Constitutional Law - Right to Property - Article 300A - Interpretation and Applicability - The right to property under Article 300A is characterized as a constitutional right and also as a human right. Compliance with a fair procedure of law is a prerequisite before depriving any person of immovable property. Section 352 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, which does not provide for necessary procedures before acquisition, cannot be considered a valid provision for the compulsory acquisition of property. [Paras 24-28]

Municipal Law - Power of Acquisition - Sections 352, 363, 535, 536, and 537 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 - Section 352 only authorizes the Municipal Commissioner to identify land for public purposes like parks, streets, etc., but does not confer the power of compulsory acquisition. The actual power of acquisition vests with the State under Section 537, which requires an application by the Municipal Commissioner to the State Government. The argument that Section 352 allows for acquisition was rejected. [Paras 16-23]

Procedural Fairness in Compulsory Acquisition - Seven Sub-Rights - The Court identified seven integral sub-rights under Article 300A that form the constitutional right to property: notice, hearing, reasoned decision, acquisition for public purpose, restitution or fair compensation, efficient and expeditious process, and conclusion. Non-compliance with any of these sub-rights renders the acquisition process unconstitutional. [Paras 27-30]

Judicial Review - Abuse of Statutory Powers - The KMC's actions were found to be in blatant violation of statutory provisions, including failure to follow due process under the Act, which led to the wrongful acquisition attempt. The High Court's decision to quash the acquisition was affirmed. [Paras 32-34]

Decision - Appeal Dismissed - Costs Imposed - The appeal by the Kolkata Municipal Corporation was dismissed with costs of Rs. 5,00,000 to be paid to the respondent within sixty days. The High Court's judgment was upheld in its entirety, emphasizing that KMC's actions were illegal and without proper authority of law. [Paras 34-36]

Constitutional Law - Civil Law – Review Petition under Article 31A – Land Reserved for Common Purposes – Vesting of Management and Control – Doctrine of Stare Decisis – Challenge to the judgment allowing the Civil Appeal of the State of Haryana and setting aside the Full Bench judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana – Petitioner contends the judgment contravenes the Constitution Bench judgments in Bhagat Ram, Ranjit Singh, and Ajit Singh – Reassessment of the applicability of Article 31A and the second proviso concerning acquisition by the State for common purposes – Review allowed due to oversight of the binding nature of the Constitution Bench judgment in Bhagat Ram, lack of consideration of consistent High Court rulings, and the doctrine of stare decisis [Paras 1-69].

Scope of Review Jurisdiction – Supreme Court reiterated the limited scope of review jurisdiction – Review permissible only if there is a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or any other sufficient reason – Review not equivalent to the original hearing and not maintainable for repetition of old arguments or minor mistakes – Supreme Court emphasized the necessity of addressing errors undermining the soundness of the original judgment – Identified material errors in the judgment under review due to non-consideration of binding precedents and failure to engage with key arguments presented by the Full Bench of the High Court [Paras 12-14].

Constitution Bench Judgments – Supreme Court reviewed the Constitution Bench judgments in Bhagat Ram, Ranjit Singh, and Ajit Singh – Reaffirmed that the management and control of lands reserved for common purposes do not vest in the Panchayat until possession changes under Section 24 of the Consolidation Act – Highlighted the need for compliance with procedural steps before vesting – Identified oversight in the judgment under review for failing to consider the binding precedent in Bhagat Ram [Paras 22-58].

High Court Judgments and Doctrine of Stare Decisis – Full Bench of the High Court in Jai Singh II and other High Court judgments consistently held that unutilized land (Bachat land) remains vested with the proprietors – Supreme Court identified errors in the judgment under review for not engaging with this consistent legal position and the principle of stare decisis – Highlighted the necessity of stability in the law and the impact of longstanding judgments on parties’ rights [Paras 59-67].

Decision – Review Petition allowed – Held – The judgment and order dated 7th April 2022 are recalled – Civil Appeal No. 6990 of 2014 is restored to the file – Appeal to be heard peremptorily on 7th August 2024 [Para 69].

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Section 14(1) – Right of Widow – Possession Requirement – Civil Appeal arising from dispute over joint Hindu family property – Held, widow's right to maintenance alone, without possession, does not convert to full ownership under Section 14(1) – Widow's adopted son cannot claim partition rights based on widow's unasserted and unpossessed right – Appeal allowed – Revenue Suit for partition dismissed. [Paras 1-33]

Right to Maintenance vs. Right to Ownership – Analysis – Held – Widow's pre-existing right to maintenance must be coupled with possession to transform into absolute ownership under Section 14(1) – Mere entitlement to maintenance without actual or legal possession does not suffice – Previous civil suit judgment dismissing widow's possession claim stands uncontested and bars subsequent partition claim by adopted son. [Para 18-27]

Decision – Reversal of Lower Court Judgments – Supreme Court reverses judgments of the learned Single Judge and Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court – Revenue Suit for partition filed by widow's adopted son dismissed due to lack of possession and acquisition as required under Section 14(1) of Hindu Succession Act. [Paras 28-33]

Constitutional Law – Writ Jurisdiction – Maintainability Against Privatized Entity – Appeals filed challenging the High Court of Bombay's decision to dismiss writ petitions against Air India Limited (AIL) due to its privatization – Supreme Court examined whether AIL, post-privatization, remains amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution – Concluded that writ jurisdiction does not subsist against a privatized entity not performing public duties, upholding the High Court's decision to deny relief and direct appellants to seek other remedies [Paras 1-6, 22-39].

Subsequent Events – Impact on Litigation – Equity Considerations – Appellants contended that rights crystallized at the institution of proceedings should not be defeated by subsequent privatization – Supreme Court reaffirmed that subsequent events rendering an entity private and non-public duty performing nullify its amenability to writ jurisdiction – Equity considerations and delay in disposal do not justify maintaining writ petitions against a privatized entity [Paras 7-13, 40-45].

Decision – Dismissal of Appeals – Held – Appeals dismissed, affirming High Court's decision that writ petitions against privatized Air India Limited are not maintainable – Appellants directed to pursue alternative legal remedies – Delay in adjudication and privatisation's impact upheld as grounds for non-maintainability under Article 226 [Paras 41-46].

Consumer Protection - Insurance Claim - Contractor’s All Risk Insurance Policy - Appellant insurance company challenged NCDRC's order directing payment of Rs. 39,09,92,828/- to respondents for bridge collapse - NCDRC relied on independent expert reports and NHAI’s decision to continue contract despite collapse - Held, insurance contracts to be interpreted strictly; exclusion clauses must be proven by insurer with clear evidence - Expert Committee found multiple factors including design flaws and construction lapses contributing to collapse - Surveyor’s report corroborated these findings, concluding exclusion clause justified repudiation - Respondent’s expert reports deemed theoretical, not based on site inspections - Supreme Court emphasized strict interpretation of insurance contracts and upheld appellant’s evidence - Appeal allowed, NCDRC order set aside - No costs awarded [Paras 1-32].

Repudiation of Claim – United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. M/s Hyundai Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. & Ors. – NCDRC directed payment of insurance claim for collapse of bridge due to faulty design and workmanship – Insurer’s reliance on exclusion clauses upheld by Supreme Court – Detailed analysis of surveyor's report and Expert Committee findings corroborated insurer's stance [Paras 1-14, 16-29].

Exclusion Clauses – Supreme Court emphasized strict interpretation of exclusion clauses in insurance contracts – Burden on insurer to prove applicability of exclusion clause – Surveyor’s report and Expert Committee’s findings treated as credible evidence – Exclusion for defective design and workmanship justified repudiation of claim [Paras 17-23, 26-28].

Evidence Evaluation – Independent expert reports not admitted due to lack of examination and site-inspection – Surveyor’s on-site examination and unrebutted evidence deemed sufficient – NCDRC’s reliance on independent reports deemed erroneous by Supreme Court [Paras 18-19, 24-27].

Judicial Scrutiny – NCDRC’s dismissal of preliminary objections and reliance on inconclusive Expert Committee findings criticized – Supreme Court found sufficient grounds for insurer’s repudiation of claim – Rejection of NCDRC’s addendum modifying compensation amount without hearing parties [Paras 14, 15, 20-23, 28-29].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – Held – NCDRC’s order set aside – Insurer’s decision to repudiate insurance claim upheld based on credible evidence – Supreme Court emphasized strict application of exclusion clauses and corroborative expert testimony in insurance disputes [Paras 30-32].

Partnership Law - Dissolution of Firm - Limitation - Applicability of Section 42(c) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 - Automatic dissolution on the death of a partner - Held: Partnership firm constituted by partners including a deceased partner automatically dissolved upon his death in 1984 - Suit for dissolution filed in 1996 held to be time-barred - Duty of court to dismiss a suit instituted after the prescribed period of limitation under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - Suit rejected as barred by limitation. [Paras 15-20]

Limitation - Duty of Court - Mandate of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - Court bound to dismiss a suit filed after the limitation period, even if limitation not raised as a defense - Held: Lower courts erred in allowing suits without considering limitation - Appeal allowed, suit dismissed. [Paras 16-17, 20-22]

Dissolution of Partnership - Continuation of Business - Impact on Limitation - Continuation of business activities post-death of a partner does not negate automatic dissolution under Section 42(c) - Business activities carried out post-dissolution deemed to be in individual capacity - Suit filed beyond limitation period held time-barred. [Paras 18-19]

Decision - Appeals Allowed - Original suit for dissolution and rendition of accounts dismissed as barred by limitation - Concurrent findings by lower courts reversed. [Paras 21-22, 33-36]

Civil Law – Dissolution of Partnership Firm – Appeal against High Court’s judgment which set aside the trial court’s decision dissolving a partnership firm and directing the rendition of accounts – Supreme Court upheld the dissolution of the firm and confirmed that the suit was not barred by limitation despite no plea of limitation being raised initially – It was established that the firm dissolved automatically upon the death of one partner in 1984, making the suit filed in 1996 barred by limitation – Decision based on the principle that courts must dismiss suits barred by limitation regardless of whether the defense was raised [Paras 1-24].

Limitation Act – Application of Section 3 – The Court reiterated that under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, courts are obligated to dismiss suits instituted after the prescribed period of limitation even if limitation is not pleaded as a defense – Affirmed that the dissolution of the firm in 1984 triggered the start of the limitation period for filing the suit for rendition of accounts, thus barring the suit filed in 1996 [Paras 15-20].

Decision – Allowance of Appeal – Held – The appeal is allowed, the judgment of the Division Bench allowing the appeal and setting aside the single judge's decision is reversed, reaffirming the firm’s dissolution in 1984 and barring the suit as time-barred – Appeals are dismissed with no order as to costs [Paras 21-24, 35-36].

Land Allotment – Cancellation of patta initiated after 13 years – Supreme Court's intervention – Appellants challenged the order of the High Court upholding the cancellation of patta on the grounds of fraud and irregular allotment – Supreme Court examined whether the proceedings for cancellation could be initiated at any time in absence of a prescribed limitation period under Section 122-C(6) of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (UPZALR Act) – Court held that power must be exercised within a reasonable period – Proceedings initiated after 13 years deemed unreasonable and without sufficient foundational facts of fraud – Appeal allowed and impugned orders set aside [Paras 1-19].

Fraud Allegations – Absence of clear evidence – Supreme Court scrutinized the allegations of fraud in land allotment process – Found no clear indication of fraudulent activity by the allottees – Irregularities based on presumed forged signatures deemed insufficient for proving fraud – Principle of reasonable time for exercising suo motu power applied – Orders of cancellation deemed unjust due to lack of concrete evidence of fraud [Paras 11-16].

Rights of Poor Villagers – Supreme Court emphasized the protection of rights of poor and rustic villagers – Allottees had constructed houses and lived there for several years based on legitimate allotment by Sub-District Magistrate – Quashing of cancellation orders to prevent injustice to poor and houseless persons – Established that unsettling long-standing residential allotments causes undue hardship [Paras 17-18].

Decision – Allowing of Appeal – Held – The appeal is allowed, and the impugned orders by the High Court, Additional Collector, and Additional Commissioner are set aside – The Supreme Court concluded that the initiation of cancellation proceedings after 13 years was unreasonable, and the allegations of fraud were unsubstantiated – The long-standing possession and residential use by the allottees justified the quashing of the cancellation orders [Paras 19].

Arbitration and Conciliation - Termination of Arbitral Proceedings - Section 32(2)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Arbitral Tribunal's Order Terminating Proceedings - Appeal Against High Court’s Decision Setting Aside Termination - Held: The power under Section 32(2)(c) can be exercised only if the continuation of the proceedings has become unnecessary or impossible - The tribunal must record its satisfaction that proceedings have become unnecessary or impossible based on material on record - Failure of the claimant to request the tribunal to fix a date for hearing, per se, is no ground to conclude that proceedings have become unnecessary - Abandonment of the claim must be established either expressly or by convincing circumstances leading to an inevitable inference of abandonment - In the absence of such circumstances, the tribunal’s decision to terminate proceedings was unjustified - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 21, 22]

Arbitration - Duties of Arbitral Tribunal - Tribunal’s Duty to Fix Meetings and Hearings - Even if the parties do not request, it is the duty of the tribunal to fix a meeting for hearing - Tribunal must adjudicate upon the dispute referred to it - If the parties remain absent without reasonable cause, the tribunal can take recourse to relevant provisions such as Section 25. [Para 21(b)]

Decision - Dismissal of Appeal - Appeal dismissed with no order as to costs - Parties to take necessary steps to appoint a substituted arbitrator following the withdrawal of the sole arbitrator from the proceedings. [Para 22]