd. and its inability to demonstrate obedience to the mandate of mutuality and non-profiteering contravened this test.

Impossibility of Profits – YRMPL's arrangement allowed one member (YRIPL) to control the operations to the detriment of others (franchisees), making it impossible for other members to derive profits.

Due to these failures, YRMPL did not qualify as a mutual concern and was not eligible for tax exemption under the doctrine of mutuality.

CONCLUSION: Yum! Restaurants (Marketing) Private Limited (YRMPL) did not qualify as a mutual concern under the doctrine of mutuality due to its acceptance of contributions from both members and non-members, its failure to adhere to the mandate of mutuality and non-profiteering, and the ability of one member (YRIPL) to control operations to the detriment of others (franchisees). Consequently, YRMPL's claim for tax exemption under the doctrine of mutuality was denied.

Facts:

The case revolved around an agreement between NAFED and Alimenta S.A. concerning the export of groundnut commodities during the 1979-80 season. The agreement contained an arbitration clause and was governed by the FOSFA 20 contract, a standard form of contract. Due to a cyclone damaging the crops, NAFED could not fulfill its supply obligations to Alimenta S.A., and the Government of India refused permission to carry forward the commitment to the next year.

Issues:

• The applicability of Sections 32 and 56 of the Contract Act in the context of the contractual dispute.
• Whether enforcing the foreign arbitration award would be contrary to public policy, as outlined in Section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Foreign Awards Act.

Held:

The Court observed that Section 32 of the Contract Act pertained to contingent contracts, while Section 56 dealt with agreements involving impossible or unlawful acts. The Court clarified that in the present case, Clause 14 of the agreement between NAFED and Alimenta S.A. created a contingent contract. As the contract became impossible to perform without government permission, it was rendered void under Section 32 of the Contract Act. The Court emphasized that the agreement was inherently impossible due to the requirement for government approval.

In terms of public policy, the Court referred to Section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Foreign Awards Act. The Court concluded that enforcing the foreign award would be against the fundamental public policy of India because the government's permission was necessary for exports, and the agreement explicitly outlined this requirement. Thus, enforcing the award would contravene public policy.

The appeal filed by the NAFED is thus allowed, and the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is set aside. Award is held to be unenforceable.

Facts:

 Notifications were issued providing exemptions and incentives for setting up new industries in earthquake-affected districts, including excise duty exemption. Subsequent notifications limited the incentive of refund of excise duty to the extent of value addition. Respondents challenged these subsequent notifications, asserting breach of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Similar notifications in other allied matters were also quashed by High Courts of Sikkim and Guwahati.

Issues:

• Whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable in fiscal matters?
• Whether subsequent notifications limiting excise duty refund are clarificatory or against vested rights?

Held:

The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked in the abstract. Courts must consider all aspects, including the objective and public good. Equity must guide the application of the doctrine. It can yield when equity so demands, especially if holding the Government to its promise would be inequitable.

The subsequent notifications are clarificatory, intended to remove doubts. They do not take away accrued benefits or rights from earlier notifications. The objective was to prevent tax evasion and rationalize exemptions for genuine manufacturers.

Subsequent notifications do not negate vested rights. They clarify the refund mechanism for excise duty, considering actual value addition. They are not hit by the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

Subsequent notifications are clarificatory, issued in public interest and to achieve the original purpose of incentives. They are applied retrospectively. High Courts erred in quashing them based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

In specific Civil Appeals, the challenge to certain notifications failed, and refunds were upheld based on subsequent notifications.

which are now upheld by this Court, the present appeals deserve to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over the determination of "small quantity" or "commercial quantity" of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances under the NDPS Act, specifically when they are present in a mixture along with neutral substances. The court addressed the challenge to a notification (Notification No. 2942(E) dated 18.11.2009) issued by the Union of India, which added "Note 4" to a previous notification (S.O.1055(E) dated 19.10.2001) specifying the quantities of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

Issues:

• Whether the quantity of neutral substance(s) in a mixture should be taken into consideration when determining "small quantity" or "commercial quantity" of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.
• Whether the impugned Notification No. 2942(E) dated 18.11.2009 is clarificatory and valid under the scheme of the NDPS Act.

Held:

The court reviews the case of E. Micheal Raj, which held a contrary view, and highlights that the relevant entry in the Notification dated 19.10.2001 was not considered in that case. The seized substance was heroin falling under Entry 56, and the case did not directly consider mixtures of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.

The court emphasizes that the NDPS Act's preamble and objectives imply a stringent approach to combat drug-related issues. The court criticizes the interpretation in E. Micheal Raj for not considering the Act's intent to deter drug trafficking and abuse.

The court discusses the interpretation of the term "small quantity" or "commercial quantity" for mixtures. It argues that the entire weight of the mixture, including neutral material, is relevant for determining quantities. The court presents an example to illustrate this point.

The court highlights the dangers of mixed substances and asserts that considering only the weight of the offending drug would frustrate the purpose of the NDPS Act.

The court emphasizes the international problem of drug addiction and the need for stringent measures to combat drug trafficking. It underscores the preventive aspect of the NDPS Act and the importance of interpreting its provisions in line with its objectives.

The court holds that the challenged Notification No. 2942(E) dated 18.11.2009 is clarificatory and not ultra vires to the scheme of the NDPS Act.

Facts:

 The Government Order (G.O.) No. 3/2000 issued by the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh granted 100% reservation to Scheduled Tribe candidates for the position of teachers in schools situated in scheduled areas within the state. This action was challenged in court, raising constitutional concerns.

Issues:

• Whether the 100% reservation provided by G.O.Ms. No. 3/2000 is permissible under the Constitution, considering the limits set by previous judgments.
• Whether the exercise of power conferred by Para 5(1) of Schedule V of the Constitution can override fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III.
• Whether there is a conflict between the Presidential Order and G.O.Ms. No. 3/2000 issued by the Governor under Para 5(1) of Schedule V.
• Whether the notification in question merely contemplates classification under Article 16(1) or provides reservation under Article 16(4).
• Whether the conditions of eligibility, including the origin and cut-off date, are reasonable.

Held:

The power of the Governor under Para 5(1) of Schedule V allows for excluding, modifying, or applying laws that are already applicable in a scheduled area. However, this power does not extend to creating entirely new laws. The impugned G.O.Ms. No. 3/2000 is deemed impermissible as it effectively creates a new law, exceeding the scope of modification or exclusion allowed by Para 5(1). [Para 49]

The power of the Governor under Para 5(1) of Schedule V does not supersede fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution. The exercise of this power must be in harmony with the Constitution's aims and objectives. [Para 78]

The Presidential Order and G.O.Ms. No. 3/2000 conflict with each other, leading to repugnancy. The Governor's power under Para 5(1) cannot override the Presidential Order under Article 371D. The Governor is competent to issue an order that aligns with the Presidential Order but not in derogation of it. The 100% reservation provided by G.O.Ms. No. 3/2000 is not valid due to its repugnancy with the Presidential Order. [Para 89]

The notification does not involve mere classification but rather provides 100% reservation, making it arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16(4). [Para 141]

The conditions of eligibility, including the requirement of continuous residence since January 26, 1950, are unreasonable and arbitrary. Such conditions do not provide a valid basis for eligibility and are discriminatory. [Para 147]

Facts:

The case emerged due to a conflict between two Constitution Bench judgments, namely Ch. Tika Ramji & Others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Others (1956) SCR 393 and U.P. Cooperative Cane Unions Federations v. West U.P. Sugar Mills Association and Others (2004) 5 SCC 430. The issue centered around whether the State of Uttar Pradesh could fix the SAP over and above the minimum price set by the Central Government for sugarcane.

Issues:

• Determining the legality and authority of the State of Uttar Pradesh to fix the SAP for sugarcane.
• Resolving the conflict between the two mentioned Constitution Bench judgments regarding the relationship between the State's SAP and the Central Government's minimum price.

Held:

The court analyzed the legislative history, relevant provisions, and the scope of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953, as well as the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, and the Sugarcane (Control) Orders of 1954 and 1966. The court concluded that the decisions in Ch. Tika Ramji and U.P. Cooperative Cane Unions Federations dealt with different factual matrices and legal provisions. The court determined that the concept of fixing the minimum price by the Central Government versus the SAP by the State Government was not considered in Ch. Tika Ramji. The court endorsed the view taken in U.P. Cooperative Cane Unions Federations that there was no inconsistency or repugnancy in fixing a higher advised price by the State Government alongside the minimum price set by the Central Government. The court held that as long as the State's advised price was higher than the Central Government's minimum price, there was no conflict, and both orders could operate simultaneously.

The court ruled that under Entries 33 and 34 of List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, both the Central and State Governments had the power to fix sugarcane prices. However, once the Central Government fixed the minimum price, the State Government could not fix a lower minimum price. The court clarified that while the Central Government could fix the minimum price, the State Government was empowered to fix the advised price, which must always be higher than the minimum price.

In determining repugnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution, the court reiterated that it only arises when there is an actual irreconcilable conflict between laws. The court upheld the power of the State Government to fix the SAP under Section 16 of the Act, noting that it was not arbitrary or illegal. It clarified that the State Advised Price was a legitimate regulatory measure to protect the interests of sugarcane growers.