Facts:

The appellants, Vohra Sadikbhai Rajakbhai and others, claimed compensation for the destruction of their agricultural land, including standing fruit-bearing trees, caused by the release of 60,000 cusecs of water from a dam constructed and maintained by the respondents (State of Gujarat and others).

Issues:

Whether the release of water from the dam amounted to negligence on the part of the respondents?

Whether the respondents demonstrated that the water in the dam was kept at a reasonable level, taking into account normal rains and unforeseen heavy rains?

Whether the release of water could be treated as an 'act of God'?

Held:

The court held that it was incumbent upon the respondents to prove proper care in maintaining the water level in the dam. The doctrine of strict liability, originating from Rylands v. Fletcher, applied, and the onus was on the respondents to show the discharge of this burden. The court found the respondents had failed to do so, establishing negligence on their part.( Paragraph 15)

The court examined whether the damage was the result of an inevitable or unavoidable accident due to heavy rains. The appellants claimed negligence on the part of the respondents in not keeping the water level sufficiently low. The court noted that the respondents did not refute this claim but instead argued that water release was in public interest. The court, relying on Rylands v. Fletcher, found negligence on the part of the respondents, contributing to the damage.( Paragraphs 26, 27, 28)

While the appellants did not provide exact proof of damages, court commissioners' report confirmed losses, including uprooted and washed away trees. The court emphasized that even without precise evidence, the appellants were entitled to reasonable compensation. The impossibility of accurately ascertaining damages was attributed to the wrong committed by the respondents.( Paragraph 29)

The appellants claimed damages of Rs. 21,50,000, but specific proof was lacking. The court acknowledged loss had occurred and, exercising power under Article 142 of the Constitution, awarded damages of Rs. 5,00,000 as a reasonable compensation. The appeal is allowed. (Paragraph 30,31)

Facts:

Private medical colleges contested the state's authority to conduct entrance tests, claiming it violated their autonomy.

The state law for conducting entrance tests was challenged, arguing that the state lacked legislative competence on the subject.

Issues:

Whether the state's authority to conduct entrance tests for MBBS/BDS courses violated the autonomy of private medical colleges.

Whether the state had legislative competence on the subject.

Held:

The court upheld the state's authority to legislate on the issue.

Legislative entries cited: Entry 66 of List I (setting up minimum standards) and Entry 25 of List III (implementation of standards).

In cases of overlap, Entry 66 of List I prevailed.

The stand of private medical colleges was rejected, and the state law for conducting entrance tests was upheld.

Eligible candidates who couldn't appear in NEET-I and those with preparation concerns were permitted to appear in NEET-II.

The Oversight Committee appointed by the court would oversee the NEET-II examination.

Clarification that only NEET would enable admission to MBBS or BDS studies.

Facts:

M/s. Ispat Industries Limited (IIL) engaged in manufacturing HR coils, avails credit on inputs like iron ore pellets.

Sister company M/s. Ispat Metallics Industries Ltd. (IMIL) manufactures pig iron and molten metal.

Dispute arose over the transfer of iron ore pellets from IIL to IMIL, with the Commissioner treating it as a sale.

Issues:

Whether the transfer of iron ore pellets between IIL and IMIL constitutes a sale or a transfer under relevant excise rules.

Applicability of Circular dated July 1, 2002, in determining the value for duty calculation in the case of goods transferred between sister units.

Held:

The Tribunal found that the transfer of iron ore pellets was not a sale but a transfer under a joint procurement policy between sister companies.

The Tribunal relied on the circular dated July 1, 2002, stating that the value in the invoice for Cenvat Credit should be adopted for duty calculation in the case of goods transferred to sister units.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision, emphasizing that it was a case of transfer, not sale.

The Court agreed that post-manufacturing expenses could not be added to the duty value.

The appeals by the Commissioner were dismissed.

Facts:

Kalinga Institute of Medical Sciences (KIMS), a recognized medical college, sought permission to admit 50 additional students for the academic year 2015-16.

MCI conducted inspections revealing deficiencies, leading to the recommendation not to permit the increased intake.

Central Government directed KIMS not to admit additional students.

High Court set aside the Central Government's order, directing KIMS to appear before the Government and granted provisional permission for additional seats.

A subsequent inspection in 2016 highlighted further deficiencies.

Issues:

Legality of the Central Government's decision not to permit increased intake.

Jurisdiction of the High Court in reviewing inspection reports.

Compliance with MCI regulations and transparency in medical education.

Held:

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, restraining KIMS from increasing seats for the academic years 2016-17 and 2017-18.

Imposed a cost of Rs. 5 crores on KIMS for jeopardizing students' future.

Directed MCI and Central Government to enforce compliance and take action against KIMS under relevant regulations.

Recommended the formulation of a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for inspections within six weeks.

Advocated transparency by publishing inspection reports and Central Government decisions on the websites of medical colleges and the MCI.

The appeal is disposed of.

Facts:

The appellant, Prabhakar Vithal Gholve, was convicted under Section 302 IPC for an assault on the deceased.

The defense argued the absence of a proven motive for the assault and sought categorization under Exception 1 or Exception 4 in Section 300 of the IPC.

Evidence indicated injuries on the appellant, suggesting a reasonable possibility of a sudden provocation.

Issues:

Whether the conviction under Section 302 IPC is justified without a proven motive for the assault?

Whether the case falls under Exception 1 or Exception 4 in Section 300 of the IPC?

Held:

The court set aside the conviction under Section 302 IPC and substituted it with a conviction under Section 304 Part I IPC (culpable homicide not amounting to murder).

The lack of a proven motive, coupled with evidence of injuries on the appellant, supported the inference of a sudden provocation.

The sentence of imprisonment for life was reduced to the period already undergone by the appellant.

The appellant was directed to be released from custody forthwith unless required in connection with any other criminal case.

The appeal stands allowed to the aforesaid extent.

Facts:

Raj Singh, an ex-Sepoy in the Territorial Army, died on 04.08.2008 in a disembodied state due to a heart attack.

The appellant, his wife, sought family pension, which was denied based on the argument that territorial army personnel in a disembodied state without completing fifteen years of embodied service were not entitled to service pension.

The appellant contended that such denial was discriminatory and violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Issues:

Whether the denial of family pension to the next of kin of a Territorial Army personnel who died while in a disembodied state is discriminatory and violative of Article 14.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the tribunal, emphasizing the distinction between regular army personnel and territorial army personnel in terms of their terms and conditions of service. The court agreed that there was no violation of Article 14.

However, considering the anomaly in the system and the appellant's plight, the court, in the interest of justice and under Article 142, awarded an ex-gratia grant of rupees ten lakhs to the appellant. The court modified the tribunal's order, directing the respondents to pay the ex-gratia amount within three months. The appeal is accordingly disposed of.

Facts:

The dispute pertains to land in the village Sarai Aziz, and the appellants succeeded before Consolidation Authorities. The non-official respondents challenged these orders before the High Court, leading to the present appeal.

Issues:

Applicability of res judicata in cases involving issues of fact and pure questions of law.

Whether findings on issues of law in previous judgments are binding in subsequent proceedings for different properties.

Held:

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that res judicata applies to issues of fact but not necessarily to pure questions of law in subsequent proceedings involving different causes of action and different properties. Once a judgment attains finality, it binds the parties on all issues related to the subject matter of the suit or proceeding. The Court distinguished between issues of fact and pure questions of law and emphasized that even an erroneous decision on a question of law is binding unless superseded through higher tribunals, review, or appeals.

Facts:

The respondent, Dr. Rajiv, was accused of murdering his wife, Dr. Suman Lata, through the forcible administration of poison. The prosecution alleged a strained relationship due to dowry demands and the accused's drinking habits. Incidents of abuse and violence were reported, culminating in the tragic event on 26.5.2000.

Issues:

Whether the circumstances surrounding the case were sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

The credibility of the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense.

Held:

The trial court convicted the respondent based on a chain of circumstances, including consistent maltreatment, the purchase of poison, and the victim's injuries. The High Court, however, acquitted the respondent, citing inconclusive circumstances.

The trial court found the circumstantial evidence, including the nature of injuries, the accused's conduct, and the purchase of poison, sufficient to establish guilt. The respondent's failure to explain the injuries and his delay in seeking medical help were crucial factors leading to conviction.( Para 10)

The High Court, in contrast, raised doubts on the conclusive nature of the circumstances, emphasizing that the accused might have administered poison to save the victim through gastric lavage. It questioned the reliability of the evidence regarding the purchase of poison and criticized the absence of stains on the victim's clothes.( Para 11)

Section 106 of the Evidence Act, requiring a person with special knowledge to explain facts, was invoked. The accused's failure to explain the victim's unconscious state was considered a grave circumstance against him.( Para 15)

The victim's gesture of raising her hand towards the accused, coupled with her crying to save herself, indicated the accused's involvement. The High Court's skepticism towards the purchase of poison was unwarranted.( Para 18)

Referring to Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, the Court emphasized the four crucial circumstances for convicting in poisoning cases, asserting that the prosecution had proven the case beyond doubt.( Para 21)

The Court rejected leniency based on the accused's care for the deceased's child, highlighting the severity of the offense, including causing the death of a pregnant wife.( Para 22)

Decision: The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's acquittal and restoring the trial court's conviction. The respondent was directed to surrender, or he would be taken into custody forthwith.

Facts:

Aligarh Development Authority initiated land acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Emergency clause invoked, claiming possession, and part of compensation deposited.

Respondent No.1 challenged acquisition; High Court quashed notification and declaration due to the non-passage of an award within four years.

Section 24 of the 2013 Act was invoked during the proceedings, asserting the lapse of acquisition proceedings.

Issues:

Applicability of Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Act, 2013.

The impact of non-passage of an award on land acquisition proceedings.

Held:

The Supreme Court clarified that Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act applies when an award has been made, but possession has not been taken or compensation has not been paid for five years or more before the commencement of the Act. Since no award had been passed in this case, there was no lapse, and land acquisition proceedings would continue. However, the court directed the Aligarh Development Authority to complete the acquisition proceedings by passing an award under the 2013 Act within six months. Compensation must be calculated under the 2013 Act and deposited with the Land Acquisition Collector or disbursed to Respondent No.1 within one month.

In emphasizing the proper approach in land acquisition, the court rejected the appellant's claim that it had deposited 80% of the compensation, stating that the approach should be 'go and give,' not 'come and get.'

The appeal is disposed of.