Criminal Law – Quashing of Proceedings – Dowry Harassment – In-laws – Appellants (parents-in-law of complainant) sought quashing of proceedings initiated under Sections 498A, 323, 504 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the DP Act – FIR and charge sheet contained vague and omnibus allegations without specifying acts of cruelty or dowry demand by appellants – Supreme Court held that generalised allegations unsupported by particulars do not constitute a prima facie offence – Held: Proceedings against appellants quashed to prevent abuse of judicial process [Paras 7, 14, 15, 18].

Abuse of Process – Matrimonial Disputes – False Implication of Family Members – FIR registered against multiple in-laws including appellants without specific acts attributed – Referring to Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana (2025) 3 SCC 735, Court reiterated that indiscriminate implication of relatives in matrimonial cases amounts to misuse of criminal law – Held: Appellants cannot be prosecuted solely on vague claims of dowry harassment – Criminal proceedings liable to be quashed [Paras 16, 17, 18].

Precedents – Applicability of Dara Lakshmi Narayana – The Court applied the principles laid down in Dara Lakshmi Narayana where quashing was allowed in similar circumstances of baseless allegations against husband’s relatives – Reaffirmed need for caution in proceeding against in-laws absent credible and specific charges – Held: Case falls under Category (7) of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 [Paras 16, 17].

Criminal Procedure – Section 482 CrPC – Scope and Exercise – High Court erred in not exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC despite clear absence of prima facie case – Court emphasized that mere mention of names without substantive allegations cannot justify continuation of trial – Held: Continuation of proceedings would amount to injustice and harassment [Paras 17, 18].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned order of High Court set aside – Criminal proceedings in C.C. No. 338/2023 against appellants before Judicial First Class Magistrate (Prohibition and Excise Offence), Nalgonda, quashed – Pending applications disposed of [Paras 18, 19].

Criminal Law – Rape – Conviction Based on Hostile Witnesses – Appellant, a medical practitioner, convicted for offence under Section 376(2)(d) IPC – Victim and her husband turned hostile during trial – Trial Court convicted accused and High Court not only affirmed conviction but enhanced sentence to ten years – Held: Conviction cannot be sustained when primary witnesses do not support prosecution and remaining evidence does not conclusively establish guilt. Acquittal. [Paras 1–5, 18–20].

Evidence – Hostile Witnesses – Reliability – Victim (PW-1) and her husband (PW-2) resiled from earlier statements and were declared hostile – High Court presumed that witnesses were won over by accused – Held: Court cannot presume that witnesses were won over in absence of prosecution case or cogent material to that effect – Testimony of hostile witnesses requires cautious scrutiny and corroboration [Paras 10–11, 18].

First Information Report – Evidentiary Value – FIR lodged by victim alleging rape – High Court relied upon contents of FIR through Investigating Officer – Held: FIR is not substantive evidence and allegations therein cannot form sole basis of conviction unless proved by reliable evidence during trial [Paras 6, 19].

Medical Evidence – Lack of Corroboration – Doctor examining victim found only minor abrasions on neck and no injuries on private parts – No signs of recent sexual intercourse found – Semen not detected on victim’s body – Held: Medical evidence did not corroborate prosecution version of forcible sexual intercourse [Paras 16–17, 19].

Forensic Evidence – Recovery Panchnama – Panch witnesses to recovery of clothes turned hostile – Witnesses stated signatures were taken on prepared papers at police instance – Held: Recovery of clothes and FSL report based on such panchnamas could not be relied upon to sustain conviction [Paras 13–15].

Investigation – Non-Examination of Material Witnesses – Independent witnesses present in clinic at time of alleged incident not examined despite being cited in chargesheet – Held: Non-examination of material independent witnesses further weakened prosecution case [Para 19].

Presumption and Proof – Burden on Prosecution – Serious offence of rape requires proof beyond reasonable doubt – Courts below erred in drawing presumptions against accused when prosecution evidence was shaky and unreliable – Held: Benefit of doubt must go to accused [Paras 18–20].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Conviction and sentence recorded by Trial Court and affirmed/enhanced by High Court set aside – Appellant acquitted – Bail bonds discharged [Paras 20–22].

Criminal Law – Quashing of FIR – Abuse of Process – Appellant, former Minister and Chairman of Committee for Regularisation of Unauthorised Occupation, challenged FIR registered by Anti-Corruption Bureau alleging illegal grant of government land – Earlier complaints on same allegations investigated twice by Lokayukta and closed – FIR registered after preliminary inquiry by ACB – Held: Continuation of proceedings amounted to abuse of process of law and warranted quashing [Paras 2–6, 13–15, 21].

Sanction for Prosecution – Public Servant – Mandatory Prior Approval – Government Order governing ACB mandated prior approval even before commencement of investigation in respect of acts done in discharge of official duties – No sanction obtained before preliminary inquiry or registration of FIR – Held: Investigation itself was barred in law – FIR and all consequential proceedings vitiated – Case squarely covered by Bhajan Lal category of express legal bar [Paras 16–17].

Quashing Jurisdiction – Principles – Section 482 CrPC and Article 226 – Scope of interference reiterated – Inherent and extraordinary powers to be exercised sparingly but justified where proceedings are manifestly illegal, barred by law or tainted with mala fides – Held: High Court erred in refusing to quash FIR despite existence of statutory bar and abuse of process [Paras 12, 16–17].

Mala Fides – Political Vendetta – Repeated Complaints – Three complaints filed over span of years by persons affiliated to rival political party on same cause of action – Earlier complaints closed after detailed inquiries – FIR lodged after more than a decade from alleged acts and close to election period – Held: Cumulative circumstances disclose political motivation and colourable exercise of criminal process [Paras 18–19].

Delay – Criminal Proceedings – Effect – Though delay alone not fatal in corruption cases, unexplained and inordinate delay coupled with repeated closure of complaints and political rivalry strengthens inference of malice – Held: Proceedings liable to be quashed on ground of mala fides even apart from absence of sanction [Paras 19–20].

Role of Lokayukta and ACB – Jurisdictional Overlap – Lokayukta’s earlier reports exonerating appellant held relevant – Abolition of ACB and transfer of cases back to Lokayukta reinforced position that FIR could not survive – Held: Investigative findings of Lokayukta could not be ignored mechanically [Paras 14–15].

Public Land Allotment – Welfare State – Constitutional Perspective – Court emphasised State’s trustee role in allotment of land to weaker sections and necessity of non-arbitrary action – However, criminal prosecution must still conform to procedural safeguards and constitutional limitations – Held: Welfare objectives cannot justify illegal prosecution [Paras 11, 20].

Connected Appeal – Beneficiary of Land Allotment – Once FIR against main accused quashed and allotment upheld by competent authority, continuation of proceedings against beneficiary unsustainable – Held: FIR and proceedings quashed in connected appeal as well [Paras 22–23].

Decision: Appeals allowed – FIR in Crime No. 5/2018 dated 08.01.2018 registered by Anti-Corruption Bureau, Karnataka, and all consequential proceedings quashed – Impugned judgments of the High Court set aside – Pending applications disposed of [Paras 21–23].

Consumer Insurance Law – Fire Insurance – Repudiation of Claim – Theft Preceding Fire – Appellant’s factory suffered loss due to fire caused when miscreants attempted theft of transformer copper windings – Insurance claim repudiated on ground that burglary was proximate cause and excluded under RSMD clause – NCDRC upheld repudiation – Held: Once loss is caused by fire, which is a specified peril, the cause igniting the fire becomes immaterial unless expressly excluded [Paras 1–10, 20–21].

Fire Policy – Named Peril Policy – Interpretation of Exclusions – Fire listed as a separate specified peril with its own exclusions – Burglary/theft not included as an exclusion under “Fire” – Held: Exclusion under RSMD clause cannot be imported to defeat a claim arising under the independent peril of fire [Paras 20–22, 28].

Proximate Cause – Application in Fire Insurance – NCDRC relied on doctrine of proximate cause to treat burglary as active cause – Held: Doctrine of proximate cause has limited application where insured peril of fire is established and no exclusion applies – Courts need not investigate “cause of causes” in fire insurance claims [Paras 22–25].

Cause of Fire – Immateriality – Loss admittedly caused by fire and no allegation of fraud or wilful act by insured – Held: In fire insurance, cause of fire is immaterial so long as fire is accidental and not caused by insured’s wilful act – Theft preceding fire does not disentitle insured [Paras 23–26].

Construction of Insurance Contracts – Exclusion Clauses – Strict Interpretation – Exclusions must be construed narrowly and consistently with main purpose of policy – Where two interpretations possible, interpretation favouring insured must prevail – Held: RSMD exclusion could not be read so widely as to nullify coverage under fire peril [Paras 26–28].

Consumer Jurisdiction – Error by NCDRC – NCDRC failed to apply settled principles governing fire insurance and wrongly upheld repudiation – Held: Impugned judgment unsustainable in law [Paras 21, 29].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Repudiation letter dated 04.01.2008 and judgment of NCDRC set aside – Matter remanded to NCDRC for assessment of loss and grant of consequential relief – NCDRC directed to decide matter expeditiously, preferably within six months – Pending applications disposed of [Paras 29–31].

Criminal Law – Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Prosecution Sanction – Mechanical Grant of Sanction – Earlier Proposals Rejected – No Fresh or Additional Material – Sanction Quashed – High Court Error – Sanction to prosecute under Sections 16, 17, 18, 20 and 21 UAP Act is a mandatory and sacrosanct requirement – State Government twice rejected proposals for sanction on the ground of insufficiency of evidence – Third sanction granted without disclosure of fresh or additional material – Mere invocation of additional sections of UAP Act cannot constitute new material – Held: Sanction order suffers from non-application of mind and is unsustainable in law [Paras 26–36].

Sanction for Prosecution – Duty of Sanctioning Authority – Reconsideration After Rejection – Requirements – When earlier refusal exists, subsequent proposal must disclose previous rejection and clearly specify fresh material justifying reconsideration – Sanction order must reflect reasons for departure from earlier view – Absence thereof renders sanction invalid [Paras 30–32].

Judicial Review – Stage of Challenge to Sanction – Maintainability of Writ Petitions – Validity of sanction can be examined at the earliest stage – Accused cannot be compelled to undergo trial when foundational sanction itself is defective – High Court erred in relegating appellants to raise objection after evidence is led [Paras 37–40].

UAP Act – Section 45 – Nature of Sanction – Not an Empty Formality – Court’s Power to Interfere – When sanction lacks credible supporting material or reflects arbitrariness, courts are empowered to strike it down at threshold [Paras 26–29].

Consequential Directions – Quashing of Sanction – Scope – Sanction order dated 03.10.2023 and consequential prosecution under UAP Act quashed – Prosecution under IPC offences permitted to continue [Paras 43–44].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Impugned judgment of Jharkhand High Court set aside – Sanction under UAP Act quashed – Trial to proceed only for IPC offences.

Taxation Law - Income Tax – Deduction of Head Office Expenditure – Interpretation of Section 44C, Income Tax Act, 1961 – Exclusive vs Common Expenditure – Non-Resident Assessee – Ceiling on Deduction – Scope of “Head Office Expenditure” – Appeals by Revenue Allowed – Matters Remanded

Income Tax – Non-Resident Assessee – Head Office Expenditure – Exclusive vs Common Expenditure – Interpretation of Section 44C – Appeals involved common issue whether expenditure incurred by head office of non-resident assessee outside India exclusively for Indian branches falls within ambit of Section 44C – Assessees claimed full deduction under Section 37(1) contending Section 44C applies only to common expenditure – Revenue contended Section 44C applies irrespective of exclusivity and restricts deduction by statutory ceiling – Issue framed accordingly [Paras 1–26].

Statutory Interpretation – Taxing Statutes – Strict Construction – Plain Meaning Rule – Contextual Interpretation – Reiterated that taxing statutes must be strictly construed – No equity or intendment permissible – Words must be read in their statutory context – Object and purpose relevant only when language ambiguous – Courts cannot add or subtract words where statutory language is clear and unambiguous [Paras 28–40].

Section 44C – Scheme – Non-Obstante Clause – Overriding Effect – Section 44C begins with non-obstante clause overriding Sections 28 to 43A including Section 37 – Once expenditure qualifies as “head office expenditure” and assessee is non-resident, Section 44C governs quantum of deduction notwithstanding allowability under Section 37(1) [Paras 43–45].

Head Office Expenditure – Definition – Explanation to Section 44C – Exhaustive Conditions – Explanation defines head office expenditure based on two factors namely place of incurrence (outside India) and nature (executive and general administration) – No distinction drawn between common and exclusive expenditure – Reading such distinction would amount to judicial legislation [Paras 46–48].

Exclusive Expenditure – Covered under Section 44C – Attributability Explained – Held that expenditure incurred exclusively for Indian branches is also “attributable” to business in India – Attributability is a genus of which exclusivity is a species – Exclusive expenditure represents strongest form of attribution and squarely falls within clause (c) of Section 44C [Paras 49–63].

Rupenjuli Tea Co. Ltd. – Scope Explained – Distinction Clarified – Calcutta High Court decision applied only where assessee had no business operations outside India – Section 44C held inapplicable there due to impossibility of attribution – Ratio not applicable to multinational assessees carrying business both in India and abroad [Paras 51–55, 58].

Emirates Commercial Bank – Incorrect Legal Position – Overruled on Principle – Bombay High Court’s view that Section 44C applies only to common expenditure held incorrect – No statutory basis for distinction between common and exclusive expenditure – Judgment does not lay down correct law and stands overruled to that extent [Paras 56–61, 71].

Legislative Intent – Mischief Sought to be Curbed – Inflated Claims – Section 44C enacted to address difficulty in verification of foreign head office expenses and prevent inflation of deductions by non-residents – Allowing full deduction of exclusive expenditure would defeat legislative purpose and render ceiling otiose [Paras 65–68].

DTAA – Article 7 – Subject to Domestic Law – Article 7 of India–USA DTAA permits deduction of expenses subject to limitations of domestic tax law – Section 44C validly restricts deduction notwithstanding treaty provisions [Paras 69].

Head Office Expenditure – Exhaustive Definition – Tripartite Test – Held that Explanation to Section 44C is not broadly inclusive – For expenditure to qualify as head office expenditure, three conditions must be satisfied – Incurred outside India – Nature of executive and general administration – Must fall within species enumerated in clauses (a) to (c) or prescribed under clause (d) [Paras 72–76].

Remand – Factual Verification – Limited Issue – Authorities below failed to examine whether disputed expenses satisfy tripartite test under Explanation – Matter remanded to Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai for limited factual verification in light of law laid down [Paras 83–85, 89–90].

Decision – Appeals Allowed – Orders Set Aside – Remand Ordered – Supreme Court held that Section 44C applies to head office expenditure irrespective of whether common or exclusive – Legal issue answered in favour of Revenue – Matters remanded to Tribunal for limited examination of nature of expenditure – Appeals allowed [Paras 86–91].

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 52 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 47, Order XXI Rules 89, 90, 92, 99-104 – Limitation Act, 1963 – Articles 127, 128 – Doctrine of Lis Pendens – Bar to Separate Suit – Remedies in Execution – Pendente Lite Transferees – Maintainability of Suit – Substantial Justice – Supreme Court allowed an appeal, holding that a suit by pendente lite transferees challenging an auction sale was barred by Section 47 CPC and the doctrine of lis pendens, as they were representatives of the judgment-debtor and had alternative remedies under Order XXI CPC, which they failed to avail; however, in the interest of substantial justice, directed monetary compensation to the transferees.

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 52 – Doctrine of Lis Pendens – Applicability to Mortgage Suits – Appeal Allowed – The doctrine of lis pendens applies to suits where any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in issue – The plaint in the original suit by the bank sought recovery of money and sale of the mortgaged property in default – This directly put the mortgaged property in question – The transferees pendente lite (respondent nos. 1 and 2) purchased the property during the pendency of this suit – Their lack of knowledge or bona fide purchaser status is immaterial as lis pendens is a public policy principle – The transfer of the suit property to respondent nos. 1 and 2 is hit by Section 52 of the 1882 Act – The pendency of a suit continues until the final decree is satisfied or discharged – The Trial Court erred in holding that the property was purchased before the original decree, as one tranche of sale occurred after the decree and another after the execution petition – The High Court's finding that the suit was maintainable, despite the transferees being representatives of the judgment-debtor, was erroneous – The transaction is covered by Section 52 – [Paras 46-70, 167-168, 256(i), 258, 262].

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order 21 Rule 89 – Application to Set Aside Sale on Deposit – Pendente Lite Transferees – Not Availed – Rule 89 allows any person claiming an interest in the property sold to apply to set aside the sale by depositing the purchase money and a 5% compensation to the auction purchaser – This remedy is available to pendente lite transferees of the judgment-debtor – However, the respondent nos. 1 and 2 were put to knowledge of the auction sale after the confirmation of sale, and the 60-day limitation period under Article 127 of the Limitation Act, 1963, had lapsed – Thus, they could not have maintained an application under Rule 89 – [Paras 71, 75-87, 256(ii)].

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI Rule 90 – Application to Set Aside Sale on Ground of Irregularity or Fraud – Scope and Limitations – Not Availed – Rule 90 allows setting aside a sale due to material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it, provided substantial injury is proved and the ground could not have been raised before the proclamation of sale – Allegations of in-camera auction, undervaluation, and non-disclosure of prior transfer by judgment-debtor's relatives (appellants) are irregularities – However, the primary grievance of respondent nos. 1 and 2 was the attachment and sale of property to which the judgment-debtor allegedly had no saleable interest, not merely the manner of sale – Questions of saleable interest fall under Rule 58, not Rule 90 – No specific pleading of substantial injury directly linked to publishing/conducting irregularities was made – The 60-day limitation period under Article 127 of the Limitation Act, 1963, for Rule 90 application had also lapsed – Therefore, respondent nos. 1 and 2 could not have maintained an application under Rule 90 – [Paras 72, 88-117, 256(iii), 256(iv), 256(v)].

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 47 & Order XXI Rule 92(3) – Bar to Separate Suit – Representatives of Judgment-Debtor – Maintainability – Suit Barred – Rule 92(3) prohibits a separate suit to set aside an order made under Rule 92 (confirming or setting aside sale) by any person against whom such order is made – Section 47 CPC bars separate suits for questions between parties to the suit or their representatives relating to execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree – The High Court correctly identified respondent nos. 1 and 2 as "representatives" of the judgment-debtor, having acquired derivative title from him – Therefore, their suit challenging the auction sale is barred by Section 47 CPC – The High Court erred in holding the suit maintainable despite this bar, based on fraud allegations – [Paras 124-134, 137-147, 150-151, 255, 256(vi), 256(vii), 262].

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI Rule 92(4) – "Third Party" – Interpretation – Not Applicable – The term "third party" under Rule 92(4) refers to a party extraneous to the original suit and execution proceedings, who has not had their right, title, or interest adjudicated under Rules 58, 97, or 99, or has not availed such remedy within the required time – It does not include persons falling within the scope of Section 47 CPC – Since respondent nos. 1 and 2 were representatives of the judgment-debtor, they are not "third parties" under Rule 92(4) – Rule 92(4) is a procedural provision, not one that confers a right to institute a suit – [Paras 152-159, 174-178, 180, 256(viii), 256(ix)].

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI Rule 99, 100, 101, 102, 104 – Dispossession of Third Party – Pendente Lite Transferees – Remedy Barred – Suit Not Maintainable – Rule 99 provides a remedy for any person other than the judgment-debtor, dispossessed of immovable property by the decree-holder or purchaser, to apply to the executing court for restoration of possession – Rule 101 mandates the executing court to adjudicate all questions of right, title, or interest in such applications – Rule 102 explicitly bars transferees pendente lite of the judgment-debtor from availing remedies under Rules 97, 98, and 100 – The respondent nos. 1 and 2 were dispossessed and could have filed an application under Rule 99 within 30 days of dispossession (Article 128, Limitation Act, 1963) – However, as transferees pendente lite, Rule 102 would have prevented them from obtaining relief under Rule 100 – Allowing a separate suit in such a scenario would circumvent the statutory bar and the legislative intent to consolidate adjudication within execution proceedings – The fate of a pendente lite transferee in a separate suit would be the same as under Rule 99/101 due to Section 52 TPA – Therefore, their separate suit is not maintainable – [Paras 181-236, 240-244, 246-247, 255, 256(x), 256(xi), 256(xii)].

Substantial Justice – Monetary Compensation – Direction Issued – Considering the peculiar facts, including the 40-year lapse since the sale deeds, the relationship between auction-purchasers (nephews of vendor/judgment-debtor) and respondents, and the concession by appellants' counsel, the Supreme Court, in exercise of its power to do substantial justice, directed the appellants to pay Rs. 75,00,000/- to respondent nos. 1 and 2 within six months – Failure to pay would attract 12% interest per annum – This direction aims to put all disputes to rest and avoid further arduous litigation for recovery of money – [Paras 260-264].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court's judgment set aside – Appellants directed to pay Rs. 75,00,000/- to respondent nos. 1 and 2 within six months – [Paras 259, 264].

Motor Accident Compensation – Death of Minor Child – Enhancement of Compensation – Notional Income – Multiplier – Appeal arose from claim filed by parents of a 14-year-old boy who died in a road accident caused by rash and negligent driving of a truck – Tribunal awarded meagre compensation of Rs.1,29,500/- – High Court enhanced compensation to Rs.4,70,000/- – Parents sought further enhancement before Supreme Court [Paras 2–4].

Notional Income – Minimum Wages – Applicability – Court held that monthly notional income of deceased minor can be determined on basis of Minimum Wages Act, 1948 – For a Class B city, minimum wages fixed at Rs.5,400/- per month – Contention regarding income of contemporaries rejected as speculative [Para 7].

Future Prospects – Minor Deceased – Addition of 40% – Court allowed addition of 40% towards future prospects even in case of deceased minor child – Consistent with settled principles governing motor accident compensation [Para 7].

Multiplier – Selection – Reshma Kumari Principle Applied – Multiplier of 15 held applicable relying on Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan – Judgment in Baby Sakshi Greola distinguished as applicable to permanent disability cases and not death of minor child [Paras 4–6, 7].

Personal Expenses – Deduction – One-half deduction towards personal and living expenses of deceased minor upheld as appropriate in claim by parents [Para 7].

Conventional Heads – Consortium – Estate – Funeral Expenses – Parents held entitled to loss of estate and funeral expenses at Rs.15,000/- each – Loss of filial consortium awarded at Rs.40,000/- each to both parents [Para 7].

Pain and Suffering – Minor Deceased – Award to Legal Heirs – Since deceased child survived for one day after accident, parents entitled to compensation for pain and suffering endured by child – Amount of Rs.25,000/- awarded under this head [Para 8].

Quantum of Compensation – Recalculation – Total compensation recalculated at Rs.8,65,400/- comprising loss of dependency, consortium, medical expenses, funeral expenses, loss of estate and pain and suffering – Earlier amounts awarded to be deducted [Paras 7–8].

Interest – Rate Enhanced – Compensation directed to be paid with interest at rate of 7.5% per annum within two months from date of judgment [Para 9].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – Appeal allowed – Compensation enhanced and modified – Judgment of High Court modified accordingly – Pending applications disposed of [Paras 9–11].

Criminal Law – Circumstantial Evidence – POCSO/rape of minor – Last seen theory and recoveries disbelieved – FIR omissions and witness conduct found highly suspicious – Chain of circumstances not proved – Conviction set aside and accused acquitted [Paras 21-22, 31-33, 49-52, 68-77, 78-79].

Circumstantial Evidence – Governing principles – Five golden principles reiterated – Circumstances must be fully established by reliable evidence – Must be consistent only with hypothesis of guilt – Must exclude every possible hypothesis of innocence – Chain must be complete and incapable of explanation on any other theory – Suspicion however strong cannot take place of proof – Sharad Birdhichand Sharda principles reaffirmed and strictly applied [Paras 21-23].

FIR – Evidentiary value – FIR is not encyclopaedia but must disclose basic prosecution story – Non-mention of crucial facts admittedly within knowledge of informant held fatal – Omission of names of alleged last-seen witnesses and alleged act of accused “pushing out” the child found inexplicable – FIR lodged after medical examination yet silent on material developments – Such omissions treated as serious infirmities affecting prosecution credibility [Paras 29-35].

Last Seen Together – Doctrine – Weak type of circumstantial evidence – Requires proximity of time and place and corroboration – Alleged last-seen witnesses introduced belatedly – Names surfaced only on following day – Two witnesses turned hostile – Remaining witnesses contradicted each other and prosecution case – Unnatural conduct noted in not helping naked bleeding child or confronting accused – Evidence found unreliable and incapable of forming incriminating circumstance [Paras 37-52].

Witness Conduct – Natural behaviour test – Courts must examine human probabilities – Conduct of complainant, journalist witness and others found abnormal and suspicious – Failure to disclose crucial information at earliest point – Possibility of afterthought and tutoring could not be ruled out – Prosecution version rendered doubtful on cumulative assessment [Paras 44-45, 52].

Victim Testimony – Child witness – Identification – Victim unable to identify accused in court – Stated she was tutored by her mother – No corroborative evidence to link accused – Trial court erred in overlooking this significant circumstance – Benefit of doubt extended to accused [Para 67].

Investigation – Quality and fairness – Duty of Investigating Officer to act fairly and objectively – Serious lapses and casual approach noticed – Failure to promptly identify, examine and medically test alleged last-seen witnesses – No explanation for delay and omissions – Investigation found pedantic, negligent and biased – Such lapses struck at root of prosecution case [Paras 55-66].

Recoveries – Section 27 Evidence Act – Strict proof required – Alleged recoveries from accused’s house not proved beyond doubt – Contradictions regarding arrest date and recovery sequence – Panch evidence inconsistent – IO silent on crucial alleged recovery – Ownership and exclusive possession of premises not established – Chain of custody of seized articles not proved – Parents did not identify child’s clothes – Possibility of planting evidence could not be ruled out – FSL report rendered inconsequential [Paras 68-75].

Forensic Evidence – Evidentiary value – FSL report cannot be read in isolation – Must be supported by reliable seizure, custody and linkage evidence – In absence of proved recovery and chain of custody, forensic findings lose probative force – Courts below erred in relying mechanically on FSL results [Paras 71-75].

Appreciation of Evidence – Duty of courts – Courts dealing with heinous offences must remain cautious – Emotional response cannot replace legal scrutiny – Trial Court and High Court failed to critically analyse glaring inconsistencies and investigative lapses – Findings found perverse and unsustainable in law [Paras 66, 76-77].

Practice Directions – Criminal Trials – Need for structured judgments – Supreme Court issued comprehensive directions to streamline criminal trial records – Trial courts directed to append standardized tabulated charts containing (i) list of prosecution witnesses with role and examination dates, (ii) list of exhibits with description and proof, (iii) list of material objects with seizure and identification details – Objective to ensure clarity, transparency and ease of appellate scrutiny – Directions aimed at reducing miscarriage of justice due to poor record management – Registry directed to circulate judgment to all High Courts for implementation and compliance – Directions declared prospective and mandatory in nature [Paras 81-91].

Criminal Appeal – Result – Prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt – Benefit of doubt must go to accused – Conviction and sentence under IPC and POCSO Act set aside – Accused acquitted – Directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case [Paras 78-80].