Criminal Law – Quashing of Proceedings – Matrimonial Dispute – Section 498A and 494 IPC read with Section 34 – Accused-appellants (father-in-law, mother-in-law and sister-in-law of complainant's husband) sought quashing of proceedings under Section 482 CrPC – High Court declined, holding prosecution records did not justify quashing – On appeal, Supreme Court examined whether FIR and chargesheet prima facie disclosed commission of offences against accused-appellants specifically, and whether continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of process – Held: Allegations against accused-appellants were vague, general and unsupported by specific acts of cruelty or active participation – Proceedings quashed [Paras 2, 12, 22, 28].

Cruelty – Section 498A IPC – Specific Allegations Required – Father-in-law alleged to have been present during incidents of harassment and to have received money paid by complainant's brother – Mother-in-law similarly alleged to have been present – Sister-in-law alleged to have received proceeds of gold sale for flat purchase – No specific acts of demand, threat or physical assault attributed to any of the accused-appellants – Allegations consisting merely of presence and encouragement insufficient to constitute offence of cruelty under Section 498A – Held: General and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence cannot form basis for criminal prosecution – Proceedings liable to be quashed [Paras 23, 24, 25].

Bigamy – Section 494 IPC – Overt Act Required – Liability under Section 494 IPC cannot extend to persons other than the contracting spouse – In order to implicate family members, complainant required to prima facie establish overt act or omission in second marriage ceremony – Prosecution failed to produce cogent evidence of any such overt act on part of accused-appellants – Inferential knowledge of second marriage, without more, insufficient to establish requisite common intention under Section 34 IPC – Held: Accused-appellants cannot be prosecuted solely on basis of familial relationship with accused-husband [Paras 16, 26, 27].

Inherent Powers – Section 482 CrPC – Abuse of Process – Settled principles governing exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC restated with reference to State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal – Courts cautioned against permitting continuation of proceedings where allegations against family members in matrimonial disputes are vague and not supported by material evidence – Mere reference to names of family members without specific allegations of active involvement should be nipped in the bud [Paras 21, 23].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned order dated 25.11.2024 passed by the High Court of Kerala set aside – Proceedings arising out of FIR No. 1318 of 2016 registered at Museum Police Station, Thiruvananthapuram quashed qua the accused-appellants.

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Misuse of Insolvency Process – Decree-Holder as Financial Creditor – Appellant, a solvent functioning company, challenged NCLAT's direction to admit a Section 7 petition filed by respondent money lender holding a final money decree of the Delhi High Court – NCLT had dismissed the petition finding it to be a misuse of the insolvency process against a solvent company – NCLAT reversed, relying on Dena Bank ratio that a decree gives rise to a fresh cause of action under Section 7 – Held: IBC is not a debt recovery legislation; its primary object is revival and reorganisation of the corporate debtor, not satisfaction of individual creditors' claims – Initiation of CIRP against a solvent debtor, without resorting to execution, amounts to abuse of the insolvency process [Paras 18–24, 32–33].

"Decree-Holder's Remedy is Execution, Not Insolvency" – Respondent held a final decree of the Delhi High Court dated 11.01.2018 for Rs. 4,38,00,617/- with 24% per annum interest, affirmed in appeal and by dismissal of SLP – Instead of filing execution proceedings, respondent filed Section 7 petition within two months of SLP dismissal – Appellant, a running company with revenue of approximately Rs. 35 crores, profits of Rs. 8 crores, and 95 employees, deposited over Rs. 3.60 crores with the Registrar General of the Delhi High Court and consistently expressed willingness to pay lawful dues – Held: These are not the attributes of an insolvent entity but of a judgment debtor disputing quantum; the appropriate remedy is execution and not the insolvency jurisdiction [Paras 25–28, 32].

"Contradictory Positions on Quantum Vitiate Insolvency Claim" – Respondent placed a chart before ITAT showing outstanding dues of only Rs. 96,48,480/- as on 31.03.2012; claimed Rs. 4,38,00,617/- before the Delhi High Court; and projected over Rs. 12,51,18,074/- before this Court — the computation before this Court having been arrived at by running interest at 24% per annum without crediting any payments – NCLAT itself found that various payments had not been accounted for and that income tax proceedings cast prima facie doubt on the claimed amount – Held: A party taking contradictory positions before multiple fora on the same facts cannot press insolvency proceedings as though the quantum of debt were established and undisputed [Paras 12–16, 29].

Dena Bank Ratio – Scope and Limits – NCLAT had placed reliance on Dena Bank (Now Bank of Baroda) v. C. Shivakumar Reddy and Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. v. A. Balakrishnan to hold that a decree gives rise to a fresh cause of action under Section 7 – Held: The said proposition is not doubted as a general statement of law, but it does not operate in a vacuum – Whether invocation of IBC amounts to misuse or use as a recovery mechanism remains a question to be examined on the facts of each case – A decree-holder is not entitled as a matter of right to prefer insolvency over execution [Para 31].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned order of NCLAT dated 01.11.2022 set aside – Order of NCLT dated 20.06.2022 dismissing the Section 7 application restored – Respondent at liberty to pursue execution of decree dated 11.01.2018 in accordance with law – Costs of Rs. 5,00,000/- awarded to appellant, payable within five weeks.

SARFAESI – Secured Asset – School Premises – Repossession – Contempt – Default – Section 13(2) SARFAESI Act – Petitioner society obtained financial assistance from the secured creditor (respondent) and defaulted on repayment of approximately Rs. 5.06 crore demanded by notice dated 13th September 2021 – Despite multiple undertakings, promises, and MoUs before courts and the Debt Recovery Tribunal, the petitioners failed to honour their commitments – Bombay High Court directed police assistance for repossession of school premises; petitioners trespassed the secured asset repeatedly – Supreme Court by earlier orders appointed an Administrator; petitioners even prevented the Administrator from assuming charge – Held: Conduct of petitioners reflects extreme disregard for the rule of law and wilful contempt of court orders [Paras 1-12].

School Closure – Students' Interest – Transfer Certificates – Final examinations of enrolled students having been conducted and parents duly informed of imminent closure – Held: School directed to be closed with effect from 1st May 2026; petitioners directed to issue transfer certificates to all students wishing to pursue further studies in nearby schools [Para 13].

Auction of Secured Asset – Fresh Valuation – Liberty granted to secured creditor to approach Superintendent of Police and Station House Officer for obtaining peaceful and vacant possession of the secured asset; upon obtaining possession, secured creditor to obtain fresh valuation report from a Government valuer before putting the property up for auction [Paras 14-15].

Administrator – Recalled – Since the school does not receive government grants, the order appointing the Administrator stands recalled [Para 16].

Contempt – Warning – In view of directions for closure and repossession, contempt proceedings not drawn up at this stage; however, petitioners warned that any hindrance in compliance of the order will be at their own risk and will invite strict action [Para 18].

Costs – Petitioners directed to bear costs of Rs. 1 lakh to be paid to the secured creditor within one month [Para 19].

Decision: Special leave petition dismissed – School directed to be closed from 1st May 2026 – Secured creditor granted liberty for police-assisted repossession and auction – I.A. No. 67814 of 2026 disposed of – Pending applications disposed of.

Criminal Law – Murder and Attempt to Murder – Sections 302, 307, 149, 120B IPC and Section 27 Arms Act – Conviction Upheld – Appellants (father and son) convicted for the murder of Ram Sharan Yadav and firing upon others on 4th December 2008, allegedly to silence a witness in a prior murder case – Trial Court convicted four persons on the basis of cumulative testimony of PW-1 to PW-5 – High Court discredited PWs-1 to 4 as eyewitnesses but confirmed conviction on the sole testimony of PW-5 (injured complainant) – Supreme Court upholds conviction finding no manifest error in the approach of courts below – Appeals dismissed [Paras 1-14].

Single Witness Testimony – Sterling Quality – Evidence to be Weighed, Not Counted – High Court discounted PWs-1 to 4 as eyewitnesses on account of inconsistencies and contradictions – Conviction affirmed solely on testimony of PW-5 (complainant/injured witness) – Held: Conviction on the basis of a single eyewitness of sterling quality is permissible; evidence is to be measured for quality, not quantity; PW-5 being an injured witness withstood cross-examination and his testimony was natural and consistent – Conviction sustainable [Paras 7-8].

Delay in FIR – Not Fatal Per Se – Incident occurred between 5 and 6 PM; FIR registered at 10:30 PM the same night – Held: Delay in lodging FIR cannot be used as a ritualistic formula to discard the prosecution case; it is a relevant factor requiring explanation, which, if satisfactory, does not weaken the prosecution – No fault found in the impugned judgment on this count [Paras 9-10].

Conflict Between Ocular and Medical Evidence – PW-5 deposed that the deceased was shot on his head; PW-7 (doctor) stated entry wound was at the base of the skull and exit wound at the upper base of the nose – Held: Both testimonies are consistent in establishing that the deceased was shot on his head; eyewitness testimony of an injured witness prevails over expert medical opinion in case of conflict [Para 11].

Absence of Independent Witnesses – Held: Non-examination of independent or village witnesses does not compromise the prosecution case; societal realities of fear and reluctance to depose in cases involving violent and influential accused must be taken into account [Para 12].

Second Appellant – Section 307 IPC – Sterling testimony of PW-5 establishes that the second appellant (son) also fired his weapon at the deceased and others with intent to kill; that the bullet did not hit the intended target was a matter of luck – Sentence under Section 307 IPC correctly imposed [Para 13].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – Conviction and sentences of both appellants confirmed – Pending applications closed.

Land Law – Public Interest Litigation – Illegal Land Transactions – Thazhambur Village – Status Quo – Third Party Rights – SLP filed by State authorities aggrieved solely by vacation of an interim status quo order passed during a PIL concerning alleged illegal land transactions in Thazhambur Village, Kancheepuram District – PIL filed by S. Raja seeking inspection of village records and action against encroachments – State Government constituted a committee by G.O. Ms. No. 283 dated 09.08.2019 to probe the matter – Division bench of Madras High Court disposed of the PIL and vacated the status quo order – Supreme Court, noting passage of over six years and three enquiry reports already in existence, disposes of the SLPs [Paras 1-25].

State Accountability – Prolonged Inaction – Welfare State – Innocent Purchasers – Despite fixing a two-month timeline in its own G.O., the State Government failed to complete the enquiry or take a decision even after six years – Several third-party rights created in the interregnum in favour of innocent flat buyers and villa owners who purchased properties pursuant to pattas and court proceedings – Held: It is not open to a welfare State to seek to turn back the clock after several decades and undo long-concluded transactions, particularly where innocent citizens have invested their savings in acquiring homes; Government not justified in wiping out decades-old transactions to claim title over lands now in possession of innocent citizens [Paras 14-23].

Status Quo – Vacation – Interim Order Cannot Be Perpetuated Indefinitely – The State Government utilised the process of this Court only to prolong the status quo order; having secured the order in 2019, it cannot continue to take advantage of it at this late stage while dragging its feet on the enquiry – Held: Status quo order dated 21.10.2019 vacated; parties aggrieved by further action or inaction at liberty to avail appropriate remedies [Paras 21-25].

Basic Amenities – Flat Buyers – Pendency of litigation is no ground for State authorities to deny basic amenities such as water and sewerage to occupants of flats in the subject lands – State authorities directed to be mindful of this aspect [Para 23].

Delay Condonation – SLP (C) Diary No. 2594 of 2021 – Delay of 403 days not condoned at this late stage – SLP dismissed [Para 27].

Contempt Petition – Limitation – Transactions cited by contempt petitioners are of years 2019 to 2022 but contempt petition filed only in January 2026 – Delay clearly beyond one year – Held: In terms of law laid down in Pallav Sheth v. Custodian, limitation for contempt proceedings is ordinarily one year from the date of commission; contempt petition dismissed on ground of delay [Para 28].

Decision: SLP (C) Nos. 24430-24431 of 2019 disposed of – Status quo order dated 21.10.2019 vacated – Parties at liberty to pursue appropriate remedies – SLP (C) No. 26314 of 2019 dismissed – SLP (C) Diary No. 2594 of 2021 dismissed – Contempt Petition Diary No. 5891 of 2026 dismissed on ground of delay – Pending applications disposed of.

Service Law – Change of Cadre – Transfer Distinguished – Hill Cadre Preference – A transfer involves change of posting within the same cadre and service structure, affecting only location without altering seniority or service conditions – A change of cadre, by contrast, is a structural shift altering the employee's service identity, seniority, and applicable rules, requiring statutory authority or higher-level approval – The distinction is clear and substantive and the High Court erred in conflating the two concepts [Para 7].

Cadre Allocation – Criteria – Option, Domicile, and Seniority – DOPT Policy – Department of Personnel and Training policy provides that cadre allocation on bifurcation of States is governed by three criteria: option, domicile (home district), and inclusion of junior most personnel in reverse seniority – Exceptions exist for women employees, handicapped persons, medical hardship cases (including mental illness in self or family), and SC/ST employees, all of whom are allocated based on option – Appellant, having opted for hill cadre, being a resident of present-day Uttarakhand, and having a son declared cognitively challenged, fulfilled multiple criteria for reallocation to Uttarakhand – Held: Request for reallocation ought to have been acceded to [Paras 8–10].

State Apathy – Inordinate Delay – Costs – Appellant became eligible for appointment in 1997 but was actually appointed only in 2011, and even in 2026 had not secured posting in his home state – High Court allowed his first writ petition in 2004, State's appeal was dismissed in 2009, yet appointment came only in 2011 – From 2011 appellant was made to run from pillar to post for cadre reallocation – Court expressed deep anguish at State's apathy spanning 22 years – Costs of Rs. 1 lakh imposed on State of Uttar Pradesh [Para 12].

Pendency of Service Disputes – Direction to High Court – Court requested the learned Chief Justice of the High Court to ascertain the number of long-pending service dispute cases and endeavour to have them decided expeditiously by distributing them across benches [Para 13].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment of Allahabad High Court set aside – Chief Secretary, State of Uttar Pradesh, directed to forthwith facilitate reallocation of appellant to Uttarakhand with protection of seniority and all relevant benefits – Copy of judgment sent to Chief Secretary, Uttarakhand, for follow-up action – Costs of Rs. 1 lakh imposed on State of Uttar Pradesh.

Bail — Cancellation — Subsequent Offence — Section 480(3) BNSS — Applicability — M.P. Excise Act, 1915 — Section 34(2) — The High Court cancelled bail granted to the appellant in connection with Crime No. 388 of 2024 registered at Police Station Kannod, District Dewas, solely on the ground of his involvement in a repeated offence under Section 34(2) of the M.P. Excise Act, 1915 — Held: Section 480(3) BNSS enables imposition of stringent conditions upon grant of bail only where the offence is punishable with imprisonment extending to seven years or more, or falls under Chapter VI, VII or XVII of the BNSS, or involves abetment, conspiracy or attempt to commit such offence — Since the punishment under Section 34(2) of the M.P. Excise Act is less than five years, the conditions under Section 480(3) BNSS are not attracted — Cancellation of bail solely on the ground of involvement in a subsequent offence of this nature is not justified — Order of the High Court set aside — Appeal allowed — Liberty reserved to the State to apply for cancellation of bail if the accused is found involved in offences attracting Section 480(3) BNSS or otherwise [Paras 5-7].

Decision: Leave granted — Appeal allowed — Order of the High Court cancelling bail set aside — Appellant directed not to indulge in any criminal activity — State at liberty to apply for cancellation of bail in the event of subsequent involvement in offences attracting Section 480(3) BNSS.

Government Grants Act – Section 3 – Scope and Interpretation – Wider Construction – The perpetual lease deed dated 26.04.1945 executed by the Governor General in Council in respect of 7.58 acres at Sujan Singh Park, New Delhi, emanates from a Government grant and its construction is governed by the GG Act – Section 3 of the GG Act mandates that all provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations in a Government grant shall take effect according to their tenor, notwithstanding any rule of law, statute or enactment to the contrary – The expression "any rule of law, statute or enactment" is of the widest amplitude and does not admit restrictive construction – Held: Section 3 is not confined to excluding the TP Act alone but constitutes an overriding declaration elevating the grant to a position of supremacy over inconsistent general statutory law [Paras 31–32, 51–54].

Government Grants Act – Collector of Bombay Distinguished – The High Court's reliance on Collector of Bombay vs. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri (1955) 1 SCC 184 was misplaced — that decision arose in a distinct factual and legal setting concerning levy of assessment tax on the character of the interest under a grant, and its observations cannot be extended beyond the contours of that controversy – A judgment is an authority only for what it actually decides; its ratio decidendi is binding, not observations that stray beyond the issue directly adjudicated – Held: Collector of Bombay does not govern the present controversy [Paras 40–42].

Delhi Rent Control Act – Inapplicability to Government Grant Holdings – The DRC Act is a legislation intended to regulate conventional tenancies arising under general law and does not extend to a holding originating in and regulated by a Government grant – The proviso to Section 3(b) of the DRC Act, relied upon by the respondent, does not alter this position – A grant under the GG Act stands insulated from the tentacles of any statutory law and the rights and obligations of the grantee are completely regulated by the terms of the grant even if inconsistent with other law – Held: DRC Act has no application to the present lis [Paras 43–45, 51–55].

ARC and RCT – Misdirection in Law – Jurisdiction – Neither the Additional Rent Controller nor the Rent Control Tribunal considered the perpetual lease deed in its proper legal character as an instrument emanating from a Government grant – Both forums proceeded on the assumption of a conventional landlord-tenant relationship treating the existence of a rental covenant as determinative, without adverting to the sovereign character of the grant – This constitutes a misdirection in law vitiating the eviction proceedings at their inception – Existence or absence of a remedy cannot determine jurisdiction [Paras 34, 37, 55].

Eviction – No Express Stipulation – Remedy Confined to Recovery of Rent – The perpetual lease deed contains no express clause providing for eviction on account of non-payment of rent and no such right can be inferred from the grant – The grant must operate according to its tenor and its silence cannot be converted into a ground of forfeiture – Held: Respondent's remedy is confined to recovery of arrears of rent in accordance with law [Para 55].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment of the Delhi High Court dated 08.01.2020 in CM(M) No. 293 of 2008 set aside – Eviction proceedings under DRC Act held to be without jurisdiction – Respondent at liberty to pursue appropriate civil remedies for recovery of rent in accordance with law.

Civil Court Jurisdiction – Municipal Limits – Legislative Nature of Power – Section 3 of MMC Act – The specification and alteration of municipal limits under Section 3 of the MMC Act is exercised by the State Government and partakes the character of a legislative function involving declaration of limits and constitution of local bodies — it is not an administrative function in the ordinary sense – Once such determination is made by the State, its validity cannot ordinarily be the subject matter of adjudication before a Civil Court by way of a suit for declaration and injunction – Held: Civil Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit [Paras 34–36, 44].

Bar of Civil Court Jurisdiction – Section 149 of MRTP Act – Finality of Orders – The Corporation's public notice dated 29.01.2013 was issued in its capacity as a planning authority under the MRTP Act alleging unauthorised constructions – Section 149 of the MRTP Act expressly bars jurisdiction of Civil Courts in matters which authorities under the Act are empowered to determine – The suit was accordingly doubly barred — both on account of the legislative character of the power under Section 3 of the MMC Act and the statutory bar under Section 149 of the MRTP Act [Paras 36–37].

Mixed Questions of Fact and Law – Not a Ground to Assume Jurisdiction – Civil Court erred in holding that existence of mixed questions of fact and law required a full-fledged trial — the question of jurisdiction must be determined at the threshold based on the nature of reliefs claimed, not the form in which they are couched – Even where factual disputes exist, if their adjudication would necessarily involve examining validity of statutory determinations relating to municipal limits, jurisdiction is excluded [Paras 31, 38, 42].

Belated Challenge – Acquiescence – Legislative Finality – Inclusion of the concerned lands within municipal limits was traceable to notifications and arrangements dating back to 1945 – The Panchayat's own witness (Deputy Sarpanch) confirmed this position – A challenge after several decades to the exercise of a legislative power under Section 3 of the MMC Act cannot be permitted — such power attains finality and cannot be unsettled in collateral civil proceedings – Conduct of the Panchayat in permitting development to subsist over the years without timely challenge militates against grant of declaratory relief [Paras 39–41].

Public Law – Civil Suit Not the Appropriate Forum – Reliefs sought, though framed as declarations and injunctions, were in substance directed at invalidating the assertion of statutory authority by the Corporation – Such challenge lies in the domain of public law and cannot be effectively adjudicated in a civil suit designed for determination of civil rights inter se parties [Para 43].

Contempt Petition – Status Quo Vacated – Contempt petition was filed by an intervenor alleging violation of the interim status quo order dated 03.05.2018 – Since appeals have been dismissed and the interim order stands vacated, nothing survives in the contempt proceedings – Contempt petition disposed of [Para 47].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – High Court's finding that Civil Court lacked jurisdiction upheld – Interim order of status quo dated 03.05.2018 vacated – Contempt Petition (Civil) Diary No. 3208 of 2025 disposed of.