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by Admin
14 December 2025 5:24 PM
The suit was hopelessly barred by limitation… parties who have knowingly slept over their right cannot be allowed to disturb court-confirmed titles after decades — Delivering a sharp rebuke to protracted and stale litigation, the Supreme Court of India set aside a remand order passed by the Madras High Court and restored the decree dismissing a second partition suit filed 17 years after the original decree. The Court categorically held that the law of limitation is not a mere procedural formality, but a substantive rule that bars resurrection of dead claims.
The Bench, comprising Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, emphasized that when sale and execution of property were publicly conducted and known to the parties, courts cannot permit reopening of the matter merely because an issue on limitation was not separately framed. “The High Court was not justified in remanding the matter... the Courts below have rightly held that the suit was barred by limitation and Respondents are not entitled for any relief,” the judgment declared.
The dispute began with O.S. No. 851 of 1965, where Samiappan’s wife and daughter were awarded maintenance, and execution proceedings led to the court-ordered sale of the ‘A’ schedule property in 1970. The property was purchased by a third party through public auction, later resold, and eventually acquired by the current appellants. The sale was confirmed and possession was handed over to the auction purchaser, who also received the patta (ownership record).
Seventeen years later, in 1982, the wife and daughters of Dasappa Gowdar, who were aware parties in earlier proceedings, filed O.S. No. 257 of 1982, seeking to set aside the 1965 decree, and claiming partition and injunction. The trial court, in 1994, dismissed the suit, holding it barred by limitation. The first appellate court confirmed the same in 1997.
However, in 2020, the Madras High Court, in a surprising move, remanded the matter to the trial court, directing a retrial on the question of limitation — despite no objection having been raised about the absence of such an issue in the earlier judgments.
The Court unequivocally held that the entire premise of the High Court’s remand was flawed and unnecessary. “In the present case, both the trial Court and the First Appellate Court, after detailed analysis… categorically held that the suit was hopelessly barred by limitation,” the Bench stated.
Rejecting the contention that an issue on limitation was required to be separately framed, the Court clarified, “The question of limitation can be encompassed within the larger question determined by the First Appellate Court for determination. The failure… to formulate a separate issue is not fatal.”
On the claim of ignorance by the plaintiffs, the Court made a significant finding: “Respondents were well aware of the earlier proceedings and the decree passed in the first suit. The auction purchaser’s title was confirmed by court orders, and subsequent transfers were properly registered and recorded.”
The Court invoked Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, emphasizing that courts have a statutory obligation to reject suits filed after the expiry of limitation — even if no objection is raised by the defendant. Citing V.M. Salgaocar & Bros. v. Port of Mormugao, it reiterated, “If a suit is ex facie barred by the law of limitation, a court has no choice but to dismiss the same even if the defendant intentionally has not raised the plea of limitation.”
Crucially, the Court observed that when parties have had the opportunity to lead evidence and contest the core issue during the original and appellate trials, raising technical objections regarding framing of issues becomes immaterial. “Procedural laws are handmaid of justice… what is to be seen is whether any irregularity arising from a failure to follow procedure has caused serious prejudice to the parties.”
The High Court’s failure to decide the substantial question of law originally framed under Section 100 CPC was also strongly criticized. The Supreme Court pointed out that the second appeal had already framed a legal issue regarding whether the whole of joint family property could be sold to satisfy a maintenance decree. Instead of answering this, the High Court sidestepped its obligation by remitting the matter. “Such remand, after this length of time, will certainly prolong the litigation without any useful purpose,” the Court held.
Restoring the decree of dismissal and setting aside the High Court’s remand, the Supreme Court has once again underscored the principle that limitation is not a technicality, but a substantive defence meant to provide legal finality.
In the words of the Court, “Parties who have knowingly slept over their right cannot later disturb court-confirmed titles after decades.”
This judgment is a compelling reaffirmation that procedural lapses cannot be used to revive long-dead litigation, particularly where rights of bona fide purchasers and sanctity of court sales are involved. It also lays down a crucial precedent on how second appellate jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC must be exercised with discipline — not as an invitation to prolong litigation endlessly.
Date of Decision: April 9, 2025